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THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF

ANCIENT GREECE.

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF

ANCIENT GREECE

INVESTIGATED,

IN ITS

ORIGIN AND PROGRESS,

TO THE

ÆRAS OF ITS GREATEST CELEBRITY,

IN THE

IONIAN, ITALIC, AND ATHENIAN SCHOOLS:

WITH REMARKS ON THE

DELINEATED SYSTEMS OF THEIR FOUNDERS;

AND

SOME ACCOUNTS OF THEIR LIVES AND CHARACTERS, AND THESE OF THEIR MOST EMINENT DISCIPLES.

By WALTER ANDERSON, D.D.

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PREFACE.

THE ſubject of the following ſheets has been treated, either in whole or in part, by the learned in almoſt every country of Europe. As curious in itſelf, and admitted to be a requiſite branch of literary education, it has employed the pens of ſeveral Engliſh authors of the laſt and preſent century; while none of them, excepting Mr Stanley, have wrote profeſſedly upon the ſubject, and ſo much at large, as ſome foreign authors have done. We have, indeed, ſeveral valuable tracts upon it, ſuch as the learned Cudworth has given, and other detached pieces, or compends, of the Philoſophy of the Ancient Grecian Schools. But, as theſe productions, whatever their merit be, are ſcattered in ſundry books, ſome of them more, and ſome leſs known to the Public, there appeared ſtill to be wanting a Work, containing an entire and connected view of the copious ſubject; without excluding from it, as Mr Stanley has done, the birth of the Grecian Philoſophy, in the ages of the earlieſt Poets.

Poets. From the neglect or ſuppreſſion of this part of the ſubject, the entrance to it, beſide being abrupt, is deficient in a curious and inſtructive point of information, reſpecting the firſt and early traces of Literature and Philoſophy, amongſt a people ſo diſtinguiſhed as the Greeks became, by their gradual progreſs, and ſignal advancement in both.

By this remark, the Author of the ſubſequent Publication would not be underſtood to derogate from the juſt reputation which Mr Stanley's work has obtained, at home and abroad. Criticiſm of it, by an Engliſh writer upon the ſame ſubject, muſt appear partial, or invidious. To his extenſive reſearches into ancient authors, and his proper ſelection of them, as vouchers, every ſuch writer muſt, in ſome meaſure, be obliged; and the Author of the preſent performance readily acknowledges inſtruction, in ſeveral points of difficulty, received from them: Yet, here, he muſt be allowed to obſerve in what reſpect his work varies much from that of Mr Stanley. In the ſcheme of it, place is given to remarks upon the reaſoning employed by the moſt eminent of the Grecian Philoſophers, in ſupport of their *phyſical*, *theological*, and *moral* ſyſtems. A fuller, and more connected diſplay of their theories and arguments, is alſo ſtudied. The frigidity of their bare details is, often, relieved by the interſperſed obſervations. Where the principles or tenets are of impious, or immoral tendency, they undergo more particular diſcuſſions. The propriety of ſubjoining ſuch confutations of their ſpecious, but futile arguments, has been attended to by moſt

moſt of the *foreign* compilers of the Grecian Philoſophy; but in Mr Stanley's performance, no caution of this kind is uſed. The omiſſion of it, when conſidered, appears an unſuitable, and faulty one; and what, in reſpect of the impreſſions which fallacious arguments may make on the minds of novices in philoſophical reaſoning, was not to be repeated, but corrected, in the preſent Publication.

But with what ability, extent of knowledge, and taſte in literary ſtudy, the following work is executed, the competent judges of that *erudition*, of which it preſents a *copy* at large, may, on a candid peruſal, decide. Yet, whatever that judgment be, the Author conſiders the acknowledgment of his aim, and endeavours, in the performance, to ſupport and illuſtrate the juſt principles of Theology and Morals, in oppoſition to their contraries, to be of ſuch peculiar importance, that any ſeparate approbation it may be allowed to have, cannot be deemed of equal value, in itſelf, or be alike reſpected by the Public.

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ERRATA.

Page 9. Line 17. *for* Elogy *read* Elegy
28. 10. *for* Themaſinus *read* Thomaſeus
41. 7. *for* Lampacus *read* Lampſocus
101. 15. *for* department *read* deportment
142. 15. *for* Æſchyles *read* Æſchylus
150. 31. *for* Phroutiſterion *read* Phrontiſterion
198. 21. and in ſeveral other places, *for* dialect *read* dialectic
254. 14. *for* illuſions *read* alluſions
282. in the note, l. 5. *for* his *read* the Deity's, and *for* his, l. 8. *read* the circuit of his
205. 14. in the Greek word, omit the firſt omicron
337. 31. the upſilon in the laſt Greek word to be changed into a ſigma
383. 28. *for* rutes *read* rules
384. 16. *for* mared *read* marked
440. 12. *for* began *read* begun
441. 1. *read* in a book
449. 5. disjoin common from ability
443. 6. in the Latin note, *for* voluntas *read* voluptas
516. 12. *for* diſciples *read* condiſciples
581. 26. *for* latter *read* later
582. 26. *for* preſume *read* preſumes
584. 33. *for* deteſtible *read* deteſtable
And, in ſome places, *for* laudible *read* laudable.

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF

ANCIENT GREECE.

PART I.

SECTION I.

PHILOSOPHY, in a general and looſe acceptation of the word, may be ſaid to be coeval with any conſiderable exertions of the faculties of reaſon and judgment among mankind. In this conception of it, the moſt ſuperficial obſervations upon natural objects, or the ſimpleſt reflections upon actions and events, may be regarded as the firſt buds of ſcience in the human mind. But if, by that term we underſtand ſuch a meaſure of rational ſtudy and inveſtigation, as may be productive of ſcientific knowledge, either in things natural, moral, or divine, the birth of philoſophy cannot be reckoned to coincide with the rude ages of the world, or the earlieſt periods of political ſociety. To mature human reaſon itſelf, a certain extent of experiences,

and a reiteration of them, are neceſſary; and this foundation of real knowledge cannot well be laid but by the ſettled intercourſe of men, and their holding converſations together, for confirming the truth of their experiences, and the enlargement of them. Philoſophy, therefore, taken in a proper ſenſe, may be concluded to have had its origin in the more ſocial and civilized conditions of mankind; and, in judging of the pretenſions of nations to acquaintance with the common arts of life, or any of the ſpeculative ſciences, in priority of time to others, it may be preſumed, in general, that the claim of thoſe amongſt them ought to be preferred, whoſe political eſtabliſhments had precedency, and whoſe governments were ſo fixed, as to afford room and encouragement to inventions and diſcoveries, either uſeful to the community, or entertaining to the minds of men, when they enjoyed from it protection and tranquillity.

In Lucian's fiction of the circuit made through the nations by Philoſophy perſonified *, her report is to the following purpoſe. 'I did not, 'immediately, addreſs myſelf to the Greeks, but paſſed them over, 'knowing how tractable they would be to my yoke. My firſt courſe 'was to the barbarous nations, and eſpecially to the Indians, the moſt 'numerous tribe of men upon earth. They deſcended from their ele-'phants to embrace me; and their brachmans and gymnoſophiſts ſtill 'live in the knowledge and practice of my diſcipline. I turned next to 'the Ethiopians, and from them to the Egyptians, whoſe prophets and 'prieſts became my eleves in theological knowledge, and the worſhip 'of the gods. I then viſited Babylon, and gave her Chaldaeans and 'Magi ſimilar inſtruction. My ſubſequent progreſs was through Scy-'thia into Thrace; from whence I ſent before me into Greece, Eumol-'pus and Orpheus, the one informed in all the rites of religion, and 'the other converſant in the powers of muſic. I quickly followed them 'in perſon; but the fancies of the Greeks were otherwiſe engaged; 'and although they did not repel, yet they admitted not altogether my 'embraces. But the conferences I held with them, in proceſs of time, 'produced thoſe eminent men called the Sages, ſo generally known and

'admired

* In Dialog. de Fugitivis.

'admired in the world.' Here it is, with reaſon, ſuggeſted, that philoſophy's firſt reſort was to the eaſtern region of the earth; which, as it is known to have been the earlieſt and greateſt nurſery of men, ſo it has been juſtly accounted and called the CRADLE of human wiſdom. The inferiority of the Greeks, alſo, in point of antiquity, to the other nations that are mentioned, and their long engagement in ſtudies in little or no correſpondence with philoſophy, were ſo known and confeſſed, that Lucian, with all his licence in fiction, preſumed not, even in his delivery of a fable, to diſſemble the truth.

Whatever energy we may aſcribe to natural genius, whatever influence to the benignity of climate, for the production of the ingenious arts, their riſe muſt be retarded in any nation, whoſe attention to them is diverted by occupations of more important concern. When Greece was embroiled in the manner deſcribed by Thucydides *, when neither families nor individuals could, with any ſafety, lay aſide their arms;

* The inſpection of that author's preliminary pages abundantly proves how far removed from a civilized ſtate thoſe vagrant tribes were, which firſt occupied the Peloponneſus and Ionia. Their ſettlements, ſays he, were, from neceſſity, removed at a diſtance from the ſea-coaſts; then conſtantly expoſed to piratical incurſions. Migrations from one diſtrict to another being frequent, and, in conſequence of them, mutual aſſaults often enſuing, every tribe was obliged to be prepared, and in warlike array for ſuch encounters. In this turbulent condition, the continental region, afterwards known by the name of Greece, and the iſlands of the Cyclades, remained until near Theſeus's time; when Minos, King of Crete, reduced the latter, and planted new colonies in ſeveral of them. Still, however, the people called Greeks were not to be diſtinguiſhed from other navigators of the ſea, called Barbarians, which both were equally known to the Cretans and Egyptians, to turn the commerce of the ſea, although then more opened, to piracy, and plundering upon ſtrangers, and likewiſe on one another. Theſe outrages were more or leſs continued, until the Argonautic expedition, and the ſubſequent war of Troy. From the ten years prolongation of it, from the deſtruction of many chiefs, and the late return of others to their countries, ſeditions aroſe, and mutual expulſions again took place in many cities. Eighty years elapſed before Greece emerged from ſuch domeſtic confuſions, and a more peaceful reſpite than ever ſhe had known, was attained by the Heraclidae, together with the Dorians, getting quiet poſſeſſion of the Peloponneſus, for ſome generations. Thucid. Hiſt. fol. edit. lib. 1.

when the only hero was he, whoſe bodily vigour, joined with dexterity in combat, enabled him to overcome brutal force, whether in the ſhape of the wild beaſt of the foreſt, or of the more ſavage man in his den; is it ſurpriſing that proper attention was not paid to the formation of the Greek alphabet, and that a great deficiency * in it was ſupplied by Cadmus's communication of his Phoenician letters? From their being firſt uſed by the Pelaſgians, they came to be denominated from that Grecian tribe; although it was known that Cadmus, who founded Thebes, had taught the orthography and qualified pronounciation of them. The ſlow progreſs of the Greeks in other arts may alſo be referred to the ſame cauſes. Their famous ſhip, the *Argo*, fitted out for Jaſon's expedition to Colchos, was not only the firſt they had built of that large dimenſion, but of the oblong and bent conſtruction, moſt proper for navigation; while the Phoenicians and Cretans, adjacent to the Grecian iſlands, had, for a conſidérable time before, whole fleets of ſuch veſſels, with which they kept the dominion of the ſeas.

If then, in the firſt view to be taken of the Grecian genius, it may appear to be feeble, and more addicted to the excurſions of the imagination, than to the ſtricter reſearches of the mind after knowledge, it is yet evident that this may be accounted for, in a great meaſure, from peculiar circumſtances. An allowance, indeed, may well be made for the accidental retardment of philoſophic improvement for ſome time in Greece, when it will be evinced that her genius, at length introduced into the paths of ſcience, became inventive, and ſignally progreſſive in them all; to ſuch a degree as renders it credible that if, being of later civilization than other nations, the Greeks were not originals in ſeveral diſcoveries, they would have been ſuch in other circumſtances, as well as they were improvers, in every branch of human knowledge.

In conſidering to what diviſions our propoſed ſubject may be reduced, in ſuch a manner as to mark the progreſs of the Grecian philoſophy, by certain aeras or noted periods, the following general ſketch of them may be admitted. The *firſt* is, that which may be called the fabulous or poetic age; in which the theology of the Greeks, conſtituting almoſt the whole of their philoſophy, was chiefly ſupported upon traditional fables,

* Diodorus Siculus, lib. 3. fol. edit. p. 201.; Pauſanius Beoticis, lib. 9. p. 560.

fables, and the fictions of the poets. The *ſecond*, that in which philoſophy came to be ſo far ſeparated from theology and religion, as to be known, and the ſtudy of it followed as a diſtinct profeſſion; and thoſe who applied themſelves to it were called *wiſe men*. The *third*, that in which ſchools of philoſophy took place*, and ſubſequent maſters in them trained up diſciples, but produced no ſects. The *fourth*, in which philoſophical ſtudies were cultivated in a greater extenſion of their ſubjects, and more method was obſerved in the treatment of them. The *fifth*, in which the proper diviſions of philoſophy being made, all its different branches were taught in the academies of Athens; which in their ſucceſſions were diſtinguiſhed, either by ſome general names, or ſuch particular ones, as were appropriated to thoſe called their *founders*; who, by the ſignal exhibition of their geniuſes, not only engaged numerous diſciples and admirers of their philoſophical ſyſtems, but ſuch adherents to them, as if in each of them had been included the utmoſt reach of human ingenuity and wiſdom; and hence were produced thoſe permanent ſects, whoſe principles and tenets, although at variance, were for ages celebrated and admired in the world.—We begin then with the firſt of theſe periods, but propoſe not to enlarge on it ſo fully as its reference to the ancient mythology may be thought to require; ſince it forms rather an introductory than a conſtituent part of our general ſubject. There is, however, to be found in it a meaſure of inſtruction and of literary intertainment, that merits attention, and a ſuitable diſplay.

That there were anciently in Greece, and in various other countries, men of ſome genius, under the name of poets or bards, who taught what may be called a *mythological philoſophy*, cannot be doubted. Their ſtudies being turned to ſubjects the moſt intereſting to mankind, the fruit of them was delivered under ingenious or agreeable fables, in meaſured ſentences, or verſe. The primitive language of almoſt all nations appears to have been, in their ſtudied or ſet diſcourſes, that, which, along with harmonious ſound, gave a dignified accent and cadence to the voice and expreſſions. Hence it obtained in the ſacred hymns, and ſupplications to the gods, and in all the announced ceremonies of religion †. Even

* There is here an exception to be made with reſpect to the Pythagorean ſect.

† Strabo, fol. edit. Zylandi, lib. 15.

Even after writing in profe was introduced among the Greeks by Cadmus, Pherecydes Syrus, and others, verfification ftill kept its place, for a long time, in all written laws, and was not departed from in important and premeditated orations. The poets, therefore, were the firft public orators; and their compofitions were looked upon as the effect of fome fupernatural infpiration; efpecially when they communicated certain theories refpecting the origin of the world, or the firft principles of all things, and that not in the dry didactic ftile of philofophers, but in one having fuch embellifhments of fancy and fable as were fuited to pleafe and captivate the imaginations of men, little converfant in ftudy, or mature reflection.

The *mythologies* being thus the vehicles of religious and moral inftruction, moft adapted to the conceptions of the people, and relifhed by them, the poets produced them in abundance. When the fertility of their own inventions failed, they had recourfe to thofe of others *. Befide what the Greeks themfelves compofed, fays Phurnutus, many of the mythologies were borrowed from the Magi of Perfia, the Egyptians, the Africans, and the Celtae. What may be called the philofophic principle or doctrine contained in thefe would be often liable to mifinterpretation; but the turning of it, along with the fable, in the fhape that beft correfponded to the tafte of the people to whom it was addreffed, would be fufficient to recommend it. The prefumption, therefore, is, that the theological or philofophic poets of the early ages, without much confidering the rationality or confiftency of their *theogonies*, (which were equivalent to accounts of the generation of the world), admitted them generally upon truft, and engroffed them into their poems, as common tradition at home reported them, or their converfation with foreigners might enable them to make additions that either embellifhed, or aggrandized their fubjects.

In the primary ftages of civil fociety, nations following one another at diftances, in the invention of the ufeful arts, or in improvements of their political governments, often had reciprocal obligations for counfel and

* In Opufculis Philofophicis, Phurnutus de Natura Deorum, Oct. Edit. p. 171.

and inſtruction upon theſe ſubjects. The practice was laudable, and followed more generally, perhaps, than is commonly ſuppoſed, or, in in the elapſe of time, could afterwards be traced. We are well aſſured *, that the Spartan laws were, by Lycurgus, copied from thoſe of Minos; and that Solon, in reforming the Athenian commonwealth, had recourſe to Crete and Egypt for more diſtinct information in policy. The cuſtom, indeed, of ſending embaſſies from one ſtate to another, upon occaſions of legiſlation, is ſo frequently mentioned in hiſtory, as to need no particular proof. But if, with reſpect to laws, ſuch communications obtained, we may well imagine, that in religion they would likewiſe prevail. Religion, yet more congenial to human minds than any tie of political government, and which places nations and individuals upon the ſame footing of dependency on a ſuperior power, would every where appear to be that affection in which mankind moſt ſympathized, and could, in different nations, include nothing in its injunctions, or ceremonies, but what was of amicable tendency to them all. Polytheiſm, indeed, naturally generated ſuperſtition, and ſuperſtition inhumane rites of religion; but, if hiſtory is to be credited, theſe hideous notions and practices made no part of its primitive appearances, but originated and grew up as polytheiſm grew and increaſed. Even under this diſguiſe, it was ſtill regarded as the diſtinguiſhing mark between ſavage and civilized nations †. When Ulyſſes is thrown upon an unknown iſland, and deſires to diſcover whether its inhabitants were humane or barbarous, he reſts his aſſurance, with reſpect to this point, upon their having or not having amongſt them ſigns of religion, and the worſhip of the gods. The monſter Polyphemus is only found to be the horrid blaſphemer of both.

We need not then inquire, whether, as Diodorus Siculus ‡ affirms, the Egyptian Seſoſtris, along with his conqueſts, ſpread colonies of the gods of his country over the eaſt, or what ſhare of them Danaus and Orpheus are ſaid to have imported into Greece. They were a common ſtock, in which all nations had a concern. It is preſumable, from the antiquity of their monarchy, that the Egyptians were, as Lucian ‖ reckons

* Plato, in Minoe. Hom. Odyſſ. lib. 19. † Odyſſ. lib. 9.
‡ Bibliothec. lib. 1. ‖ De dea Syria.

ons them, the firſt who made the worſhip and ſervice of the gods their particular ſtudy, and who, underſtanding ſacred names, taught to other nations the language to be uſed in the ſolemnities of religion. From the early uſe they made of ſymbols and hieroglyphic characters, for concealing from the vulgar, and reſerving to the prieſtly order, and to their kings, all their acquired knowledge either in theology, phyſics, or other ſciences, we may ſurely infer, that *mythologies* were much ſtudied, and abounded amongſt them. We know what a laboured and intricate piece of philoſophy and mythology blended together, Plutarch, judicious and critical * as he is, thought fit to write upon the ſubject of the two ungenerated and primary Egyptian deities, *Oſyris* and *Iſis*; names, in the Egyptian language, given to the ſun and moon; and which, according to the phyſiology of the learned prieſts, conjoining their eſſential qualities of heat and humidity, and producing the temperature of air and water, ſupported the univerſe. It was alſo part of their ſyſtem, that the deities called celeſtial, although ancient, and the objects of human worſhip, were yet no more than the productions of the *Nile*, or *Ocean*, which was the original name of that famous river. Theſe divinities, in the firſt ages, were reckoned to have aſſumed not only human forms, but thoſe of ſacred animals, and to have traverſed the world, and obſerved the actions of men. Here, then, we have a moſt probable original of what the Greeks called *theogonies*, exhibiting, according to the groſs imaginations of their poets, lineal generations of their fabulous gods, and having a reference, which was but obſcurely or curſorily ſignified by them, to the generation of the world. To this we have only to add, that no poet is ſo remarkable as Homer, who travelled into Egypt, for adopting into his poetic machinery, that fiction which correſponded to the Egyptian mythology, and repreſented the gods as rendering themſelves viſible to mortals, and holding frequent conferences with them †; and that Father Oceanus, and Mother Tethys, or Earth, being the generators of all things, is a verſe, with him, in favourite currency.

Upon mentioning this great poet, we cannot avoid remarking the unfavourable circumſtances in which the Grecian bards or mythologiſts were

* De Iſide et Oſiride. Diod. Sicul. ibid. p. 17. † Iliad, lib. 14.

were placed. With little help from ſuch traditional information as was to be met with in other more ancient nations, without having any reſort to public inſtitutions for literature, obliged often to divide their attention betwixt ſtudy, and the means of ſupporting themſelves, and expoſed to neglect in turbulent ages, the early Grecian poets were thrown entirely upon the natural vigour of their genius. Unleſs engaged in the ſervice of the oracles or temples, or appearing in the character of diviners and prophets, they were deſtitute of all other patronage, but what their gifts in ſong, and their muſe, could procure. Yet, under theſe diſadvantages, their productions were ſuch as made them to be taken for ſome ſupernatural inſpiration. When Amphion * ſtruck the lyre, the ſtones were ſaid to leap up to rebuild the walls of Thebes. Linus's † ſkill in harmonious verſe was ſo eminent, that he was reckoned to have vied with Apollo in his art, and to have owed his death to the reſentment of the god, for his being brought into compariſon with him. His fatal exit became the ſubject and original of a poem, compoſed in a ſingular ſtrain of the mournful elogy, and which was imitated in ſeveral foreign countries. Muſaeus's ‡ celebrity for his hymns to the gods, and his excelling in the ſpecies of poeſy called Eumolpean, obtained for him a monument on an eminence near Athens, where he often ſung his verſes ‖. Diogenes Laertius ſupporting, but in the weakeſt manner, his argument, that philoſophy originated, not with the nations he calls barbarous, but with the Greeks, alledges that ſome of the compoſitions of Muſaeus and Linus were of the philoſophic kind, or a ſort of poetical *coſmogony;* which is not probable. He pretends to prove this only by a citation of the firſt line of one of them, and a bare and unauthoriſed aſſertion with reſpect to both, that ſuch pieces were written by them. He then makes a rapid and ſtrange tranſition to the introductory verſe of the philoſopher Anaxagoras's poem on the origin of the world, as being an imitation of that which he had before quoted from Linus. Ac-

* Pauſanias Boeoticis, lib. 9. fol. edit. Hanov. p, 568.

† Ibid. p. 581. ‡ Ibid. Phocicis. lib. 10. p. 517.

‖ In Prooemio. There can indeed be nothing more abſurd or ridiculous than his ſaying, that Greece muſt have given birth to philoſophy, becauſe it abhorred the name of barbarous; which epithet the Greeks thought fit to beſtow upon all other nations.

cording to Pauſanias *, an inveſtigator of antiquities, no compoſition of Muſaeus, which could be reckoned authentic, was tranſmitted, except his hymn to Ceres; and as to Linus, the report he makes is nearly the ſame †; and although Diodorus Siculus aſcribes to him a poem in the Pelaſgian diction, the ſubject of it is ſaid to be the acts of the firſt Bacchus; and beſide it, he mentions no other but ſome pieces of a like fabulous kind.

Contemporary with theſe, and having yet ſuperior fame, appeared Orpheus, of Thracian birth, but ſaid to be Linus's diſciple, whoſe muſical talents, and the harmonious ſtrain of his verſes, are repreſented of ſuch potent efficacy, as to have drawn the woods and wild beaſts after him ‡; and at laſt, in the caſe of Eurydice, to have ſoothed the unrelenting powers of Pluto's domain. Yet, when we conſider the great authority he acquired not only in Thrace, but over a large part of Greece, we muſt ſuppoſe it to have been procured by ſomething more than the charms of his poetry. He muſt have availed himſelf of the character he had, and which Horace ‖ gives him of being a ſacred perſon, and an interpreter of the will of the gods; and hence his influence was exerted, not according to the common fable, in making beaſts ſtand agaſt around him, but inducing men, from the dread of inviſible powers, to quit their dreary haunts, and their blood-ſtained caves, to aſſociate together, and aſſume the features of humanity. For this operation, it ſeems the Thracian ſeer § had qualified himſelf by reſiding in Egypt, and carrying along with him, from that equal nurſery of ſcience and ſuperſtition, the names and worſhip of a number of fabulous divinities. Upon him, therefore ‡‡, ſome Grecian authors have thrown the reproach of many of the abſurd and unhallowed rites in their popular religion, and the extravagance, and the immoral tendency of their poetic mythologies. This duplicity of character imputed to him appears ſo unworthy of one who had ever written a line of what are called the *Orphic* verſes ††, that ſome

* Ibid. † Lib. 3. ‡ Philoſtrati Icon. fol. p. 842.

‖ Silveſtres homines, ſacer interpreſque deorum,
Caedibus et victu foedo deterruit *Orpheus*,
Dictus ob hoc, lenire tigres rabidoſque leones. *Ars Poetic.* v. 391.

§ Diodor. Sicul. lib. 4. p. 232. ‡‡ Diogen. Laert. Diodor.

†† Suidas in voce; Euſebii Praeparat. Evange.

ſome of the learned, ſuppoſing only a few of them to be genuine, have gone in ſearch of another Orpheus, to whom they might be aſcribed, in a much more antient age. But we enter not into a digreſſion, which, with the appearance of literary labour, would introduce a much controverted ſubject, productive of moſt obſcure conjectures. We ſhall, therefore, only ſubjoin what ſeems moſt remarkable in Pauſanias's account of Orpheus's poems *. After obſerving that he derived his greateſt reputation from his knowledge in religious initiations and expiatory rites for crimes, he adds, that thoſe who were converſant in the writings of the poets, acknowledged that Orpheus's hymns were not many in number, and that they were diſtinguiſhed by a ſtudied brevity of the verſes, but that, for elegant expreſſion, they might be placed next to Homer; who, by a ſort of deſtiny, was ever held in the higheſt eſtimation.

At length the aera of the father of the Epic muſe came, to adorn that ſpecies of poetry with all the invention, and with all the embelliſhments of which it was ſuſceptible, and to include in it a juſt copy of human characters, and a diſplay of the popular theology of the Greeks, and of the fables grafted upon it. About the ſame time, Heſiod appeared, to reduce into a more connected view the origin, and genealogies of their deities. It is to be obſerved, that theſe two poets varied from each other in aſſigning the firſt principles of things, out of which all others were generated. The one, as has been ſaid, without particularly unfolding his idea, aſcribes to *Oceanus*, or the watery element, and to *Tethys*, or the earth, the *parentage* of all things. The other, as if he had conſidered his ſubject more attentively, and meant to treat it more philoſophically, not only adduces † ſeveral firſt principles, as Chaos, Tartarus, Erebus, and Love, but infers ſome effect produced by their mutual intercourſe and action upon one another. His meaning, indeed, is not very plain from his *Theogonia*, as we now have it; but Ariſtotle and other philoſophers generally quote Heſiod, and not Homer, as the primary or moſt ancient Grecian author of a ſort of theory of the conſtitution of the world from ſeveral diſcordant principles. But if, in this re-

 ſpect,

* Graeciae deſcript. lib 9. p. 586.

† In Theogon.

ſpect, any diſregard was ſhown to Homer as a phyſiologiſt, ſome of his admirers, not ſatisfied with animadverting upon the propriety of it, endeavoured to render him a more than ſufficient compenſation *. In the tranſport of their zeal, or in the extravagance of their imagination, this father of verſe, who never affects to be myſtical or obſcure in delivering whatever he had learned or knew, is transformed into an allegorical poet; who, under the veil of many traditionary fables about the gods celeſtial and terreſtial, concealed phyſical explications of the phenomena of nature, and the effects of the concords and diſcords, to which the elements are liable. In this light, according to Heraclides Ponticus, and other commentators on Homer, various paſſages in the Iliad and Odyſſey, are to be viewed; while the ſtretches of fancy made to ſwell the number of them, are ſufficient to prove the abſurdity of their hypotheſis.

That Homer was converſant in all the learning of his country, and poſſeſſed, in conſequence of his travels abroad, more than what its domeſtic ſtock in that age afforded, can hardly be called in queſtion †. In the ſculpture of Achilles's ſhield alone, he has included what may be reckoned the circle of the ſciences and arts, which were then known in Greece.—The elements are divided into earth, air, water, and fire; and the celeſtial ſigns of the Pleiades, Hyades, the artic Bear, called alſo the *Wain*, which never ſets in the ocean, but looks towards Orion, are introduced. Deſcriptions follow of the policies of cities in war and in peace, and eſpecially of public feſtivities, and rural ſcenes of agriculture and harveſt, with their attendant pleaſures. But to ſuppoſe, with the allegorical interpreters of the poet, that we may diſcover his phyſical knowledge in the mythology of Juno, connected with her conſort Jupiter, and her other two brothers, Neptune and Pluto, in their ſeparate dominions, and from thence trace the elementary ſympathies and antipathies as underſtood by him, muſt be owned to be a reading of his text merely imaginary, and aſcribing to him alluſions to ſcience, which, as it is not credible he ever thought of, ſo the explications of his ſuppoſed myſtical meanings muſt ever be liable to doubt and perplexity. The allegories

* In Opuſculis Mytholog. oct. edit. in Homeri Vita.

† Iliad, lib. 18. ad fin.

allegories to be found in him are ſuch as poetry, from its original, had invented, and to which Homer's creative imagination gave a larger extent; and being chiefly perſonifications of inanimate nature, or of the human paſſions, or of ſome of the moſt ſtriking accidents to human life, they cannot be miſtaken, and are generally called by their common names. But if there be any allegorical alluſions to phyſical ſubjects, or the phenomena of the natural world, they muſt be allowed to be thoſe of the ſimpleſt and plaineſt kind. The ſcience of phyſics was then among the Greeks, and for ſeveral ages after, in too much obſcurity to be thrown into allegory, and treated in the myſtical ſtyle; unleſs we ſuppoſe that the little of it that was known, and which every intelligent perſon was acquainted with, might render it eaſy to Homer, and other poets, to deliver, in a poetic dreſs, the inconſiderable pittances underſtood of it.

But, if Homer cannot be granted to have philoſophiſed in this myſtical manner, his pretenſions to a name in another kind of philoſophy, the value of which ſignaliſes him more than that impoſed on him by fantaſtic commentators, may well be admitted. The wonderful capacity and penetration of his mind enabled him either to form to himſelf, or to embrace the moſt diſtinct and juſt ideas of human actions and characters, with a deſcrimination of them as deſerving, in ſeveral eſtimates, different proportions of praiſe or of blame, and to mark them in his works with the accuracy of a philoſopher, and the livelineſs of a poet, in an extent that has rendered him a great original in ſuch intereſting delineations. His celebrity upon this ground produced the ridiculous contention that Seneca * obſerves had taken place among the ſects of the philoſophers, all of whom occaſionally quoting him as an indiſputable authority, and ſome of them holding him forth as the particular patron of their tenets, it came to be a critical queſtion, whether, upon the whole, he might be moſt accounted a Platoniſt, or a Peripatetic, an Epicurean, or a Stoical philoſopher; while, as that author remarks, the juſteſt concluſion appeared to be, that, as he could not ſurely be appropriated by all of them, neither by ſome of them more than by others, he truly might be pronounced to belong properly to none of them.

But,

* Epiſt. 88.

But, notwithſtanding this honour paid to Homer by the generality of the philoſophers, when they only conſidered the extent of his genius, and the many juſt rules and obſervations relative to moral, civil, or political conduct, to be collected from him, the more critical and ſpeculative amongſt them accounted him unworthy of the name of a philoſopher, and to be condemned as a moraliſt, on account of his groſs and ignominious fictions about the characters and actions of the gods. This indeed could bear no apology, but the inſufficient one, that he advanced no opinions of his own, and only, by the licence allowed to poets, copied the traditions and fables invented before his time, and which had obtained a general credit. Upon this head, it may be truly ſaid, that he not only retailed, but did more to ſupport and embelliſh that corrupt theology, than any ordinary poet could have done. The portraits he has drawn of the fabulous divinities, with the diſtinctive epithets, and colouring of their different perſonages, would be no leſs ſtriking to the imaginations of men, when impreſſed only with ſenſible ideas, than were afterwards ſome of their capital ſtatues and figures, with the characteriſtical enſigns of the thunderbolt, the aegis, the trident, the torches, the ſerpents, and thyrſeſes, or wreathed ſpears, wrought by the ſkillful hands of Phidias or Praxiteles, who were reckoned to have borrowed their ideas from the pictureſque poet. We might therefore, with reaſon, conclude, that the poetical, or Homeric, theology ought to be thrown aſide, as containing nothing but what is oppoſite to every rational conception of deity, and even to any common notion of beings, of a moral nature, ſuperior to men. Yet we have to obſerve, what will afterwards be found exemplified in ſome of the more approved ſyſtems of philoſophy, that, where a falſe and pernicious principle was entertained, which, if admitted in its proper conſequences, would have overthrown every dictate of reaſon, and every moral ſentiment, a qualification of it, in ſome ſhape or other, was interpoſed; and although, by this means, the ſyſtem was marked with a glaring contradiction, it was ſtill imagined to have conſiſtency. It is no wonder, then, that the poets, who pretended not to connection in their doctrines, made no ſcruple of blending together, as they pleaſed, thoſe which were moſt oppoſite: And we may rather

rather admire the pains Homer has taken to patch up his motely ſyſtem of theology, and to palliate, if poſſible, its moſt palpable depravities.

This attention of the poet is moſt apparent in the qualifying touches he has given to the character of his ſupreme god. Jupiter, with all his profligacy, has certain attributes of decency ſuitable to a celeſtial power aſſigned him. He is not only the ruler of the ſkies, the cloud compelling Jove, and the thunderer *, but is called the father of the gods and of men. Although his acts often prove the contrary †, he declares the impartiality of his procedure, and that he is the powerful controller of the ſtrifes of the other divinities. He brings forth his golden ſcales to weigh, in their equal balance, the different deſtinies ordained for the Greeks and Trojans ‡. He declares Mars to be, of all the other celeſtials, the one moſt hateful to him, on account of his rage for war. He is repreſented ‖ as puniſhing, in a ſignal manner, the treacherous violators of public faith, and as being the guardian of the duties of hoſpitality, and the protector of ſupplicants at the altars, and ſtrangers. The poet alſo teaches §, in ſeveral paſſages, that, although neither gods nor men could avert the decrees of fate, yet human vices and follies were to be regarded as the immediate and juſt cauſes of the many evils and ſufferings of mankind; and that good and virtuous men were dear to the gods, who often inſpired them with wiſe and ſalutary counſels. In this manner was Homer, when he adminiſtered the poiſon of the popular theology of his country, attentive to mingle with it in his works all the lenient correctives it could receive, and without which, indeed, he could not have engroſſed it into ſuch poems as the Iliad and Odyſſey. That the natural light of his mind was ſuperior to the belief of its groſſeſt abſurdities, there can hardly be a doubt entertained; and from what is further to be added about his notions of the immortality of human ſouls, we may preſume that he was aſſiſted in it, and in ſome other topics connected with theology, by what he learned in foreign countries.

That the human ſoul ſurvived the body, and, like a parting viſion in ſleep, or an airy vapour, fled from it, at death, to the realms of Pluto, or,

* Odyſſ. lib. 1. † Iliad, lib. 8. ‡ Ibid. lib. 5.
‖ Odyſſ. lib. 9.—14. § Ibid. lib. 1. ad initium.

or, by the favour of the gods *, to the fields of Elyſium, is well known to have been the doctrine of the moſt ancient Grecian poets. But whether this implied an opinion of the ſoul's natural immortality, is a queſtion of much uncertainty. In ſome reſpects, to the departing ſoul † they aſcribe a meaſure of intelligence ſuperior to what it ever had before; and, in others, they repreſent it, even in its ſeparate ſtate, as having an imbecillity and weakneſs below that of its condition in the body. Patroclus dying, predicts the fall of Hector by the ſpear of Achilles; and the Trojan chief, proſtrate on the ground ‡, diſcovers yet more preſcience, by foretelling the death of that invincible hero by the weak hand of Paris. In the ſhades below, the *idola*, or ſpectres, although not tangible, or capable of an embrace, are yet afraid of being wounded § by Ulyſſes's ſword; and they have no recollection of what paſſed in the world, until they taſte the blood of the victims. 'Strange it is ‖,' exclaims Achilles, after ſeeing Patroclus's ghoſt in a dream, 'there muſt 'be in the regions below ſome ſuch ſpectre, or image of the deceaſed 'man, as I have now beheld; though it be only an airy form. Pa-'troclus in tears, but in his wonted ſhape, ſtood by me, and complain-'ed of what he had ſuffered.' How long Siſyphus might roll his ſtill recoiling ſtone, or Tantalus catch at, but not imbibe the fugitive waters, we are left to conjecture. In the Elyſian fields, where departed ſouls ** are ſaid to lead the happieſt lives, where no chilling ſnow, or winter's watery cloud is known, but ſoft and recreating zephirs are wafted from the ſmooth movement of the ocean; even there the ſouls are repreſented as not in a perfect ſtate of contentment. They follow ſtill, as they can, their wonted purſuits, however vain and fantaſtic; or they wander about dejected, and ſad, for their abrupt, or premature removal from the ſcenes of them in the world. 'In theſe fields,' ſays Ulyſſes, 'I alſo beheld 'the divine Hercules, that is to ſay, his *image* ††; for he himſelf is pre-'ſent with the immortal gods, a partaker of their celeſtial pleaſures.' Many, and various, are the comments of the learned upon the import of theſe

* Odyſſ. lib. 11. Iliad, lib. 22. p. 311.
† Iliad, lib. 17. Spondan. edit.
‡ Ibid. lib. 22. p. 389.
§ Odyſſ. lib. 11. p. 154.
‖ Ibid. lib. 23. p. 397.
** Ibid. lib. 4.
†† Ibid. lib. 11. p. 167.

theſe expreſſions; and the moſt approved explication is, to underſtand them in a ſenſe adopted afterwards in the Pythagorean philoſophy. In this conception of them, the poet is ſuppoſed to hold forth, in the example of Hercules, three conſtituent parts of the human frame; one the corporeal, and mortal part; another more ſubtile, and ſenſitive, having the exact image of the body, but not ſuſceptible of diſſolution with it; and the third, the pure ſpiritual and immortal ſubſtance of the ſoul itſelf, congenial to that of the celeſtial beings.

But, however plauſible this interpretation may appear, it is liable to ſeveral objections. It applies to human ſouls * in general, or at leaſt to thoſe of heroes, what is only ſaid of Hercules in particular; who, according to the poetic ſtory, owed his *apotheoſis*, or admiſſion to the celeſtial abodes, to his ſingularly virtuous labours on earth, which were judged by the gods to merit this recompenſe. It is unſupported by any other inſtance, or alluſion in Homer, of his having ſuch a conception of the human conſtitution; which appears to be reſolved by him only into two parts, the groſs body, and its ſimilitude, or airy form. Laſtly, it holds forth an idea of pure ſpirit, or ſoul of an incorporeal nature; which is more than can be inferred to be Homer's account of the ſubſtance of his immortal gods themſelves.

To deliver, in a queſtion of this kind, an opinion, unattended with ſome heſitation about the certainty of it, would be abſurd preſumption. But, without entering into a detail of arguments, it appears, upon conſidering the whole mythological doctrine of Homer about the gods, and human ſouls, that it conveyed no other conception of an immaterial ſubſtance, but that of a more ſubtle, active, and indiſſoluble body; and that the idea of ſuch a diſtinct nature, either in divine beings, or in men, was not entertained until a more accurate philoſophy was, in a ſubſequent age, imported into Greece; and that, as the opinion of the immateriality of celeſtial beings was connected with that of *one* eternal and inviſible mind in the univerſe, ſo the notion of the natural immortality of human ſouls was generally ſupported upon the perſuaſion of their pre-exiſtence to the bodily ſtate, and their appointment to cer-

* Vid. Spondani. Comment. in Odyſſ. lib. 11.

tain viciſſitudes in it. The tenet of their immortality upon this ground *, Herodotus affirms to have been firſt taught by the Egyptians, and from them communicated to the Greeks, although ſome of his countrymen aſſumed it as their own invention. It was, as he underſtood it, to this purpoſe; that the human ſoul, for the ſake either of puniſhment or purgation, from corporeal attachments, was ordained to roll through all the variety of animal bodies, whether thoſe of the earth, or of the water, or of the air; and having completed its courſe of ſuch viciſſitudes, in the ſpace of three thouſand years, it then returned to animate a human bodily form. But this doctrine, or what was ſimilar to it, was by no means peculiar to the Egyptians. It obtained among the Celtae of Gaul, whoſe Druids † taught that the human ſoul did not periſh, but paſſed from one body to another, and held alſo this general principle, that all things which were in exiſtence, although changeable in their corporeal forms, retained ſtill their diſtinct natures or eſſences. The immortality was the boaſted principle of the Scythian Getae ‡, who got their particular denomination from it; and, together with that of the tranſmigration, was generally ſpread amongſt the eaſtern nations, as the common doctrine of their philoſophers.

From the ſurvey now taken of the philoſophy of the Greeks in the poetic age, we may underſtand to what it amounted. One principle in it was that of a coſmogony, or a generation of the world in time, either from Chaos, or Night, according to Heſiod, or from Water and Earth, as Homer ſtates it. The conception, *that the world had a beginning of its exiſtence*, as it is the moſt juſt, and beſt ſupported in reaſon, when taken along with that of an *all ſufficient cauſe*, may alſo be allowed to be the one moſt natural to the human mind; and hence it was the moſt ancient opinion,

* In Euterpe, lib. 2. Plin. Hiſtor. Natur. lib. 16.

† Caeſar, Comment. lib. 6. Strabo, lib. 15.

‡ Lucan delivers the doctrine of the Celtic bards in the following lines:

———Vobis auctoribus umbrae
Non tacitas Erebi ſedes, Ditiſque profundi,
Pallida regna petunt; regit idem ſpiritus artus
Orbe alio; longae canitis ſi cognita vitae.

PHARSALIA, lib. 1.

opinion, and that which generally prevailed amongſt the philoſophic claſs of mankind, in oppoſition to an inconceivable *eternity of generation.* Beſide the conſideration of their own production, almoſt every object in nature would lead men to the idea of an original and a beginning in all things. The vegetable as well as the animal ſpecies of beings preſenting it inceſſantly to view, would give it, as it were, the firſt place in the human conceptions. But nothing, ſurely, could be more irrational and abſurd than the uſe that was made of this principle, of the world being generated, and not eternal, by the Greeks poets, in imitation indeed of the authors from whence it was borrowed by them. They founded upon it what has been called their Theological Philoſophy, marked with this ſtrangeſt of all paradoxes, and which may appear to ſurpaſs the moſt vulgar credulity, that gods, or divine beings, originated either from ſome primary ſtate of things, called by an unintelligible name, that could ſtand for nothing, or from parts of matter, to which that which ſignified any thing animated, ſenſitive, or rational, not to ſay human or divine, could never be applied.

SECT. II.

Of the Appearance, and Characters of the Seven Sages of Greece.—Of the Riſe of the Ionic School of Philoſophy; and the Phyſical Tenets held by the Succeſſors in it.

ANTIENTLY, the profeſſion, as well as the name of a philoſopher, was for a long time unknown in Greece *. Even the man who was called *wiſe* was underſtood to be one rendered ſuch by his age and experience, or a more extenſive intercourſe with mankind. He who, like Neſtor, could remember, and recite what he had ſeen and obſerved of the actions and characters of men, for two or three generations, and make proper reflections upon them, was the ſage of his times. Wiſdom was conceived to imply nothing more than the prudent counſels of action in life. The ſtudy of things in the natural world, or of any ſcience that required much ſpeculation, was incompetent to a people conſtantly agitated by inteſtine factions, or engaged in foreign enterpriſes. Intelligence of this kind was accounted the privilege only of the diviner, the prieſt, or the prophet: Yet none of theſe kindred characters of men can be ſuppoſed to have been, in reſpect of acquired knowledge, equal to what they were in Egypt, and other countries, where they were put under a regular eſtabliſhment, that afforded the means and opportunity of cultivating the uſeful arts, and more abſtract ſciences. In none of the Grecian ſtates were the prieſts a tribe of men by themſelves, to whom a certain rank, and ſpecial emoluments, belonged. Their perſons were held ſacred; but their other privileges were confined to the limits of their particular ſanctuaries; and their benefits were free gifts, and only caſual. Hence they formed no ſchools of ſcience; and ſo far from

* Themiſt. Orat. 26. fol. edit. p. 39.

from being connected, or holding a mutual communication, the oracles and ſhrines of the deities which they attended were often in emulation, and rivals of one another.

Beſide their *bards*, therefore, the ancient Greeks had no inſtructors in any branch of knowledge; and all the ſtudy of theſe poets was to render their ſongs agreeable, and to adapt the ſubjects and embelliſhments of them to the taſte of their countrymen. By the retail of the fictions about the Gods, they may be ſaid to have turned Greece, in moſt of its diſtricts, into *romantic* ground; when every conſiderable city, every remarkable mountain, every fertile plain, every ſhady grove, or chryſtal ſtream, was celebrated in ſong as the haunt of one or more of their numberleſs divinities. The imaginations of the Greeks were captivated with theſe poetic tales; to which were added, in the taſte of thoſe above the vulgar, the intereſting productions of the epic poet. Fables, or wonderful narratives, epiſodes of various kinds, heroic actions and characters, and marvellous or ſurpriſing incidents, entering into their contexture, they were calculated to move all the ſprings of the human paſſions. After the publication of Homer's two great exemplars in this ſpecies of poetry, in which the Greeks were flattered with the exhibition, not only of their firſt heroes, but even of the grandchildren of theſe heroes, pitched together with the contending deities, in a famous field of martial ſtrife; all their delight and admiration, and all their applauſe, were made to run with a rapid current to the ſide of epic fable and compoſition. Poetry in this acceptable ſtrain, or in what was ſimilar to it, was only attended to, and became the general entertainment. For a courſe of near three centuries, no rational ſpeculation ſeems to have been entered upon, nor any inquiry made, with reſpect to the origin of the world, or a firſt principle of things, beyond what Homer and Heſiod had thrown out in their poems, until Thales and Pythagoras appeared; or, if there were any ſuch productions, they were allowed, like the genuine poems of Orpheus, to ſink into obſcurity and oblivion.

In the neglect and diſregard of all ſtudy and literary improvement, but that of the poetic kind, the ſhrines of the gods maintained the higheſt reputation, and their oracles were conſulted not only about ſuch events as human wiſdom could not foreſee, but with reſpect to thoſe which

which required no extraordinary ſhare of natural ſagacity or penetration to comprehend. From the ſuperſtitious and abſurd belief, that every conſiderable reſolution or ſtep to be taken in life, ought to proceed upon ſome oracular authority, the exerciſe of common reaſon appeared to be altogether ſuſpended among the vulgar, and diſcouraged among the more intelligent. To unlooſe this fetter upon the human mind, beſide the requiſite of ſuperior judgment, it was neceſſary that thoſe who firſt attempted it, ſhould have obtained, in a way not liable to miſconſtruction, a meaſure of public credit and eſteem, for the rectitude and probity of their counſels and advice. It was in this manner that philoſophy, wearing her ſimpleſt garb, and venturing upon embarraſſed ground with a timid ſtep, may be ſaid to have made her appearance in the character of thoſe men called the ſages of Greece. Although far from pretending to bring their wiſdom in competition with that of the interpreters of the will of the gods, as the prophets and prieſts ſtiled themſelves, yet the reputation they had acquired for ingenious ſentiments on many ſubjects, for knowledge in matters of civil policy, and for prudent and virtuous conduct in private life, cauſed men to look upon the exertions of the human faculties with a more reſpectful eye, and to conſider them as ſources of wiſdom more tractable, perſpicuous, and evident, than were generally the ambiguous and dark reſponſes given by the oracles.

The wiſe men were commonly reckoned ſeven in number; yet ſome authors abridge *, and others enlarge the catalogue of them; they alſo diſagree about the perſonages moſt worthy to be included in it. Plato expunges the name of Periander †, the intelligent, but infamous tyrant of Corinth, inſerted amongſt the ſeven, and ſubſtituting in its place that of Myſon of Chene, reckons them up in the following order: Thales, Pittacus, Bias, Solon, Cleobulus, Myſon, and Chilo. The three firſt, and the fifth, were natives of Mitylene, Priene, and Lindus ‡, Grecian cities in Aſia Minor. The fourth and two laſt were of Athens and Sparta. To this liſt ſeveral authors were inclined to add as contemporaries,

* Diogen. Laert. 4to edit. p. 60.

† In Protagora, vel Sophiſta.

‡ Pauſanias Phocicis, lib. 10. p. 655.

raries, and not unequal in celebrity, Epimenides, the Cretan poet, Pherecydes Syrus, Pythagoras's firſt inſtructor, Piſiſtratus, the famous invader of the Athenian liberties, and, laſtly, Anacharſis, the Scythian philoſopher. With regard to theſe, omitting Piſiſtratus, a few remarks are only neceſſary. Epimenides may be rather ranked among the poets, who affected to be thought a favourite of the gods than a diſciple of philoſophy *; notwithſtanding he is ſaid to have written a genealogy of the gods, joined with that of the Curetes and Corybantes, who nurſed Jupiter, to the extent of five thouſand verſes. His ſuppoſed prediction about the miſchief † that would ariſe to the Athenians from their *munychia*, or fortified harbour, which was not fulfilled in leſs time than that of ſixty-four Olympiads, was ſufficient to make the character of a prophet he pretended to, be recollected; although there was nothing very wonderful in what he foretold. It was more to the credit of his judgment, if, as it is ſaid, he aſſiſted Solon in the framing of his laws.

Of all the Greeks of his time Pherecydes, of the iſle of Syrus, next to Thales, was accounted the moſt learned. Upon the authority of Theopompus, he is ſaid to have been the firſt of them ‡, who wrote, as we may underſtand it, in proſe, and philoſophically, upon nature, and the gods; and a ſmall work of his, upon the origin of all things, was extant in Diogenes Laertius's time, who gives the introductory ſentence of it, "Jupiter, and time, and earth, always were." He is quoted by Ariſtotle, as delivering this juſt ſentiment, that the *principle which generated all other things was the beſt in the world*: But of his coſmogony, and of his manner of reaſoning upon it, no particular account remains §. The doctrine which gave him moſt celebrity, and of which he is allowed to have been the firſt author in Greece, was, *that human ſouls were immortal*, or had, from their nature and ſubſtance, a perpetuity of exiſtence; for, unleſs his tenet be taken in this ſenſe, it could not be accounted new, or unknown among the Greeks. That Pythagoras, his diſciple,

* Diog. Laert. in Vita.

† Diogen. Laert. ibid. Plutarch in Solone.

‡ Diogen. in Vita. Sextus Empericus, lib. 8. p. 367.

§ Cicero. Tuſculan. Quaeſt. lib. 1. p. 121.

diſciple, traverſed Egypt and Aſſyria, without finding this principle aſſerted, and that he owed his knowledge of it ſolely to his Grecian maſter, appears to be a looſe and unauthoriſed affirmation, and inſiſted upon * by thoſe, who, with St Auguſtine, would repreſent the moſt intelligent part of the heathen world ignorant of what a ſage of Greece knew, at a time when philoſophy only began to be ſtudied in that country, and the moſt rational gave but the firſt ſpecimens of their genius for it.

Anacharſis, whoſe mother was a Grecian, compoſed ſeveral poetical pieces in the Greek language and others in that of his country. The ſubjects of them are ſaid to have been, the Scythian cuſtoms, the Grecian manners, and treatiſes of war. His father's family was of the † regal dignity in Scythia; and by his appearance in Athens, and his introduction to Solon, he created admiration of his perſon, of his pointed yet bold elocution, and of his acquired knowledge. The natural vigour of his mind, and the quickneſs of his imagination, were evinced by the juſt obſervations he made on the novelties he beheld, and by his ſpirited replies to queſtions put to him in converſation. To a vain youth of Athens, who, conſidering him as a barbarian, accoſted him in an inſulting manner, he ſaid, "Why this ſtaring and contemptuous look? "do you not underſtand, that what I may appear to you in your coun- "try, you would undoubtedly be thought in mine."

Thales, the Mileſian, is juſtly placed at the head of the ſeven wiſe men; for, if Solon be excepted, none of them were his equal, either in extenſive fame, or in the variety of his natural and acquired endowments. A private and ſtudious life was preferred by him, while the rank of his family entitled him to be advanced to the moſt honourable offices of a public kind. He appeared to conſider himſelf as born to ſtudy nature; and, inſtead of being no more than the citizen of a particular ‡ commonwealth, that he had a ſuperior connection with the world at large, and eſpecially with thoſe regions of it, where ſcience was cultivated,

* Vid. Hiſtoire Critique de la Philoſophie, par Deſlandes, 8vo. edit. tom. prem. p. 351.

† Diogen. in Vita. Plutarch ibid.

‡ Diogen. Laertius in Vita.

cultivated, or philoſophic ingenuity held in eſteem. Doubtful it may be reckoned, whether, in the infancy of phyſical, geometrical, and aſtronomical ſtudy in Aſiatic Greece, he had, or could find, in any corner of it, a preceptor, or one qualified to inſtruct him in the elements of theſe ſciences. Several geometrical theorems of his invention are mentioned by ancient authors, which are, indeed, of the ſimpler kind, and no more than what are comprehended in ſome of the plaineſt propoſitions in Euclid. Yet, on account of their being the firſt openings of the mathematical ſcience, a curioſity has prevailed, and pains have been taken, both in ancient and modern times, to diſtinguiſh and aſcertain them, although it has not been done in a ſatisfactory manner. The ancient authors who recite theſe and other diſcoveries of the Mileſian philoſopher, vary from one another, and are deficient in the correctneſs and preciſion requiſite to their being fully underſtood *; a diſadvantage to which the records of ſcientific inventions are particularly liable. Thus we are informed by various authors, that Thales predicted the famous ſolar eclipſe that enſued in the fourth year of the 48th Olympiad, and prevented the aſtoniſhed armies of the Medes and Lydians from engaging in battle. But we are only told in general by Plutarch, that he made this diſcovery by obſerving the poſitions of the ſun and moon, with reſpect to each other, and to the earth, without any further explication of the theory held by him about the motions of theſe heavenly bodies, by which he might be enabled to form, not a groſs conjecture only, but a certain calculation. His improvement of the Grecian Calendar, by dividing the year into 365 days, was certainly an evidence of his accuracy in a computation connected with knowledge in aſtronomy; yet in this † he is ſaid to have adopted the Egyptian reckoning, as preferable to that which obtained in Greece. To make up an exact circuit of time, the Greeks intercalated a month every third year, computing each year to conſiſt of 360 days; a method leſs preciſe than that of an addition to their annual number. He is alſo ſaid to have obſerved,

* Cicero de Divinatione, lib. 4. p. 274. Plinii Hiſtor. Natural. lib. 2. Herodot. lib. 1.

† Herodotus, ibid.

with exactneſs, the tropical points of the ſun's retrograde motions in the heavens, and to have compoſed treatiſes upon them and the equinoxes.

Thales, to complete his knowledge in geometry and aſtronomy, undertook a voyage to Egypt; where, beſide the ſtructures of the temples, thoſe wonderful ones of the pyramids, and of the artificial canals and ſluices, were monuments of the progreſs made in the mathematical ſciences. He is ſaid to have given occaſion to the prieſts of Memphis to admire his ingenuity, by his method of meaſuring the heights of the pyramids from their ſhadows. He took, according to Jamblichus *, the projection of the ſhadows at mid-day, and compared them with thoſe of other known and meaſured elevations. This account is exceptionable, if not an erroneous one. It is doubtful whether, in the latitude of Egypt, where the ſun, in his fartheſt receſs, falls but a few degrees ſhort of being vertical at noon, there is a projection of the ſhadows in ſuch a proportion as to afford a meaſurement adequate to a juſt ſolution of the problem; more eſpecially as, from the declining form of the pyramids, the ſhadows muſt be much abſorbed in their groſs and wide extended baſes. Plutarch gives † a more mathematical repreſentation of Thales's procedure, which is reſolvable into the fourth propoſition of the ſixth book of Euclid. In Egypt, the Grecian ſage found ſuch entertainment to his inquiſitive mind, that he prolonged his ſtay for ſeveral years, and returned not to Miletus until far advanced in age. With the merited name of the chief of the ſeven wiſe men, and being the firſt of the Greeks who inquired into natural cauſes, he founded the Ionic ſchool of philoſophy at Miletus, which, not long after his time, was removed to Athens. About the commencement of this aera of ſcience, the ſchool called the Italic likewiſe took its riſe from Pythagoras, born in the 47th Olympiad, when Thales was in the height of his fame. Jambichus aſſerts, what may be queſtioned from chronology, that Pythagoras viſited the Mileſian philoſopher, and converſed with him in the decline of his life.

Thales,

* In Vita Pythag. lib. 2.

† In convivio Sapient.

Thales, confiding in his phyſical knowledge, endeavoured to trace the origin of at leaſt all ſublunary and corporeal things to one elementary principle. Although he muſt have contemned the poetic coſmogonies, founded altogether on tradition, he ſaw no reaſon, it ſeems, for receding entirely from Homer's parentage of the world, when he adopted water as the ſource of all generation. It is not ſaid *, that, with the poet, he took earth into copartnery with it, nor that with the prieſts of Egypt, he joined heat to humidity, the better to help out the proceſs of nature. Water alone, conſidered as a ſimple and uncompounded element, was deemed of efficacy ſufficient for all natural productions. It was known to be eſſential to the vegetation of the earth, to the growth of plants, and to the procreation and nouriſhment of animals. It might even be reckoned to enter into the conſtitution of the hardeſt bodies, and pervade all minerals. Thales was the more ſupported in his tenet, from an opinion, which then commonly prevailed, that the fire of the ſun itſelf, and of the ſtars in heaven, was fed from humid vapours. But notwithſtanding the utmoſt allowance that may be made for this firſt eſſay in phyſics, it muſt be owned, that, to explain the concretion of ſolid ſubſtances, ſuch as ſtones and metals, from the fluid element alone, without any thing acceſſary to it, was a theory as vague and abſurd as could well be imagined. The ſlighteſt attention too was ſufficient to diſcover, that water is impregnated with air, and ſeems to depend upon that element being rarer or denſer, for the fluidity or congelation of its globules. Water, therefore, could neither be reckoned the ſimpleſt element, nor of itſelf an active and productive one, and the aſſumption of it as a principle bore little teſtimony to the depth of Thales's phyſical inveſtigations, nor to thoſe of the Egyptian prieſts, if he borrowed it from them.

In tracing this firſt ſtage of the Grecian philoſophy, it is to be obſerved, that the word ἀρχὴ, or principle, in the ſenſe in which it was afterwards generally applied by philoſophers †, ſignified that which was void of compoſition, ungenerated, and the efficient cauſe of other things. But, for a conſiderable time in the early ſtudy of philoſophy, as the

* Ioan. Stobaei Eclogae Phyſicae, lib. 1. fol. edit. Antwerp, p. 26. Diogen. Laert. in Vita.

† De Placitis Philoſoph. lib. 1. cap. 2.

meanings of words are often undefined, it was uſed ſometimes in the ſenſe ſubſequently affixed to it, and more commonly to expreſs the material element, which, although neither ſimple nor uncompounded, was ſuppoſed, like Thales's water, to operate principally in the conſtitution of other ſubſtances. From this ambiguous application of the term, it came to be alledged, eſpecially by the ſceptics, that Thales, and ſome others who followed him in the Ionic ſchool, and called their element an ἀρχὴ, ought to be underſtood, not only as referring to it the compoſition of the material world, but the origin and efficiency of all other beings. In this groſs interpretation of their doctrine, they muſt be accounted as wretched reaſoners, and no leſs miſerable theiſts than the poets before them, who made their cahos, or the ocean, productive of all the divinities and daemons they imagined to exiſt in the heavens, or in the earth. That the ſubjects of philoſophy were treated by them in a confuſed manner, and that, not having a term ſuch as στοιχεῖον, which was uſed by more accurate philoſophers to diſtinguiſh the material element from the immaterial and efficient principle, they blended together their metaphyſical and their phyſical reaſonings, may be allowed, according as Thomaſinus and Cudworth have ſhown by their learned inveſtigations. But to infer that, upon the ſubject of an original principle of all things, they coincided in their ideas with the poets, ſo as to hold forth water or earth, or air, or fire, to be the active cauſe of the diverſified natures and ſubſtances of the world, muſt be a degradation of their names as philoſophers. It may be enough to render us doubtful of the credit to be given to ſuch an account of their abſurdity, to conſider, that, inſtead of any entire work of theſe philoſophers, we have tranſmitted to us only ſome fragments, or maimed extracts from what remained of their writings, by authors who lived long after their time; and who may be ſuppoſed, in ſeveral points, to have miſtaken their meaning, or explained it in a manner agreeable to their prejudices.

With reſpect to Thales, the ſentiments of deity, of the fabric of the world, and of the human ſoul, aſcribed to him by ſeveral authors, are more than ſufficient to exempt him from the imputation thrown upon ſome of his ſucceſſors in the ſchool of Ionia *. Even Cicero, reaſoning as an academic,

* De Natura Deorum, lib. 1. p. 199.

academic, ſays, "Thales, who firſt inquired into phyſics, affirmed wa-
"ter to be the firſt principle of things; but that *God* was the mind
"which formed them out of that element." Yet, for the ſake of ſup-porting the academic doubt, he endeavours to twiſt this ſentence into a meaning favourable to it, and that Thales could be underſtood to aſcribe no more originality or efficiency to the principle of mind in the world, than he did to that of water. We may judge how unjuſt the ſceptical ſting was, by what Diogenes * Laertius reports of his opinions of the divinity: "Of all things that are, Thales aſſerted, that *God* is
"the moſt ancient; for he is ungenerated, and without beginning.
"The faireſt of things is the world; for it is his work; and the ſwift-
"eſt is mind; for it runs over all things." Being aſked, if he thought a wicked perſon could hide his actions from the obſervance of the gods? "No," ſaid he, "not even in the meditation of them." According to Stobaeus's † account of Thales's doctrine, and that of thoſe who followed it, the firſt cauſe was held to be immoveable; which, as is obſerved by Stanley, comes near to the idea which Ariſtotle aſſumed as his own, that *the deity was an immoveable mover*. By the report of the ſame author, Thales's ‡ definition of ſoul was, "a nature which moved
"always, and of itſelf;" an idea delivered by Pythagoras, and generally entertained amongſt the philoſophers who were not corporealiſts, until Ariſtotle attempted to explode it. But enough has been ſaid to prove the uncertainty, if not fallacy of the general aſſertion, inſiſted upon by Bayle, and other modern ſceptics, that, until Anaxagoras appeared, the doctrine taught in the Ionic ſchool was only *materialiſm*. Thales expired, when a ſpectator of the Olympic games—Born in the 35th celebration of them, and dying at the 58th—His age extended to above ninety years.

Before proceeding to recite the philoſophic tenets of his ſucceſſors in the ſchool of Ionia, we ſhall here conclude all that is neceſſary to be ſaid upon the abilities and characters of thoſe who ſhared with him the title of wiſe men. In the period in which they appeared, Greece experienced

* In Vita. † Eclogae Phyſicae, lib. 1. cap. 16. p. 31.
‡ Ibid. cap. 40. p. 93.

ced in almoſt every ſtate ſome political revolution; and the ardent conteſt was, whether the government of one, or of the *optimates*, or of the many, ſhould prevail in various cities. It is well known how much Solon was engaged in this controverſy, and what ſucceſsful reſiſtance he made to the dominion of a ſingle perſon in Athens. What Thales was in ſcience, compared with the poetic Coſmogoniſts, that, in a great meaſure, the reformer of the Athenian ſtate may be reckoned in his political and moral knowledge, when put in balance with the other ſages. Studied maxims with regard to human life in general, and the prudent conduct of it in particular ſituations, joined with the capacity of adviſing and acting properly in the offices of civil government, were what chiefly diſtinguiſhed them *. Plutarch's account of the ancient wiſdom appears expreſſive of that which they poſſeſſed. After mentioning Pittheus, the grandfather of Theſeus, as one who had ſignal reputation for underſtanding and knowledge, he adds, 'wiſdom then conſiſted, principally, "in the invention of ſuch ſhort and grave ſentences as Heſiod has "thrown into his book of *works and days* †." "They were,' ſays Plato of the ſeven ſages, "all of them ſtudious of the laconic wiſdom; for in "Lacedemon, the ſtudy of wiſdom was moſt ancient amongſt the Greeks; "and there the greateſt number of thoſe called ſages were to be found. "But the Spartans, to avoid envy, induſtriouſly concealed this pre-"eminence, and took care to prevent all ſtrangers who came among "them from participating in their ſtore of knowledge." He obſerves, that the Cretans uſed like precautions againſt any exportation of their wiſe ſentences. To excuſe this extreme reſerve in ſome nations to communicate their knowledge, we ought to conſider not only the rarity of it in thoſe ancient times, but alſo, that, when it was comprehended in proverbs, which Plato calls the *firſt figure* of wiſdom, any particular nation might eaſily be robbed of all its treaſure, and, without the acknowledgement of it being made, forfeit to another the credit and honour of its inventions.

To guard againſt this diſadvantage, and, at the ſame time, to preſerve the reputation of ſuperior wiſdom affixed to theſe tokens of it, the apothegms were often caſt into the form of *aenigmas*, or expreſſed in metaphorical

* In Vita Theſei. † In Protagora.

phorical terms, allegories, or fables, ſuch as thoſe of Æſop. In the eaſtern nations, the firſt of theſe forms was in the higheſt eſteem; ſo that to deviſe a riddle, or to ſolve one properly, was regarded as the teſt not of ready wit only, but of wiſdom. The Grecian ſages were not defective, but occaſionally ſhowed themſelves expert in this affected mode of ingenuity. Beſide Thales's anſwers to the King of Egypt's nice queſtions, Diogenes Laertius * has recorded ſeveral other replies made by them to queries in the enigmatical ſtyle.

But it was not much in the taſte of the Greeks to *enigmatiſe;* nor did the ſages affect to conceal their knowledge. Every one of them is underſtood to have had a wiſe ſaying, of a moral or prudential import, appropriated to him as his favourite invention. The whole of them, it is ſaid, being inſcribed upon the gate of the temple of Delphos, were, in this manner, dedicated to Apollo; and yet ancient authors diſagree in aſſigning to each his proper apothegm †. To moralize upon life and manners, was, next to that of preſcribing the firſt rules of civil ſociety, and which Horace calls the *ſapientia quondam* ‡, the earlieſt indication of the reflections and improvements of the human mind. It had taken place long before the ſages appeared, and made part of the ancient poeſy; out of which that profuſion of moral ſentences thrown out by them was, probably, in a great meaſure collected. They did no more than make ſome additions to them in a ſimilar ſtyle. They delivered no particular explications of the rationality of their maxims, unleſs, perhaps, when they were by any called in queſtion, or ſcorned. They diſtinguiſhed

* In Vitis Cleobuli. Pittaci. et Biae.

† In the aſſignment of the ſentences, there is a conteſt about that celebrated one, *know thyſelf;* whether it was firſt announced by Solon, or Thales, or Chio the Spartan, or by the Delphic oracle itſelf. Suppoſing it to appertain to Apollo, Thales comes in for rather an ungenerous one, "Be a ſurety, and loſs is nigh." And Solon, for his ſaying to Croeſus, "For the account of happineſs in long life, "look to the end of it." And Chilo, for "Hate only ſo far as that, perchance, "you may afterwards love." To Cleobulus was given, "Nothing too much." To Pittacus, "Know opportunity." To Bias, "The illiterate, who are the mul-"titude, are naught." To Periander, "Counſel is all."

‡ Publica privatis ſecernere, ſacra profanis,
Concubitu prohibere vago, dare jura maritis,
Fuit haec *ſapientia quondam.*

ſtinguiſhed not the caſes when they might be found more or leſs applicable; and little conſidered whether they were, upon the whole, conſiſtent with one another. They preſented, therefore, no connected view of moral principles; but, like thoſe who bring together the materials of an edifice in their ſimpleſt form, they left to others the more ingenious part of adapting them to the ſtructure, and giving them the poliſh and the ſymmetry which a regular ſyſtem of ethics required. In the ſimplicity of the age in which they appeared, this ſkill, as it could hardly be expected, was not looked for. Men were then contented with receiving the wiſe rule or precept, without having all the reaſons of it unfolded to them. Of honeſt and worthy characters, practical teachers of morals, although not recogniſed under the title of Speculative Philoſophers *, ſeveral of them, as Chilo, Pittacus, and Bias, bore the firſt offices of magiſtracy in their ſeveral cities, and were remembered with honour, for the eminent ſervices rendered to them. They likewiſe may be conſidered as the firſt who raiſed the eſteem of characters marked with the civil virtues alone, and ſeparate from the dazzling acceſſories of military proweſs and warlike glory; and the admiſſion which others of them, as well as Solon, had to the courts of princes, upon the reputation of their virtue and knowledge, was a proof that theſe qualities have an intrinſic value, and fail not to excite admiration, unleſs in the prevalence of great depravity in the ſentiments and manners of mankind.

It may be inferred from a paſſage in Plutarch †, that the wiſe men had ſome imitators of their characters and actions; but who, like moſt under that denomination, fell far behind in the repreſentation of them. In his account of Mneſiphilas, one of Themiſtocles's preceptors, he ſays, that he was neither an orator nor natural philoſopher, but a profeſſor of what was then termed wiſdom or prudence in the management of political affairs. This profeſſion was firſt begun by Solon, and from him grew up, for ſome time, like a philoſophic ſect, until, in the following age, the adepts in it betook themſelves to the pleadings of civil cauſes, and attending diſputations in law. Hence, being more ſtudious of the

* Cicero hardly allows them their common appellation. Nam qui ſeptem appellantur, eos, (qui iſta ſubtilius quaerunt), in numero ſapientum non habent. De Amicitia.

† In Vita Themiſtoclis.

the oratorial art than of the maxims of wiſdom, and of practical virtue, they generally paſſed under the name of *Sophiſts*. It was, we may ſuppoſe, in this degradation of the profeſſion of the Grecian ſages, that ſome of the libertine wits took occaſion to throw out that indecent burleſque of their wiſe ſentences mentioned by Athenaeus; who has retailed *, as decorations of his work, various ſcurrilities of a like kind, no where elſe to be found. But we proceed now to the account of Thales's ſucceſſors in the Ionic ſchool.

The example ſet by the philoſopher of Miletus, for attempting to reſolve the great queſtion about the production of the world, upon ſome phyſical theory, was followed by ſeveral who ſucceeded him in the profeſſion of philoſophy in Ionia. Yet Anaximander, ſon of Praxiades, his countryman †, companion, and immediate ſucceſſor, adhered not to his ſolution of the problem, but quitting the tract pointed out, of a particular phyſical principle, as inſufficient, he adopted a more abſtruſe, and what he undoubtedly thought a more tenible hypotheſis than that of any of the four elements. The infinity of nature, or of the univerſe, he contended, was all that was requiſite to be conſidered; from whence the origin of the world, and all its phenomena, might be deduced ‡, without having recourſe to the generation of one thing from another, or diſtinguiſhing water, or earth, or air, or fire, as bodies different in themſelves, or from the univerſal maſs; for this, being infinite, could not fail to produce worlds after worlds without end. Thus, a ſuppoſed infinity of ſomething, or of an undetermined all, was with him the propoſition by which might be explained intelligibly, all the motions, and all the apparent, if not real differences of things, either ſeen, felt, or underſtood, in the immenſity of nature. And it may indeed be reckoned that kind of hypotheſis, which, aſſuming every thing in queſtion, any thing may be inferred from it. He did not, in plain terms, declare ‖ of what ſubſtance his infinite nature conſiſted; and it

* They ſet, in contraſt, to each ſentence, a *ragout*, or diſh for the table, as dreſſed up by one or other of the ſeven Grecian cooks, who prepared the public repaſts.—Athen. lib. 2.

† Cicero Academic. Quaeſt. lib. 4. p. 33.

‡ Diogen. Laert. lib. 2. p. 79.

‖ Stobaei Eclogae Phyſic. lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 26. De Placitis Philoſoph. cap. 3.

was only by inference, and from his making no diſtinction between the ſoul or mind, and body, and repreſenting the gods * as being generated, and riſing and ſetting, at long intervals, like the ſtars in the heavens, that he was underſtood to hold forth the exiſtence of matter alone. In this conception of his hypotheſis, he muſt have admitted what is inconceivable, an infinite magnitude, or corporeal maſs, ſo extended, that not one atom could be added to it. Although he ſuppoſed his infinity to be immutable, he allowed what he called a *circumduction* of it; ſo that, by this means, numberleſs worlds, he fancied, might be generated out of his infinite matter, and ſucceſſively † be reſolved into it. He even preſumed, without aſſigning any reaſon, that this circumduction enſued at equal periods of time. It is not poſſible to imagine a theory more profoundly obſcure than this, which, notwithſtanding the arbitrary ſuppoſitions made for its elucidation, never emerges in the leaſt from the darkneſs of its firſt inexplicable principle. It was, therefore, not improperly reſorted to by thoſe philoſophers who afterwards, under the cloud of metaphyſics, endeavoured to prove the incomprehenſibility of all things, and called the univerſe a *one infinite*. Although it be more preſumed than evinced, that Anaximander held his infinity of nature to be only material, yet ſubſequent philoſophers, of the ſceptic or the atheiſtical tribe, both in ancient and modern times, have conſidered him as authoriſing, and giving, at leaſt, the outlines of their theories of a material univerſe. But, as there are not even hints tranſmitted in what manner he reckoned his deities, or intelligent beings, to be generated, his retainers are left unaided by him, to explore the dark and diſmal abyſs of their ſpeculations.

Upon the ſubject of particular phyſics and aſtronomy, he appears to have written with leſs obſcurity, but not conſiſtently; ſince, relaxing the immutability ‡ of his infinite, he allowed that its parts, although not the whole, might be changed. As Ariſtotle remarks, he made contraries proceed from one and the ſame principle; and ſo, with equal propriety, he turned his infinite into a whole, which is finite, conſiſting of parts.

But

* Cicer. de natura deorum, lib. 1. p. 120.

† Stobaeus, ibid. cap. 21. p. De Placitis, lib. 1. c. 8. It muſt be ſuppoſed infinite, ſaid he, leſt all things ſhould fail. ‡ Diog. Laert. ibid.

But how, otherwiſe, could he ſuppoſe the formation of particular bodies, how ſay that the earth was ſtruck off, and made globular, the ſun lighted up, and the ſtars, from their motion about the earth as a centre, acquire rotundity? According to Diogenes Laertius, he held the moon's light to be borrowed from the ſun, which was an orb of the pureſt fire, and of equal magnitude with the earth *. Stobaeus, and the author *De Placitis*, repreſent his opinion of the ſubſtance of theſe luminaries as the ſame. Many are the inſtances of ſuch contradictions among ancient authors, in giving the phyſical ſentiments of the Ionic philoſophers. To Anaximander, the firſt invention of the *gnomon*, or horoſcopical dial, together with that of a geographical table, or map of the world, is aſcribed by Laertius; and yet Pliny †, more accurate in ſuch inquiries, places the former to the credit of Anaximenes. It is probable that one of them had introduced into Greece the uſe of the *gnomon*, which was long before known to the Babylonians, and from whom Herodotus ‡ obſerves, various diſcoveries in aſtronomy, and the arts connected with it, were tranſmitted into other countries.

Anaximenes, who next ſucceeded to the Ionian School, was the diſciple of his predeceſſor, and a native of the ſame city. Reſuming one of the four elementary principles which Anaximander ‖ had rejected, he is ſaid to have referred the origin of all things to air joined with infinity. But how was this ambiguous propoſition to be underſtood? Was air itſelf infinite and ungenerated, or was it only finite, and yet, as a principle of generation, extended over the univerſe, ſaid to be infinite? Upon comparing the authors who ſtate the opinion of this philoſopher, they appear irreconcileable. As Cicero expreſſes his meaning, he made air infinite, and ever in motion, to be deity; and yet either the air or the deity to be generated; for there is ſome ambiguity in the Roman § author's ſentence. Stobaeus, without ſaying what exiſtence he

* Eclog. Phyſ. cap. 25. p. 55. † Hiſt. Natur. lib. 2.

‡ In Euterpe, cap. 32. ‖ Diogen. Laer. Stobaeus, lib. 1. p. 26.

§ Cicero's ſentence is: "Anaximenes aera deum ſtatuit, *eumque gigni*, eſſeque "immenſum, et infinitum ei ſemper in motu; quaſi aut aer ſine ulla forma deus "eſſe poſſit, cum praeſertim deum non aliqua, ſed pulcherrima ſpecie eſſe deceat, "aut non omne, quod ortum mortalitas conſequatur."—De Natur. deor. lib. 1. p. 100.

aſſigned to Deity, aſſerts that he held air infinite to be of itſelf productive of the univerſe, and that from which all finite things originate, and are reſolvable into it. "Our ſoul," ſaid he, which is air, is the ἀρχὴ "or principle, which compoſes our frame. In like manner, air, or "*ſpirit*, which are two names for the ſame thing, conſtitutes the world." The author *De Placitis* obſerves, if this air, or *ſpirit*, was underſtood to be of one ſimple form, how could the vaſt diverſity of animals found in the world be produced from it, without ſome acceſſory and efficient cauſe? In this perplexed account of Anaximenes's original principle, it has been, with reaſon, ſuggeſted by ſome learned modern * authors, that its variation from that of his predeceſſor, is to be regarded as only apparent, and not real. No definition being given by Anaximander, of the powers or qualities of that nature he called infinité, nor any diſtinction made between the properties of one body and another, but that of hot and cold, which are not eſſential, but only relative qualities, Anaximenes found it proper to join an acknowledged phyſical principle, ſuch as air, with that infinity, which could ſtand for nothing more than a new name applied to the univerſe. In that age when few or no phyſical experiments were made, air would be imagined as immenſe and boundleſs as ſpace itſelf, and to have an equal claim to the attribute of infinity, and, by pervading all corporeal ſubſtances, might be concluded to operate upon it in ſome wonderful manner: And thus the diſciple, without advancing any thing inconſiſtent with his maſter's theory, may be reckoned to have attempted no more than an explication of it.

In its more explicit form, and phyſically conſidered, it cannot be thought to exceed that of Thales in propriety. Air, although a more ſubtile element, is undoubtedly a degree farther removed than water from the conſtitution of ſolid bodies, and ſtill a leſs competent cauſe of their production. Its capacity of condenſation and rarefaction ſeems as much to require the acceſſories of cold and heat; and, as for the preſſure of the particles of air upon one another, its weight, and elaſticity; theſe were ſecrets in phyſiology then unknown, and for ages after undiſcovered.

* Cudworth's Intellect. Syſtem, part 1. ch. 5. Hiſtoire Critique par Deſlandes, octav. edit. Amſterd. tom. 2. ch. 12.

covered. Inſtead, therefore, of reciting ſome rude notions about the aerial meteors, founded upon the qualities of an element not underſtood, we may rather conclude this part of the Ionic philoſophy with a recollection of what was advanced in the introduction to it; that from any view that can be taken of the theories of theſe two philoſophers, which are hardly intelligible in themſelves, it cannot be determined that they were only materialiſts, and derived every quality and power in nature from corporeal ſubſtance. The one ſpoke of gods, and the other of a deity, generated; but Anaximander eſpouſed no particular element as the ſource of generation, and Anaximenes only ſubſtituted one, and, joined with infinite, called it Deity; but, as appears from Cicero, left his generation, or the mode of it, to be conjectured.

By the appearance of Anaxagoras, a native of Clazomenæ, and the diſciple of Anaximenes, the ſeat of philoſophy was transferred from Miletus, in the Aſiatic Ionia, to the city of Athens, although his regular inſtitution of a ſchool there be not exactly aſcertained *. His birth is computed to the 70th Olympiad, and his departure from Ionia to the 20th year of his age, which coincides with the time of Xerxes's expedition into Greece. He renounced every ſtudy and attention but that of philoſophy; which he taught under the patronage of Pericles at Athens, with no view to pecuniary reward. The innovation he made in the doctrine of the firſt principles of all things, or his illuſtration of that doctrine, was alone ſufficient to give him celebrity above all the Ionic profeſſors of ſcience. He ſaw the abſurdity of holding forth any one natural element, the properties of which were limited, and even the modifications it could admit circumſcribed, to be the original of all the diverſified bodies in nature.

In his phyſical ſpeculations, he therefore thought it neceſſary to ſuppoſe an infinity of material principles, or at leaſt † as many of them as there were kinds of compound bodies. Theſe he imagined might be conſtituted by ſuch particles of matter as were ſimilar to each other, and which he termed *homoiomeria*, being collected together. Thus a piece of gold was made up of many particles homogeneous, and of the quality of

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 2. p. 82. † Cicer. Acad. Quæſt. lib. 4. p. 194.

of gold; and water, and blood, bone, and iron, and other ſubſtances, were in the ſame manner formed by the acceſſion of like parts to like. He owned, that theſe conſtitutional particles were concealed under various forms *. When bread, water, or other common aliment, was ſeen to produce hairs, veins, arteries, nerves, and bones, it is to be preſumed, ſaid he, that the ſeeds, or ſeminal particles of ſuch compoſitions, are found predominant in the natural aliments, and that they are augmented in number and power by the conſtant uſe of the aliments †. He therefore denied that colours, or other perceptible qualities of bodies, could be juſtly aſcertained by the teſtimony of the ſenſes; and ſaid that ſnow, which was water congealed, ought rather to appear black than white.

But it appeared to him that *mind* was the original ‡ principle of all motion in matter or body; and that not even the ſuppoſition of an infinity of matter could be accounted a ſufficient cauſe of the diſtribution of its particles into the various ſpecies of compound ſubſtances, to be ſeen in the world, and yet leſs of the wiſe and beautiful arrangement of them in the ſyſtem of nature §. From fortune, or neceſſity, a world ſo conſtituted and adorned could never be imagined to have its original; and that the exiſtence ‖, and intercourſe of an infinite, and ſelf-moving *mind*, were evinced from the work that was produced. This *mind* he declared to be of an incorporeal nature, and equally poſſeſſed of power and intelligence. The aſſertion of it as the active, and preſiding principle in the univerſe, gave occaſion to his being himſelf diſtinguiſhed from the other Ionic philoſophers, by the name of Νους. The ſuppoſition of *matter* pre-exiſting its arrangement in the world, was common to all the ancient philoſophers, who pretended to give a phyſical theory of the generation, or origin of natural things. Their general axiom was, that *out of nothing, nothing could come, or be made;* and it muſt be owned, that Anaxagoras followed this received opinion, without having the idea of the

* De Placitis Philoſoph. lib. 1. cap. 7.; et Stobaeus, lib. 1. cap. 13.
† Sextus Empiricus adverſ. Mathem. lib. 7. p. pag. 153.
‡ Ariſtot. Phyſica, lib. 8. cap. 1. § Plutarch. in Vita Periclis.
‖ Cicero, De Natura Deorum, lib. 1. p. 199. Diogen. Laert. in Vita.

the *creation* of matter by his infinite mind. But, its particles were not reckoned by him to be natural bodies, previous to their ſpecific collection *; and his theory with reſpect to them, however crude and unphiloſophical it may appear, is to be conſidered as nothing more than his aſſigning certain *primordia rerum*, or an imaginary ſpecies of matter, out of which he thought every ſenſible object having diſtinguiſhable qualities might be formed. We ſhall afterwards have occaſion to obſerve what an irreſolvable problem it was found among the philoſophers, to determine what this *primordial* matter might be, which ſerved for the formation of bodies conſtituted in the moſt different manners, and variouſly qualified.

It is allowed that Anaxagoras ſhowed himſelf †, in many phyſical ſubjects, both a curious and diligent inquirer. So much did he inſiſt upon ſome theories formed by him about the natural phenomena, and his phyſical ſolutions of them, that he ſeemed to exclude, in caſes where it appeared to be neceſſary, the agency of his intelligent principle. It is upon this account ‡, and for the ſlight regard paid by him to *final cauſes*, that Plato repreſents his writings as judged reprehenſible by Socrates. His ſpeculations were extended over all the appearances of nature; and, with ſingular ingenuity, if not with much depth of knowledge, he endeavoured to aſſign the natural cauſes of winds, thunder, lightening, and earthquakes, and to account for eclipſes, meteors, comets, and other phenomena, in the celeſtial regions §. He not only undeified the moon, by declaring her to be an opake and earthly body, ſhining with a borrowed light, and having hills and vallies on her ſurface; but he alſo aboliſhed the divinities of the ſtars; which, according to his theory, were pronounced maſſes of ſolid matter, catched up from the earth by the vortex of the etherial heavens, and turned into burning ſtones by the rapid motion they underwent. But, in this tract of ſpeculation, it is unneceſſary to follow him; and we may be contented with obſerving, that it expoſed him to obloquy, and, at length, to a criminal charge for impiety at Athens ‖. It appears that Pericles, who owed much of his know-

* De Placitis Philoſoph. lib. 1. cap. 7. † Sextus Empiric. ibid.
‡ Plato in Phaedone. § Diogen. Laert. in vita. ‖ Plutarch. in vita Periclis.

knowledge in ſcience to Anaxagoras's inſtructions, had not paid that decent and ſuitable attention to the ſupport of a man devoted to philoſophic ſtudy, and careleſs of the affairs of life, and his ſituation in the world. Whether, in abſence of the Athenian ſtateſman, or in ſome ſudden eruption of faction, he was impeached, thrown into priſon, and capitally condemned: Viſited by Pericles in this forlorn condition, he, who before had overlooked all indifferent uſage, could not help uttering this modeſt complaint, "They, Pericles, who would uſe a lamp, ſhould "take care to ſupply it with oil." It is not clearly aſcertained in what manner his condemnation iſſued. Certain it is, that, by Pericles's interpoſition, he eſcaped death, but under the penalty of a heavy fine, and baniſhment from Athens. With ſenſible diſguſt, he left that city, and returned to Ionia. At Lampſacum he reſumed the teaching of philoſophy, and continued there to the end of his life.

Although the ſcience of phyſics chiefly occupied his attention, and was indeed the only one profeſſed in the Ionic ſchool, he is ſaid to have been the firſt who ſtudied and pointed out the moral leſſons * contained in the Iliad and Odyſſey of Homer. His abandoning his country and his patrimony, which was conſiderable, and attaching himſelf wholly to ſcientific improvement, was a proof of his being ſingularly diſintereſted, and leading a life of innocent and virtuous contemplation. "Do you "not care for your country?" ſaid one to him. "No one," replied he, "cares more; but there it is," added he, pointing to the canopy of the heavens. His philoſophy enabled him alſo to ſhow the utmoſt compoſure when under the ſentence of death. Being told that he was adjudged to ſuffer it, "Many years have paſſed," ſaid he, "ſince na-"ture pronounced this ſentence upon me." He is ranked by Stobaeus † amongſt the philoſophers who made a diſtinction between ſoul and mind; and held the latter to be extrinſically adventitious to the human conſtitution. But this ſtands in need of clearer proof; nor is it evident what opinion he entertained of the nature of the human ſoul: For, according to his theory, it might be accounted unperiſhable, and yet of a corporeal ſubſtance. Every production in nature he maintained to ariſe from

* Diogen. Laert. ibid. p. 86. † Eclog. phyſic. lib. 1. c. 40. p. 93.

from an aſſemblage of homogeneous particles, which might be diſperſed, but could not periſh, or be utterly deſtroyed. In this, his ſentiment correſponded to one generally admitted in the ancient philoſophy, "that "all things, which once were, could no more be reduced to nothing, "than come from nothing." Being aſked, when near death, whether he wiſhed not to draw his laſt breath in Cladzomenae, his native city *, than in Lampacus? "That circumſtance," ſaid he, "is an indifferent one, and can be no object of choice; for the diſtance to the ſhades "below is from every place the ſame." The magiſtrates of Lampacus deſired him to ſignify what manner of ſolemnizing his memory amongſt them, which they had reſolved upon, would have moſt his approbation. "Let the anniverſary of my death," anſwered he, "be made "a play-day amongſt the ſchool-boys." It has been remarked, that no celebration of it he could have named had a chance to be ſo long obſerved, nor any feſtivity he could have fancied was likely to have been ſo cordially ſolemnized, as this ſtated proviſion for the recreation and joy of youthful minds. Accordingly, Diogenes Laertius takes notice, that the cuſtom of it had been uninterruptedly continued till his time.

The Ionic ſchool came to a concluſion with Archelaus, the diſciple of Anaxagoras. Diogenes Laertius alledges it was he, not his maſter, who firſt taught the ſcience of phyſics at Athens, and conſequently that the transference of the ſchool is to be referred to Archelaus's appearance in that city. This is one of the controverſies amongſt the learned, in which curioſity about the hiſtory of literature has been rather unneceſſarily intereſted. The detail of the diſpute makes a conſiderable article in the Dictionaries of Moreri and Bayle. It would be of more importance to know whether Archelaus adopted or rejected Anaxagoras's doctrine of an incorporeal and intelligent principle in the univerſe; or if he accounted for the generation † of the world ſolely upon the phyſical theory he is ſaid to have held about heat and humidity. It ſeems that he admitted the exiſtence of mind, but aſcribed not to it the formation of the natural ſyſtem. He is likewiſe ſaid to have philoſophiſed in moral ſubjects, and to have conſidered the principles of juſtice and equity as

 founded

* Cicer. Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 1. p. 182.

† Stobaei Eclog. Phyſic. lib. 1. p. 28.; De Placitis Philoſoph. lib. 1. cap. 3.

founded * more in policy than in nature. His diſciple Socrates, who taught another doctrine, could not therefore be much indebted to him for inſtruction in that ſcience. We ſhall ſee that, by the fame which Socrates acquired, the ſtudy of phyſics, which had uſurped the place of all other ſciences in the Ionic ſchool, and was likely to do ſo in that of Athens, ſuffered a decline, and came to be leſs regarded. It was time, it may be ſaid, that ſuch a change ſhould take place, when it is conſidered that, notwithſtanding the partial attachment ſhown to the phyſical philoſophy, the progreſs in it was but ſuperficial, and often fallacious; and that, of all theories, thoſe reſpecting the production of the world, and the original conſtitution of the heavens and the earth, have been, and, without ſupernatural diſcovery, ever will be, altogether ambiguous and conjectural. The variations of the Ionic philoſophers from one another in their phyſical tenets, have proved preſages of the fluctuation of opinion amongſt thoſe who, in ſeveral ages, have followed them in their unſearchable tract; and, although ſome of theſe theoriſts have ſhown ingenuity, they have been either outdone by others, or the palpable defects of their ſyſtems have been expoſed. To be a dogmatiſt, therefore, upon any general theory of phyſics, has not been the mark of the wiſeſt mind. The moſt intelligent have been ſenſible, that the inveſtigation of the firſt principles of natural bodies is the hardeſt and moſt dubious one in philoſophy; and that, if it were poſſible to aſcertain them, the eſtimate of their forces, their operations, their dependencies and connections, when combined together in a general ſyſtem, becomes another obſcurity, and ſuch a one as may be pronounced impenetrable to human minds.

We may conclude the account of the philoſophers of the Ionic ſchool with obſerving, that all of them, from Thales, denied a vacuum in the univerſe; and that † this tenet was generally maintained by other phyſical theoriſts, until Leucippus and Democritus appeared. Upon the principle of a plenum, a manifeſt difficulty preſented itſelf, whether the univerſe was held to be finite or infinite. If the firſt was aſſerted, there could ſurely be conceived a void ſpace beyond it; and if the ſecond, it was

* Diog. Laert. lib. 2. † Stobaei Eclog. Phyſ. lib. 1. b. 22. p. 38.

was a perplexity, if not impoſſible, to imagine how local motion could take place, when no room was left for it. The *immobility* of all things being therefore conſidered as the conſequence of the tenet of an infinite *plenum*, we ſhall find that theſe philoſophers who pretended to invalidate the teſtimony of the ſenſes, and the cleareſt deciſions of reaſon among mankind, adhered to the theory which excluded motion, as affording a colour for their groſs inferences.

In the general diviſion of our ſubject, the philoſophy of Pythagoras could not well be comprehended, as it had little or no connection with that which was taught in the other ſchools of Greece in the periods we have traced. Yet the appearance of its founder cloſely following the inſtitution of the Ionic ſchool by Thales, the account of it falls to be here introduced. It is therefore to be conſidered as forming a ſeparate tract by itſelf, and having much more of a foreign than a Grecian original.

PART. II.

SECTION I.

Of Pythagoras—his Travels into Egypt and other foreign Countries—his Inſtitution of the Italic *School of Philoſophy,—and the peculiar Diſcipline taught in it.*

IN the more ancient times, the Egyptian temples are ſaid * to have contained no images or ſtatues of the gods; and, from Homer's ſilence upon the head, it may be inferred that thoſe of Greece were not furniſhed with them in the time of the Trojan war. It is even to be preſumed that many of the rites and ceremonies recited by him, as uſed in ſacrifices and expiations, were introduced after that period †. It is likewiſe known that neither the antient Chaldeans of Aſſyria, nor the Magi of Perſia, admitted of images, nor, for ſome time, of temples, for religious worſhip; and that they adored, under the *expanſe* of the heavens, the firſt or ſovereign principle of all things, in the ſun, or the element of fire; while the Egyptians paid a ſimilar veneration to that of water. The like ſimplicity of religion appears to have obtained among the antient nations of Italy; and, according to Dionyſius Halicarnaſſeus ‡, Pliny, and Plutarch, it took place in the ſacred inſtitutions of the Romans by their firſt King, and more eſpecially in thoſe of his ſucceſſor. The religion of the Sabines, ſays Livy §, of which nation Numa Pompilius was, had much of the character of that of the *Pythagoreans;* and,

* Lucian de Dea Syria. Cicero de Legibus, lib. 2. p. 345.

† Diogen. Laert. in Prooemio; Strabo, lib. 15.

‡ Antiquitat. Rom. lib. 2.

§ Lib. 1. p. 27. fol. edit.

and, although it was afterwards accounted by the Romans too auſtere, it might well be accounted more pure and incorrupt than any other in its precepts. In its exterior forms, a principal regard was paid to compoſure of mind, and to a chaſte adoration of the preſent, but *inviſible* divinity. Numa *, adds Plutarch, diſapproved the uſe of ſenſible images of the *deity*; "for the firſt cauſe," ſaid that legiſlator, "is not to be "conſidered as an object of the ſenſes; neither is he ſuſceptible of paſ- "ſion; but, having no mixture of parts, he is inviſible, and to be "comprehended only by the mind." It is alſo obſerved by the ſame author, that this ſentiment of *deity* correſponded with the one delivered in the philoſophy of Pythagoras.

It would however be a groſs error, to imagine that Numa could have borrowed any thing from Pythagoras, who was poſterior to him by two or three generations, and is reckoned † to have come into Italy, not ſooner than the reign of Tarquinius Superbus, the laſt of the Roman kings. Not much ſkilled in chronology, the ancient Romans, ſays Cicero ‡, eaſily admitted of this anachroniſm about Pythagoras; accounting it honourable for their king to have converſed with a philoſopher ſo celebrated for his wiſdom. The Roman orator ‖, when copying the religious inſtitutions delivered in Plato's book of laws, in which that philoſopher connects the regulations of Minos with the Pythagorean diſcipline, finds an almoſt entire agreement of the two with the ſacred appointments of Numa. It appears, then, that rational and worthy ſentiments of deity, together with ſuitable notions of religious worſhip, ſuch as diſtinguiſhed the philoſophy of Pythagoras, were not unknown, even in that region where he afterwards choſe to inſtitute his ſchool. In tracing the ſources of theſe ſentiments, we are therefore ſtill obliged to look back to an antiquity prior to that of any Grecian poet or ſage; and ſhall find that Pythagoras, who became moſt intelligent in them, was hardly deemed a Grecian philoſopher, on account of his having paſſed the greateſt part of his life in foreign climes, and received there almoſt the whole of his erudition and diſcipline.

There

* In Vita Numae.
† Tuſculan. Quaeſt. lib. 1. p. 129.
‡ Ibid. lib. 4. p. 163.
‖ Ibid. de Legibus.

There are many fables, and unvouched anecdotes, with which Porphyrius, and, after him, his diſciple Jamblicus, have loaded their lives of this philoſopher, that are to be thrown aſide, in any credible account of him that may be given *. That Pythagoras had parents, or near relations, in a condition to afford him the moſt liberal education, and to gratify the uncommon thirſt for knowledge he ſoon diſcovered, need not be called in queſtion. His father's name † was Mneſarchus, a perſon of rank in the iſland of Samos; although his employment was that of an engraver of ſeals. As Samos furniſhed no maſters in ſcience of more ability than the ordinary prieſts in the temples, he was early placed under the tuition of Pherecydes Syrus, whoſe literary fame has been mentioned. That he made a circuit among other profeſſors of ſcience in Greece and Phoenicia, previouſly to his voyage to Egypt, and by his ſtudies under them, before the age of eighteen, had attained to that proficiency in knowledge aſcribed to him by Jamblicus ‡, is neither reconcileable with probability nor chronology. We may indeed aſk, with reſpect to *theology*, which afterwards made a principal part in his philoſophy, where, among all his Grecian maſters, he could receive it? Unleſs we admit that there were genuine poems of Orpheus, which taught it, and might be peruſed by him, he muſt have collected it from ſome obſcure hint, ſuch as that of the ſyllable ει, inſcribed on the gate of the temple of Delphos, of which Plutarch gives ſeveral explications, or extracted it from ſome alluſions or figurative expreſſions in Homer, in the manner his allegoriſing commentators pretended to do; or penetrated into it through the veil of the Eleuſinian myſteries.

It is not alledged that Pythagoras received the inſtruction in ſcience that Thales could have afforded him, but only a direction from that philoſopher ‖, then in the decline of life, to proſecute his ſtudies in the ſacerdotal colleges of Egypt, which were the beſt ſources of knowledge. He proceeded, accordingly, in his voyage to that country; but, although

* Cicero, De Divinatione, lib. 2. p. 296. reckons him and Plato among the authors who were wealthy. † Diog. Laert. lib. 8. p. 487.

‡ Jamblici Vita Pythag. edit. Bibliopola Commeliano, cap. 2. et 3.

‖ Archaeologiae Philoſophicae, quart. edit. lib. 3. cap. 11. p. 150. Ibid. cap. 8. p. 87.

though he carried with him letters of recommendation from Polycrates, who bore the chief ſway in Samos *, to Amaſis the Egyptian King, they did not immediately procure him the admiſſion to inſtruction which he expected. Amaſis's mandate for that purpoſe, which he obtained, was not directly complied with by the prieſts. Thoſe of Heliopolis, to whom he firſt applied, remitted him to their brethren of Memphis, as their ſeniors in office. The latter, under the ſame pretext, directed him to the college of Dioſpolis, or Thebes; the prieſts of which, although they did not uſe the ſame evaſion, endeavoured to deter Pythagoras from inſiſting upon his demand, by repreſenting to him what diſagreeable auſterities he would be obliged to undergo, in the courſe of his initiation into their myſteries. Finding, at laſt, that he was neither to be diſſuaded nor terrified, the rigid fraternity relented, and willingly taught him what they wiſhed not to communicate to any ſtranger. Perhaps the King's authoritative command was, in this caſe, diſreliſhed by the prieſts, who might deſire to preſerve entirely in their own power, and without his interpoſition, the privilege of admitting or rejecting ſuch applications to them for inſtruction †. Upon this ſuppoſition, may be explained what Plutarch, Strabo, and other Grecian authors, ſay of the frequent inexorability of the prieſts to communicate their ſciences to foreigners; eſpecially if we add to it, that theſe guardians of the temples and ſacred monuments might be alſo influenced by the motive of intereſt, and that they expected to be recompenſed for their pains by proper preſents. Pythagoras had provided ‡ three ſilver cups, as his gift to the three colleges he meant chiefly to attend. But, coming firſt with the royal mandate in his hand, he would be thought to have truſted to it alone for compliance with what he required. Others, who had not a like ability to conciliate the favour of the prieſts, would be expoſed to repulſes from them.

For the courſe of two and twenty years, was Pythagoras's ſtay in Egypt prolonged; ſuch ſtudy did the diſcipline of philoſophy, when extended to all its branches, require in that country, where he had

* Porphyrius de Vita.

† Plut. de Iſide et Oſiride. Strab. lib. 17.

‡ Diogen. Laert. lib. 8.

had to learn the Egyptian language *, the common or epiſtolary orthography, and the ſymbolic character; or that in which the ſacred books, and thoſe of ſome of the ſciences, were written. The uſe of a vulgar and of a ſacred alphabet prevailed among other nations as well as the Egyptians, and which, it is well known, many of the eaſtern parts of the world ſtill retain. Pythagoras's aſſiduity in ſtudy was aided by ſingular abſtinence in diet, and by a diſregard of all pleaſures excited either by the ſenſes or the paſſions, except that of *muſic*, the powers of which he was, perhaps †, the firſt who inveſtigated *theoretically*, by endeavouring to reduce ſounds to certain meaſures and rules. His genius alſo gave him to the contemplation of numbers, and to cultivate the mathematical and abſtract ſciences of geometry and aſtronomy; in which he ſhowed himſelf an able proficient, by the leſſons of his Egyptian preceptors, and alſo an inventor of ſeveral curious theorems ‡. To extend yet more the account of his acquired knowledge, he is ſaid to have been carried away to Babylon, amongſt the captives which Cambyſes made in his expedition to Egypt, and to have remained there for twelve years; and, during that time, to have had the benefit of theological and ſcientific inſtruction from the Chaldeans of Aſſyria, and the Perſian magi. Here, again, chronology is perplexed, and hiſtory labours under inſurmountable difficulties: For, according to the exacteſt computation, Cambyſes's invaſion of Egypt took not place ſooner than the third year of the ſixty-third Olympiad; and Pythagoras's return from his travels to Samos and Greece, is commonly fixed to the ſixty-ſecond of that æra. To patch up ‖ this inconſiſtency, ſome throw back his birth to the forty-ſeventh, and others advance it to the fifty-ſeventh Olympiad. The former prolong, and the latter ſhorten his life, by more than twenty years; ſo that, however the particular events of it may be tranſpoſed, they may, at leaſt, agree with each other about the time of his death.

Although Pythagoras endured every trial of his patience, for the ſake of attaining the Egyptian ſciences, he could not bear the arbitrary ſway

* Diog. Laert. lib. 8. Archaeolog. ibid. Porphyrius de Vita Pythag. octav. edit. p. 185. † Jamblicus, cap. 26. ‡ Ibid. cap. 4. p. 36. Cicero de finib. lib. 5. p. 113. ‖ Vide Stanley's lives of the philoſophers.

with which Syloſon, the brother of Polycrates, ruled the Samians. Finding alſo a great indifference among his countrymen for philoſophic inſtruction, he quitted Samos, and viſited ſuch places of Greece as were accounted moſt remarkable either for religious or political inſtitutions. In this courſe, his conference with Leo, the Prince of Phlius, became more memorable than any other held by him. It gave occaſion to his explaining what was to be underſtood by the name and profeſſion of a *philoſopher*; a title which he firſt modeſtly applied to himſelf, inſtead of the more oſtentatious one of *ſage*, or an adept in wiſdom. "You call "yourſelf a philoſopher," ſaid Leo; "but can * you tell what is the "meaning of this ſingular appellation?" "You may, perhaps," replied Pythagoras, "conceive its import, by only conſidering the ſpec- "tacle we lately beheld, which was that of the Olympic games, and the "concourſe of people of all claſſes and characters to the celebration of "them. We there ſaw the eager and anxious competitors for the prizes "of victory; and obſerved others intent upon their projects for profit, "by the ſale or the exchange of their commodities. A diverſity of "motives and paſſions appeared to have drawn together, and to agitate "the vaſt multitude: Yet a ſmall number may be reckoned to have "come to the games without any view to glory or gain, to be ſpectators "merely of the promiſcuous ſcene, and to obſerve the various motions "of the actors in it. The philoſopher reſembles this laſt claſs of men. "*Contemplation* is his object; and in it he places all the profit or plea- "ſure he expects in human life. To look around him, and to reflect "on what he has obſerved, and to ſtudy his own nature, and that of "the univerſe to which he belongs, is the noble employment, and the "rational pleaſure of a *philoſopher*."

Inſtead of copying either the abſurd tales, or fabulous prodigies related of this philoſopher by authors, who, with a credulity ſimilar to that of his two biographers, would have him conſidered not ſimply as a man, but one of thoſe genii, who were believed to hold a middle rank betwixt a divinity and a mortal, we ſhall proceed to relate the moſt diſtinguiſhing inſtitutes of his ſchool, the rules preſcribed to the eleves in it,

* Cicero, Tuſculan. Quaeſt. lib. 5. p. 176. Diogen. Laert. ibid.

it, and his peculiar manner of imparting ſcientific inſtruction to them. After narrating the fate which befel him, and the firſt philoſophic ſocieties reared by him in Italy, a ſeparate view ſhall be taken of the whole Pythagorean ſyſtem, comprehending its phyſical, theological, and moral theories, whether as taught by Pythagoras himſelf, or ſubſequently adopted by his moſt eminent diſciples.

The firſt and moſt conſpicuous feature of Pythagoras's ſchool was, that in it he imitated what he ſaw in the foreign colleges of the learned, where the ſtudies of religion and philoſophy were enjoined; and the veil of ſanctity, common to the one, was extended to the other. Although he could not in Greece appropriate them to one claſs of men, yet he did his utmoſt to make a ſelection of proper participants in theſe ſublime ſtudies. The opinion that the minds of men being various, like their bodily conſtitutions, the ſame diſcipline ought not to be diſpenſed to them all, had early obtained credit in the world. It was ſo much adopted by Pythagoras, that he admitted none into his ſchool without a previous obſervation and trial of the temper and diſpoſition of their minds*. "We do not," ſaid he, "make an Apollo of every block "of marble, nor a Mercury of every piece of wood." The *purgation*, as it was called of a diſciple, equalled the auſterity of the ſtricteſt religious initiation. The ſilence enjoined to the diſciple, for five years, was of itſelf a ſevere probation.

The communication of knowledge to his eleves, in three ſeveral ways, by *plain ſpeaking*, by *concealing*, and by *ſignifying*, was a further proof how much he adhered to the manner of inſtruction he had learned abroad. The firſt of theſe needs no explication. The other two were the hieroglyphic and ſymbolic ſtiles, both highly eſteemed in Egypt †. In conformity to one of them, he taught, for inſtance, that the *unite* in number denoted *deity*, or the one original generator of all things; and that *two* expreſſed the indefinite nature of matter, or the whole complexity of viſible objects. The *quaternion*, or number *four*, was alſo conſidered as

* Aulus Gellius, lib. 1. † Sextus Empiricus, Adverſ. Mathem. lib. 4. p. 104, 5, 6. Diogen. Laert. lib. ner. 8. p. 507.

competing with the *unite*, in indicating the ſtability and power of the firſt cauſe. In this manner, the ideas of theology were concealed under numerical denominations. The *ſymbol* was likewiſe uſed to ſignify them; but, more generally *, to convey moral or political maxims. It conſiſted of a ſhort ſentence, and ſometimes of only a word or two, which, according to its literal ſenſe, was either vulgar or frivolous; but in another acceptation, which was latent, it required and merited attention and ſtudy, on account of its important meaning. Thus †, it was *ſymbolically* ſaid, "*Stir not up the fire with a ſword*," which has the obvious meaning, not to uſe an inſtrument unfit for the work to be done; but when reflected upon or explained, it communicated a precept, more proper and inſtructive, not *to inflame anger*, or inſtigate paſſion, where it was already excited, "*Sit not down upon the buſhel.*" The meaſure of corn of that denomination was not made for a ſeat; nor had it the conveniency of one, and yet it might be ſo uſed by the indolent and careleſs. Vulgarly taken, it might be ſuppoſed only to prohibit that practice; but its interpretation conveyed a more refined ſenſe, that men ought not to ſuſpend their thoughts of action and induſtry, on account of their having gained the preſent day's proviſion, but be always ready for the labour, which the next would require of them. *If a temple of the gods ſhould lie in the way of your journey*, and you were even to paſs near its gates, *yet enter it not*, was rather a religious precept that needed a comment, than a ſymbol in its proper form. It guarded againſt raſh intruſion into ſacred places, and againſt offering an unpremeditated worſhip to the gods, and pretending to do that occaſionally, which ought ever to be performed as a principal act. The ſymbol, beſide being ſometimes reduced to a ſingle word, was alſo expreſſed by letters or figures, which the inſtructed Pythagorean could eaſily explain. It appears to have been a device, which even civilized nations had fallen upon, for ſignifying to others their deſires and intentions, on important occaſions, by ſome ſenſible repreſentations of them, when letters and writing were little known. The ſymbolic ſigns were conſidered as forming

* Jamblicus ibid. cap. 29. † Porphyrius de Vita, p. 199.

forming a language more emphatic than that of words *, and calculated to make a more forcible and laſting impreſſion upon thoſe to whom they were addreſſed.

It has been obſerved, to the honour of Orpheus, that he reſtrained ſavage men from their horrible food; which ſome underſtand to have been their devouring their vanquiſhed enemies, and others their feeding upon the animal kind, while life yet quivered with the warm blood in their limbs. Plato † ſpeaks of the *Orphic* diet as a preſcribed abſtinence from all animal food, and the uſe of only the vegetable productions of the earth. That Pythagoras was acquainted with, and imitated ſeveral of the religious and moral precepts of the Thracian bard, is generally admitted. The diſtinction betwixt clean and unclean beaſts, whether for ſacrifice or for common nouriſhment, he might have learned in Egypt, and other eaſtern countries. To his diſciples he enjoined a total diſuſe of animal food, although it was not altogether obſerved among them. His ‡ favourite altar for religious worſhip was that of Apollo at Delos, who preſided over births; and where life, and not death, being the object, the ſpilling of blood, even accidentally, was accounted a profanation. The ſtory of his ſacrificing an ox upon his diſcovery of the mathematical theorem known by his name, Cicero § obſerves to be utterly improbable. Inconſiſtent it was with the ideas he had formed of religion and morality; in which a rational and temperate devotion, and a humanity extended to every creature poſſeſſed of life and ſenſation, were conſpicuous. His doctrine was, that all animated beings ‖ here below might be reckoned in a manner of a kindred tribe. In what point of view he underſtood and taught the particular one of the tranſmigration of human ſouls, known in Egypt, and diffuſed over all the Eaſt,

* One of the Scythian Princes ſent to Darius Hyſtaſpes, when he paſſed the Iſther with his army, a ſymbolic defiance, inſtead of a verbal one, which was that of a mouſe, a frog, and a bird, tied up together with a javelin, in a bag. It intimated, that, unleſs the Perſian ſoldiers could creep into holes, ſwim rivers, or fly through the air, they could have no ſucceſs. Clemen. Alexand. Strom. mat. 5.

† De Legibus, lib. 6. Diogen. Laert. ibid. p. 499.

‡ Philoſtratus in Vita Apolonis, lib. 1. cap. 2.;

§ De Natur. Deor. lib. 3. p. 253.

‖ Diogen. Laert. ibid.

Eaſt, will be ſtated in the account to be given of the philoſophy of the Italic ſchool. Here we ſhall only take notice, that, in the judgment of his ableſt diſciples, the vulgar notion of it was not admitted by him; and alſo, that he by no means held the human or rational ſoul to be of the ſame nature or origin with the mere animal or ſenſitive one; or that the corporeal and mortal nature could be ranked in the ſame claſs with that which was pre-exiſtent to body, and immortal.

A fiction, ſuch as that which Homer throws out * in his ſtory of the tranſmutation of Ulyſſes's companions into ſwine, by the inchantments of Circe, might be allowed to paſs in Pythagoras's ſchool, for the ſake of its moral import, although not conformable to any ſpecial tenet in his philoſophy; unleſs as it might be underſtood by common hearers of his diſcourſes, who were not admitted to the knowledge of its principles. It was †, however, agreeable, both to his phyſical and moral doctrine, to hold forth the animals below us as conſtituent parts of the general ſyſtem, and, on that account, reſpectable to us, who ought to lay aſide that thirſt for their blood contracted in the barbarous ages, when the wild kinds of them were many and formidable. Conſidering the food of man as indicating either his brutality or his humane feelings, he recommended that ſort of it which was attended with no cruelty, and, by being leſs inflammatory, would render him temperate and mild. The ſentiment itſelf was truly compaſſionate, and worthy of being touched in Orpheus's tendereſt ſtrains. No ſon of the muſes has alluded to it without ſome ſympathetic approbation. When recollected by the contemplative mind, it has been revered as the image and concomitant of the golden age; and, even in the indulged ſtate and latitude of the human appetites and paſſions, it has ſtill been admired. The Roman poet, a libertine as he was in principle and practice, could not take up the theme without falling ‡ into notes of relenting ſenſibility; ſo that, from

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* Odyſſey, lib. 10. p. 136. † Porphyrius de Abſtinentia ab Uſu Animalium, octav. edit. lib. 3. p. 135. et ſequent.

‡ The line of "Quid meruiſtis, oves, placidum pecus, inque tuendos," and the ſequel, is hardly ever forgot by any boy who ever read it at ſchool; and the "O genus attonitum gelidae formidine mortis," &c. alſo dwells upon the memory. Ovid. Metamorphoſ. lib. 15.

a licentious Epicurean, we are apt to think him ſuddenly transformed into one of the primitive diſciples of Pythagoras. He alſo conſiders another doctrine of this philoſopher, as emancipating human minds from the fears of Hades, and the Stygian lake, but upon a very different principle from the unnatural, comfortleſs, and heart-freezing conception of Epicurus, that death would totally extinguiſh their being. This will be afterwards explained. But we proceed now to narrate the inſtitution of the Italic ſchool, in conſequence of Pythagoras's voyage to Crotona, a Grecian city upon the Italian coaſt.

Colonies from Greece, beſide migrating eaſtward to Aſia minor, alſo took their courſe to the weſt, and planted themſelves in ſeveral ſea-ports of Italy and Sicily, which, in time becoming populous cities, were, with their diſtricts, called by the general name of *Magna Graecia*. It is remarkable, that a ſchool of philoſophy was inſtituted in both theſe colonial regions, before any ſuch literary ſeminary took place in the parent country. It would appear that one great motive which Pythagoras had to betake himſelf to the Grecian cities in Italy, was the hope, that the principles, both of their religion and policy, being of a later eſtabliſhment, and leſs rivetted by cuſtom than thoſe of the original ſtates, would admit more eaſily the improvements he might preſcribe. Upon his arrival in the city of Crotona, the extended fame he had already acquired, ſufficed to procure him the moſt honourable reception. People of all ranks flocked around him, and, according to Jamblicus *, were diſpoſed to pay him a veneration beyond what was due to one in mere mortal condition. The admiration of his eloquence and wiſdom, joined with that of his apparent probity and virtue, engaged the magiſtrates to ſubmit to his deciſion their moſt important public reſolutions. But the change of manners he introduced among the citizens was ſtill more ſurpriſing, eſpecially as the Crotoneates are ſaid to have contracted various depravations of luxury. The numerous audiences he had, of both ſexes, to his public lectures, gave him opportunity to diſplay and enforce the ſcience and practice of moral virtue †. The women laid aſide their ſuperfluous ornaments; and the men became aſhamed of their effeminate

* In vita Pythag. cap. 6. † Juſtin. Hiſtor. lib. 20. Philoſtrat. ibid.

nate habits; and ſo much was even the ſtrict diſcipline appointed to his eleves in ſcience complied with, that ſchools and ſocieties for learning, in imitation of thoſe of Crotona, were, in a ſhort time, erected at Rhegium, Locris, Tarentum, and Metapontum, in Italy, and at Catana, and other Grecian towns on the Sicilian coaſt. Thus far did the *Pythagorean dreams* * hopefully proceed; for conſtituting, or reforming republics upon a peculiar mixture of the principles of religion, and philoſophic ſcience.

The courſe of a few years was ſufficient to ſhow the fallacy of Pythagoras's project; and how vain the imagination was that the precepts of a philoſopher, or the principles of a contemplative ſociety, could avail to repreſs the operation of the common paſſions of men, eſpecially when exerted in free governments, where they are apt to run into the greateſt exceſſes. If Pythagoras, as ſome alledge, reckoned that his ſeminaries of diſciples could become, like the prieſts of Egypt, eſtabliſhed and permanent councils of the ſtates in which they were erected, he was ſurely no wiſe calculator of the difference of *political meridians*, and of the varying characters of nations. But in this, it is preſumable there was much more of philoſophic enthuſiaſm than of political deſign. One man's diſguſt was only required to ſubvert all the labours of the philoſopher, and that of his followers, and to involve him and them in a general ruin. As the number of the Pythagoreans increaſed, they became the majority in the ſenate of Crotona, and attained the chief adminiſtration of public affairs. For ſome time this created no jealouſy, but rather gave the utmoſt ſatisfaction †. Cylon, however, a perſon of rank and opulence in the city, reſenting Pythagoras's refuſal to admit him into his ſchool, upon the footing of an initiated diſciple, exerted all his endeavours to awake the ſleeping ſpirit of faction. He was ſoon ſucceſsful in attaching to his party all thoſe who were, like himſelf, diſſipated in their manners. He repreſented the Pythagorean ſocieties as diſguiſed inſtruments of political domination, and that their aſſumed authority in the government of Crotona, fully verified this accuſation.

Ignorance

* The ſcheme may be reckoned among the *Somnia Pythagoræ*, mentioned by Horace.

† Jamblicus, cap. 25. p. 205.

Ignorance in the multitude, and jealouſy in others, rendered it credible. The ſilent demeanour of the Pythagoreans, their ſecrecy, the *ſymbol*, or *cypher*, intelligible only among themſelves, were deemed indubitable proofs of its truth. Various are the accounts of the meaſures purſued by Cylon, and his aſſociates, for overthrowing the ſect. But the iſſue was, that, taking advantage of the popular odium now excited, a ſcheme was laid for their deſtruction, by aſſaulting the perſons of the principal men among them. While convened in the public hall, or, as ſome ſay, in the houſe of Milo, the famous wreſtler, they were ſurrounded; and the edifice being ſet on fire, all who were preſent, except Archippus and Lyſis, fell victims to the flames, or to the ſwords of their enemies. The number of the ſufferers is not agreed upon; while ſome reckon them forty, and others a great many more. Pythagoras himſelf, before the fatal event, had gone to Metapontum, where concern, added to the infirmity of his age, ſoon put an end to his life. The ſame outrageous jealouſy, which aroſe in Crotona, ſpread through the other Italian cities and towns, into which the Pythagorean fraternities had been introduced. Rhegium only afforded a protection for the refugees from Crotona. In other places, they were generally ſubjected to forfeitures of their eſtates, or to exilements.

To conſider this cataſtrophe of the Pythagoreans as the conſequence of their aſpiring to civil power; and to conceive their founder to have been one who entertained the deep deſign of ſubjecting, by means of his religious and philoſophic diſcipline, the cities and ſtates of the *Magna Græcia*, to the controul and juriſdiction of his ſect, is an opinion unauthoriſed by the judgment of antiquity, which vouches no leſs for the ſimplicity, candour, and diſintereſted virtue, of the Pythagorean diſciples, than for the extent of their theological wiſdom, or political knowledge. Pythagoras himſelf was, perhaps, in no principle maintained by him ſo much an enthuſiaſt, as in that of his hatred of political tyrranny, and zeal for equality among the citizens in every community. He connected his deteſtation of the oppoſite principle with the idea of injuſtice, when underſtood in a religious as well as in a moral ſenſe, to imply an uſurpation of power contrary to the will of the gods, and which they had aſſigned to no individuals. It was the chief labour

of his life to oppoſe arbitrary rule *; as the tyrant of Centoripa is ſaid, in conſequence of his remonſtrances, to have reſigned his oppreſſive power, ſo the cruel Phalaris is reckoned to have owed his death to his inſtigations. His political doctrines were not, like his philoſophical ones, involved in myſtery, but openly declared, and well known. Various cities and communities, by the juſt and equal laws he promoted amongſt them, bore teſtimony, that not the narrow view or ambition of throwing civil authority into the hands of his ſect, but the noble one of reducing the ſcience of government to its trueſt principles, and exemplifying wiſe and equitable legiſlation, animated all his endeavours †: Hence he is called by Cicero the *greateſt ornament* of ancient Italy, on account of the civil inſtitutions, and ingenious arts, communicated by him; and the diſciples trained up in the knowledge of his political maxims ‡, ſuch as Zaleucus of Locris, and Charondas of Thurium, are not known to have aſſumed power, or dealt in intrigues, even where every opportunity was given them, but to have derived the ſignal fame that followed them, from the honeſt and worthy exertions they made for eſtabliſhing civil concord and harmony in the ſtates they were called to reform. To have the capacity of performing this ſervice to mankind, was reckoned, in the Pythagorean ſchool, the higheſt of all worldly honours.

The deciſive ſentence of the *ipſe dixit* has been often quoted, to the reproach of Pythagoras ‖, as a teacher of philoſophy, and to the ridicule of his ſchool; and, if underſtood according to the common acceptation, nothing can be imagined more abſurd. Perhaps there may be a miſtake in ſuppoſing that it implied an implicit ſubmiſſion to every dictate of Pythagoras. We may venture to ſay, farther, that it is morally improbable, in the higheſt degree, that ſuch diſciples as Archytas of Tarentum, Philolaus, Timaeus of Locris, Ocellus Lucanus, Alcmaeon, Lyſis, the preceptor of Epaminondas, men of the moſt diſtinguiſhed abilities in ſcience, and whoſe literary works teſtified their genius, could ever admit Pythagoras's aſſertion, or that of any philoſopher, in the room of reaſon

* Jamblic. cap. 32.
† Tuſculan. Quaeſt. lib. 5.
‡ Diogen. Laert. ibid. p. 501.
‖ Cicer. de Natur. Deor. lib. 1. p. 192.

reaſon itſelf, and acquieſce in it as the *ultimatum* of human knowledge *. It appears, indeed, that the *ipſe dixit*, or the precept, without the reaſon being annexed to it, was directed to thoſe called *Acouſtics*, or the croud of auditors, and the undiſciplined, who attended his ſchool. During the five years of the *noviciate* of the diſciples, it alſo had its currency amongſt them. But, if we ſuppoſe that it was extended to the fully inſtructed, it is likely to have been only with a particular view of terminating diſputes, and preſerving in the ſect an apparent unanimity of ſentiments. In that age, the *dialectic*, as it was afterwards called, or a method of conducting any argument with accuracy, and in ſuch a manner as to avoid a falſe concluſion, unleſs what natural good ſenſe might ſuggeſt to that purpoſe, was unſtudied, and made no part of erudition or ſcience. The Pythagorean diſciples, ſenſible how readily they might be miſled, or miſlead others, in various diſputable queſtions, would find it the propereſt remedy againſt vague and fallacious argumentation, and generally the beſt termination of their reaſoning, to appeal to ſome noted axiom, or acknowledged principle, in the doctrine of their maſter. Conſidered in this light, the *ipſe dixit* was no ſuch groſs abſurdity as it is commonly repreſented.

The diſtinction which Pythagoras choſe to make amongſt his diſciples, according to the judgment he could form of their genius and capacities, inſtead of being a political meaſure, calculated to ſtrengthen his ſect, had a direct tendency to weaken and infringe its union. It rendered his ſchool a breed of philoſophers, who cultivated ſeparate branches of ſcience †. Some were *theologiſts*, dedicated chiefly to religious ſtudies; ſome were *politicians*, converſant in the theory of legiſlation and civil government; and others *mathematicians*, who applied themſelves to geometry and aſtronomy. Upon none was impoſed, and from none was exacted, any other taſk or performance, but that for which their natural faculties and inclinations appeared to qualify them ‡. One party of them was cloſely united to the college; and, having their eſtates thrown

* Diogen. Laert. ibid. † De vita Pythag. autor. incertus. Ex. Photii. Bibliotheca, codice 249. Holſteno Interprete.

‡ Porphyr. de vita, p. 189. et obſervat. ad vitam.

into the common ſtock, uſed the diet, and lived according to the forms preſcribed in the ſociety. Another claſs was allowed to retain their fortunes, and to dwell at home, under the profeſſion of being of the ſect, but tied to leſs ſtrict rules of fellowſhip. Theſe two orders were diſtinguiſhed from each other by the names of *Pythagoreans* and *Pythagorites*, or the genuine diſciples, and their imitators. The diſtinction was triple, when it included foreigners.

According to Pythagoras's doctrine, morals and politics formed one ſyſtem, and were reducible to the ſame principles. As his treatiſes on the latter, which are ſaid to have been large, are not tranſmitted, we can form no diſtinct judgment how he reconciled the duties required of his diſciples in their private capacity, which, in ſeveral reſpects, were ſingular, and out of the tract of common life, with ſuch as might be exacted of them, as members of civil government. Here we allude not to the precepts about diet and abſtinence, but take into view their ſenſe and practice of certain moral duties, when they came in competition with others that might be accounted of ſuperior obligation. A Pythagorean, it appears, under promiſe to render any perſonal ſervice to one of his fraternity, although not very important, reckoned himſelf indiſpenſibly bound to perform it, in the preciſe manner and time he had engaged. Arreſted by his word given, he could not turn aſide to do any other office, which his country or his neighbours might requeſt of him, if that demand put him out of the way of acquitting himſelf of his promiſe *. Lyſis meets his friend Euryphamus going to worſhip in the temple of Juno, and is aſked by him to wait at the gate, until he had performed his adoration, and ſhould return to him. He promiſes to do ſo. Wrapt up in ſome deep meditation, Euryphamus forgets the appointment he had made, and departs by another entry. In expectation of his appearance, Lyſis had taken his ſeat upon a ſtone bench, and remained there all the hours of the day, and through thoſe of the night. His name being accidentally mentioned next morning, in the preſence of Euryphamus, the interview with him was recollected by the latter. He repairs to the temple, and finds him there, keeping his ſtation, and ſtill waiting

* Diogen. Laert. ibid.

waiting his return with all compoſure. In this inſtance, there was teſtified, perhaps, more reſpect to a friend, and a confidence in his punctuality, than a ſenſe of ſtrict obligation. But if it was a Pythagorean maxim to put an ordinary and accidental promiſe upon an equality with the engagement of an oath, which is alledged to have been the caſe, it muſt be looked upon as a *hyperbole* in morals, and to have inferred various improprieties in conduct. An oath or vow was either a deliberate, voluntary, and public act of religion, or was pronounced upon ſome extraordinary occaſion, and ſuch as was ſufficient to introduce it. All that was accounted ſacred among men was called to witneſs the ſincerity of it; and therefore, although a perſon ſwore to his own hurt, he was not to think himſelf at liberty to retract. It would ſeldom interfere with any call to public or private duty; or, if it did, its ſolemnity would make it publicly known. But promiſes among friends are often requeſted and granted upon ſlight occaſions, and with no reſerve or ceremony. Unleſs, then, the Pythagoreans be ſuppoſed to have been as ſcrupulous in giving promiſes as they were religiouſly ſtrict in the obſervance of them, they muſt have been frequently thrown into diſagreeable ſituations, and committed errors in moral behaviour, more culpable than thoſe incurred in other ſocieties, where a proper diſtinction was made with reſpect to the obligation of the greater and leſſer moralities.

There are other precepts of a frivolous kind imputed to Pythagoras, or delivered as articles of his moral diſcipline, which may be reckoned more worthy of the *Pythagoritæ*, or *mimics*, of his ſchool, than of the true Pythagoreans. We can, indeed, diſcover no foundation for them in thoſe fragments which bear the names of ſome of his earlieſt diſciples, and appear to be genuine relicts of their writings: Nor does Hierocles, in his commentary on the *Golden Verſes*, give ground to ſuppoſe that ſuch *embrios* of religious or moral doctrine had credit amongſt the more intelligent of the ſect. Some of them, as we may underſtand from Porphyry, were no more than preſcriptions for health, or for the rendering the body more freely ſubſervient to the energies of the mind. The enjoined abſtinence from *beans* moſt probably proceeded from no other reaſon, notwithſtanding the various fictions reported with reſpect to it. Venerated as the name of Pythagoras was among his diſciples, and its authority

authority required for every ſpecies of doctrine, yet this did not prevent various miſtakes and corruptions of it from taking place *. It is not agreed among antient authors, whether any philoſophic treatiſes he had written were preſerved after his death; and, by ſeveral of them, it is obſerved hat he committed nothing to writing. But, if it ſhould be allowed that there were extant ſuch commentaries of his as Diogenes Laertius † mentions, upon the authority of Heraclitus, the philoſopher, who, in his books, gave the titles of them, it ſeems that they had been loſt at an early period. Beſide uncommon accidents to which they were liable from the cataſtrophe of his followers, Porphyry takes notice of its ‡ being an unfavourable circumſtance that they were written in the Doric dialect, which had a peculiar obſcurity; and that tranſcripts of them into other dialects were made by thoſe who were not true Pythagoricks. Hence enſued a miſapprehenſion of many of his precepts, and a ridicule of their perverted meaning §. The poet Epicharmus, who was only a common hearer of his public diſcourſes, and not of his college, took the liberty to deſcant, in ſportful verſe, upon ſome of the moſt abſtruſe points of his philoſophy.

It is alledged, and with probability, that, at firſt, every literary compoſition, by any of the diſciples of Pythagoras's ſchool, had his name prefixed to it: But this uſage had been ſoon laid aſide, moſt likely on account of the abuſe to which it was turned. Although antiquity has tranſmitted his golden verſes as the moſt genuine ſummary of his moral doctrines, they are evidently not of his compoſition. Some of the verſes were probably taken from his mouth ‖, but the greater part appear to be recollected ſentences, turned into numbers by Lyſis or Philolaus, or them both; who, in contradiction to fictitious or faulty compilements of their maſter's precepts, might find it neceſſary to publiſh a juſt abſtract of them **. From the latter of them came that *Collect* of Pythagoras's philoſophy which was moſt eſteemed, and that Plato thought well purchaſed for forty *minae*. The theory of the ſciences, divine and human, taught

* Vide Lucian, Plutarch, Cicero.
† Ibid. in Vita.
‡ De Vita Pythag. p. 205. et ſeq.
§ Jamblicus in capit. ult.
‖ Diogen. Laert. in Vita Philolai, lib. 5.
** Porph. de Vita Pythag. p. 208.

taught by this celebrated philoſopher, was further illuſtrated by the publications of Timaeus of Locrtis, Ocellus Lucanus, Archytas, and other eminent diſciples of his Italic ſchool.

Notwithſtanding the great ſubverſion of the Pythagorean ſchools that has been mentioned, ſtill ſome ſcattered veſtiges of them were preſerved. In theſe, both teachers and diſciples were found, who ſupported the reputation, although they could not revive the ſplendour, of their ſect. The unenvied privacy to which they were reduced, joined to the virtuous ſimplicity of their manners, contributed to their duration; and *, according to Diogenes Laertius, we muſt reckon nineteen generations, from Pythagoras, until his retainers totally diſappeared, or were abſorbed in other ſects, whoſe principles bore ſome analogy to their own. While a remnant of them ſubſiſted, they were beheld with veneration, like the ſequeſtrated prieſts of ſome once famous, but forſaken ſhrine. "At this day," ſays Iſocrates, "we more admire a Pythagorean in his "ſilence, than a perſon who diſcourſes in the moſt eloquent manner." Although contemplative and ſtudious, a true Pythagorean was attentive, and feelingly alive to every act of duty, and generous ſervice, to all of his tribe. The tie of friendſhip amongſt individuals of the ſect, was equal to every proof of its conſtancy. Damon † and Pythias contended which of them ſhould die in place of the other. In youth, the ſtudies, the exerciſes, and amuſements of the *friends* were the ſame, and tallied through every period of age. An indiſſoluble ſympathy was the conſequence, which ceaſed not altogether in death. The image of the departed friend was ſought for, and contemplated, as far as might be, in ſome living character. The proviſions made for the general benefit of the ſect, teſtified not only the prevalence of friendly affections, but of the warmeſt benevolence amongſt its members. The aged and infirm had comfortable receſſes aſſigned them. The credit of the fraternity ſerved the accidental neceſſities of every individual; and his wilful receſſion from it, or the breach of his ſacred engagements, could only deprive him of theſe privileges. In this caſe, if he had contributed any thing

* In Vita Pythag. ad finem. p. 234.

† Valerius Maxim. lib. 4. quart. edit.

thing to the public ſtock, it was returned to him; but his alienation was conſidered as a ſad walk into the grave. His *moral* death was deplored; and his obſequies were ſolemnly performed, as of one more *woefully* dead, than he who only falls a corporeal victim to mortality.

So far we have attempted to trace, not what may be called *a life* of Pythagoras, which, perhaps, never was, and now cannot be compiled without an intermixture of fables or vague conjectures. An eſſay only has been made, to give the outlines of his genius and character, and to join with them ſome explications of the diſcipline of his ſchool, and of particular tenets of his philoſophy, which otherwiſe might have been omitted, and could not, without frequent and improper digreſſions, be introduced into the following general diſſertations on the principles, theological and moral, which not only diſtinguiſhed the Pythagorean ſect, but were partly ingrafted into the ſyſtems of the moſt admired philoſophers in the academies of Athens.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Preliminary reaſoning of the Pythagoreans.—Their argument for the Incorporeal Nature being the Original Principle in the Univerſe;—and why they Philoſophiſed by Numbers.—Views of Theories in Theology and Morals.

TWO natures of things, the incorporeal and corporeal, were held by the Pythagoreans as together conſtituting the univerſe. They, therefore, defined philoſophy to be the ſcience of things divine and human, or of objects intelligible by the mind, and of thoſe perceived by the ſenſes. In diſcuſſing the queſtion, into which of theſe two component parts of the univerſe, its principle might, moſt rationally, be reſolved, they held it to be an evident truth, *that bodies could never be the principle of bodies.* All of them, ſaid they, apparent to us, are compounded; and, therefore, in none of them is to be diſcerned a firſt principle. To alledge, that the minute particles of bodies, although they eſcape the ſenſes, may have the form of principles, is a vague aſſertion, and, when conſidered, leads to no concluſion. For, if we ſuppoſe any ſpecies of body to be analyſed, and its ſmalleſt particles to be reduced into thoſe which are ſmaller; yet, whether theſe be called atoms, or inviſible quantities, we can ſtill conceive a further diminution of them, and that to proceed in an endleſs ſeries. There is, therefore, no principle of originality either apparent or conceivable in bodies; and thoſe who inſiſt upon it, are only right in ſaying, that it is unapparent and obſcure. But they ought to go further, in order to diſcover the truth, and acknowledge, that, if ſuch a principle obtains in the univerſe, it is to be found in the incorporeal nature, or that genus of being which is comprehended only by the mind; otherwiſe it muſt be concluded, that

the world is without a principle *. It is added by Sextus Empiricus, who ſtates the Pythagorean argument at greater length, that Epicurus, who is known to have held the eternity of atoms, and denied all incorporeal ſubſtance, was obliged to confeſs, that we acquire the idea of body, by combining in our minds its ſenſible qualities of extenſion, figure, and ſolidity; without which conception it could be no intelligible thing. But, if a mental idea of body neceſſarily precedes the knowledge of body, the incorporeal and intelligent nature muſt be inferred to have eſſence prior to the corporeal and unintelligent †; and as bodies, apparent and ſenſible, are conſtituted of thoſe which are unapparent, ſo the intelligible ideas of them muſt have their original in beings incorporeal, and poſſeſſed of intelligence; which are, therefore, to be concluded the only principles of things in the world.

In attempting to give any rational account of the conſtitution of the world, whether it be ſuppoſed to have been eternal, or to have been generated, all philoſophers have found it neceſſary to form certain conceptions of the ſubſtances that do exiſt, and to expreſs, in the moſt perſpicuous manner they can, their ideas of them. Some held all ſubſtances to be no more than an aſſemblage of what others called the qualities of bodies, and therefore contented themſelves with taking only a collective view of theſe qualities ‡; while the Pythagoreans thought it more philoſophical to conſider them ſeparately by themſelves, as objects intelligible to the mind. *Thus*, ſaid they, the extenſion of body may be conceived

* Sext. Empir. Adverſ. Mathem. in cap. de Numero, lib. 9. p. 425. fol. edit.

† Notwithſtanding the above argument uſed by the diſciples of the Pythagorean ſchool, it muſt be admitted, that they generally ſuppoſed matter unformed, which was not body, to have been eternal, or, at leaſt, pre-exiſtent in time to the conſtitution of the world. That this was their hypotheſis, appears from the account to be given of the formation of the world, according to Timaeus Locrus; and it muſt be owned to have been the common deluſion of the ancient philoſophers. We call it a *deluſion*; becauſe no idea can be conceived of matter without any form; nor is it explained by them in any other way, but by ſaying what it was not, and making it a *chimera*, void of all properties, and yet ſo far qualified as to be the ſubject of them.

‡ Porphyrius in Vita Pythag. p. 202.

ceived without its figure, and both theſe properties ſeparate from its weight. A line, a ſuperficies, a ſolid, are ſurely different conceptions, although all of them be found together in the dimenſion of body. Yet each of them comes under the predicament of numbers. A line, as conſidered by mathematicians, conſiſts of ſeveral points; and its length is determined by the number of them. A ſuperficies is compoſed of ſeveral lines, and a ſolid of ſeveral ſurfaces *. *Number*, therefore, is a primary *idea*, antecedent even to that of a conceivable ſubſtance, or the conſtituent properties of body. It is ever occurring to the mind; for each idea is one, and, when joined to another, it is more. As the Pythagoreans held incorporeals, or intelligibles, to be the principles of all things, they reckoned that their eſſential differences could not be ſo diſtinctly and philoſophically expreſſed in any language, as in that of numbers: For how, ſaid they, is the firſt principle of the univerſe underſtood, in its identity and individuality, to be repreſented to the mind with a propriety equal to what the *monad* holds forth; and, if alterity be found in nature, the duad, as it may be called, is a no leſs expreſſive epithet, when taken not according to the common conception of the arithmetical number two, conſiſting of one, and one, but of one, and another, or what is indefinite; and therefore not properly number, but its ſource or beginning. In this manner, they reckoned the cleareſt diſtinction was made between the incorporeal and indiviſible firſt cauſe, and paſſive matter, the ſubject of its operation; which being diviſible and alterable, had the capacity of producing the triad, the firſt diſtinct numerical idea, or quantity aſcertained, and particularly terminated, having a beginning, a middle, and an end. It may be aſſerted, therefore, that Pythagoras, and his immediate ſucceſſors, by no means entertained the viſionary notions of a phyſical and generative power in numbers, which their followers, in a ſubſequent age, abſurdly adopted, to the ſhame of philoſophy; and that the former inſiſted upon the ſcience of numbers only as ſubſervient to the abſtract and intellectual contemplation of the principles of things, which they maintained to be incorporeal, and in conjunction with body, to be ſuſceptible of multitude and

 magnitude,

* Porphyrius in Vita Pythag. lib. 4. p. 104. 105.

magnitude, identity, and diverſity, equality and inequality. It has been reported, ſays Theano, as cited by Stobaeus, by many of the Greeks, that Pythagoras taught that numbers were * principles; but his doctrine was, not that things originated from them, but according to them. The treating philoſophical ſubjects according to mathematical ideas, and particularly thoſe of arithmetic, was not ſo much exploded even in Ariſtotle's † time; but that he, who overſpread the whole ground of philoſophy with metaphyſical and logical terms, choſe to explain the four faculties of the ſoul in the Pythagoric manner. The underſtanding, ſays he, correſponds to the unite, knowledge to the number two, opinion to three, or the triangular ſuperficies, and ſenſe to the quaternion, or ſolid figure. The idea annexed by the Pythagoreans to the quaternion, was, however, a very different one. The author of the Golden verſes ſwears by his maſter Pythagoras, who had tranſmitted to his diſciples ‡ the knowledge of the *Tetractys*, which is the ſource of nature, ever flowing on in generation. Hierocles, in his commentary upon the verſes, underſtands by the myſtic number four, the Deity himſelf, the fountain of everlaſting order in the world. But in what ſenſe is he the quaternion? This, adds he, muſt be learned from the ſacred book, aſcribed to Pythagoras, in which the Deity is held forth as the *number of numbers*. He then deſcants upon the perfection of the unite, as the principle of all the numbers, and having the powers of them all; and obſerves further, that the whole power of the Decad, which is the finite interval of number, was firſt diſcoverable in the four, which, taken together with the three numbers antecedent to it, made up ten. After ſuch ſpeculations on the virtue and efficacy of the quaternion, he concludes it to bind together all beings, the natural elements and ſeaſons, the ages of human life, and of human ſocieties. It is ſubjoined, that the intelligent God is, after this manner, the cauſe of the ſenſible one, or the animated world. By all this, if any thing be intelligible, we may underſtand it to be an eſ-

ſay

* Stobaei Eclog. Phyſ. lib. 1. p. 27. Theano was Pythagoras's ſpouſe, who took the government of the ſchool upon his death, and wrote ſome philoſophic treatiſes, which remained.

† Ariſt. de Anima, lib. 1. cap. 2. cum Hieroclis Comment.

‡ Aurea Car. verſ. lin. 47. 48.

ſay on the myſterious Theurgy, as it was called, or the operation of the Deity in the fabric of the heavens and the earth, and on the ſubject of which, we have, in the fragment of Timaeus Locrus *, the following diſſertation, together with other principles of the Pythagorean philoſophy.

There were two cauſes of all things, mind and neceſſity; the one, of ſuch as are done with reaſon, and the other, of thoſe which are produced by power, and according to the capacity of bodies. The principle of the fair, and the beſt things in the world, is called God; whilſt other adventitious cauſes are to be referred to neceſſity. Before the generation of the world, form, or the idea of it, and matter void of ſhape, but ſuſceptible of it, coexiſted with God, who wiſe, as well as good, ſaw what was to be done in order to produce a regular ſyſtem of things. He imparted that form to the maſs of matter, which gave it a definite conſtitution, and rendered it one whole, and perfect; being uniform, and alſo moſt comprehenſive, from its rotundity, and from its circular motions, adapted to that perpetual duration for which it was deſigned by him. For he who made it fair, not after the model of any thing done before, but according to his own intelligible idea, willed that it ſhould be ſo permanent, as to be diſſolvable by no other cauſe but that of his own volition. As, therefore, a good parent can have no motive or inducement to deſtroy what has been procreated by him, eſpecially when it bears the ſtamp of pulchritude upon it, the world remains, as it was formed by its maker, unaltered, and exempted from change. The more it may be reckoned to have this perfection, as it was endowed with life, and the infuſion of an all-informing and intelligent ſoul; a ſoul ſo contempered, as to conſiſt of idea individual, or unity, and dividual eſſence, or number. Hence the world is found to contain two different powers, or principles of motion, which may be diſtinguiſhed by the names of *the ſame*, and *of another*; the firſt being conſtant, and the ſecond variable. The conjoining theſe two powers, whether in the ſoul of the world, or in the viſible creation, was an intricate operation; but effectuated according to the powers of harmonic numbers. Here, then, the wide ſtep was made into

* Timaeus Locrus de Anima Mundi. In Opuſculis Mythol. Phyſic. Ethic. Octav. edit. Amſtelodami, p. 544.

into philoſophyſing, in the myſtic ſtyle that has been exemplified, and which threw ſuch obſcurity upon the doctrine of the Pythagorean ſchools, that the inſcription upon the ſtatue of the Egyptian Iſis, or Minerva, wrapt around with a thick ſhroud, was ſaid to become them, "who "can penetrate through my veil."

Reſigning, therefore, the inveſtigation of the numerical faculties to thoſe who can be amuſed with them, we ſhall only here ſubjoin, from the ſame author, ſo much of his account of the ſyſtem of the world as may ſerve to introduce that of Plato, afterwards to be given, which is no more than an enlarged view of the ſame principles.

The ſoul of the material world, which is its greateſt ornament, muſt be conceived to have had all its endowments prior to its infuſion into a ſubject void of all qualities. For, whatever in the univerſe is more adorned, and more eminently qualified than another, muſt be concluded to be the more ancient, and to have the precedence in originality. Time, indeed, is but coeval with the generated world; yet in ſuch a manner, that it may be conceived to be the image of that time ungenerated, which is called *eternity*. As the conſtitution of the world, furniſhed with an enlivening ſoul, demonſtrated the operation of its parent and founder, ſo the generation of animals, ſubject to mortality, but capable of continuing their ſpecies, teſtified a ſimilarity of deſign, and a completion of like admirable workmanſhip. The procreation and cuſtody of all living ſubſtances, under the law of mortality, was, indeed, committed to Nature; who, as the appointed diſtributer and nouriſher of animal life, performs her work in every region of *alterity*; making ſouls flow into bodies, ſome from the ſun and moon, and others from the wandering ſtars; but her power ſtops at that which, in the human compoſition, poſſeſſes identity, and which being the eſſence of the rational part, remains the ſame as it was given by the ſupreme ruler of the world, to be the type and ſignature of wiſdom to thoſe of the human race, who, along with this good deſtiny, make it the ſtudy of their life how to uſe it aright.

In the myſtical detail of the origin of all rational ſouls, ſuch as the human, their exiſtence before their connection with bodies, is evidently delivered as a Pythagorean doctrine. They are repreſented, not as generated

rated by Nature, but as individual portions of the intelligent ſoul of the world, which being contempered with the elementary eſſences, were conſigned to Nature's charge for diſtribution into mortal bodies, and coalition with them. Therefore they were, in a manner, coeval with their original, and the production of the world; which, according to this philoſophy, beſide human ſouls, contained a multiplicity of other intelligencies converſant with bodies, and acting in the celeſtial and terreſtrial ſpheres, in various capacities, and with the ſeveral denominations of heroes and demons; the earth being accounted the reſidence of certain inferior divinities, as well as of men. Evident it is, that the immortality of human ſouls could be inferred, by neceſſary conſequence, from the doctrine of their pre-exiſtence; and that the argument with reſpect to this important point, inſtead of a prolix diſcuſſion, might be reduced to this ſhort ſtate: Whatever ſubſtances had co-exiſted with the world, and were not generated from any adventitious forms, or accidents of body, could not be affected by corporeal viciſſitudes, and corruptibility; but the rational ſouls of men are ſuch ſubſtances; therefore they are not ſubject to corruption with the body, but immortal.

The doctrine of the tranſmigration of human ſouls into the bodies of other animals, by way of penal ſuffering, and correction for their vices, is mentioned by Timaeus Locrus, not as a tenet of the Pythagorean philoſophy, adapted to rational minds, but a fictitious one, calculated to ſtrike the groſs, and otherwiſe indocile minds of the multitude. He ranks it with the fables of Homer; which having a religious or moral tendency, might be reckoned allowable deceptions, and properly enough employed to deter the impious and profligate from their lawleſs and pernicious practices. This, ſays he, is no more than what is often done by the phyſician in his healing art. Diſeaſes which yield not to gentle, and what may be called more ſalubrious remedies, are expelled by thoſe which are more effectual, but ſevere and violent. Therefore, to impreſs truth, which is the ſanity of the ſoul, upon certain impenetrable minds, they muſt be told of ſtrange puniſhments abiding them, ſuch as the tranſmigration of their ſouls from one animal body into another, in which every one ſhall meet the chaſtiſement due to his depravation. But, with reſpect to the ſuffering of ſouls, there can, in reality, be no

other

other than what Nemeſtis, in adequate judgment of their demerit, has determined for them; and which, in the ſecond circuit, or the return of the ſoul into the regions of air *, the furies, and other terreſtrial demons, the inſpectors of human affairs, are impowered to inflict; having this charge from the ſupreme God, the diſpoſer of all things. We alſo find in Hierocles's commentary †, a ſimilar diſapprobation of the Metempſichoſis, which is declared to be a miſtaken and irrational opinion, implying a degradation of the ſuperior nature into the inferior, which the order of the univerſe forbids; and that can be underſtood only in a metaphorical ſenſe, when vice is ſaid to debaſe man to the brutal condition.

The author laſt mentioned has alſo given, in the explanation of his text, the Pythagorean doctrine with regard to the future felicity of thoſe ſouls which have adorned themſelves with virtue and truth, and thus completed their purification from corporeal paſſions. It amounts to a kind of deification. Liberated from the body, ſays he, the enlightened and purified ſoul ſhall become an immortal god, no more obnoxious to death or corruption. But its elevation to divinity was to be underſtood in a limited ſenſe, and in connection with other points of the Pythagorean theology. It was a principle in it, *that ſpecies does not coincide with ſpecies;* but every diſtinct nature remains under its peculiar law. Thus, in the three fixed orders of beings, the immortal gods, the heroes by nature, and the terreſtrial demons, together with human ſouls, the perfection of each of them is not placed in the change of its eſſence, or in its tranſmutation into a ſtate of being ſuperior to that which it occupies, but in the proportional and comparative likeneſs which all of them, in their ſeveral ranks, bear to the ſupreme God. In the firſt of them, this reſemblance was ſaid to be of conſtant duration, always the ſame in degree; in the ſecond, to be no leſs perpetual, but not ever in equal meaſure; and, in the third, to have neither conſtancy in the one way, nor invariability in the other. Yet the human ſoul was to be conſidered as having attained a deified condition, when, in conjunction with its ſubtile vehicle, it mounted to its pure aetherial place, ſuperior to that of terreſtrial

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 5. † Hierocles Comment. in Verſ. 52. 53.

terreſtrial and periſhable bodies; and from thence never to deſcend again to the ſphere of mortality and corruption. It is in alluſion to this retreat of purified ſouls, according to the Pythagorean principle, into the regions of aether, ſuppoſed to be below the celeſtial ſpheres, but above the ſublunary one, that the poets * ſing of their taking flight from hence, and being reunited, each of them to its proper ſtar; which, in more philoſophical language, was expreſſed, by their recovering their primaeval ſtate, being reſolved into their original principle, and harmoniſing with the ſoul of the world.

We enter not into a more particular account of the ſphere of the *triple world*, as it was called, and which the Pythagoreans diſtinguiſhed by the names of the inferior, ſuperior, and ſupreme. The explication which ancient authors give of this arrangement of the univerſe, is marked with obſcurity, and a conſiderable diverſity of opinion. Even the terms they employ in deſcribing it are varied, according to the indiſtinct conceptions they had of a theory ſo dark and abſtruſe. Yet, before concluding the ſubject, it is proper that one remark ſhould be added to what has been ſaid of the three orders of intelligent and rational being found in the univerſe. Among them, it ſeems, of the ſame order, and who poſſeſſed the ſame eſſence, it was imagined that ſome natural diſtinction took place, ſo as to infer ſubordinate degrees of virtue and excellence, according to the higher or lower places in the celeſtial ſphere, aſſigned them for habitation, by the will of the Deity. Hence, we find Hierocles aſſerting, that, in the firſt of theſe claſſes, as well as in the other two, ſome of thoſe he ſtiles immortal Gods were more, and ſome leſs, divine than others †. From this doctrine we may trace the introduction of thoſe fantaſtic ſpeculations about the moral attributes and qualities of theſe divinities, their agency in the globes and ſtars of heaven, and the influence they were ſuppoſed to derive, to the ſublunary and terreſtrial world, which, by the later Pythagoreans, were carried into all the abſur-

 dities

* Virgil, who in ſeveral paſſages alludes to the Pythagorean philoſophy, has, in in his Georgics, the verſe well known to every reader of the claſſics:

Nec morti eſſe locum, ſed viva volare,
Sideris in numerum.

† Hieroclis Comment. V. 1. cap. 1.

dities of judicial aſtrology and divination. The veſtiges of theſe and other corruptions of this philoſophy, which was early propagated through the eaſtern nations, are obſervable among them to this day. But, in whatever manner they explained what they called the *condition*, *chorus*, and *order*, that obtained in the fixed ſtars, and in the ſeven planets, they diſtinguiſhed from them the ſuper-etherial or ſupreme world, as that which comprehended them and all other things within itſelf; having the eſſence of ſempiternity, and being replete with all principles, the ſum of which was found in one divine mind. Without reference to time or place, without diſtinction of its genus, it could not be properly called by any name, unleſs that of the all-governing throne of the Deity was applicable to it. But this much may ſuffice as a ſketch of the theory of the world as it was conceived by the Pythagoreans, and which we will find reſumed and inſiſted upon, at greater length, in the account of the Platonic philoſophy. The general principles of the ethical, or what was called the practical part of the Pythagorean ſyſtem, come now to be delineated.

All philoſophy, at firſt, and for a courſe of time, was comprehended under the general name of Phyſics, which has been ſince more fully expreſſed by the compound word Phyſico-theology. Until about Socrates's age, there was no diviſion of it into phyſics, properly ſo called, and dialectic, and ethics. Theology and morals were generally treated under one head; and, in the Pythagorean ſchool, they were not diſtinguiſhed further, than as the one was conſidered to be the foundation of the other. Piety and the worſhip of the gods was taught as the fundamental principle of moral diſcipline. But it may be reckoned the peculiarity of this philoſophy, not only that the precept was at firſt given without the reaſon of it, but that a certain degree of moral and virtuous practice was required of the diſciple, before he was deemed qualified to underſtand or to reliſh theoretical principles, relative to the general nature and conſtitution of things, and productive of wiſdom and mental improvement, not human only, but divine *. For as the blemiſhed eye, ſays Hieroeles, or one accidentally ſtained, endures not, until it be cleanſed,

* Hieroeles in Proœmio ad Aur. Carm.

cleanſed, the view of bright objects, ſo neither does the ſoul, which has not the purification of virtue, behold with ſteadineſs the beauty and ſplendour of truth.

Upon this axiom, the philoſophy of human life, or the moral diſcipline of man, was reduced by the Pythagoreans into two parts, the *purifying* and the *perfective* one. By the firſt was underſtood the delivery of the ſoul from corporeal impurities; by the ſecond, its advancement to conformity to the great original, which is the divine image. In the ſcale of beings, when an aſcent is to be made by individuals of one claſs of them, ſmaller things muſt precede the greater. We muſt firſt be men, and then divinities. The civil virtues known and practiſed, ſtamp upon us the former character; but ſcience and contemplation aſſimulate us to the latter *. Nature has made the human body ſuch an inſtrument, that it may be accommodated to different kinds of life; yet the habits it moſt contracts ſerve to diſcover that temper of the ſoul which is moſt predominant, and may be reckoned the openings of its propenſities to the practice either of virtue or vice.

The analogy that may be traced between the powers of the body in the beſt condition, and the moral faculties of the ſoul, is moſt remarkable; and the correſpondence of the one to the other is ſo manifeſt, that the great lines of the virtues may be ſaid to have their ſimilitudes in the bodily accompliſhments. In this comparative view, the virtue of temperance is ſimilar to health, prudence to acuteneſs of ſenſe, fortitude to vigour, and juſtice to the beauty and ſymmetry of the whole body. It is therefore a primary dictate in ethical philoſophy, that the order inſtituted by nature in the corporeal part of the human conſtitution has a reference and a connection with that ſuitable to the mind, and that the perfection of both, and the means of promoting it, are alike and harmonious †. The ſeeds of virtue, as incitements to acquire this perfection, are indeed imparted by nature; but neither the middle nor the end of the neceſſary progreſſion is attainable without labour and diligent ſtudy. Hence the helps to advancement are to be ſought after; and the ſame prudence which diſcovers the uſefulneſs of exerciſe and medicine to the

* Timæus Loc. Opuſcul. ibid. p. 564. † Ibid.

body, points out the neceſſity and benefit of philoſophical inſtruction and diſcipline to the ſoul. To allay anger, and abate vehement deſire, to liberate the ſoul from the turbulence of paſſion, is no leſs proper and advantageous, than to keep the body cool, to preſerve the equal temperance of the blood, and to expel the humours which are pernicious to the animal frame. By what method the latter purpoſe may be accompliſhed, belongs to that branch of practical ſcience to ſhow, which relates to diet and medicine, and may be called the Therapeutic.

Diſpoſitions to good or ill, to virtue or vice, ariſe not only from indulged habits, but alſo are derived to us from our parents, and the elements of which we are compoſed; at leaſt, the depravities or defects found in either of theſe have their effect upon us. But the ills that are in nature, of whatever kind they be, have their mitigations or their remedies; and the means to be uſed for the ſanity of the body are not more aſcertained, nor more efficacious, than what true philoſophy preſcribes for the human ſoul. To underſtand what aliment or medicine may beſt ſupport or relieve the one, or what rule of reaſon or prudence may prove beneficial to the other, the conſtitution of both muſt be ſtudied with attention. If we inquire into that of the latter *, we ſhall find it to conſiſt of three parts; reaſon; iraſcible paſſion, and cupidity. Reaſon has ſubjected to it knowledge; paſſion, the bravery of ſtrength; cupidity, appetite. When theſe three are brought to coaleſce, and be at one with each other, virtue and concord are produced in the ſoul. But, if their motions be incoherent and tumultuary, vice and diſcord are neceſſarily generated. Since by virtue is generally underſtood that which perfects any thing in its kind, or raiſes it to the higheſt pitch of excellence, human virtue † muſt be reckoned, and defined to be the perfection of man's nature. But this perfection is unattainable, unleſs the mind, or rational faculty of the ſoul, govern that which is void of reaſon; for, by the one we are enabled to judge of the nature of objects, and conſider their effects; while the other ſubjects us to the power of every impelling and blind appetite or paſſion. The dominion of the firſt

* Fragmenta Pythag. ex Theage in Opuſculis Mythol. ibid. p. 681.; Maximus Tyrius Diſſert. 8. octav. edit. p. 66. † Frag. ex Thurio Opuſc. ibid. p. 689.

firſt tends to produce tolerance and continence *, without which, neither the labour neceſſary in human life can be ſuſtained, nor the good of which it is ſuſceptible procured. By its influence, the gratification of appetite is moderated, cupidity is turned into temperance, and the impulſe of paſſion into fortitude; and that compoſure of the jarring parts of the human conſtitution † takes place, which is the reſult of juſtice, or the diſpoſing of all of them in their due proportions.

When the term Juſtice is uſed in this peculiar ſenſe, it is to be underſtood as ſignifying a branch of that ſupreme law of reaſon, which, extending through all the conſtituent parts of the univerſe, combines them together as a whole; while to each particular part its proper place and function are aſſigned. By it, whatſoever is nobler and better in its properties ‡ and attributes has the aſcendency above that which is of inferior and meaner qualities. That which moves of itſelf is preferred to that which is moved; that which conſtantly acts, to what is ever acted upon; and that which is divine and eternal, to what is human and created. Therefore, as God bears rule in the world, ſo ought reaſon and mind to preſide in the ſoul of man. The conformity of the human conſtitution to this law does not imply the rejection of any of its parts, but only their ſuitable diſtribution and action. The irrational paſſions, as uſeful, and the appetites as neceſſary, have their ſubordinate place and office. Submiſſive to reaſon, or in concert with it, they give that animation and vigour to the intelligent faculties, which contributes to their laudable operation, and their ſucceſs §. As ingredients of the human conſtitution, they are parts of a whole, which are to be arranged, but not ſet aſide. Unlike as they appear to be, to the intelligent principle, they may yet be ſo regulated, as to harmoniſe with it. In the viſible world, harmony is produced, not by the ſeparation of the elements from each other, but by their due mixture. To remove from the human body all cold or heat, or all moiſture or dryneſs, in the participation of which its proper temperament conſiſts, would not be to promote but to deſtroy

* Ex Theage, p. 689. † Hieroc. Comment. in Carm. Ver. 13. 14.
‡ Fragm. ex Critone, p. 619.; ibid. ex Archyt. p. 677.
§ Ibid. ex Theag. p. 691. & 695.

deſtroy its health. The ſame rule is applicable to the ſoul. The extinction of the paſſions, as it would unhinge its conſtitution, would be deſtructive of its active powers.

The affections and paſſions may indeed be conſidered as the matter out of which the human virtues themſelves are formed *, ſince, in the due government of them, the moral qualities are beheld. It is the ſufferance of pain, and the moderation of pleaſures, which chiefly hold forth theſe diſpoſitions to view, as having excellence and propriety in them. But, for ſuch virtuous exertions, reaſon, or the counſel of the mind, would prove unequal, were it not for the ſupport which the natural paſſions afford. Fortitude ariſes from them †, and excites us to defy and ſurmount difficulties. In like manner, the powerful inſtinct for ſelf-preſervation enables us to counteract the immoderate deſire of pleaſure. Nor yet, upon this account, is the luſtre of virtue tarniſhed, but rather is ſet off to greater advantage, like a picture, the more illuminated by the mingling of light and ſhade. It proves that there is no obſtruction to the harmony of the world ‡, but that all things, according to their nature, bear a part in it; and eſpecially that whatever is connected with the rational faculties of the ſoul is made reſponſive to reaſon's voice, and to conform, in ſome degree, to its excellence and dignified office.

There is, it muſt be owned, a ſenſe of decency, which approves it as a general rule in every moral action, that virtue is placed § in a mean between extremes, and chiefly between exceſs in that which is eaſy and agreeable to us, and defect in what is troubleſome and laborious. To eſtimate the too much and the too little, muſt, in various caſes, prove difficult. Hence the mixed character, participating of one or other of the extremes that is ſo commonly found in human life, and which, in the ethics of a more rigid philoſophy, would be pronounced a proof of the failure of all human virtue. It obtains, however, more frequently from a miſtake of the mean to be obſerved, and the decorum to be attended to, in moral conduct, than from a wilful treſpaſs upon what is proper

* Ex Theage, p. 683. † Ex Metopo. p. 686. ‡ Hierocles in Carm. ver. 12. 13, § Ibid. ex Theage, p. 69. 93.

proper and virtuous. Beſides, it is to be conſidered, that the moral qualities of fortitude and temperance are not exerted, as has been ſaid, but in ſome concurrence with the natural paſſions, and therefore they are the more liable to run into the extremes. In compariſon with prudence and juſtice, they are virtues of a leſs perfect kind, which admit of ſome variations, from what may be reckoned, in certain caſes, the meaſure of their energy, and yet they ceaſe not to be virtues, in a higher or lower degree. All then that philoſophy can preſcribe with reſpect to their due exerciſe, is, to be in the habit of attention to decorum in every particular and important action. Evident it is, that inſenſibility and languor are no leſs * inconſiſtent with true virtue, than the immoderate incitement of paſſion, or perturbation of the mind. But when, as far as may be done, the mean between theſe is ſtudied, the way to virtue will be found, as well in the ſmooth courſe of Neſtor's life †, as in the toilſome one of Ulyſſes. Thoſe philoſophers, who would refine upon this point, weigh paſſive fortitude againſt temperance or ſufferance of what is painful, againſt moderation in what is agreeable and pleaſant, and inſiſt that the former is a nobler ſource of virtue than the latter, ought to reflect, that in both characters there is an admiſſion of what is leſs excellent in its nature, of the taint of paſſion in the one, and of want of deſire or inſenſibility in the other. Let us, then ‡, be contented to ſpeak of human virtue, according as it is found in human nature, and acknowledge that it is, in general, a certain concord of the irrational with the rational part of our frame, and that the exerciſe of it is beſt diſcovered, when our averſion to pain, and our deſire of pleaſure, are alike regulated by a ſenſe of decorum.

Beſide prudence, which may be called the ſource or leader of the virtues, beſide the faculty that reſiſts difficulties §, and that which reſtrains deſire, it is requiſite that the moral temper and diſpoſition be approved and choſen by the will of the mind, otherwiſe the character of virtue can never be truly embraced, and much leſs properly ſuſtained. It muſt be known and regarded as the real good of the mind, in order to its becoming

* Ibid. † Ex Archyta, p. 693. ‡ Ex Theage, p. 694.
§ Ex Metopo. p. 695. et ex Archyta, p. 695.

coming deſireable; and then, as the body's good is ſought after, for its own ſake, ſo alſo will that of the rational ſoul be purſued. In the happineſs of human life, the good of each is a neceſſary ingredient, although the laſt, by nature and eſtimation, be more excellent than the firſt. But to attain its greateſt felicity, there muſt likewiſe be a concurrence of good deſtiny. The utmoſt degree of beatitude competent to man muſt indeed ever fall ſhort of that of the divinity, as that which is acquired muſt be inferior to that which is eſſentially poſſeſſed *, and that which depends on certain acts, accompanied with circumſtances, muſt yield to that which has always in itſelf perfect energy, and an all-diſpoſing power. The human faculties, which have been mentioned, when harmoniouſly exerted, produce virtue, which is the perfection of human nature; but it is not, therefore, by neceſſary conſequence, the perfection of the happineſs of human life in all its conditions. Virtue itſelf, in order to its complete exerciſe, requires a certain favourable ſtation, and a ſphere of action adapted to it; but this a propitious deſtiny only can provide. Laudable ever, and ſo far as his active powers go, the virtuous man muſt be deemed happy; yet ſtill he would partake more of felicity in a more fortunate arrangement of external things. From this conſideration †, it is not to be inferred, that virtue, which conſiſts in the free and independent acts of the mind, ſhould reckon upon the outward advantages of fortune as her life-guards, without which ſhe cannot be conſpicuous. Such reliance upon them ſhe does not acknowledge. What is eligible to her is no more than, by the opportunity they may afford, to enlarge her activity, and, with the increaſe of her beneficent abilities, to augment the felicity ſhe brings to her votaries.

By two things, therefore, the happineſs of human life is perfected; by moral diſcipline ‡, and good deſtiny. The one, like health and vigour of body, qualifies the man to act well his part, whatever his external condition be: the other ſo accommodates circumſtances to his laudable performances, that ſucceſs, and its ſure attendant complacence, are

* Ex Euryphamo, p. 665. † Ibid. p. 667. ‡ Ex Thurio, p. 661. Ex Archyta, p. 678.

are the reſult *. In few words, human felicity is the uſage of virtue in good fortune. The eſtimate of the actual attainment of it is not to be made from ſingle acts, or a few particular events, but from the general tenor of the one, and the collective ſum of the other. Accidental variations there may be found in both, which yet, like the ſtops in muſic, hinder not the progreſs of the concords, and their iſſue in the beſt harmony. In the conduct of human life, there cannot be too much reaſon uſed, or too much virtue performed; yet, in the circumſtances attending it, there may be imparted a ſuperfluity of external goods, or what may be called an exceſs of good fortune; which is always dangerous, and often hurtful to the poſſeſſor. But here the oeconomy of Providence is worthy to be obſerved †. The deity, ever wiſe and watchful of man's greateſt good, has only put in his power that accompliſhment of his nature, in the uſe of which he cannot err or exceed. Virtue is aſſigned as his ſure guide to happineſs; while, with reſpect to the ſituations of life, in which it is to be exerciſed, whether in more or leſs outward proſperity, a reſerve is found to take place, and a diſpoſing power is kept in the hands of deſtiny. In thoſe of man, who never can be a ſufficient, and would generally be a partial judge, it could not in reaſon be placed: he, therefore, remains unaſſured whether his virtuous acts may be allowed all the extent he may wiſh, or be followed with that meaſure of ſucceſs and felicity they may deſerve. Yet of this he cannot complain, if he admits it as a principle, that virtue is eligible for its own ſake, as well as on account of the good it produces.

There is, however, one external condition of human life, to which beatitude, as the conſequence of virtue exerciſed in it ‡, appears to be chiefly or only annexed. It is that of ſocial and civil life enjoyed in a free and well regulated commonwealth. Such ſeems to be the order of divine deſtiny, with reſpect to man, that, diſjoined from ſociety, he ſhould vaniſh, as it were, out of being; and that, notwithſtanding all the propenſities and powers he has to reliſh it, and to form a part of its harmony,

* Ibid. p. 680. † Ex Euryphamo, p. 668. ‡ Ibid. p. 666.

mony, he ſhould exiſt no more * than a creature is ſuppoſed to do, when, though alive, it is bereft of all its natural faculties. Without ſociety, conſtituted in its beſt political form, without connection with a commonwealth, the model of order and equity, no good of nature's gift can be truly enjoyed, nor any acquired one be poſſeſſed with ſecurity. But under the auſpices of a republican government, every private benefit has a double reliſh, and is enhanced in its value. As an equal right, common to every one of the community, it is participated of without envy or fear, being undetached from, and accounted ſubſervient to, the public good. In a ſimilar manner, every advantage derived to the ſtate redounds to the profit, or to the credit of its individual members. In reſpect of all exterior advantages, life, in ſuch a community, may be reckoned the poſſeſſion of Amalthea's horn of plenty, ſo celebrated by the poets. But it is ſtill more to be eſteemed in another point of view: It is Virtue's ſchool, and her ſanctuary †. There, morals and manners, ſuch as become men and citizens, are ſtudied, and exhibited with honour and applauſe. There, right reaſon and piety being cultivated, the ſanctity of the virtues is maintained, while ſacred and juſt laws operate with all their authority and benign influence.

Among the proofs of man's ſuperiority above other animals in capacity and intelligence, there is none in which he diſcovers ſuch knowledge of the world he inhabits ‡, or ſo ſignally imitates the wiſdom of its founder, than in the inſtance he gives of his penetration and ability in making civil government exiſt in its nobleſt and beſt form, which is only to be found in a republic. His applying names to things diſtinctive of their ſpecies, or his invention of letters, for the ſilent ſpeech of the mind, cannot be accounted more worthy of admiration. To be the founder of a political ſtate, in which laws and not men rule, is the higheſt attainment of human wiſdom. To live with virtue, and to die, in ſuch a conſtitution, may be reckoned that circumſtance which conſummates human felicity §. Deprived of this happy addition to his lot in life, even the virtuous man has reaſon to regret his deſtiny, if not as quite unfortunate, at leaſt as unfavourable.

But

* Ex Hippodomo Thurio, p. 662. † Ibid. p. 663. ‡ Ex Euryphamo, p. 666. § Ex Hippod. Thur. p. 653.

But if, in human life, a compenſation for the want of this diſagreable deſtiny can be found, it is that of contemplation, or the exerciſe of that intellectual power of the ſoul, which may be compared to the eye of the body *, as it comprehends things in *wholes*, or entire compoſitions; whilſt its perceptive faculty apprehends them ſingly, or by tranſition from one part of them to another. It may alſo be diſtinguiſhed from the reaſoning faculty, when following, ſtep by ſtep, the information of the ſenſes, and their ſlow and lame experience of things, it arrives only at a probable, but no certain judgment with reſpect to them. This † ſuperior light of the mind, which well may be reckoned of divine original, opens the ſource of knowledge in a way more immediate and diſtinct, by bringing forward objects that are wholes in themſelves; and, being ſo conſidered by the mind, claim its firſt attention. As, in common reaſon, the idea of a whole is prior to that of a part, ſo that of the conſtitution of the world, or of the univerſe, is antecedent to any conception of its component parts. The latter can be ſuppoſed to have no exiſtence but in reference to the former. If there were no formed world, there could neither be ſun, nor moon, nor ſtar, of any denomination; but becauſe there is a world, conſtituted as it is, theſe things are not only ſeen, but known for what they are. In like manner, what could be underſtood of an eye, an ear, or a limb, without the previous knowledge of an animal, of which theſe might be the proper members. The conception of a general conſtitution of things, or of whole natures, is therefore the foundation of all true knowledge, or wiſdom, properly ſo called: And, if we would extend this contemplation farther, we muſt ſay, that, as the whole is to the part, in reſpect of precedency, ſo is the virtue of the whole to the virtue of the part, in reſpect of power and efficacy. As the world could not have exiſted without conſtitutional harmony, ſo neither could it continue in its ſtate without the conſtant energy of that principle: But the recognition of it as a truth, that the world is ruled by one principle, leads on the intelligent mind to the diſcovery ‡ of Deity, or the exiſtence of that being, in whom the fitneſs

* Ex Euryph. ibid. † Ex Archyta de ſapientia, p. 732.
‡ Ibid. pag. 734.

of order and harmony, or reaſon, in its perfection, ever reſides. Without this knowledge, wiſdom halts; but he is the wiſe man *, and above all others moſt converſant in truth, who having thus comprehended the univerſe, or the whole of being, under one principle, and referred its efficiency to one cauſe, is farther able to trace its arrangement into ſpecific natures, and diſcover what diſtinguiſhes them from, and how they are ſubordinate to, one another; and, while ſo diverſified, what ſingular tie connects them with the whole.

To ſuch contemplation the human ſoul is prompted by its innate deſire of knowledge; which, unſatisfied with the ſurvey of earthly objects †, ſeeks to inveſtigate thoſe of celeſtial dignity, and to recreate itſelf with the conception of forms that are of a permanent and divine nature. How much may the thought of the brevity of human life diſpoſe man to indulge this ſpeculation; and how forcibly does the conſideration of its many natural and moral evils enjoin it as a proper reſource? Theſe can, indeed, be no more diſſembled than they can be altogether avoided. Such as beſtow little thought upon them, or affect to overlook them, are more apt than others to be overwhelmed with their unexpected aſſault. But, ſurely, it is fit that we ſhould know ourſelves, and what is allotted to man in his preſent condition ‡; out of which, as it is not permitted to any to withdraw himſelf without the leave of his commander, ſo it is indecent and unmanly to be always deploring its diſtreſſes and calamities. By the adept in wiſdom, none of them are unreckoned upon: They are known to be concomitants of his corporeal habitation, and of the ſoul's remiſſion into a temporary exile. Comfortable it is to reflect, that it is to be endured only for a ſpace of time, which is as a point, or as nothing, compared with eternity. He, therefore, takes courage, not from ignorance, or inſenſibility of human evils, but from obſerving a divine deſtination with reſpect to them; and, eſpecially, that they can have a pernicious efficacy ſolely upon the wilful ſlaves

* Ex Stobaei Sententiis, in Serm. I. de Virtute, pag. 23. fol. edit. Hieroclis Comment. in v. 49. 50. 51.

† Ex Hipparch. pag. 660.

‡ Cicero de Senectute, fol. edit. p. 416. Hieroc. in Aur. Car. v. 46. 47. 48.

ſlaves of ſenſe and corporeal paſſion *. The remedy is put in his own power; and the ſoul, which yet bears the traits of her high original, longs to apply it. Inſtructive, and, therefore, ſo far agreeable, ſhe knows her ſhort peregrination here may be rendered. From it ſhe learns what it is to be enveloped in a maſs of groſs and corruptible matter; where the perception of ſenſible things is only deluſive, and that of thoſe which have the character of truth, is obſcured or loſt. She feels what miſery ariſes from the failure of reaſon's light †, and the dominion of the unruly and irrational appetites. From their tumult ſhe makes an effort to eſcape, by the faculty ſhe retains of ſelf-recollection. Its repeated acts ſuſpend the career of the paſſions, and produce that happy attainment of the proficients in true philoſophy, *internal tranquillity*, to which all vulgar ſouls are ever ſtrangers.

This mental tranquillity may be conſidered as the aſcent of the ſoul, from the denſe air of the earth, to that of the unclouded and ſerene aether. Congenial ſhe feels it to herſelf; and introductive of the recogniſance of her native faculty of contemplation. Such feeble diſcoveries of truth as ſhe had been before enabled to make, from the precarious information of the ſenſes, and which ſhe could underſtand to be only ſimple judgments of their experiences, ſhe finds now to be the openings of her own intellectual powers, and that all human ſcience is to be conſidered as the flower of thoſe ſeeds of knowledge originally planted in her. Let us here attend to what Nature has done for the animals placed far below the rank of man. Do they borrow their ſagacity from abroad; or is it required of them to ſeek it from external objects? No. Nature has inſtructed the individuals of every ſpecies in all points relative either to their particular preſervation, or to the general good of their kind. How utterly improbable is it, that this providence of nature ſhould not take place with reſpect to mankind, but that they ſhould be left to find out, by help of their ſenſible perceptions alone, not only the openings to knowledge, but all the concluſions of reaſon, and the principles of abſtract ſcience? If the latter were not the product

* Hieroc. in Aur. Car. v. 17. 18. 19. † Maxim. Tyrius, Diſſ. 28. 8vo edit. pag. 289. ‡ Ibid. pag. 293.

product of the human intellect, acting of itself, the former could be turned to no rational account, or reflect upon the soul the light of truth, and the evidence of general and scientific knowledge.

Whence is it, that what is called *natural genius* is found so different in its degrees among men, that some understand at once *, and as it were by a glance of thought, what others do not comprehend but with the greatest study and application? How is it, that the true poet is said to be born such; the musical genius to require no master; and the wise lawgiver, and the able commander in the field, to have each of them his peculiar talent, bestowed by Nature, with little aid from study or instruction? Were such reputable endowments to be acquired by labour and industry, they would not be so rarely exemplified. But no exertion of pains is sufficient to supply what all men agree in saying, *the gods only can give.* Intellect is, indeed, originally the same in all men; and, were it not so, the most intelligent would hardly correspond in their idea of any one truth. But the corporeal prison of the soul admits of great variations; and, as the matter composing it is mutable, so the bodily organs are diversified. In some they are easily moved; in others more slowly. In many they are so gross, that the soul is seldom roused to any reflection. But, from the awakening † which philosophy gives, her intellectual powers revive; and her conceptions following close to one another, appear more like the retracing of ideas formerly known, and exertions of the memory, than as discoveries of science newly made, in consequence of a train of progressive reasoning. Such a reminiscent faculty may well be supposed to appertain to the soul, pre-existent as she has been in another state, where the natures of things were contemplated, not by intermissive and partial views, but intuitively, and by *wholes.* A reason, therefore, may be assigned, why the poets reckon memory (Mnemosyne) to be the nurse, or mother of the muses ‡. They are the daughters of Jove, and the same with the sciences; but it is memory that produces them to men, and ascertains their due order and harmony.

The

* Maxim. Tyrius, Dissert. 28. pag. 293. † Ibid. 298.

‡ Hesiod in Theog. v. 52.

The human or civil virtues, perfected by juſtice, have been ſaid to bear analogy to that eternal law of reaſon, and order, which combines the ſyſtem of the univerſe. The contemplative mind aſſumes them in this illuſtrious point of view. Regarded not merely as the dictates of prudence, which have decorum and utility in human life *, but as principles co-ordinate with the wiſdom of the univerſe, and portions of it; their tendency to elevate the ſoul poſſeſſed of them to the life of the gods, becomes manifeſt †. The heights of perfection and felicity attainable by virtuous ſouls have no other limitation except what the law of their being preſcribes. Sufficient to beatitude theſe attainments muſt be, which extend to the happieſt qualification their ſtate can admit. But, while virtue and knowledge thus exalt the human ſoul, vice and ignorance degrade it. In the latter, neither principle nor conſiſtency can be found. Disjoined from what is true, uniform, and juſt, in the conſtitution of the univerſe, they are neceſſarily involved in a proſcription from good, which only can ariſe from conformity to virtue and truth, the fixed principles of union and harmony in the moral world. Hence the vicious are ſeen precipitated into various evils, that bring on their ruin; rolling like heavy ſtones upon a declivity, which, along with the diſcompoſure they may give to other bodies, fail not to be daſhed in pieces by their own weight.

Here, then, we may conclude the account of the Pythagorean philoſophy, which exhibited a theory of the univerſe reduced to a ſyſtem complete in its phyſical and moral parts, but little reſembling any one that iſſued from the maſters or diſciples of the Ionic ſchool. It had, indeed, evident marks of a foreign original, from the manner in which it was taught, and the peculiar diſcipline it preſcribed. With a ſublimity of ideas in theology that ſurpaſſed the beſt of the Grecian theories, it appeared to recede too far from ſimplicity, and to err by a ſuperfluity of principles and doctrines. Along with exalted conceptions of an eternal mind or deity, it held forth a ſyſtem of gods of undetermined power; and an infuſion of a rational ſoul into the world, which rendered it an intelligent

* Aurea Carm. Verſ. 45. 46. 47. cum Hieroc. Comment.
† Ibid. Verſ. 70. 71.

gent being, while nature was ſtill required to act her part. Theſe, and other tenets, arranged with method, and a ſhew of conſiſtency, proved the complicated ſyſtem to be the reſult of long and deep ſtudy, and the production of thoſe foreign colleges of philoſophy and literature, which had ſubſiſted for generations, and with which Pythagoras was for ſo many years converſant. Whether the exceptionable parts of it may be regarded as additions, which it is natural to ſuppoſe theſe learned men would make to a more primitive, ſimpler, and purer theology, to the knowledge of which, in Egypt eſpecially, they might have acceſs, belongs not to our ſubject particularly to inveſtigate. Without entering into theſe elaborate diſcuſſions, to which this queſtion has given room, the probability is, that the Moſaic Scriptures, and other prophetical writings under the Jewiſh diſpenſation, could not be unknown to the prieſts of Egypt, Chaldaea, and other adjacent countries. What uſe they made of them is another point, which cannot, perhaps, be more truly determined, than by ſaying, that they would aſſume from them ſuch theological ideas and moral doctrines as they could beſt accommodate to their own favourite ſyſtems. That they would hold them in contempt, or neglect them, as the Grecians and Romans afterwards did, is extremely improbable. In theſe early ages, knowledge, wherever it could be found, was eagerly ſought after, and not deſpiſed; neither was the Jewiſh nation then in that low eſtimation among the neighbouring kingdoms, to render their antiquities or their religious and civil knowledge unworthy of regard. This degraded character, they, in ſubſequent times of their depreſſion, and from the pride of conquering nations, incurred. What we here alledge the Egyptian prieſts might do, with reſpect to the Moſaic writings, was certainly much practiſed in regard to their own ſtore of erudition and ſcience. The proofs already given will be followed with other evidence, how common among nations this ſort of plagiariſm was, when the rarity of knowledge increaſed the vanity of being accounted originals in it.

We cannot, therefore, aſcribe more to the philoſophical genius of Pythagoras, than that it enabled him to diſcloſe a theory of the univerſe, wrapt in myſteries, taught in the moſt abſtract manner, and ſtill perhaps wanting, in the hands of its maſters, that finiſhing which he was qualified

qualified to give it. That he might methodiſe, and, in ſome reſpects, extend and improve its general principles, is probable; that he modified them in the moral and political part, ſo as to bring them nearer to the genius and taſte of his countrymen, appears a certainty. But, with all the illuſtrations and improvements this philoſophy received from Pythagoras, or his ableſt diſciples, it was ſtill accounted in the other Grecian ſchools a borrowed ſyſtem, and was not thoroughly known or ſtudied among them, until Plato gave it a place in his Dialogues; with ſuch embelliſhments, however, as his invention ſuggeſted. Blended with his philoſophy, it became leſs diſtinguiſhable from it; and, as the ſect declined, its original doctrines were corrupted, or, by a motley ſuperſtructure induced upon them, rendered extravagant and abſurd. Yet the ancient fame of its diſciples revived their inveſtigation; and, from the ſketch given of them upon the authorities cited, we may judge that they well merited this attention and labour. Not only are ſeveral of the principles and doctrines held forth, important, inſtructive, and entertaining to the human mind, but they are ſupported upon arguments that diſcover a profundity of thought and reflection upon the univerſe, the different natures of the beings that compoſe it, and the ſpecial, yet uniform and harmonious laws by which they are governed. Above all, the placing the conſummation of wiſdom in the knowledge of one eternal and incorporeal principle, the primary and efficient cauſe of all that is orderly and beautiful in the univerſe, and the reſolving the moral diſcipline of the human ſoul into the perfection of its faculties for contemplation, and the appointed courſe of its advancement to a happy and divine condition, muſt be owned ſuch rational and noble ſentiments as prove thoſe tracts of the Pythagorean philoſophy a venerable remainder of ancient wiſdom and ſcience.

Having mentioned the difficulties that occur in chronology, in aſcertaining the period of Pythagoras's birth, and alſo that of ſeveral events in his life, we ſhall ſubjoin to this ſection, not any eſſay upon this perplexed point, but ſuch an account of the computation by Olympiads, and of the aera to which it refers, and the term of years included in each of its periods, called an Olympiad, as may render intelligible thoſe dates of

chronology which will, in the ſubſequent pages, be frequently announced *.

* The aera to which, as a fixed date in time, the chronological reckoning by Olympiads referred, was that of the inſtitution of the Olympic games, celebrated in honour of Jupiter Olympius, at Elis, a city in the Peleponneſus of Greece. This aera was convenient on account of the regular return of the ſolemnity of theſe games within a limited time. But it happened unfortunately for this ſcheme of chronology, that ſcarcely any event recorded in hiſtory was of a more uncertain and undeterminable date, than the commencement of the Olympic games. Venerated as they were in Greece, and their origin reckoned an important piece of knowledge in its antiquities, no inveſtigation availed to fix either the time or occaſion of their inſtitution. The account given of the latter circumſtance in Herodotus, lib. 8. alluded to by Pindar, Olympion ode 2. and followed by Diodorus Siculus, lib. 4. who aſcribe their firſt celebration to Hercules the ſon of Alcmena, is rejected and confuted by Strabo, lib. 8.; and Pauſanias, Eliacorum prior, vel lib. 5. ſhows what various opinions, and all of them fabulous, were entertained upon that point. One ſuppoſition, with reſpect to it, appeared to be allowable, that theſe games were either unknown, or in no reputation before the war of Troy; ſince it could not well be imagined, that Homer, who abounds with ſuch narratives, would have omitted to mention them. Some evidence there was of their being celebrated, if not, after long intermiſſion, re-inſtituted by Iphitus, King of Elis, contemporary with Lycurgus, as mentioned by Plutarch in the life of that lawgiver. But the great uncertainty of this period in chronology, as well as the diſcontinuance of the games for various years, ſtill left an exact date of time, and the regular meaſurement of certain intervals of it, in doubt or obſcurity. It was therefore ſuggeſted by Phlegon, the author of the computation by Olympiads, to fix upon a period, in which there appeared the leaſt chronological dubiety, and the other requiſite circumſtance of the ſtated celebration of the games might alſo be found. Such what was called the 25th Olympiad, in the common reckoning of them from Iphitus's time, was judged to be, when Choraebus proved victor in the race on foot, and of which the memory was preſerved in his ſepulchre at Elis. From that period, the Olympic games were regularly ſolemnized at the end and completion of every fourth year; ſo that they were generally held in the ſecond month of the fifth, and continued for five days. Reckoning, then, an Olympiad a ſcale of four years, and that twenty-eight of them were elapſed in that marked by Coraebus's victory, the only queſtion was, to what aeras fixed in chronology the firſt year of the firſt Olympiad was to be referred. It has been generally agreed, with only the variation of a year or two, to correſpond to the 408th year from the taking of Troy; to the 19th before the building of Rome; and to the 757th or or 759th before the Chriſtian aera. Computing, therefore, according to the Olympiads,

piads, it is plain, that Rome was built in the 3d year of the fifth of them, and Pythagoras reckoned to have been born about the 47th; his birth anſwers to the 169th year of Rome; by this rule, that the announced number of Olympiads multiplied by four, and a deduction made of nineteen years, will always give the year of the ancient Roman calendar. If, again, a given year of this epoch be ſubtracted from the number aſſigned for the commencement of the Olympiads, or 19 years before the building of Rome, the year preceding the nativity of Chriſt will be found. Thus, if the 169th of Rome be given for the birth of Pythagoras, and the ſubtraction of it be made from 757 or 759, there will remain either 588 or 590, to mark the years before the Chriſtian æra.

PART III.

SECTION I.

Of the Foundation of the Eleatic School,—and of the Sect called Acataleptics *;—and of the Philoſophy of Heraclitus and Empedocles.*

THE reproach which Diodorus Siculus throws upon the Grecian philoſophers, who early divided into ſects, controverted * each other's theories, and, from emulation of excellence in invention, or in the faculty of diſputing, or for the ſake of increaſing the number of their diſciples, and procuring gain to themſelves, heſitated not to call in queſtion truths the moſt eſſential in ſcience, and of the greateſt importance in human life, may be pronounced too ſevere, and partly unjuſt, but not quite deſtitute of foundation. Concerned for advancing their fortunes, the early philoſophers of Greece were not; but, on the contrary, ſuch of them as poſſeſſed conſiderable wealth, exhauſted it in their travels abroad, or in other purſuits of knowledge. Schools, in which pecuniary profits were exacted, were for a long time unknown among them, and had not an introduction, but with the degeneracy of philoſophy, in the age of the *Sophiſts*. To the other part of the accuſation, it muſt be owned, that ſeveral of them made themſelves obnoxious. Evident it is, that the genius of the Greeks, fertile in invention beyond that of other nations, ſubmitted not eaſily or ſoon to laborious ſearches into natural things, or to ſuch tedious obſervations or experiments as could help them to juſt explications of their phenomena. With them, imagination

* Diod. Bib. Hiſ. lib. 2. fol. edit. p. 115.

imagination was the predominant faculty; and all exertions of it were held in the higheſt eſteem. Speculative ingenuity, often ſupported more upon plauſible than ſolid reaſoning, was accounted adequate to all diſcoveries that could be made in the phyſical and apparent, as well as in the conceived, but inviſible, departments of the world. Hence their philoſophers of the Ionic ſchool have been ſeen, each of them aſſuming one or more of the natural elements, as his principle of all things; and, without ſtrictly examining what that element was in itſelf, or how qualified to produce other things, its oppoſites in nature, proceeding rapidly to generate from it, and arrange the complex conſtitution of the heavens and the earth. It would ſeem, that, as their faculty of invention had given them one poet that might be ranked with the firſt in the world, and ſome others of ſignal merit, ſo they truſted that their abſtract ſpeculations would carry them, with ſufficient certainty and ſure applauſe, to the knowledge of the general ſyſtem of nature, in its extent and dependencies. Having often traverſed the field of the natural elements, they began to be ſatiated with this taſk, and to throw their theories entirely upon abſtract reaſoning; and, conſidering all things as one univerſe, either infinite or finite, to abridge, or rather ſuperſede all inquiries about the different natures and qualities of things; and to have only one queſtion to be reſolved, Whether, under the predicament ſtated, things could be reckoned to ſtand, or to move; or, in other words, if real motion could obtain in the world.

This ſection may well be introduced with theſe reflections, confirmed as they will be by the account now to be given of the Eleatic ſect, ſo called from Elea, or Yla, a town of Lucania, in Italy, that gave birth to Zeno *, who, for his fame in acute diſputation, got the name of being the founder of a ſect, which really commenced with Xenophanes. This philoſopher, who was a native of Colophon, in Ionia, appeared many years before Zeno, and is reckoned to have flouriſhed about the 60th Olympiad. It is a queſtion, under what teacher of philoſophy he ſtudied, or whether he had any inſtructor; although Boton of Athens be named for one, and even Archelaus, by a conſiderable time poſterior to him,

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 9. quart. edit. p. 502.

him, for another. He had, for his diſciple, Parmenides, whoſe reputation ſurpaſſed his own, and whoſe cleves Zeno and Meliſſus, were no leſs famous. The laſt of them inſiſted upon the ſingular poſitions Xenophanes advanced, from which the two former varied greatly; but they were together reckoned ſupporters of the Eleatic ſect, which was alſo called that of the *Acataleptics*.

Diſguſted, it is ſaid, with the fictions of Homer and Heſiod, about the gods, the Colophonian Philoſopher made them both the ſubject of his ſatire; alledging, that it was not more abſurd and impious to affirm that the gods were mortal *, than to ſay, with theſe poets, that they were generated. His own tenets in theology, and his ſpeculations on the conſtitution of all things, which he compoſed, and publiſhed in verſe, were by no means reckoned remarkable either for conſiſtency or perſpicuity. Ariſtotle, an able judge, expreſsly declares that he was not diſtinct in delivering his opinion about the univerſe †; but that, caſting his eyes around the heavens, he often pronounced the ſentence, that *one was God*. This apothegm, however, was underſtood to refer to that noted doctrine of his, of a *one eternal, infinite, and immoveable univerſe;* into the particular diſcuſſion of which the Stagyrite enters in another place ‡, where Xenophanes's reaſoning is ſtated by him in the following manner: "All that is, or the univerſe, muſt be eternal; becauſe from nothing, nothing can come. For, whether we ſuppoſe all things generated, or ſome eternal, and others generated, the production of ſomething out of nothing will, either way, follow; ſince, if to an eternal any thing ſome other thing be added, there muſt be a generation, more or leſs, of what before was not; and this comes from nothing. But what is eternal is alſo infinite; for eternity hath no point, whence can be reckoned its origin, or its end: And what is infinite is one; for, if it were two or more, one of them might terminate, and another begin, or each have its limitation. One is further every way, like itſelf, and can admit no diſſimilarity, without becoming another thing, or

* Cicero de Nat. Deor. lib. 1. Quaeſt. Acad. lib. 2. † Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. 1. chap. 5. fol. edit. oper. omn. Sextus Emper. Hypotyp. lib. 1. p. 46.

‡ De Xenophane.

or more than one thing. But a one eternal, infinite, and every way ſimilar thing, is immoveable; for it cannot move but by exceeding itſelf, or going out of its place; neither can it be tranſpoſed, unleſs by moving either into a *plenum*, or into a void. By the former it cannot be received, and the other is nothing."

From this ratiocination, the ſubſumption was, that there could be no real generation of things, either by the ſecretion or the mixture of their parts, or any modes of motion; no more than there could be ſuch a deſtruction of their qualities, as would imply a ſeries of it, and a change of the one whole; and therefore, whatever changes ſeemed to us to take place, were only apparent and not real; and ſince our ſenſes deceived us in ſome particulars, they might be concluded to do the ſame, in all imagined motions of things. Whence it followed, that the only thing comprehenſible was, that of a *one* eternal and immoveable univerſe, and that no other certain opinion about any thing could be entertained.

Thus we have exhibited the whole argumentation uſed by the founder the ſect of the Acataleptics, which had this deomination from their holding the *incomprehenſibility* of all things: Yet it is to be obſerved *, that Sextus Empiricus excludes Xenophanes from the claſs of ſceptics, and holds him for a dogmatiſt; who, ſays he, maintained a one all of things, and god congenial with them; and that this being was ſpherical, without paſſions, immutable, and rational. This repreſentation of his theory fully confirms Ariſtotles's opinion with reſpect to it, that it was not perſpicuous; for in his reaſoning upon the all that is, he did not ſay of what nature or ſubſtance it was, and whether only corporeal or not. He was, however, underſtood by that philoſopher, to make the material and ſenſible world his god, and to reject all other ſubſtance. In this conception of his dialectic theſis, the Stagyrite minutely traces every branch of his argument, in a manner that not only ſhows how contrary it was to the dictates of common ſenſe and reaſon among mankind, but clearly proves it to be futile, abſurdly conceived in itſelf, equivocal and inconcluſive. As it has been adopted by ſuperficial reaſoners, who would, on ſlight ground, eſpouſe materialiſm, and bears a great analogy to

* Ibid.

to the deluſive reaſoning uſed in Spinoſa's atheiſtical credenda, though the form of its propoſitions be varied in them, we ſhall here collect, from Ariſtotle, thoſe confutations of Xenophanes's doctrine, which appear no leſs ingenious than forcible and concluſive.

The axiom, that out of nothing nothing can come, although a common one in philoſophy, has not been adhered to by philoſophers in their theories about the univerſe *: On the contrary, all of them, preceding Xenophanes, have agreed in admitting certain principles of generation, whence other things were formed; unleſs ſuch of them be excepted, as ſuppoſed generation to proceed in an eternal ſeries: And yet, it is to be aſked, whence came the ungenerated principles of the former, or from what ariſes the infinite ſeries of the latter? Are they not to be conſidered as proceeding from, or cauſed by, nothing? But the propoſition, which neither aſſumes original principles, nor ſuppoſes an eternity of generation, but ſtates, that the univerſe, or whatever is now, was always, muſt be pronounced a moſt groſs and irrational one; for, if there be no generation of things, no principles, or powers, in the univerſe †, which produce the many and different things that every moment ariſe, they muſt be concluded to have ever exiſted, or elſe to be nothing; ſince, according to this aſſertion, they can come from nothing. But, although there be a neceſſity, in reaſon, for affirming that ſomething ever was, there can be none for inferring, that whatever is, is that ſame thing, and not another, or different; for it is a fallacy to ſay, that, if to what is ungenerated, and eternal, any thing accede, there muſt ariſe a more and a leſs in it, and that from nothing. This is not true with reſpect to matter or body, which may be at reſt, or in motion, and undergo ſeveral changes in its parts, without being, in the whole of its ſubſtance, either augmented or diminiſhed. Yet again, this ſomething eternal is ſaid, of conſequence, to be infinite. To this, Ariſtotle properly oppoſes the reaſoning of Parmenides, who, in this point, differing from his maſter, acknowledged, that, although the univerſe were one, and eternal, it did not follow that it was infinite; for, ſuppoſing, as Xenophanes

* Ariſtot. Phyſic. lib. 5. c. 6. p. 784. † Ariſt. de Xenophane, ibid.

did, that it was like an immenſe globular maſs *, equally round, it then muſt be concluded to have a middle and extremes, and ſo cannot be infinite, but circumſcribed and bounded. But how, indeed, adds the Stagirite, if the univerſe be body, can it poſſibly be infinite? How have parts, ſeparate from, and terminated by one another, and yet theſe finite, and, therefore, by themſelves moveable parts, conſtitute a univerſe infinite, and without mobility? If it be either earth, air, water, fire, or any corporeal ſubſtance, and yet have infinity, this attribute muſt be extended to its magnitude, its breadth, and its profundity, and thus infinite will be multiplied. To this conſequence of his poſition, Xenophanes himſelf ſeems to have adverted, by allowing an infinite depth to the earth, and to the air, while he repreſents his univerſe as deſtitute of all motion, even that of reſpiration; becauſe there is no *vacuum* within it, and without it there is nothing. It admits, ſays he, no diſſimilarity; for one is every way like itſelf. But this is an obſcure or equivocal mode of expreſſion, ſince there is no likeneſs to infinity, but infinite itſelf; and to compare one with itſelf, appears an abſurdity.

The general inference, that there is nothing comprehenſible but a one eternal and infinite ſomething, or any certain opinion to be formed about any thing beſides, is marked with the ſame futility that runs through the ſeries of the argument. For why is this only to be comprehended? becauſe a ſome one thing ever muſt have been and be; otherwiſe the all that is would proceed from nothing. But how come we then to comprehend this axiom as true, that *nothing is from nothing*; upon which this argumentation is founded? We have only the evidence of our ſenſes and perceptions that any thing exiſts. They vouch, that we, and other things around us, have being. Their teſtimony, therefore, cannot be diſcredited without removing every foundation of a queſtion, or rational argument †. Again, let it be conſidered, how this conception of a one infinite, and no other, would diſplay itſelf, were it applied to any of the abſtract ſciences, that have number or quantity for their object. If any one ſhould, in this manner, aſſert, that *unite* infinite comprehended all numbers, and that every other numerical denomination

* Cicero ad Lucullum. † Ariſtot. Phyſic. lib. 1. cap. 2. 3.

tion was incompetent, and could not be traced; and, by the ſame rule, ſhould affirm, that all figures in geometry were contained in one infinite round, or ſquare, and that no other figure, but the one or the other, could be rationally contemplated, is it not evident, according to this doctrine, that the ſciences of arithmetic and geometry would be rendered unintelligible, and totally ſubverted? Yet ſuch is the ſophiſtical reaſoning of Xenophanes, and his followers, when they maintain all things to be one infinite.

Meliſſus, however, thought fit to maintain the incomprehenſible poſitions of the philoſopher of Colophon, and determined, in plainer terms than he had done, that the *one all* was, in its nature, matter or body; but whether this matter was of one quality, or conſiſted of two or more of the known elements of body, he left undecided. A principle under this vague denomination, and which was ſtill ſaid to be one infinite, and immoveable, could no more account for the generations in nature, than the abſtract one of Xenophanes could be the foundation of ſcience. And here it ought to be recollected, that the materialiſts, who admitted body as their only principle, generally neglected, or evaded any definition, or even a particular deſcription of it; and, as we are acquainted with bodies only in their compound and qualified ſtate, the deepeſt reſearches of philoſophers not having diſcovered of what pure and ſimple eſſences they are compoſed; matter or body was contemplated in philoſophy, not according to clear or determined ideas of its ſubſtance, but as having certain natural qualities, or attributes, which, becauſe they are commonly perceived in its arranged condition, were often erroneouſly, and without ſufficient inquiry, allowed to be properties inherent in, or eſſential to it. But this topic may be more fully inſiſted upon when we come to conſider the theories of the atomical philoſophers. The ſubject now under conſideration rather calls our attention to what was before hinted, that there is a manifeſt analogy between the reaſoning of Xenophanes and that of Spinoſa, and not only ſo, but that the former appears to have been the model † of the latter, caſt into a different form. The

* Ariſt. Metaphyſ. lib. 1. cap. 5.

† It is ſaid, that, in an epiſtle to Henry Oldenburg, Secretary to the Royal Society

ſame ſophiſtical argumentation which the ancient philoſopher raiſed upon his abſtract principle of a one infinite, and immoveable, the modern has the addreſs to imitate and purſue, upon his axiom, which was ſimilar to it, that there could be only *one ſubſtance* in the univerſe. But, does he, in the courſe of his geometrical proofs, define what he meant by ſubſtance? No; unleſs we underſtand the old ſcholaſtic definition, that it is what ſubſiſts of itſelf; and, therefore, muſt be concluded neceſſary, independent, and eternal. Do we admire, if this conceſſion be made about the unintelligible term *ſubſtance*, that a ſeries of demonſtrations may be built upon it; and that what is never explained ſhould, by an artificial contexture of corollaries, be arrayed with all the attributes of a corporeal deity. This one undivided, and indiviſible ſubſtance *, may modify itſelf, in an infinity of manners and ways; be ſpace, body, extenſion; be bounded, and not bounded; be impaſſioned, and impaſſive; be conſtantly affected with motions and changes, and yet, upon the whole, neither moved nor changed. It appears, however, that the two eſpouſers of the ſame impious theory did not quite agree in their explications of it; and in this reſpect the ancient ſpeculatiſt may be reckoned leſs preſumptuous, if not more rational, than the modern. Xenophanes, it would ſeem, rather than admit modifications of his one infinite, which he thought incompetent to it, choſe to impugn or deny the reality of any ſuch changes. The other, by giving place to them in his one ſubſtance, teſtified the inſenſibility of his heart to all the horrors of his execrable ſyſtem. Bayle, the ſceptical Bayle, appears to have recoiled from them; when, having the ſubject before him, in his article † of Xenophanes, he concludes, that the beſt reſult of our reaſoning, with reſpect to the generation of things, from certain principles, or their production from nothing, is, that *every thing but God had a beginning*. For, to explain the generations of Nature upon the ſuppoſition of ſeveral eternal

ciety of London, Spinoſa acknowledged, that he took the great principle of his ſyſtem, that there could be only one ſubſtance in the univerſe, from the ancient philoſophers, but held it forth in a new light, with better proofs, in the geometrical method. Hiſtoire Critique de la Philoſophie, par Deſlandes, 8vo. edit. tom. 1. p. 179.

* Deſlandes, ibid. † Dictionaire Critique.

eternal principles, whoſe action and reaction may diverſify that which otherwiſe would remain uniform, if nothing exterior to it intervened, amounts to no more than, for the ſake of avoiding one difficulty, to run upon another which is greater.

The incomprehenſibility of Xenophanes's principles did not prevent his incurring the public ſuſpicion on account of them. He was ſoon in life obliged to leave Colophon *, and to make Zancle and Catania, in Sicily, his retreat. There, complaining once to Hiero, King of Syracuſe, that, being poor, he could keep no more than one ſervant, That, indeed, replied Hiero, is ſtrange; eſpecially when it is conſidered, that Homer, ſo long ſince dead, and ſo ridiculed by you, ſhould be able to maintain ten thouſand dependents. Of a life, extended to ninety-two years, he ſpent ſixty-ſeven of them in exile. It is to be obſerved, that ancient authors differ much from one another in their accounts of his doctrines; and that his notion of deity, as Diogenes Laertius ſtiles it, does not correſpond to the interpretation of it by Ariſtotle, Sextus Empiricus, and others. But we can hardly quote, from antiquity, a greater authority than the agreement of theſe two about any opinion entertained in philoſophy.

Parmenides, ſenſible of the contradiction of the one infinite, and immoveable, applied to the univerſe, or natural world, not only conceived it to be finite, but that there was a diſtinction to be made in the principle of the *one all*; which might be expreſſed by being ſaid to be one, and all, or an indefinite number. But whether this diſtinction amounted to Plato's repreſentation of it, in his dialogue, entitled Parmenides, as drawing the line between the intellectual and ſenſible worlds, and aſſigning immobility to the one, and fluctuation to the other, admits of conſiderable doubt. Cudworth, no leſs ingenious than learned in his explications of difficulties that occur about the tenets of the ancient philoſophers, diſcovers his ability in ſupporting the truth of Plato's allegation. He obſerves, that, in analogy to this doctrine, Parmenides held two phyſical principles; thoſe of fire and earth, or heat and humidity, which together operated to the generations in nature, the one as the artificer,

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 9.

tificer, and the other as the ſubject of the work. This tenet we find aſcribed to him by Deogenes Laertius †, and others, and is, indeed, a ſufficient proof of what is not called in queſtion, that he differed widely from Xenophanes, but can be no evidence of his eſpouſing the ſyſtem of the univerſe that has been mentioned. The principle may be rather reckoned a common one, as it was adopted by ſeveral diſciples of the Ionic ſchool. But the chief, and only forcible argument is, that we cannot, without ſome ſuch ſuppoſition, underſtand upon what ground the controverſy proceeded between the followers of Parmenides, and thoſe of Heraclitus, which divided almoſt all the philoſophers of that age into two great parties, according as they eſpouſed either the immobility, or mobility of things, and, conſequently, held, the one, the apparency, and the other, the reality of motion. But, if the argument between them only included this point, of local reſt or motion, and had no reference to the ſtate of mind in the univerſe, it would ſeem to be frivolous, and not of ſuch great ſignificance; and, if the Parmenideans maintained the immobility, in Xenophanes's ſenſe of it, they would coincide with Heraclitus, and his diſciples, in the conſequence of their doctrine; which, from the conſtant fluidity of all things, inferred their incomprehenſibility. Ariſtotle, however, takes notice, that the diſpute between the parties was of the higheſt importance, as it involved the queſtion, whether there were, in the nature of things, fixed principles of truth, and ſcience, beyond what the perception of ſenſible objects only conveyed to the human underſtanding? or, if all our knowledge was to be accounted no more than an incoherent maſs of ſuch perceptions? That the tenet of Heraclitus, and his followers, led to the wideſt, and wildeſt ſcepticiſm, is ſufficiently obvious, when they maintained, that the univerſe, or all of things, viſible and inviſible, was without either ſelf-conſiſtency, or dependency of parts, and in conſtant and perpetual mutation; but there is ſome dubiety, whether this philoſopher's opinion reached to all this pitch of extravagance; as will be remarked when we come to the account of his life. His aſſertions, however, were reckoned ſuch as unhinged all truth of ſcience, or certainty of human knowledge.

† Lib 9. p. 561.

ledge. By what ſort of argumentation Parmenides oppoſed his doctrine of the immobility of things to this ſcepticiſm, ſo as to ſupport intellectual and moral principles of truth, we are little informed, unleſs we adopt the ſtate of the controverſy as found in Plato, which will be afterwards particularly explained. Hence we need only obſerve, that the qualified doctrine of the immobility aſcribed to Parmenides, and by which the character of ſtability is aſſigned to mind and intelligence, and that of fluctuation to the objects of ſenſe, ſerved as a proper introduction to Plato's ſyſtem of ideas, exiſting by themſelves, independent of matter, or the ſenſible world. As Heraclitus and Parmenides flouriſhed, according to Laertius, about the 69th Olympiad, the Athenian philoſopher is reckoned to commit an Anachroniſm, when he introduces the latter, even although in his old age, as a contemporary with Socrates.

The Eleatic ſect had its moſt diſtinguiſhed diſciple in Zeno Eleates; who, if what was called the *Eriſtic*, or the diſputatious kind of philoſophy, deſerved approbation, was ſurely entitled to much honour and applauſe. But we cannot truly eſteem that art of reaſoning, which, encouraging more the ſtudy of evaſion or fallacy, than of truth in argument, ſeems to attain its end, when it throws every queſtion into perplexity, and confounds, but does not convince, or inform the inquiſitive mind. It was principally cultivated under Euclid, the founder of the Megaric ſchool, the eleves of which got the name of the Contentious Sect appropriated to them. Zeno, however, as a father of the Dialectic *, or Logics, obtained the praiſe of Ariſtotle, who, in other reſpects, could not be ſuppoſed to admire his philoſophy; and, when he extolled his ingenuity in argument, might be thought to derogate from his own. Zeno's famous arguments againſt local motion proved a remarkable trial of the Stagirite's faculty in ſubtile diſputation; and it remained long a queſtion in the ſchools, whether they were properly anſwered by him. We may indeed imagine what the ſubtility of his conceptions was, by his being the firſt who argued, that ſpace, or place of body †, could be nothing,

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 9. p. 560. Sextus Empir. adv. Math. lib. 7. p. 139.
† Ariſtot. Phyſ lib. 6. cap. 9. p. 300.

nothing, or at moſt an idea of the mind; for this reaſon, that, if it were any real thing, it might be as well aſſerted, that there was a place of that place, and the ſame affirmation continued in an endleſs ſeries; which overthrows all reaſoning. But his four objections to the reality of motion were deemed the moſt ſingular proof of his invention; when, in a matter that appeared to be placed beyond all conteſt, he could ſuggeſt ſuch arguments as were ſpecious, and not eaſily confuted, and yet not conſtituted upon a miſapplication, or ambiguity of words and terms, but having a direct reference to thoſe refined, and hardly conſiſtent ideas, which ariſe in the human mind, when it conſiders local motion in an abſtract view, together with the infinite diviſibility of body, ſpace, and time. It is difficult to conceive how motion is communicated from one body to another at reſt, without a procedure of the impulſe through all the minute parts of the latter; and, therefore, there can be no inſtantaneous motion; and, if a body be ſuppoſed in motion, it muſt alſo have progreſſion; and, from this circumſtance, it muſt be abſurdly conceived to come to the middle of the ſpace it occupies before it gets to the end. But we forbear the detail of theſe ſtudied contradictions to common reaſon, which, with ſome appearance of ingenuity, are no recommendations of the ſolidity of the metaphyſical ſcience: Yet in this field, as having reputation, Zeno choſe to ſhine; and, it is preſumable, ſtretched his invention in framing arguments, of the truth or probability of which he entertained no belief. He was not accounted a ſceptic, or one inclined to think in philoſophy, or act in life, with that heſitation about truth, and that irreſolution, or indifference as to action, which is acknowledged to accompany alike a ſceptical and a feeble mind. On the contrary, he is ſaid to have been moſt rational *, manly, and determined, in the general turn of his conceptions and ſentiments; and hence his bold enterpriſe, and his invincible conſtancy in ſuffering torments and death, in the vindication of civil liberty, has been often recited for the honour of philoſophy.

But it would be an improper omiſſion not to inſert here his reaſoning with reſpect to the eternity, unity, and incomparable excellency of the ſupreme

* Plato in Parmenide et in Sophiſta. Diogen. Laert. ibid.

ſupreme being, upon the ſuppoſition of his exiſtence, as it is ſketched by Ariſtotle; in which, although we may diſcern a ſtrain of the argumentation that Xenophanes applied to the univerſe, there appears an accuracy of inveſtigation on the ſubject that merits rehearſal. It is impoſſible, ſaid he, ſpeaking of the Deity *, that the *being which is*, can be generated; for, in things ſo produced, there is a neceſſity that they come either from things like, or thoſe which are unlike; but both the one and the other ſuppoſition is equivocal, or contradictory; ſince a thing like may as well be conceived to generate its likeneſs, as to be generated of it; for, among things ſimilar, there is a common and reſpective equality. Neither are unlike things generated from the unlike; for, whether we ſuppoſe the ſtronger to be made from the weaker, or the greater from the leſs, and the better from the worſe; or, in the contrary way, the leſs excellent from thoſe which are more ſo; upon either hypotheſis it will follow, that *of a nonentity ſomething is generated.* God, therefore, if he be, is not made, nor generated, but eternal; and, if eternal, he hath an excellence of being above all others; and therefore he is one. If there were two, or more, ſuch as he, he would ceaſe to be the moſt excellent. Among many gods, equal to one another, there can be no beſt; and to real divinity it is eſſential to ſurpaſs all others. To God, and the power of God, it belongs to have ſway and to govern; and in him every perfection being equal to another, he ſees, hears, and perceives all things with the ſame facility. Thus far does Zeno's conceptions of divinity proceed in a manner that is rational; and, conſidering the defects of the current philoſophy of his time, worthy of approbation. But what follows, with reſpect to the figure of the divinity being round, and his being neither finite nor infinite, moveable nor quieſcent, ſhows that he entangled himſelf with thoſe ſubtile and perplexed ideas, by which the human mind in vain endeavours to riſe to adequate views of the one only Being, who is infinite and eternal. Zeno is reckoned to have flouriſhed about the 79th Olympiad.

We here introduce ſome ſketches of the phyſical philoſophy of Heraclitus and Empedocles, together with accounts of their other tenets, and

* De Zenone.

of their characters, as philoſophers, before we proceed, in the next ſection, to conſider the principles of thoſe called by the particular name of *Atomiſts*, or the Corpuſcular Sect, of which Leucippus and Democritus were held to be the originals in Greece.

Heraclitus was a native of the city of Epheſus, in Aſia Minor, and born in a condition of fortune that promiſed the enjoyment of wealth and power; but he early reſigned theſe advantages, and betook himſelf to phyſiological ſtudy. In the proſecution of it, he either neglected, or deſpiſed, thoſe helps to ſcience, which the ableſt geniuſes muſt owe to the knowledge or diſcoveries of others before them. Upon this point, for ſome time at leaſt, his ſaying was, that he knew nothing *; but he afterwards changed his language, and rather boaſted of the univerſality of his knowledge. By much learning, ſaid he, the mind is not really inſtructed; otherwiſe Heſiod, or Pythagoras, or Xenophanes, would have more exemplified its efficacy; but there is only one wiſdom, and that peculiar to the mind, which conſiſts in knowing "how, and when "to govern all by all." This obſcure ſentence ſeems to have no meaning that is obvious but a political one; yet, as he uttered ſome things very myſteriouſly, it was conſtructed in various ſenſes. That he held the adminiſtration of civil affairs, and eſpecially of a popular government, in high eſteem, appears from another ſentence of his, "that every "people ought to fight as much for their laws as for their walls;" and from his diſplaying, in ſome paſſages of his book on Nature, his ſkill in political ſcience; yet he was reſtrained from the exerciſe of it in the Epheſian ſtate, not only by his diſpoſition to ſtudy, but by the treatment the Epheſians gave his friend Hermodorus, whom he had aſſigned for their legiſlator †, and they thought fit to baniſh. Indignation roſe in his mind, naturally faſtidious, and of a melancholy caſt, to a heighth of rage. He pronounced all the Epheſians of adult years worthy of deſtruction for their ſhameful procedure; and alſo for the no leſs ignominious reaſon they alledged for it. "Let no man," ſaid they, "who "pretends to excel another live amongſt us; but let him remove to "ſome other place." Expreſſing, afterwards, on ſeveral occaſions, his utter

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 9. p. 550. † Cicer. Tuſcul. Quaeſt. lib. 5.

utter contempt of the underſtanding and manners of his countrymen, he ſecreted himſelf from them in the receſſes of the temple of Diana. The acrimony of his temper increaſing, he, who was never ſeen to indulge a ſmile, now deplored the miſeries of mankind with conſtant tears. He recollected not then, in the impaired ſtate of his mind, what is ſaid to have been one of his apothegms *, "that a ſolitary man is "either a God or a beaſt." Or, perhaps, he preferred to it another, "that wiſdom was ſomething ſeparated from all other things."

In theſe diſmal circumſtances, his application to ſtudy, and to the compoſition of his book on Nature, muſt have been often interrupted. Accordingly, the chaſms, or involved ſentences of that work, were ſuch, that, although, where intelligible, it was allowed to be excellent in matter and ſtyle, yet, in many places, as Socrates ſaid, it required a Delian diver † *to explore the depth of his meaning.* His phyſical principles, ſo far as they are imperfectly traced by ſeveral authors, are reducible to the following particulars: That fire was the primary and ſole element in nature, of which all things conſiſted ‡; that the compoſitions of other bodies, and their various phenomena, were explicable, not according to the known power of that element, to rarify, or to condenſe them, but from the different dilatations, and contractions of itſelf; that the apparent extinction of it, which was its groſſer contraction, generated earth; which, looſed in its particles, was reſolved into water; and from its exhalations, again, came air; that the natural world, being ſubjected to this viciſſitude, would, at certain fatal periods, revert into, and be abſorbed in fire, its original principle §. He defined fate to be *reaſon pervading univerſal nature:* In which aſſumption, he ſeems either to have deviated from that noted tenet of his followers, called Heraclitians, *that all things flowed, without coherence, like a river* ‖, or ſtated a doctrine not

 reconcileable

* Stobaeus, Sentent. Mor. Sermo 3.

† Cicer. de Finib. lib. 2.

‡ Diogen. Laert. ibid.

§ Stobaei Eclogae Phyſ. lib. 1. p. 12. De Placitis Philoſ. lib. 1. cap. 25.

‖ In conſequence of his theory, he affirmed, that the ſame perſon could never go twice into a bath; and Cratylus, his diſciple, ſaid, not even once. The human ſoul, though allowed by him to be inexplicable, he held to be, like other things, in conſtant fluxion. Motion, he ſaid, was no

reconcileable with his other theory; if that implied, beſide rejecting the teſtimony of the ſenſes, the uncertainty and fallacy of all the perceptions, or judgments, of the human mind. Opinion he called the ſacred diſeaſe. Yet he declared the human ſoul to be of a nature he could not, by all his ſtudy, comprehend. On ſeveral ſubjects, although opiniative, he expreſſed himſelf like a Pythagorean. "My body," ſaid he, "is but the vileſt droſs; yet, ſuch as it is, I ſhall treat it with ſome care, "as long as God requires me to to make uſe of it, as an inſtrument of "action." But it is in vain to pretend to collect with exactneſs the philoſophical tenets of a man, who, ſometimes from affectation of ſingularity, and often from diſtemper, is acknowledged to have written many things in a contradictory, or an unintelligible ſtrain. We ſhall only remark, that his choice of his phyſical principle, fire, as the conſtituent, and prime mover of the natural elements, ſhowed diſcernment, and his manner of conceiving its action, a degree of ingenuity; and that it might be juſtly deemed to be more efficacious in the production of the varying qualities of bodies, and, therefore, more tenible in theory than any ſpeculation upon the inferior elements, or the diviſions of matter into its minuteſt parts. After all the ſearches that late ages have made into the *ſtamina* of bodies, and their action upon one another, it ſeems to be evinced, that an aetherial fluid, of the nature of fire, pervades them more univerſally, and produces more wonderful effects, than is found to be done by any known element. Heraclitus flouriſhed about the 69th Olympiad, and was contemporary with the Perſian monarch Darius Hyſtaſpes, whoſe invitation to come to his court, he, with a tincture of philoſophic pride, declined. He is ſaid to have given a like refuſal to a requeſt of the Athenians.

Agrigentum, in Sicily, gave birth to Empedocles; and, in the judgement of the Roman poet Lucretius, more honour and celebrity was derived to the iſland from this circumſtance, than from all the wonders of Nature it contained; although Charibdis roared on its coaſt, and Ætna flamed

no otherwiſe known but by motion. But, if it makes the uncertainty of knowledge, it is to be aſked, How is motion itſelf known?—Ariſtot. de Anima, lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 419.

flamed in the midſt of its domains. His encomiaſtic lines * are in a high ſtrain of enthuſiaſm, eſpecially coming from a philoſophical poet; and, perhaps, in reſpect to the ſubject he treats, to that *nature of things he attempts to explain*, they may be reckoned both extravagantly and unjuſtifiably applied. Yet, it may be alledged in his excuſe, that he only extols reaſon in the human breaſt as ſuperior to all other exhibitions of it. It is no more, too, than one phyſical poet pouring incenſe on the admired works of another: There was, however, little correſpondence in their philoſophical tenets. The four elements were aſſumed by the Sicilian ſage as the principles of all natural generations; yet Stobaeus †, and the author *de Placitis*, alledge, that he held certain minutiae of bodies, of ſimilar parts, and round, to be antecedent to the formation of the elements, and, therefore, conjoin his doctrine with that of Epicurus, and other Atomiſts. But we know, with more certainty, that, to fire, or aether, water, earth, and air, he added the concomitant powers of *concord* and *diſcord*; and, giving the poetic names of Jupiter, Neſtis, Juno, and Dis, or Pluto, to the ſeveral elements, he made all the productions and phaenomena of Nature to ariſe ‡ from their union or ſeparation. According to him, there was properly no ſettled conſtitution of things; but the viciſſitudes of junction and disjunction, of love and diſcord, everlaſtingly took place. So ſung the bard of Agrigentum, in a poem of five thouſand verſes, including thoſe he wrote on religious luſtrations; and, while he gained much public admiration, he thought it the more allowable to applaud himſelf. In compariſon with the Sicilians,

* Quorum Acragantinus cum primis Empedocles eſt,
Hic eſt vaſta Charibdis, et hic Ætnaea minantur
Murmura———
Quae cum magna modis multis miranda videtur,
Gentibus humanis regio———
Nil tamen hoc habniſſe viro praeclarius in ſe,
Nec ſanctum magis, et mirum, carumque videtur.
Carmina quinetiam divini pectoris ejus
Vociferantur, et exponunt praeclara reperta,
Ut vix humana videatur ſtirpe creatus.
De Rer. Nat. lib. 1.

† De Placitis Philoſoph. lib. 1. cap. 19. p. 677. Diogen. Laert. lib. 8. p. 538.

‡ Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. 4.

lians, he ſtyled himſelf a god, with his proper attribute of immortality; ſo that Lucretius's panegyric, which aſſerts, that on account of his wonderful endowments, *he could hardly be thought ſprung of the human race*, ſtill fell ſhort of the character he aſſumed. Sextus Empiricus thinking this frantic expreſſion irreconcileable to his having common reaſon *, alledges that he could mean no more by it than ſome other philoſophers, who ſaid, that, poſſeſſing purity, and ſanctity of mind, they had a god within them, or a receptacle fit for a deity.

His general principles, that have been mentioned, implied the doctrine, that things in the univerſe ſometimes moved, and ſometimes were at reſt †. The one enſued, when, out of many things, or of the ſeveral elements, concord made one thing, which was improperly called generation; and alſo, when, of one thing, diſcord made many things, as in what was termed their diſſolution. Reſt happened in the intervals of theſe two movements; and, therefore, he reckoned that the world was not the ſame with the univerſe; and that thoſe parts only of the latter were called by the former name, which underwent the different influences of concord and diſagreement. All the reſt was matter unmoved, and in profound quiet. Whether in this ſtate the natural elements exiſted at all, or how they lay together, or if they had any diſtinguiſhable form more than the chaos of the poets, we are left to conjecture. Yet, upon the hypotheſis of their exiſting as many things, and not one thing, it muſt be preſumed, that Concord was the firſt mover; ſince Strife, her oppoſite, could only intervene, and divide that which before was one, and in a condition of harmony. But Empedocles, whom Ariſtotle pronounces ‡ rather a ſtumbling than an accurate reaſoner, made his two principles convertible into each other, and contention to ariſe out of friendſhip, originally, and as much, as friendſhip out of contention; ſo that the queſtion about the firſt introduction of motion was rendered nugatory, or evaded.

Beſide the two imaginary powers of concord and diſcord, Empedocles ſpoke of a one God, or deity, exempted from their influence ‖, and not included

* Adverſ. Mathem. lib. 1. c. 13. p. 61. † Ariſtot. Phyſ. lib. 8. c. 1. p. 319.
‡ Metaph. lib. 1. c. 4. p. 646. ‖ Ibid. lib. 3. c. 4. p. 662.

included in the generations of other things; and who, happy in himſelf, knew not contention. For, according to his philoſophy, all knowledge proceeded from a *ſenſe of like to like* *; or, in plainer terms, from a participation of the element of any thing to the conception of it. Thus, ſaid he, we know water, by water *in us*; fire by fire; earth by earth; air by air; and, in the ſame manner, friendſhip and contention. This was a ſhort and eaſy account of a difficult point, the origin of our ideas. To render it complete, he made the human ſoul a compound of the four elements; and hence it could not fail to have a ſpecial knowledge of each of them. But, without inſiſting on ſuch ſuperficial ſtrains of his philoſophy, we may here take occaſion to repeat an obſervation already made, with reſpect to thoſe called Phyſical Philoſophers, and diſtinguiſhed from the Atomical ſect of them in Greece. We have Ariſtotle's teſtimony, that Empedoles did not comprehend, in his phyſical principles, the agency of that deity, whom he mentions as a ſeparate and ſuperior being to them, but diſcuſſed the whole conſtitution of things by a theory of ſympathy and antipathy, agreement and averſion. It is moſt probable, that he did no more in this ſecluſion of his ſuperior deity from any interference in the work, than what other philoſophers, who profeſſed to hold forth a phyſical ſyſtem, thought themſelves obliged to do, even when they admitted one eternal and ungenerated being, called God. Their invention and inquiry, they ſuppoſed, could not ſufficiently appear, but by deducing from ſome of the natural elements, or by the fiction of certain ideal powers in the univerſe, the origin and formation of the worlds of beings, inanimate and animate, vegetable, brutal, rational, and intelligent. But how abſurdly, and inconſiſtently, this taſk was performed, is evinced, not only from Empedocles's theory, but that of the ſeveral ſpeculatiſts of the Ionic ſchool, and others that have been examined. The Roman poet, Ovid, who appears, as well as Lucretius, to have been acquainted with the famous poem of the Sicilian bard, on the *nature and principles of things*, and whoſe notion of a *concordia diſcors* ſeems to be copied from it, is known, by every ſcholar, to deſiderate a principle adequate to the arrangement of his *chaos*. It is a *God, and a better*

* Sextus Empiric. ibid.

better nature, than could be found in it *; but to which deity, in the catalogue of gods, the work was to be referred, he ventures not to declare, but leaves it doubtful; and, it is likely, in imitation of the authors he conſulted.

With reſpect to the ſolutions Empedocles gives of the particular phenomena of Nature, or his notions of the heavens, and of the ſun, moon, and ſtars, it is unneceſſary to be particular. They are, in general, neither better nor worſe than thoſe of almoſt all the Grecian phyſiologiſts who preceded him; and, it may be added, of thoſe who followed after him for ſeveral generations. His chryſtalline heavens, with ſtars of fire faſtened to them, while the planets were left looſe, are equal to Heraclitus's flaming lamps, in the form of boats, nouriſhed from the exhalations of the earth; and his ſea, ſaid to be the ſweat ſqueezed from the earth by the ſun's heat, is not ſo deſpicable as Xenophanes's fancy of cloudy ſtars, having their fires extinguiſhed through the day, and lighted up every night. In the many abſurd opinions adopted in phyſics and aſtronomy, by the ancient philoſophers, for a ſucceſſion of ages, we have a convincing demonſtration how ineffectual to proper diſcoveries, upon theſe ſubjects, all efforts of imagination muſt prove; and that, while men of genius contented themſelves with the common aſpects of things around them, without attentive and continued obſervations on their various appearances, the theories formed by them about the celeſtial bodies, and their motions, or even the properties and qualities of the terreſtrial ones, could differ little from the conceptions of the vulgar; and, if they exceeded the latter in fancy, they could only equal them in truth. The detail, therefore, of theſe reveries, we have, in a great meaſure, avoided; and ſhall forbear, in decent regard to the name of philoſophy.

It yet remains to add ſome remarks on the common report of the manner in which the Sicilian philoſopher was ſaid to have made his exit, by a tremendous leap into the burning jaws of Ætna †. The act is

* Sic ubi diſpoſitam, *quiſquis fuit* ille deorum,
Congeriem ſecuit, ſectamque in membra redegit.
Metamorph. lib. 1. § 2.

† Lucian. Dial. de Morte Peregrini. Diogen. Laert. ibid. lib. 8.

is allowed to have paſſed in a clandeſtine way; and that the detection of it enſued by the ſingular accident of one of his brazen ſandals being thrown out by the mountain, and ſo ſmall a relict of him being found entire. He was not known to be liable to any natural phrenzy; but the vanity he often ſhowed in performing amazing feats, by medicine, and expelling epidemical diſtempers and plagues, taken together with the language he held with reſpect to himſelf, as a being of a ſuperior condition to mortal men, conſtituted a preſumption, if not a clear proof, that he had recourſe to this ſtratagem, although the moſt audacious one, to eſtabliſh the belief he had in the courſe of his life laboured to excite, of his being an immortal divinity, and, therefore, was removed in ſome ſupernatural way out of the world. Such is the ſummary of the charge againſt Empedocles, as an impoſtor of the firſt magnitude, and who could encounter death in any form, rather than not attain his favourite object; to which, as he had many accuſers, ſome ſatirical one might ſubjoin, according to Horace's inſinuation *, that being accounted a dramatic, as well as a phyſical poet, he might think himſelf entitled to the liberty allowed the former, of managing, in the manner he pleaſed, *his exit from the drama*. In his vindication, the alledged account of his death is declared, by ſeveral authors of credit, to be altogether a fiction, which had been raiſed upon no other voucher, incident, or circumſtance, but that of there being no certain record of the time or place in which he died; and that no ſepulchre or monument was found erected to him at Agrigentum. For this a reaſon was given, that having taken a journey into the Peloponneſus of Greece, he never returned, but died there; or, as Phavorinus related it, at Meſſina, after a public ſolemnity, by a fall from his chariot. Strabo †, entering gravely into the queſtion, declares it to be his opinion, that Empedocles could not have accompliſhed his death in the manner repreſented, by throwing himſelf into the dreadful vorago of the mountain, whence, when the fiery eruptions ceaſed, a violent wind blew conſtantly, and with

* ——— Ardentem frigidus Ætnam
Inſiliit; ſit jus liceatque perire poetis.
HORAT. de Arte Poet.

† Strab. lib. 8.

force ſufficient to repel the near approach of any human being. From the contradictory aſſertions, as to facts, on the part of the arraigners, and defenders, the queſtion appears to be thrown back, for reſolution, upon the general character of Empedocles; whether, in his behaviour as a man and a citizen, he could be deemed to have carried his vanity, and affectation of divine honours, to the pitch of extravagance alledged againſt him. Here, too, the evidence has its counter parts. Many of his public actions atteſted him to be humane, temperate, liberal, and beneficent, and ſo moderate and unaſpiring, as to ſecular dignity and honour, that he refuſed the principality of Agrigentum, when offered to him. On the other hand, it is not denied that he diſcovered exceſſive oſtentation and vanity in the attire of his perſon, in his equipage for all public appearances, and, upon ſome occaſions, did not decline accepting the rituals allotted to a divinity. Upon this admitted circumſtance of his conduct, he has been much more condemned than acquitted; and, to the cenſure or ridicule of his affectation in life, the belief of the laſt act of his inſane ambition, although by no means proved, has been generally added.

Ariſtotle, as Diogenes Laertius reports, reckoned Empedocles one of the earlieſt founders of the rhetorical art. His delivering his philoſophy in a poem was no ſingularity; but rather, after Heſiod's example, ſuch compoſition of their works was often preferred by the philoſophers of ſeveral ſucceeding generations. The ſyſtems of Xenophanes and Parmenides, and ſome others, were alſo compoſed in the ſtile of the muſes. The period of Empedocles's birth and death is among the unfixed points in chronology; and it can only be ſaid, with certainty, that he flouriſhed between the 75th and 80th Olympiad.

SECT.

SECTION II.

Of the Atomical Philoſophy,—and the Phyſical Theories of Leucippus and Democritus.

WE inquire not here, when or where the atomical philoſophy firſt took its riſe; whether in Phoenicia, or in Greece; or what credit is due to the report mentioned by Poſidonius, of its having a Sidonian original, from a philoſopher of that nation, called Moſchus, who lived before the war of Troy. Strabo *, and Sextus Empiricus, both take notice of this tradition; which has given occaſion to various conjectures of the learned about the name and country of Moſchus. Leucippus and Democritus were allowed to be the firſt Grecian adepts in this phyſical theory; and certain it appears, that no ſyſtem of it was formed in any of the ſchools of Greece at an earlier period than their appearance. We ſhall not, therefore, examine, with ſome authors, whether its origin, in that country, may be traced to Pythagoras's *monads*, under the interpretation of *atoms*, or to like gloſſes on the obſcurities of other philoſophers; but ſhall only premiſe, to the view to be taken of the atomical theories of theſe two philoſophers, a remark on the ſtate of phyſical knowledge, among the Greeks, about the periods in which they are reckoned to have flouriſhed.

We have already ſtated in what range of ſcience the forward genius of the Greeks chiefly diſplayed itſelf; and how thoſe called phyſical philoſophers among them were little more than mere ſpeculatiſts upon

* Lib. 16. Sextus Emp. lib. 8. p. 367.

the natural elements, as they appeared, without any courſe of obſervations or experiments being inſtituted, for diſcovering the natures and qualities of bodies. Amongſt all their cities, or ſtates, there was no public proviſion made for phyſiological ſtudy; and their philoſophers, beſide the different bent of their genius, were, with the exception of two or three, in no condition to undertake, and much leſs to proſecute this taſk, to the improvement of ſcience. As interludes, or concomitant entertainments of the Olympic games, exhibitions of the ſcientific, or literary kind, were introduced; but the ſubjects of them were either inventions in ſome of the practical arts, or ſpecimens of the more ingenious ones, ſuch as poetry, muſic, painting, rhetoric, and hiſtory. To productions in the more abſtract ſciences, or diſquiſitions in phyſics, they could not be extended; and, although we have it to narrate, that Democritus read, in a public aſſembly, one of his phyſical treatiſes, it was a ſingular and dangerous experiment; ſince any coſmogony, inconſiſtent with the received theology, was more likely to have excited indignation, and procured baniſhment to its author, than obtained applauſe or reward. From theſe circumſtances, Phyſics, properly ſo called, could not be cultivated in Greece, but in an inadequate and ſuperficial manner; and the few of their philoſophers who were inclined to more diligent inveſtigations in that ſcience, were more eſpecially obliged to reſort to the colleges of foreign countries, for information and progreſs in it; an attainment which muſt have proved as ſlow as it was laborious. Democritus appears to have given more application to this ſtudy, and, by what he learned abroad, to have been more intelligent in it than all his phyſical predeceſſors. It muſt be added, that he was not followed, or but indifferently, by any claſs of Grecian philoſophers, for a long ſeries of time, in this painful tract of knowledge; and, until Caliſthenes *, at the requeſt of Ariſtotle, and by the concurring favour and munificence of Alexander, made that immenſe collection of the vegetable, and animal, and other ſpecies of natural bodies, from the various regions which the Macedonian prince over-ran, as a conqueror, and alſo tranſmitted thoſe records of aſtronomical obſervations, which had

* Plin. Hiſt. Natur. lib. 8. c. 9.

had been kept for many centuries by the Chaldeans of Babylon, it may be juſtly reckoned, that the proficiency of the Greeks in theſe ſubjects was inconſiderable, and did not much exceed that of the nations, which, in other reſpects, compared with them, were accounted rude and illiterate. Even thoſe tables of obſervations on the motions of the celeſtial bodies, adapted as they were to diſcoveries in aſtronomy, and to the correction of many errors in chronology and hiſtory, ſeem to have been little conſulted, or turned to ſmall account in ſcience, until the reigns of the Ptolemies in Egypt, and the eſtabliſhment of the Alexandrine ſchool.

The vague account given of the time in which Leucippus appeared, and the uncertainty * of the place of his birth, and where, or under whom he ſtudied, may be conſidered as a confirmation of what has been ſaid about the ambiguity of the origin of the Atomical philoſophy in Greece. The explication of his theory of atoms, or imperceptibly ſmall particles of matter, and a *void*, has been commonly delivered by authors under the name and recommendation of Democritus's more explicit and improved ſyſtem of them. We might therefore omit the ſhort ſketch of Leucippus's coſmogony, which we find in Diogenes Laertius, or conſider it only in connection with the doctrine and principles of his more celebrated follower, and diſciple. But, as there appears to be an invention and ingenuity in it, which induced at leaſt one learned author † in the laſt century to contend, that it muſt have ſuggeſted to Deſcartes the firſt idea of his *vortices*, and that Leucippus may not forfeit to another the ſhare of reputation due to him, we ſhall ſtate in what manner he conceived that a globe, ſuch as our terreſtrial one, might be formed, upon his only aſſumed principles of an infinity of atoms, and a *vacuum*. "After the floating motion, which he ſuppoſes the former ever to have had in the latter, it muſt have happened, that ſome of the atoms, reckoned to be of various figures and ſhapes, would come cloſer together, and be ſeparated from the reſt; and that, by their huddle upon one another, a ſort of rolling, or toſſing about of them in the empty ſpace,

* Diog. Laert. lib. 9. p. 566. Ariſtot. de Generat. lib. 1. † Daniel Huetius Avaranch. Epiſcop. In Cenſura Philoſophiae Carteſianae.

ſpace, would be occaſioned. In conſequence of this, hitting againſt one another; and now ſome, and now others, prevailing to carry them in different directions, thoſe which were alike would come at length to encounter with their like, and, leaving the atoms in diſparity to them, ſettle more eaſily in a conſiſtent form; but, being of equal weight, and their maſs of vaſt magnitude, they could not revolve, until ſuch of them as were placed upon the extremities, being leſs preſſed together, recoiled, or *leaped back again* into the vacuum. Upon this incident, a rotation would enſue in the remaining body of the atoms, which now clinging faſter to one another, would form the firſt concretion of them in a globular ſhape. There would be produced upon its revolving ſuperficies, a kind of ſkin, or ſubtile membrane, incloſing within it all varieties of atoms; but, as it would rather wear thinner, than become more groſs, from their conſtant attrition and motion, it would ſerve, chiefly, to attract greater numbers of them from without towards their middle aggregate; which, by this means, would be more condenſed, and gradually acquire the ſolidity and firmneſs of the body of the earth." In this eſſay of Leucippus, towards the formation of a revolving globe, with his atoms having ſelf-motion, although there be not preciſion, or ſufficient accuracy ſhown about the laws of moving bodies, yet, making ſome allowance upon this point, and comparing it with what we are further to learn from the theories of Democritus and Epicurus, the ſignal improvers of the Atomical ſyſtem, it cannot be reckoned a deſpicable part, but rather the moſt plauſible one, of their doctrine. This may be allowed, more eſpecially if we conſider what is intimated, but not diſtinctly expreſſed, about the atoms on the extremities of their maſs flying off, when its revolution enſued; which preſents an idea or conception of that great principle in mechanics, ſince ſo much illuſtrated, by which every body moving round its axis is found to have a conſtant tendency to recede from, as well as to preſs towards its centre. It was this interpretation, given by Huetius to the paſſage we have quoted from Diogenes Laertius, that afforded ſome ground for his argument, that the French philoſopher, inſtead of being the inventor of his theory of the *vortices*, had taken the hint of it from the coſmogony of Leucippus and Democritus.

This

This laſt philoſopher, who had ſo great a name in antiquity, was commonly reputed a native of Abdera in Thrace. The opulence of his father was reputed to have enabled him to receive, and furniſh entertainment for ſome days, to Xerxes, and part of his army, diſcomfited, and fugitive from Greece *. The monarch is ſaid to have left, at the requeſt of his hoſpitable entertainer, two or three of the Perſian magi, with the charge of inſtructing his ſons in their ſciences. That Oſthanes, a chief of the magi, whom Pliny mentions † as an attendant of the expedition, might be one of the number, ſeems not very probable. But that ſeveral of that order were diſperſed in Greece, with the view of making proſylites to their theology, and that the Greeks became at this period better, and more generally acquainted with the Perſian and Chaldaic knowledge in aſtronomy, and divination by the ſtars, and were particularly captivated with their performances in the magical art, is ſufficiently atteſted. Democritus, therefore, in the years of puerility ‡, received from his Perſian preceptors ſome elements of literature, if not of ſcience; and, moſt probably, what was more ſuited to his age, and more uſeful in his ſubſequent peregrinations, a preparation for learning the Aſiatic languages. But, whatever his youthful and domeſtic improvements may be reckoned, he ſoon diſcovered the ardent thirſt of his mind after ſcience. He was the youngeſt of three brothers; and, when their paternal inheritance came to be divided, he made choice of that ſhare which appeared rather the leaſt valuable, but could moſt readily be reduced into money. It amounted to a hundred talents; a large fortune for a private perſon, but which he accounted inconſiderable to be expended in the purſuit of ſcience §, and the attainment of the nobler treaſure of wiſdom and knowledge, which philoſophic ſtudy affords to the inquiſitive mind. After attending Leucippus, and other Grecian maſters, he reſolved to gratify to the utmoſt his favourite paſſion, and, it may be ſaid, the only one by which he was ever known to be actuated. Taking a courſe ſimilar to what many of the Grecian ſages

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 9. p. 579. † Hiſt. Nat. lib. 30. in Prooemio de Magic. ‡ Diogen. Laert. lib. 9. p. 579. § Cicero de Finib. lib. 5. p. 107.; et Tuſcul. Quaeſt. lib. 5. p. 197.

ſpace, would he paſſed, of a long life, full forty years in Phoenicia, another and in the Perſian and Indian territories. diff- proficiency in knowledge, and high entertainment to him- theſe peregrinations, may be underſtood from what he de- a kind of exultation or triumph, upon his return *, "That, n of his time, he had been the greateſt traveller, had converſed ore of the ſages and learned, in different countries, and made noſt inquiries, in philoſophy; and that, in the demonſtration of es and figures, not even thoſe of the Egyptians, called *Arpedonaptae*, could excel him." Inſtructed he was in every ſpecies of ſcience; in mathematics, phyſics, ethics, and in all the liberal arts; but more particularly converſant in the knowledge of natural bodies, and their compoſitions, and of what might be effected by their analyſis †, and the commixture of their minuteſt particles. He owed to the prieſts of Memphis that inſtruction in aſtronomy ‡, which enabled him to pronounce the *galaxy* in the heavens a *co-apparition* of ſtars. To what account he turned, in his voluminous writings, the materials of information he had acceſs to, and the communications in ſcience he received, we may judge from what Pliny ſays § of the uſe he made of the books of Apollonices and Dardanus, Phoenician authors, upon whom he wrote commentaries; but ſo partially, as to leave room for publications of his own upon their general principles and doctrine. This practice, the Roman phyſiologiſt obſerves, was not uncommon among the Grecian philoſophers, who might be ſaid not only to have travelled abroad, but, ſeveral of them, to have gone into exile for many years, in order to acquire, for the benefit of their countries, every known art or ſcience; and, therefore, might juſtly think their pains and expence ought to be productive of ſome reputation, as well as emolument to themſelves. *Magic*, indeed, in the vulgar acceptation of the word ‖, was what they were principally underſtood to have learned in their foreign excurſions; but it was well known to the philoſophers themſelves, and to all the learned

* Clemens Alexandrinus, Stroma 1. Ælian. Variae Hiſt. † Seneca, Epiſt. 30. ‡ Diodor. Siculus, lib. 2. § Ibid. ‖ Suidas in Voce.

learned, in what ſenſe that word was taken in the countries they viſited, and that it denominated the ſcience of natural philoſophy, and that part of it, eſpecially, which led either to uſeful, or ſurpriſing diſcoveries, in the qualities of bodies.

Upon returning to Abdera, Democritus found that he had incurred a penal law of the city, which excluded, from the right of ſepulchre *, every one who, like him, could be proved to have conſumed, in an unaccountable manner, his whole patrimony. To ſhun this mark of ignominy, and to gain favour with his countrymen, he either availed himſelf of the common opinion, that a philoſopher, ſuch as he was, could foretel future events, and ventured to emit certain predictions with reſpect to them, which only to vulgar underſtandings could be accounted ſupernatural; or elſe †, he imagined he had attained, by his converſe with the magi, the art of divination. Two of his preſages are recorded by Pliny ‡, which, although wonderful, rather than miraculous, produced ſuch an effect upon the minds of the people, as ſurpaſſed his moſt ſanguine hopes. With an unanimous voice, they proclaimed him *wiſdom* itſelf, and offered him divine honours. While under this favourable prepoſſeſſion, he took the liberty to produce, and read in their aſſembly, a famous work of his, which had the title of the great *Diocoſmos*; and began §, *Here I diſcourſe of all things*. As it muſt have unfolded the principles of that atomical philoſophy he meant to introduce, he may be reckoned fortunate, not only in the admiration he excited of his wiſdom among the Abderites, but alſo in their profound ignorance; which made them applaud what they did not in the leaſt underſtand. Beholding him now with the utmoſt veneration, and calling him their oracle, and the ornament of their city, they replaced his exhauſted patrimony, and inſiſted that he ſhould preſide in the public government. Nothing could be more contrary to his inclination, taſte, and habits, which were uniformly and inceſſantly turned to phyſical inquiries and experiments. To proſecute theſe, he withdrew from one receſs to another;

* Diog. Laert. lib. 18. cap. 28.

† Cicero de Divinat. lib. 1. pag. 255.

‡ Hiſt. Nat. pag. 24.

§ Hic loquor de univerſis. Cicer. Academ. Quaeſt. lib. 4.

and, finding he could not altogether avoid interruption, he retired from the city, and ſhut himſelf up among the ſepulchres and tombs.

Perhaps there could not be a more ſtriking inſtance of the alienation of the human mind, poſſeſſed of reaſon, from all its natural and ordinary affections. Hardly ſenſible to hunger, unwearied in vigilance, compoſed in his diſmal and dreary abode, and regardleſs of all other objects but thoſe with which his mind was occupied *, he paſſed many days and nights almoſt entirely either in reading, writing, and contemplation, or in the analyſing of plants, and the diſſection of birds. Before he betook himſelf to this laſt retreat, the Abderites, when they came to conſult him, upon any public or private emergency, were often mortified by his replying to them only with a contemptuous grin, or fits of laughter, even when they reported what was calamitous or diſtreſsful. He became now more addicted to this ſtrange manner of receiving their complaints. Inſult deſigned they could not interpret his behaviour to be; but it bore all the appearance of inſanity of mind. A deploring epiſtle was ſent to Hippocrates, requeſting his preſence. The father of phyſic came; and, notwithſtanding the firſt approach to ſuch a patient was perplexing, and the conference was frequently interrupted by burſts of laughter from Democritus, for which no occaſion appeared to be given, but rather ſuch as ſhould naturally have produced an oppoſite emotion, he was pronounced by no means deprived of reaſon; and that, on the contrary, he ought to be ranked among the wiſeſt of men. Democritus, however, ſupported, before his phyſician, a theſis, with which he had often confounded the Abderites, that the diſtreſſes of mankind, conſidered as ariſing from their follies or vices, was an allowable, and juſt ſubject of deriſion.

Here a compariſon has been often introduced by authors, upon the contraſted ſentiment of Democritus and Heraclitus; between the philoſopher whoſe laughter was provoked by the obſervation or recital of the troubles and woes befalling men; and the other, who ſhed tears of vexation, mixed with pity, upon beholding their groſs errors and miſfortunes. Upon which ſide the humanity lay is obvious. But as, in Heraclitus,

* Lucian in Philoſpendes.

Heraclitus, it appeared to be diſeaſe more than ſentiment; and in Democritus's caſe, notwithſtanding Hippocrates's favourable declaration, a touch of diſtemper may be ſuſpected; the compariſon between their moral feelings is of leſs ſignificance: Yet, if a queſtion is to be ſtated, upon the ſuppoſition of their being unaffected by any perceptible malady of body or mind, it ſhould be *this;* What is the difference, in point of abſurdity, and want of common reflection, between one, who, like Heraclitus, ſhould be diſpleaſed, and vexed to anger and tears, with the generality of mankind, becauſe he could not bring them to think as he did, upon ſubjects not levelled to their conceptions; and another, who, like Democritus, ſhould entertain ſuch a ſenſe of his ſuperiority over them, in the choice he had made of his ſtudies and purſuits in life, and in the extenſive knowledge he had acquired, as to be perſuaded that the common aims and underſtandings of all the reſt of men in the world were contemptible and ridiculous, the ſources of trouble, and, according to their management of them, the occaſions of their many calamities and ſufferings; for all which prevailing folly they were to have none of his pity, but as much of his ſcorn and deriſion as he could ſhow them? To imagine that the bulk of mankind were to be converted into ſpeculative philoſophers, or otherwiſe to be bewailed; or, while they acted in the neceſſary employments of life, and on the theatre of the world, that they were to diveſt themſelves of every paſſion, and become as indifferent to the parts of the ſcene they had to perform as a philoſopher, who had withdrawn himſelf from all concern in them, and, if they did not, to be accounted ridiculous, ſeems, in common reaſon, to approach nearly to the ſame abſurdity. But we come to the diſplay of Democritus's atomical theory.

In the opinion of Horace *, Democritus, from his inceſſant purſuit of knowledge, might be reckoned *a ſoul without a body;* and yet he embraced the corpuſcular philoſophy. Much converſant as he was with the Pythagorean, and other ſects of Greece, he preferred to them all

* Lib. 1. Epiſt. 1.—12.

——Democriti pecus edit agellos,
Cultaque; dum peregrè eſt *animus ſine corpore* velox.

the doctrine of Leucippus, which he made it his great ſtudy to illuſtrate and improve. Its only principles were atoms, or an *ens* full and ſolid, and another having rarity, and called a *void* *; and although, where the former was, the latter could not be, and, in this reſpect, was a non-ens, yet entity, and corporeiety, were alike predicated of both; neither was the one generated of the other; but the two, ever co-exiſting, became the cauſe of all other things. The ſolid conſiſted of an infinite number of ſeparate particles, indiviſibly ſmall †, and of different figures; and yet, among theſe atoms of bodies, there was to be conceived ſome difference of weight, according as they might exceed one another in ſolidity, or ſuperficial extenſion. In all other reſpects, they were deſtitute of every quality, and, taken ſeparately, were neither moiſt nor dry, cold or hot, black or white, bitter or ſweet, but only capable, in certain conditions, of producing theſe perceptions in other beings. In general, it was argued, that bodies muſt either be originally conſtituted of atoms, or of nothing; for, allowing every body to be diviſible, and that diviſion to proceed to the utmoſt poſſible length, it muſt come to atoms, or to nothing; and, therefore, there could be no original for any body but atoms ‡. Motion innate, and from neceſſity, and amounting to a kind of animation, was aſcribed to every individual atom; ſo that in the infinite void, where there was no diſtinction of heighth or depth, length or breadth, they could move alike in all imaginable directions. Solid and infrangible as they were ſuppoſed, and capable of impinging upon one another, and rebounding, it was reckoned that their diverſe figures, round, angular, ſtraight, crooked, ſmooth, and pointed, would, after repeated colliſions, enable them to unite into various maſſes, and firmly to cohere. After this manner, Democritus alledged, not only that numberleſs globes of atoms might be formed, and rolled about, but that the elements of fire and water, earth and air, together with all the qualities of bodies, which other philoſophers ſuppoſed to be compounds, or tranſmutations

* Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. 1. cap. 4. p. 6. † Ibid. de Generat. et Corrupt. lib. 1. cap. 1.—2. p. 314.—315. ‡ Cicero de Finib. lib. 1. p. 41.; et de Fato, p. 305. De Placitis Philoſoph. cap. 4. Ariſtot. de Anima, lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 748.

mutations of theſe elements, required no other principles of their generation or corruption, but thoſe of the concourſe or diſſipation of atoms.

In theſe barren principles, aided as they were by ſuppoſed motion, he could not pretend to find any other energies than what aroſe from the different poſitions and coheſions of his atoms *. He therefore acknowledged what was ſo evident; and expreſſed all the powers of his elements of bodies, by three differences; one of figure, another of order, and a third of poſition; which were by him alphabetically repreſented thus, A and N, A N, and N A, and N and Z †. But his philoſophy furniſhed him with a reſource, which abridged the difficult account he had to give of the qualities of bodies, from theſe three accidents to atoms. He denied that qualities exiſted in the things themſelves; and aſſerted, that their apparency was to be referred to the human ſenſations, which modified them ſo as to make men imagine they had an exiſtence, real and external to them; while they judged not from what they underſtood to be true, but only from what they perceived ‡. In any thing compounded, ſaid he, the acceſſion of the leaſt heterogeneous particle ſuffices to make it appear different; and, as the tranſpoſition of the letters in a book may vary the reading from a tragedy to a comedy, ſo, it is to be conceived, that hot and cold, ſweet and bitter, white and black, are no otherwiſe diſtinct properties of bodies, than as their atoms, or ſmalleſt particles, may be differently diſpoſed; and the latter being infinite in number, their variations may be extended to any length. He therefore concluded, that qualities of bodies had their exiſtence only in opinion; and that atoms, differently combined in a *vacuum*, were all that could be deemed real entities, and the principles of all other things.

In conſequence of theſe poſitions, he was generally underſtood to have excluded from the univerſe every incorporeal and intelligent principle, or ſubſtance, unleſs what was called ſuch might be conſtituted of atoms.

But

* Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. 1. cap. 4. † Lucretius, taking in motion and concourſe, rèckons five atomical powers in the line,

Concurſus, motus, poſitura, ordo, figura.

A and N differ in figure, A N, and N A, in order, N and Z in poſition.

‡ Ariſt. de Gener. lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 305.

But in this judgment there is an uncertainty, not only from his admitting an animating principle in his atoms neceſſary, but unexplained, and affirming, according to the author *de placitis* *, that every thing had a ſoul, but alſo from his entertaining a conception of certain phantoms and images, of a nature and power above corporeal, which reflected from external objects, conveyed awful impreſſions to human minds. Theſe, indeed, he could not well deſcribe; but fluctuated in his opinion †, as Cicero ſays, with reſpect to them and the gods. Sometimes he repreſents ſuch images as endowed with a divine nature; and then he calls principles of things, and minds in the world, gods. Again, he holds it, that there muſt be either particular animated images that do good and harm to men, or vaſt ones, of immenſity ſufficient to embrace, exteriorly, the whole world. Such groſs, and incoherent fictions, adds the Roman academician, might be worthy of the people of Abdera, but diſcredit the name of a philoſopher, ſo highly extolled as Democritus. Much the ſame account of his *apparitions* ‡ is given by Sextus Empiricus, who ſubjoins, that he conceived them to predict, vocally, future events to men; and hence, as ſome were benevolent, and ſome malicious, he prayed that he might meet with thoſe of favourable ſpeech and aſpect. He therefore much commended the inſtitution of *auſpices* for divination. If we had not ſtriking inſtances of the contradictory opinions entertained in human minds, and thoſe, too, of eminent penetration and acuteneſs, and if it were not apparent that this philoſopher generally diſcovered a leaning towards the belief of ſupernatural preſages, and of his own ſkill in them, we might be apt to conclude, that all this anouncciation about unintelligible phantoms and viſions, was only affected, and a ſort of conjuration, in the philoſophic ſtyle, which he induſtriouſly employed, in order to hold forth certain fictitious images of things, equivalent to the popular notions of the gods, and to conceal his own total diſbelief of any ſuch ſuperior beings. Yet, upon conſidering, that he, who propoſed to write of all things, without exception of any, in the univerſe, acknowledged that obſcurities often occurred, and that truth,

* Ariſtot. de Generat. lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 305. Cicero, de Nat. Deor. lib. 1. p. 210. ‡ Adverſus Mathem. lib. 8. p. 311.

truth, in moſt caſes *, might be ſaid to be hid in a depth not to be explored, we can hardly ſuppoſe that he had formed a direct and poſitive opinion againſt the exiſtence of incorporeal and divine ſubſtances. It ſeems evident that he only laboured through phyſical enquiries, but pretended not, which Epicurus afterwards did, to have ſo far completed them, as to become a dogmatiſt upon a particular ſyſtem †. The report of his having deprived himſelf of ſight, by means of a ſhield, or braſs plate, oppoſed to the hotteſt rays of the ſun, in order to be more recollected in meditation, is not very credible, as a voluntary act; but might readily befal him accidentally in the courſe of his various experiments. If we ſuppoſe that his eyes were not ſo totally blinded, but that ſome gleams of light might fall upon them, ſo as to occaſion a vibration of the nerves, he might then be ſenſible to viſions of things, in unnatural and fantaſtic forms, of which if he had any previous fancy, his belief of their reality, and fearful appearances, would be confirmed and increaſed.

In the production of the four elements, he choſe to make fire conſiſt of round atoms only ‡, as that figure ſeemed to him the fitteſt to pervade other maſſes of them, and, together with ſoul, which was accounted a ſpecies of fire §, to diffuſe its influence among them. Air, water, earth, he no other way defined, but by their being great or little atoms, which, by their concretions, became a kind of recipient, or vehicle of the motions of the reſt ‖. In one principle of his phyſical theory, he contradicted the doctrine of all the other philoſophers, by aſſerting that different things could not act upon, or ſuffer from one another; and that every agent, and patient, muſt always have fameneſs or ſimilarity. When referred to general obſervation and experience, as contrary to his aſſertion, his reply was evaſive, by alledging, that, although there were a difference apparent in many inſtances, there ſtill might be found in them a latent ſimilarity. But, without inſiſting upon his frivolous arguments in ſupport of this doctrine, and his lame ſolutions of ſeveral difficult

* Cicer. Acad. Quaeſt lib. 4. † Ibid. de Finibus, lib. 5.
‡ Ariſtot. de Coelo, lib. 3. cap. 4. p. 375. § Ibid. de Anima, lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 479. ‖ Ibid. de Gener. lib. 1. cap. 7. pag. 395.

difficult phenomena from it, we ſhall now take a more preciſe and critical view of the general principles of his atomical theory.

It holds forth an hypotheſis for reſolving the queſtion about the origin and conſtitution of worlds in the univerſe, which may be found liable, upon examination, to more objections than almoſt any other, that excited conſiderable attention and regard in the ſchools of philoſophy. It aſſumes a ſpecies of body, or corporeal quantity, called *atoms*, which being ſuppoſed void of every property, but figure and ſolidity, with weight, can hardly be conceived poſſible, and never can be known actually to exiſt. Their imaginary exiſtence, as the utmoſt ſections of bodies, is contradictory to the infinite diviſibility of matter or body, a conception which muſt attend every idea of extenſion or quantity. What then are atoms more than unknown and occult quantities of matter, introduced inſtead of occult qualities in it, to account for the production of viſible and qualified ſubſtances?

But, if the conceſſion ſhould be made, that, in the actual diviſion of matter, there muſt * be an indiviſible point, or *ultimatum*, unleſs we proceed to infinity of diviſion, or from ſomething to nothing, the hypotheſis is ſtill loaded with an inconſiſtency, by the aſſignment of an infinite number of atoms, in correſpondence to the infinite void. Is an infinitely great number more poſſible, or more conceivable, than a quantity infinitely ſmall? If neither of them is comprehenſible, they are both to be rejected; but if one of them enters into the ſuppoſition, where quantity is the ſubject, the other cannot be excluded. If, again, it ſhould be allowed that atoms, although indiviſible, were not like mathematical points, which only form a line, but had figure and magnitude, in the ſmalleſt conceivable degree, ſo as only to imply their ſolidity and infrangibility, yet their figures being ſuppoſed of that immenſe variety as to extend to all thoſe competent to body, they could hardly be reckoned to fall ſhort of infinite; and thus their number being put alſo under that denomination, it would follow, infinity might be ſuperadded to infinity. But it is ſufficient to obſerve, upon this head, the abſurdity of an hypotheſis, which inſiſted upon an infinite *full*, as it was called, or ſuch a corporeiety

* Ariſtot. de Cœlo, lib. 3. cap. 4.

corporiety of atoms, and the like extent of a void. Yet this was a part of the theory ſo fundamental, that Epicurus gave his reaſons why it could not be relinquiſhed *. For, ſaid he, if the vacuum was ſuppoſed infinite, and the atoms not, then the latter, ever in motion, might be diſperſed, and in a manner loſt, in endleſs and unefficient boundings in empty ſpace. If, again, the atoms were infinite in multitude, and the void limited in its latitude, the former would not find place ſufficient for their exiſtence, and their various motions. But, if it was neceſſary to frame his hypotheſis ſo as to avoid theſe conſequences, he ſhould have alſo adverted to what would follow from this proviſion; and that he might be aſked †, In what reſpect did an infinite void, divided by infinite points of ſolidity, differ from a plenum? Unleſs he made the figures of his atoms infinite, the difference could not be ſuch as to afford room for their motion; and thus, unleſs impoſſibilities were allowed to proceed in a train, the hypotheſis was contradictory, and ſubverſive of itſelf.

All the known qualities of bodies, cold, heat, moiſture, dryneſs, ſoftneſs, hardneſs, and all the degrees of them obſervable in nature, were reckoned to proceed ſolely from the figures, and by means of the tranſpoſitions of atoms, which were things in themſelves immutable ‡. The doctrine, that qualities could be aſcribed to mathematical, or geometrical figures, was a ſtrange one, and unknown in philoſophy. Certain properties, eſſential to them, theſe figures were allowed to have, and which, being traced, proved them to be what they were, ſeverally in themſelves, and as they might be diſtinguiſhed from, or found equal to, but not the ſame with, one another. The properties of the ſquare were not compared with thoſe of the circle, nor their figures demonſtrated to be contrary to, but only to be diſtinct from, each other. But the theory not only ſuppoſed qualities of bodies to be produced from atoms unqualified, but contrary ones, from their figures, which had no contraries. To palliate, or get rid of this abſurdity, it was maintained, that theſe qualities had no exiſtence in the things themſelves, but that,

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 10. p. 691. † Ariſtot. de Generat. et Corrupt. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 396. ‡ Ibid. lib. 4. cap. 8.

by certain modifications which objects underwent in the organs of ſenſe, and by perception, they were illuſively repreſented to man. But, according to Democritus, perception itſelf was no more than a configuration of atoms. How, then, could any peculiarity be aſcribed to figures in perception, which, ſeparate from it, was incompetent to them? What could be imagined in round atoms, which, by themſelves, were ſaid to engender fire, to make them productive of the quality of heat, or to impreſs the perception of it on the human ſenſes, more than pyramidical ones, or other ſuppoſeable figures of them, could do? To derive the qualities of bodies, in this manner, from atoms even of one figure, was equivalent to a generation of them from no cauſe, or nothing.

The aſſumption of motion to the atoms unaccounted for, unauthoriſed in reaſon, and without being reckoned a principle in the univerſe, was a manifeſt proof of the ſtretches neceſſary for ſupporting an ill digeſted theory. Democritus *, as well as Leucippus, not only gave them motion, but in ſuch latitude, and ſo undetermined, that they might be ſaid to leap about, or to be deſpatched around, to perform every energy he thought proper for them. Other philoſophers, who preceded him, generally thought themſelves obliged to point out ſome cauſe of it in bodies, or, at leaſt, to adopt it, as found in conjunction with the natural elements they inſiſted upon; as in thoſe of air, water, or fire. But how it ſhould be connected with a multitude of infrangible atoms, was in no reſpect evident. Hence Plato, Ariſtotle, and other ſucceeding philoſophers, accuſed the Atomiſts, whom it leaſt became, of evading this point of inquiry, or of treating it in a moſt curſory manner. They, by this means, avoided other queſtions that were relative to the explication of it as a principle; and eſpecially that important one, whether it might be held coeval with matter, or had its origin in ſoul, or mind, the only ſelf-moving powers known in the univerſe? Epicurus, as if ſenſible of this deficiency in Democritus's theory, and how unſuitable it was to be found in a phyſical ſyſtem, endeavoured to ſupply it, by aſcribing motion in the atoms † to their natural weight, or *gravity*. But, in his account of the origin of the world, a principle of gravity was unintelligible;

* Ariſtot. de Anima, lib. 1. cap. 2. et 3.

† Diogen. Laert. ibid.

gible; and, when granted him, he perverted, in the ſtrangeſt manner, the idea of its operation.

The ſolidity of atoms, and that degree of it which rendered them infrangible, was another arbitrary poſition; but which could not be diſpenſed with, in the hypotheſis, leſt the worlds made of them ſhould fall into nothing. The coheſion of the particles of matter, although a ſurpriſing phenomenon, when attentively conſidered, was, indeed, much overlooked in the ancient philoſophy. It was regarded as the ſimple effect of their condenſation, as if attended with a compreſſive force; but whence this came, in the wonderful meaſure, with which the particles of hard maſſes of matter are found to attract one another, was hardly ſtated as a phyſical queſtion. The licenſe taken in the hypotheſis was the more obvious, from the atoms being found in a *vacuum*, where there could be no atmoſphere, or ſhadow of body, to operate their condenſation, and far leſs their irrefrangibility. Of the moſt ſolid maſſes of matter, there are none known in which pores are not diſcoverable; and, therefore, an abſolute ſolid and infrangible one, may be concluded an anphyſical ſubſtance. Thus the whole hypotheſis of atoms indiſſoluble, indefinitely figured, indiſcriminately moved, was a creation of ideal ſubſtances, endowed with inconſiſtent and unaccountable properties; and yet unfounded, and from nothing, as their ſuppoſed exiſtence was; the work to be performed by them, and alledged to have been accompliſhed in the conſtitution of the world, by their accidental and fortuitous motions and colliſions, may be proved a phenomenon no leſs wonderful than the reality of their exiſtence under the predicaments that have been mentioned. From their attribute of ſolidity, the atoms would be more apt, upon contact, to reſile from one another than to cohere; and it could only be thoſe of particular figures which could form combinations; ſo that the compariſon of their tranſpoſitions, ſuch as might be made in the letters of a book, was, in ſome reſpect, inadequate. For, every movement of the letters would have ſome effect to alteration, and but rarely one of the ſame ſignificance, while repeated colliſions of the atoms would often have none. But if, admitting the compariſon, we ſhould ſuppoſe it might happen, in the laſt degree of all conceivable poſſibilities, that the letters of the Greek alphabet, ſhifting conſtantly in

all manner of poſitions and tranſpoſitions, and in a long protracted ſeries of theſe, might produce ſometimes intelligible, as well as unintelligible, combinations of words, and at length hit upon ſuch a train of them as would preſent a poem, like the Iliad or Odyſſey; yet, even this utterly incredible effect of chance would not be equal to that of the world, ſuch as it is, being produced by the caſual motions of atoms. It would be inferior to it, in proportion as the varied combinations of the particles of matter in the univerſe muſt be allowed to exceed, in multiplicity, the tranſpoſitions of letters to be found in any one book, or, it may be ſaid, in thoſe of all the books in the world.

Beſide tranſmitting, in his writings, that phyſical theory which Epicurus, from his more ſyſtematic compilement of it, called his own, Democritus appears alſo to have ſuggeſted to that philoſopher the diſtinguiſhing * principle of his *ethics*. He did not, indeed, make pleaſure the ſupreme end of human action, or felicity to conſiſt in the attainment of it, but in a ſtate of mind, which he called its *right form*, or *well-being* †; and which was attended with a tranquility undiſturbed by any fearful ſuperſtitions, or paſſionate emotions. Epicurus, explaining his ſupreme good, defined it nearly in the ſame manner, admitting body to its ſhare in the tranquility. In the collection of Democritus's apothegms, by Stobaeus, there are ſeveral of them converted into *topics* in Epicurus's moral diſſertations. In place of them all, we ſhall only recite ‡ the ſtory of Democritus's intercourſe with the Perſian monarch, and the device he uſed to reſtrain his exceſſive grief for the death of his beautiful queen. Finding him inconſolable, and that no reaſoning he or others could urge made the leaſt impreſſion, he told him, at laſt, he would raiſe her from the dead. He took care, in the mean time, to require the King's promiſe, that whatſoever he wanted for the undertaking ſhould be furniſhed him. Having received this aſſurance, he went about for ſome time, as if in ſearch of the requiſites for his aſtoniſhing purpoſe. Upon his return, he told Darius, that he had indeed obtained all things he ſought for, with the exception of only a ſingle article, which he, being

* Diog. Laert. ibid. † Cicer. de Fin. lib. 5. ‡ Julian's Epiſt.

ing Lord of all Aſia, might perhaps be able to procure. It was no more than an inſcription, for the royal tomb, of the names of three perſons, atteſted to have *met with no occaſion of grief.* The monarch was ſtruck with the unexpected demand; and, awaked to recollection of the diſtreſſes incident to mortal men, confeſſed, that he deſpaired of finding the epitaph he deſired. Then Democritus, giving ſcope to his deriſive features, ſaid to him, "Unreaſonable as thou art, is it not ſhameful for thee to grieve and to mourn in the manner thou doſt, as if no individual beſide thyſelf had ever experienced ſuch a calamity; when thou art obliged to acknowledge, that none can be named upon earth, who have not had their occaſions of woe?"

This philoſopher flouriſhed chiefly in the time of the Peloponneſian war, which began in the 2d year of the 87th Olympiad, being, as he marked it in his book called the Little Diacoſmos, forty years younger than Anaxagoras, whoſe birth is placed in the 1ſt year of the 70th Olympiad. This computation brings that of Democritus * to the commencement of the 80th of that aera. By all accounts he lived to the age of a hundred, or rather ſome years above it.

SECT.

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 9.

SECTION III.

Of the Sophiſts,—and of their aſſociates of the Eleatic, or Eriſtic Sect.

IN tracing the progreſs of ſcience, we have already touched upon the origin of a ſet of men, to whom the name of *Sophiſts* came to be particularly applied. The original term for the wiſe man, or ſage, was undoubtedly, in the language of the Greeks, σοφος; but the derivative of it, σοφιστης, was early adopted as ſynonimous to it *. Hence Herodotus calls the ſeven wiſe men, indifferently, by both theſe names. The poets, alſo, as they were denominated *Sophiſts* by other authors, often beſtowed † that epithet upon one another, as may be ſeen in various examples. It appears ‡, indeed, that the appellation was given to every eminent artiſt. It came, at length, to be more particularly fixed upon thoſe, who, neither ranking properly with the philoſophers, poets, or other known artiſts, profeſſed excellence in rhetoric, or declamation; a faculty much admired, and, in time, converted to vaſt influence in the Grecian republics. The talent of thoſe ſophiſts conſiſted not ſolely in their oratory, or ready elocution, but extended to a ſuppoſed ability of ſuſtaining, plauſibly, any theſis propoſed by them, either on philoſophical or political ſubjects. Their whole ſtudy, therefore, was directed to the invention of turgid expreſſion in ſet diſcourſe, or ſubtleties in diſputation, and to protract argument, without view or aim at any concluſion.

* In Glio, lib. 1. † Pindar Iſthm. Ode 5. Cratinus the poet called Homer and Heſiod Sophiſts. Diog. Laert. in Prooem. p. 8. ‡ Ariſtot. Ethic. lib. 6.—7. Cicer. de Orator. lib. 3.; et Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 2.

eluſion. As their reputation increaſed, their aſſurance and vanity grew; ſo that their pretenſions to univerſal knowledge and penetration, may be ſaid to have been hardly equalled by thoſe of the moſt renowned oracles *.

From this feature of the profeſſion of the Sophiſts, we may conclude it to have been characteriſtical with them to make the moſt extravagant oſtentation of their abilities; and that, being incapable to fulfil their declarations, they would, in order to ſecure admiration and gain, exert their oratorial and diſputatious faculty, chiefly, to charm the ears, amuſe the imaginations, or touch the paſſions, of their auditors. Accordingly, we are told †, it was a principle of ſcience with them to explain and decide nothing; but to aſſert, and to controvert their aſſertions, or to cover over any queſtion they treated with a magnificent parade of obſcure words. In which practice, it was obſerved ‡, that they differed from all other profeſſors of ſcience, or art; ſince, in the great variety of them, it was generally known what they undertook to teach, and that ſuch a meaſure of inſtruction might be obtained from them, as they were qualified to impart. But, of the Sophiſt, it could only be ſaid, that he was one who *opened his mouth and declaimed.* It was not, therefore, without the juſteſt grounds that they were, at length, accuſed of being, in reſpect of all civil or moral inſtruction, a ſet of ſelfiſh, trifling, or arrogant impoſtors, deſerving public animadverſion, inſtead of credit and encouragement in civil ſociety. Yet, notwithſtanding all theſe imputations, no claſs of men was ſo generally admired, and ſurrounded with ſuch crowded audiences, as the Sophiſts. For this phenomenon in the Grecian ſtates, two reaſons may be aſſigned. A general one proceeded from the natural vivacity of the Greeks, which led them to a fondneſs for all exhibitions of an entertaining kind, whether of the forum or of the theatre; a paſſion which was cheriſhed, more eſpecially in ſome of their republics, to an exceſs unknown in other nations. A ſecond reaſon was founded upon this propenſity. From the proſpect of the public approbation and recompenſe which followed every diſplay of ingenuity,

* Lucian de Fugitivis. ad initium. † Ibid. ‡ Plato in Protagora,

ingenuity, or what appeared ſuch to the multitude, ſeveral men, trained in the ſchools of philoſophy, and proficients in the various branches of ſcience, were induced to throw themſelves into this field of reputation, and gather the laurels and the lucre it afforded. Of theſe aſſociates to the Sophiſtical tribe, the moſt diſtinguiſhed were diſciples of the Eleatic ſect, and converſant in Zeno's contentious logic. Such were Hippias of Elea, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Chios, and Gorgias of Leontium; perſons whoſe natural genius, or acquired abilities, were ſufficient to lend reputation to any liberal profeſſion, whether laudable or not; and whoſe imitation of the preſumptuous tone, and mercenary uſages of the Sophiſts, operated ſo far in ſupporting the popular fame which attended them, that, until Socrates appeared, it received not the leaſt check or diminution.

With the name of the firſt, two of Plato's dialogues * are inſcribed; and, in each of them, Hippias exemplifies the character of a conſummate Sophiſt; pretending to ſuperior underſtanding in all ſciences and arts, and boaſting of the general applauſe which his declamations received, and of the vaſt pecuniary profits reſulting from them. He is, therefore, firſt expoſed to the irony of Socrates, and then ſubjected to the ſcrutinizing queries of that able detector of fallacious argument. It is Cicero's obſervation, however, that, although his arrogance, like that of his fraternity, was exceſſive, yet when, in addition † to his ſcientific attainments, he could declare, in the hearing of all Greece, at the Olympic Games, that the cloke he wore, the ring on his finger, and the ſandals on his feet, were the work of his own hands, it might be allowed, that this tribe of orators was not deſtitute of intelligence in ſtudies of importance, when their induſtry thus appeared in thoſe of an inferior kind.

From a condition ſo abject as that of a porter, or bundler of wood, Protagoras came to aſcend to the rank of a Sophiſt; and, in a favourable eſtimate of his abilities, to be reckoned one of the moſt acute diſputants of the ſect. He owed this change of his circumſtances to Democritus's

* In Hippia majore, vel de Pulchro,
In minore, vel de mendacio.

† De Oratore, lib. 3. p. 192.

mocritus's accidental obſervance of the mathematical accuracy with which his load of wood was diſpoſed for eaſieſt carriage. Being taken into the philoſopher's ſervice, his genius * was found equal to the prognoſtic of it; and it was not long before he was able to teach to others thoſe leſſons in mathematics he had learned from Democritus. But his mind was not ſo much addicted to the ſtudy of lines and figures, but that it carried him with more ardor to ſpeculate upon the whole phenomena of nature; and that as much in the way of moral as of phyſical argumentation. Meanwhile, he played the part of the Sophiſt to the utmoſt of his abilities. He inſtituted diſputes among the fraternity; and, inſtead of queſtions or topics, he gave them ſophiſms to diſcuſs; and thus exerciſed their apparent dexterity in argument, by turning it upon verbal equivocations and ambiguities. Hence the dialectic of the ſchools came to be reſolved entirely into that frivolous and unmeaning mode of diſputation, which conſiſts in quibbling, and altercations about words. He took care, however, to ſet a high value on his own prelections; the courſe of which was rated at a hundred *minae;* and for obtaining which, he often travelled, in company with Prodicus, from one city to another.

But it was not ſo much on account of theſe exhibitions that Protagoras incurred, more than others of his profeſſion, the animadverſions of Plato, Ariſtotle, and other philoſophers. His doctrines, committed to writing, and publiſhed, gave ſufficient occaſion to them. Diſſenting, in a great meaſure, from Democritus, and aſſuming the principle of Heraclitus, that nothing conſiſted with itſelf, or any other thing, but in a ſhape that was merely apparent, and of momentary continuance, and that all things flowed like a river, he connected the tenet of a material univerſe with this doctrine, which the Epheſian philoſopher heſitated to do; and, upon theſe two poſitions, appeared to ſtrike out a peculiar ſyſtem of ſcepticiſm. "There are," ſaid he, "but two aſſertions † to be made about every thing, the one being always contrary to the other;

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 9. Suidas in voce Protag. † Diogen. Laert. ibid. Sext. Empiric. Pyrrhoniar. Hypotypoſeon, lib. 1. cap. 32. p. 44. Plato in Thaeetet.

as that ſuch a thing is, or is not. For either of them, in argument, there can be no critery of truth but human opinion; which, being particular in every man, muſt be to him the only teſt of what is true, and what is not true; ſo that every individual is to himſelf the meaſure of all things, as to their being or not being. That each man has his particular *phenomena* of things, may be concluded from the fluidity, and inceſſant motion of matter which admits *appoſitions*, but no ſubtractions, and varies the organs of ſenſe in the different ages and conſtitutions of mankind. Any thing more than the ſenſes, the ſoul is not. But matter holds, ſubjected in it, the reaſons, or powers, of all apparent things, in ſuch manner as to become to all, and every one, whatever theſe appearances repreſent. But men perceive things differently at different times, and according to their various habits. The ſound, according to nature, perceive in matter thoſe things which are capable of appearing to ſuch perſons; and the unſound, and whoſe conſtitution is unnaturally diſpoſed, have, in like manner, their ſuitable perceptions. And the ſame is to be ſaid of the differences occaſioned by ſleeping or waking, and all the changeful affections incident to the human frame."

No piece of falſe or ſophiſtical reaſoning ſeems more calculated for the ſuport of ſcepticiſm than this; and yet Sextus Empiricus * will not allow it to be fabricated in the proper Pyrrhonian ſtrain. Its author, ſays he, dogmatiſes, by pronouncing matter to be in conſtant and perpetual fluxion, and that in it were ſubjected the reaſons of all apparent things. Theſe are uncertainties, to which no juſt aſſent can be given; and the more ſo, he might have added, that no ſpecial proof was afforded either for the one or the other poſition, but both are thrown together, to frame an hypotheſis, which, after all, appears inconſiſtent with itſelf. For, if all matter be in a more fluid condition than water, or air, or fire, or in one equal to any of them, it cannot be conceived to become either agent or patient, in any thing relative to human perceptions, but to evade all ſuch combinations as they require. In vain is this modification ſaid to proceed from the ſenſes, which are paſſive to impreſſions, and cannot be active in fabricating them but according to a modus, or a certain ſtate of their organizations. But, if the ſoul, as muſt be ſuppoſed, be the ſource of the perceptive faculty, it muſt be a principle

* Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. cap. 32.

principle ſuperior to the ſenſes, ſince, in the act of perception alone, more is performed by it than any of them, or all of them taken together, can be conceived to accompliſh. Nor yet is perception and opinion the ſame, nor the one always conſequent to the other. We perceive often without reflection, or forming any opinion with reſpect to the object or ſenſation: And, when an opinion is conceived, it is not held to be the *criterie* of truth, or that idea of the object which the mind, on farther reflection, or on a more accurate ſurvey of it, may entertain. In moſt caſes, excepting the animal ſenſations of pain or pleaſure, the act of judgment is with-held, and the mind remains in ſuſpenſe, and, as it were, in expectation of what it muſt, ſubſequently, diſcover to help its deciſion. Man, therefore, in the poſſeſſion of his reaſon, admits neither his perceptions, nor his firſt conceived opinion, to be to him a final judgment of truth. He is known, on the contrary, to have inſtincts, even in infancy, for trying the veracity of the former; and to aſſume the latter, upon the footing that it may be varied, or altogether rejected, upon mature deliberation, or clearer evidence. This variation of his opinions is, therefore, falſely imputed to the changeable frame of his corporeal organs. It is generally a voluntary act, of which he is conſcious; and he exerciſes it early, as if appriſed of its neceſſity, in a ſtate where acquiſitions of knowledge are found, by experience, to be gradual, and the mind to be led to them by ſlow, but yet progreſſive ſteps. But ſentiment or opinion, confirmed by the mind's repeated judgments of it, ſo far from being eaſily varied, yields not, but to the ſtrongeſt conviction, of its being erroneous; and, frequently, the perſiſtence of the mind, in its adopted ideas, is ſuch, as to reject all evidence in contradiction to them. They are adhered to in the decline of the bodily conſtitution, and in the infirmity and fluctuation of the organs of ſenſe; which, therefore, cannot be the foundation of theſe opinions. To alledge that there muſt be a diſagreement of men's ſentiments and opinions, becauſe of ſome imagined particularities in their conceptions of objects, is of no more conſequence than to aſſert, that becauſe, in viſion, the ſame angles of incidence, from the rays of light, are not ſubtended by the eyes of all men, and that differences do take place; there-

fore, there muſt be a general diſſenſion among them, as to the common appearance of viſible objects; or, becauſe the conceptions of a perfect circle, or of a perfect ſquare, if it can be formed, may not be preciſely the ſame in all judicious minds, that, therefore, the properties of theſe different mathematical figures cannot be ſo diſtinctly inveſtigated, or ſo juſtly aſcertained, as not to leave room for differences of opinion, and various judgments, with reſpect to them. This much may be ſaid in confutation of Protagoras's ſceptical hypotheſis, and of his particular aſſertion, that whatever a man thinks is to him the meaſure of its certainty, or the meaſure of truth and real being. The fallacy of the converſe propoſition, that what any man does not think, or which has no apparency of being to him, is not true, and has no real being, we ſhall find expoſed, with logical exactneſs, in the account of the Platonic philoſophy.

That one who could pretend to maintain, were it only in the way of argument, that the truth of things, and their being, or not being, depended upon his or another man's perceptions of them, and, conſequently, that they might be realized, or annihilated, according to the ſubſiſtence, or obliteration, of theſe perceptions; that ſuch a frantic ſophiſt ſhould ſtick at no poſition whatſoever, need not be ſurpriſing. It may, therefore, be accounted only ſuch a ſcoffing treſpaſs upon the ſentiments common to mankind, as might be expected from Protagoras, when he introduced one of his books with the ſentence *, "Whether the gods are, or are not, or what they are, I cannot ſay; as various difficulties occur in the queſtion, for the diſcuſſion of which human life is ſhort." The reading of this gave ſuch public offence in Athens, that a decree paſſed for his baniſhment, under pain of death, and the burning of all the copies of his book that could be found. He quitted in haſte the Athenian territories, and did not long ſurvive his expulſion. But, had he been called upon to plead, and *ſhew cauſe* why, according to his philoſophy, this ſentence ſhould not paſs, when the Athenian judges had their imaginations impreſſed with this *criterie* of his book, it is

* Sextus Empiric. adverſus cont. Mathem. lib. 3. p. 319. Cicer. de Nat. Deor. lib. 1. p. 204. Diogen. Laert. ibid.

is plain that Protagoras could have had no defenſive reply; or, if he had oppoſed his particular criterie to theirs, he muſt have confeſſed, that, by his meaſure of truth, a thing might be true and falſe at the ſame time.

Prodicus, of the iſle of Ceos, was another Sophiſt of great reputation; and being himſelf Protagoras's diſciple, is ſaid to have had Socrates, Euripides, Iſocrates, and Theramenes, for his hearers *. In Plato's dialogue of the Sophiſts, Socrates expreſſes a deſire to ſee and hear him, in preference to all the reſt of the convention, from the idea he had conceived of his knowledge, and his eminent perſonal virtues. The natural coarſeneſs of his voice †, which was increaſed by his frequent vociferations in public, did not abate the admiration of his eloquence. Although a public envoy from his country to Athens, he betook himſelf to teaching rhetoric in that city; a proof of the credit in which the profeſſion of oratory was held, notwithſtanding the tarniſhing it received from the Sophiſts. He appears to have ſupported the character of a ſtrict moraliſt in his declamations and literary works, as well as of an able rhetorician; of which his fable of *the Judgment of Hercules* may be reckoned a juſt and elegant teſtimony. He did not, however, decline taking the full profits of his profeſſion. His declamations were ſtudied and prepared; and had different prices ſet upon them. That of *fifty drachmas* was famous in the ſchools. Extemporary harangues he is not reckoned to have tried. To exhibit in this manner, and to diſplay, more ſignally than all his contemporaries, the united talents of the Sophiſt and the Rhetorician, was reſerved for Gorgias of Leontium, in Sicily, and reputed originally the diſciple of Empedocles.

He was unqueſtionably a moſt ſingular and extraordinary genius, in reſpect of his oratorial qualifications ‡. Cicero's eſtimate of them is ſufficiently encomiaſtic, but not equal to the audacity of the man, who profeſſed to reply immediately to any queſtion that could be propoſed to

* In Protagora, ad initium. lib. 1. p. 488. Suidas in voce. et de Rhetorica.

† Philoſtratus in Vitis Sophiſt. edit. fol.

‡ Ibid. de Orat. lib. 3. Plato in Gorgia

to him, upon any ſubject, and to give it the proper dialectic diſcuſſion; and actually challenged the whole Olympic aſſembly to find one able to contend with him, either in diſſertation or in diſpute. It was no wonder that every one might be afraid to enter the liſts with an antagoniſt who offered to maintain theſe three theſis: "1ſt, That there was nothing, or no being. 2dly, If there was being, man could not be comprehended in it. 3dly, If he was comprehended, it could not be expreſſed." What proſtitution of common reaſon, and what frantic oratory, Gorgias muſt have adopted in ſupporting ſuch propoſitions, is hardly to be imagined. We cannot, indeed, deny, without contradicting the beſt judges of antiquity, that, upon proper ſubjects, he diſcovered amazing powers not only of fluent and copious, but perſuaſive elocution *. He is allowed to have improved, and introduced refinements, in the rhetorical art, comparable to thoſe which are aſcribed to Æſchyles, in Tragedy. Theſe are ſaid to have conſiſted principally in the nice arrangements of his words and ſentences, which gave them an agreeable and harmonious cadence, and in contraſting frequently the figures and metaphors he uſed. His orations were, therefore, in the higheſt celebrity over all Greece, and in the neighbouring nations. In the ſolemnities of the Pythian, and Olympic games, he pronounced panegyrics upon eminent men, eſpecially on thoſe who fell in battle, and, by their valour, or conduct, had merited the honours of a public ſepulchre. In theſe pieces, the poliſh he could give to his ſtudied compoſitions was conſpicuous. From the demand for ſuch eulogies, and his other exhibitions, he acquired much wealth; and yet a ſuperior ſhare of fame and influence in the Grecian ſtates, and more particularly at Athens. There, in proportion to the greater admiration in which all liberal and entertaining arts and endowments were held by the citizens, his reputation roſe, and the benefit of it was extended to all the tribe of Sophiſts and Rhetoricians. By the propenſity of the youth to become their followers, it ſeemed, in a city the reſort of the wiſe and the learned, and in a commonwealth where ſo much depended on their

* Philoſtrat. ibid. p. 487. Cicero, ibid.

their proper education, that the management of it was likely to fall entirely into the hands of a claſs of men who converted all ſcience into perplexed argument, and taught verſatility in the principles of reaſon, and in the doctrines of morality. Into this unpromiſing ſcene, it was the lot of Socrates to be introduced. In what reſpect the character he ſupported, and the philoſophy he taught, were diſtinguiſhable from all others who preceded him in the Ionian, or Athenian ſchool, comes now to be brought into view.

PART

PART IV.

SECTION I.

Of Socrates;—his Character, and Accompliſhments, as a Philoſopher;—his Manner of Reaſoning.—Sketches of his Philoſophy, and Moral Doctrines.

THE father of Socrates was by trade a ſculptor, or cutter of marble into figures, called Sophroniſcus. His mother, whoſe name was Phaenareta *, could reckon her pedegree from an Athenian family of rank; but her indigence, not much relieved by her huſband's circumſtances, made her engage in the profeſſion of midwifery. She is deſcribed in Plato's Thaeetetus, as remarkable for the auſterity of her countenance, joined with a boldneſs of feature. Her ſon's phyſiognomy, in manhood, had yet more ſingularity. His aſpect was moroſe, his look rather dejected, and heavy, his noſe flat, and his head bald; while his eyes were ſmall and prominent. The painters and ſtatuaries could hardly err in taking the uncommon lineaments of his countenance, or his buſt; but thoſe who firſt beheld him, and formed any judgment of his diſpoſitions from his aſpect, were apt to be much miſtaken †. He is ſaid to have followed for ſome time his father's occupation; and to have carved the figures of the Graces, in robes, which ſtood in the *Acropolis*, or Citadel of Athens. From the penury of his parents ‡, ſome

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 2. † Pauſanias Boeoticis, lib. 9. p. 596.
‡ Plato in Menone, ſub Fin. Cicero in Paradoxis.

writers would conclude, with Porphiry, that he had no literary education; a conjecture which is contradicted by the beſt authorities; and which appears, from his extenſive knowledge in all the ſubjects of philoſophy, to be repugnant to truth. In that aera of the Grecian literature, maſters in the different ſciences and arts ſo much abounded, that, without having recourſe to the mercenary Sophiſts, it was not difficult for any free born citizen of Athens, who had genius, to obtain, upon eaſy terms, a learned education. Accordingly, we are told that Socrates began his philoſophical ſtudies under Anaxagoras; and, upon his exile, became the favourite diſciple of Archelaus *, who got the name of the Phyſical Philoſopher, as being the firſt in Athens who profeſſed that branch of ſcience †. The names, alſo, of ſeveral inſtructors he had in particular arts, and in the theorems of geometry and mathematics, are tranſmitted; of which Damon, baniſhed Athens for his excellence in muſic, and Connus of the ſame profeſſion, together with Evenus the poet, and Theodorus the geometrician, are in celebrity. Of all the Sophiſts, he only attended Prodicus: What inſtruction he received from the famous *Diotima* will be afterwards mentioned. He was born, according to the exacteſt computation, in the fourth year of the 77th Olympiad, and in the 467th before the Chriſtian aera.

Socrates early diſcovered a natural faculty of expreſſing his conceptions; and he poſſeſſed a ſpecies of eloquence untaught by the Rhetoricians, and peculiar to himſelf. It differed from the declamation of the orator, as it affected no figures of ſpeech, or ſtudied ornaments, and likewiſe from the too conciſe and ſententious ſtyle, which was dry, and often obſcure. It had an excellence ſuperior to both theſe; where inſtruction was required, and perſuaſion to be effectuated, by an addreſs to the human mind, and not to the paſſions. It was, indeed, beſt adapted to *colloquial* reaſoning, or that carried on by dialogue; a method of teaching philoſophy, which Socrates, upon ſeveral accounts, preferred both to the declamatory manner, and to the ſimple didactic. The dialogue

* Diog. Laert. lib. 2. Cicero Tuſcul. Quaeſt. lib. 5. † Maximus Tyrius, Diſſert. 22. p. 226. Plutarch. in Pericle, Suidas, in voce Socrat. Cicer. in Epiſt. lib. 9. p. 104.

logue admitted not eaſily the pompous or flowery ſtrain, into which the one was apt to run; and, by proper management, it could conceal, or avoid altogether, the appearance of dictating, which was diſagreeable in the other. But, if Socrates had excelled in declamation, and choſe to captivate his hearers by rhetorical harrangues, there was a juſt and forcible objection to his following this courſe. The reputation in which the Sophiſts and Orators were held, was a reaſon ſufficient for his departing, as far as he could, from their manner of arguing and perſuading, and adopting one of his own, in contraſt to their vanity and oſtentation. As he wiſhed more to prove a uſeful inſtructor in the ſcience he profeſſed, than to be deemed a ſhining orator, or even a profound theoriſt in philoſophy, he took care that his method of teaching ſhould correſpond with this laudable aim.

Inſtead, therefore, of boaſting, like the Sophiſt, that he was a maſter in every ſcience, he gave it out, *that he was only ſo far intelligent, as to underſtand that he knew nothing* *. When every principle of reaſon was brought into controverſy, and fallacious dexterity in argument paſſed for ſuperiority in reaſon, Socrates ſaw it to be neceſſary and expedient to emit no aſſertions of his own, but to wait for, or to prompt, thoſe of others, and to make them the ground of his diſquiſitions. This cautious manner was of more conſequence than the greateſt acuteneſs in diſputation. By the uſe of it ſome incitement could always be given to an antagoniſt, however wary, either to aſſert, or to grant, ſomething which could be turned againſt him with propriety and force. Beſide being the propereſt and beſt weapon that could be employed againſt the ſceptical reaſoner, Socrates proved its advantage †, in rendering the youth, from their conceſſions, apparently their own inſtructors. The concluſion of his dialogical reaſoning was often not a direct or poſitive confutation of what was aſſerted or denied by his opponents, but a finely conducted proof of its abſurdity. When the effrontery of the hardened Sophiſt, or the diſſipated ideas of the libertine, or the dogmatiſm of the ſchool bred philoſopher, diminiſhed the influence of this conviction, it

* Cicer. Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 1. p. 5. † Ibid. lib. 4. p. 14; et in Officiis, lib. 1. p. 365.

was apparent that a vein of irony had accompanied the diſcuſſion of the argument on Socrates's part, which, if it did not enforce what he ſaid, tended to guard it againſt any affected ſcorn, or to turn into ridicule the arrogated wiſdom of a ſupercilious adverſary. His art in joining irony with his ſerious diſcourſe, in the manner of a ſkilful ſatyriſt, was ſo remarkable, that ſome graver philoſophers called him the *Attic jeſter;* and Ariſtophanes *, and the other comic poets, who were adverſe to him, and probably bore not well his excellence in their talent, accuſed him of ſporting with reaſon, and ſetting it at variance with itſelf. It was this faculty, however, which enabled him more eaſily to baffle the Sophiſts; and, united with his other abilities, had the effect of engaging the Athenian youth to ſeek his company, and reliſh the pleaſantry of his converſation.

Whatever inſtructions in *phyſics* Socrates obtained under Archelaus, he is known ſoon to have relinquiſhed that ſtudy; and, following the natural bent of his genius, to have turned his principal attention to that of *morals* †. Of this ſcience, in the ſchool of Athens, he became the eminent father, and founder; and, in reſpect of the general neglect of it by the Ionian philoſophers, he is ſaid to have been the firſt who recalled philoſophy from fanciful theories about the production of the world, and the conſtitution of the heavenly bodies, to the more ſuitable and intereſting contemplation of human nature itſelf, and the *ſtudy of man*, as having an end in life moſt worthy to be regarded, and which, by proper diſcipline, he could attain. "Such reſearches," ſaid he ‡, "as tranſcend the human faculties, or which nature has hid in obſcurity, are not *relative*, or only in a ſecondary way, to the human kind." When we reflect upon the ſtate of philoſophy, as, previous to his appearance, it has been repreſented, and conſider that the Pythagorean ſyſtem, either in its theological or moral part, was hardly known to any but thoſe of that ſect, and that it required a diſcipline that was accounted foreign, and diſguſtful to the Grecian taſte; it muſt be apparent what a defect there was, in all the ſchools, in point of ſufficient moral inſtruction,

* Ariſtophan. in Nubibus. Cicer. Acad. Quaeſt. ibid.

† Ariſtot. Metaph. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 649.

‡ Sextus Empiric. lib. 7. p. 139.

tion, either as to theory or practice. If we add to this the particular ſituation of the Athenian ſtate at this juncture, we may be convinced, that, beſide the natural and juſt preference to be given to the moral ſcience, Socrates was urged, by ſpecial motives, to cultivate and improve, more than all other ſtudies, the knowledge of its principles.

In the preceding ages, the doctrine delivered by the greateſt and beſt poets was not of the ſoundeſt kind. It diſplayed the pernicious effects of the indulged, and violent paſſions; while, at the ſame time, it aſſigned, in a certain degree, the character of merit and worth to perſons acting under their undue influence. It was generally to be learned, not by poſitive precept, but by inference. It was often enveloped in allegories, and obſoure fictions, and groſsly contaminated by impure fables about the gods. Among the wiſe men, or firſt philoſophers of Greece, it was comprehended in ſhort ſentences, unconnected, and elucidated by no deduction of reaſon, and too general in their import to be rules for the particular practice of duty. When the Sophiſts drew all maxims into diſpute, and ſpread the taſte of wrangling upon every topic, the moral or political apothegms would be treated with contempt, or form only a feeble barrier againſt their captious logic, or verboſe declamation. In conſequence of the contagion they had diffuſed, it appeared, in Socrates's time, that a total revolt from the principles and practice of morals was about to enſue among the citizens of Athens. From the high proſperity of the republic before the Peloponneſian war, undertaken from vanity, and injudiciouſly conducted, the way to this general depravation of manners had been paved *. In its unfortunate iſſue, joined with the dreadful calamity of the plague, which laſted three years, and carried off 4500 citizens, beſide numbers of others, the Athenians were not ſufficiently taught to reſtrain their ambition, or to revert to ſobriety of manners. After Pericles's death, the public diſorders increaſed, to that heighth, that both the ties, and the ſenſe, of juſtice and equity ſeemed, from the prevalence of faction, and the ferocity engendered by a long war, to be nearly obliterated †. It is known, that, in a democratical government,

* Thucydides, lib. 3. parag. 14. cap. 1. et 3. 8vo edit. pag. 250.

† Xenophon. Memorab. lib. 4.

government, more than in any other, morality and virtue are the great ſtays of the ſtate; and that, unleſs ſuch of the youth, as, from their ſtation, are likely to riſe to authority, be trained up in virtuous principles, corruption will prevail, and ſoon infect all orders of the community. Animated with the zeal of a patriot, and poſſeſſed of the ſentiments of a philoſopher, who choſe *morals* for his part of ſcience, Socrates thought it his duty to oppoſe, to the utmoſt of his ability, the growing evil of vice and depravity in the ſtate; and, by engaging the youth of rank to come under his tuition, to impreſs their docile minds with a deteſtation of it.

To pretend to this office, he had no other title, or recommendation, but what his character as a man and a citizen, and his name as a philoſopher, afforded him. He was ſeen to live in the moſt frugal and abſtemious manner, and to be exemplary in temperance, and in the moderation of all his appetites and paſſions. He had reſcued Alcibiades, upon his firſt ſervice in the field *, from being ſtripped of his armour by the enemy; and prevailed, by his arguments, to have the prize of valour, due to himſelf, to be adjudged to the youthful ſoldier. In watching, and military hardſhips, he was obſerved to ſurpaſs the common ſoldiers; and, when Xenophon was thrown from his horſe †, and incapable of being remounted, he had the vigour to carry him ſeveral furlongs upon his ſhoulders, until he was out of danger of being overtaken by the victorious enemy. In that defeat of the Athenians, his intrepidity, in often halting, and taking a calm circumſpection of every advantage that could be taken in the retreat, was no leſs remarkable. To diſtinguiſh, to the Athenians, his profeſſion of philoſophy from that of the Sophiſts, or Orators, he inſtituted no regular ſchool, or auditory, in his houſe, or any particular place. He delivered no courſe of ſtudied lectures from his chair; and it is rather in ridicule, that Ariſtophanes mentions, that he had his *phroutiſterion*, or high deſk, ſurrounded with benches. He ſaw this declamatory manner of inſtruction every day abuſed; and, even where virtue itſelf was the ſubject, he neither much ſtudied nor admired it.

* Plutarch. in Alcibiade. † Diogen. Laert. in Xenophonte. Plato in Convivio.

it. General principles of morals, however well connected, he knew often take but a ſlight hold of the human mind; and, although the greateſt theoriſt of his age in ethical doctrine, his aim and ambition was to be the practical teacher of virtue. This, he thought, could be beſt accompliſhed by converſing familiarly with his pupils, and modifying his leſſons in ſuch a way as ſuited with their different capacities, and the proper regulation of their natural tempers.

To few or none were the elements of any particular ſcience taught by him *; and, where ſome individuals who attended him required ſuch inſtruction, they were directed by him to the proper maſters. His diſcourſes, which were of a general kind, reſpecting the principles upon which theology, morals, politicks, and oeconomics, proceeded, he made ſpecial, and particular, when appearances in the manners, or character, of any of his hearers rendered it neceſſary. They were chiefly calculated for thoſe, whoſe future department might create much good or ill to the commonwealth, or to their families. To meet with ſuch †, he was almoſt conſtantly abroad, during the mornings and evenings, in the public walks, or, with more ſelect parties of his friends, on the banks of the Iliſſus; and, at other times, in the Gymnaſia, or in the Forum of the city. In this manner, ſays Plutarch, he made every place to which he reſorted a ſchool of virtue. In the midſt of all this aſſiduity to communicate uſeful inſtruction, he took no money, not even from thoſe who attended him at home, for daily improvement; and he received, with exceptions, and much reſerve, the preſents that were ſent him by the moſt opulent.

That he poſſeſſed ſingular invention, and originality in argument, together with the moſt energetic and perſuaſive elocution, not the leaſt doubt can be entertained. To the ſuperficial, and thoſe who looked for the outward addreſs of the orator, and could only be entertained with rhetorical flouriſhes, his perſonal appearance, and his manner of opening the ſubjects of his diſcourſe, ſeemed homely and upoliſhed ‡. But his conſtant attendants, who knew what they were to hear, were alſo pleaſed

* Xenophon. Memorabilia, lib. 4. cap. 7. 8vo edit. pag. 319. † Ibid. lib. 1. cap. 1. ‡ Plato in Convivio.

pleaſed with the ſimplicity of his manner. They compared it to the figures of Silenus, and the Satyres, which were often grouped with thoſe of other divinities, and carried about in the ſtreets. Their ruſtic forms were forbidding to the eyes of the beholders; but, as ſoon as the ſweet muſic of their pipes and flutes was heard, all the exterior beauty of the other deities was diſregarded. How juſtly this commendation might be given to Socrates's diſcourſes, and what a charm they had above the moſt decorated orations of the Sophiſts, can only be underſtood by thoſe * who are converſant in the repreſentations of them by Plato and Xenophon, without mentioning ſome imitations of them by Æſchines, and other Socratics. There is no form into which the reaſoning in theſe dialogues can be caſt, by any modern writer, which can ſhew them in a light, in any degree, comparable to the original one, in which his two eminent diſciples, maſters of the true taſte of antiquity in the dialogue, have happily placed them. There is, however, much diſſimilarity in the ſtyle of theſe authors, and in the extent and amplification of the ſubjects treated, the greateſt diſproportion between them. The diſtinct merit each of them had in their literary compoſitions may afterwards be obſerved. Here the point to be conſidered is, which of them may be reckoned to have moſt juſtly repreſented the original, or given the trueſt copy of their maſter's philoſophy.

It appears evident, that, of Socrates's own writing, nothing remained after his death, but a hymn to Apollo, and a fable in the manner of Æſop †, which he compoſed when in priſon ‡. The ſtory of a gift made by him, or by his wife Xantippe, of ſome dialogues he had written, to Æſchines, is too vaguely related to deſerve credit. His more ſtudious diſciples, ſuch as Cebes, Æſchines, Plato, and Xenophon, were careful to take notes of his ſet diſcourſes, and occaſional converſations. The latter, according to Diogenes Laertius §, firſt began publiſhing the compilements he made of theſe diſcourſes, under the title of *Commentaries;* or

* Socraticae poterant oſtendere chartae. HOR.

† Cicero de Oratore, lib. 3. ‡ Diogenes in Æſchine, lib. 2. p. 116.

§ In Xenophont. lib. 2. p. 109.

or pieces which had, from their ſimpler form, the character of authenticity and exactneſs, but not the ornaments, which, from ſtudy and imagination, they might receive. In this ſhape, his *Memorabilia* of Socrates may well be allowed to have been produced; ſince every approach to decoration is avoided, and not the leaſt excurſion is made from the plain tract of the narrative that is given. Plato, it is obvious, and generally acknowledged, aſſumes the liberty of delivering, either as eſpouſed, or favoured by Socrates, ſeveral philoſophical tenets, and theories, ſome of which, it is highly probable, were never known to him; and which he himſelf confeſſes were borrowed from foreign ſchools. Dialogues there are, which have been, and with juſtice may be, accounted *Socratic*, or much more conſonant than others to the doctrines of his maſter. When in theſe, or others, references are made to facts, or incidents, in Socrates's deportment, or to converſations that muſt have been publicly known, there can be no heſitation about the credit due to them; and, where an evident deficiency appears in Xenophon's narrative, or only a curſory ſketch of the dialogical argument is found, what ancient authors have generally received, as the proper ſupplement by Plato, muſt be admitted. But, as our proper object is to give the juſteſt, and not the moſt adorned account of Socrates's reaſoning on theological and moral ſubjects, the examples will be taken, chiefly, from the author againſt whom the leaſt exception lies, and who is known to have preferred ſimplicity and truth to the ſplendid colouring of diffuſe and redundant eloquence.

It is a proof ſufficient of itſelf, if there were no other, of the attractions of Socrates's converſation, that he was able, in a ſhort time, to check the admiration in which the Sophiſts were generally held, and to detach from attending their declamations, a number of the moſt eminent youth. Such, beſide Plato, Xenophon, and others, addicted of themſelves to the ſtudy of philoſophy, were Crito, Charmidas, Theramenes, Critias, Theages, Euthydemus, Euthyphron, and, to mention one in room of all the reſt, Alcibiades, equally famous for his ſignal endowments, and his various miſdemeanours. He whoſe early vanity *

* Plutarch, in Alcibiade.

was flattered by the Athenians, and who alſo knew how to flatter them into a compliance with whatever he wiſhed to do, either in a public or private capacity, thought it a merit to be the favourite of Socrates. In fear of reprehenſion from none, he ſtood in awe of his reproof, and was obſerved, in conſequence of it, not only to ceaſe from his irregularities for a time, but to give ſymptoms of his ſhame of them, and of his ſenſibility to virtue, in a degree which few believed could take place in his breaſt. When it was apparent, that the aim of Socrates's tuition was not ſo much to entertain them with philoſophical theories, as to improve them in uſeful knowledge, and moral deportment, conferences with him, while the delight of ſome, became the averſion of others. Several, by fits, ſought after, and fled from his converſation. When this laſt circumſtance happened to any diſtinguiſhed genius among them, ſuch as Alcibiades, the intereſt which Socrates had in the giddy apoſtate was not quickly, or eaſily reſigned by him. He was ſolicitous to reclaim him; and, as was uſual among the Greeks, declared himſelf the lover of ſuch a youth, whoſe talents were either in danger of being loſt, or proving fatal to his country. In this ſtrain, according to Plato, he imitated the paſſion of a jealous lover; appearing to be in diſtreſs, until he could regain the direction of his fugitive pupil.

That this part might be acted with all the purity of a philoſophic mind, by ſuch a perſon as Socrates *, we need not quote, for argument, any part of Plato's dialogues upon the refinement of love, nor the ſtudied diſſertations of Maximus Tyrius upon the ſubject. We ſhall only produce Xenophon's teſtimony in proof of the moral leſſons he read, and of the example he afforded of unſtained manners, and ſtrict virtue, to thoſe of every age and condition, converſant with him. "It is wonderful," ſays that author, "how any could be perſuaded that he corrupted the youth, ſo as to render them either voluptuous, or immodeſt, or inſolent, or ambitious; who, beſide the ſentiments which he entertained of the gods, which led directly to probity and virtue, was himſelf, perſonally, the moſt abſtemious and continent of all men; and whoſe habits of enduring inconveniencies, and reſtraints were ſo confirmed, that he underwent

* Plato in Convivio, Max. Tyr. Diſſ. 8. 9. 10.

derwent any labour or hardſhip, equally in the ſummer's heat and in the winter's cold. Nay, to all who knew how he lived with contentment and chearfulneſs, in apparent penury, it was ſhown to what degree their ſenſual appetites might be controuled; ſo that in minds ſtudious of virtue, the agreeable hope might be entertained, that, by due vigilance over themſelves, and manly reſolution, they might become, like him, admirable proficients in the exerciſe of it *." Such improvement, it was well known, many of his attendants received, either by the culture of their good diſpoſitions, or the correction of their vices. Phaedon †, born of a noble family, but, in the diſaſter of his country, reduced to beggary, he reſcued from abominable proſtitution. Æſchines he took under his care, from no other recommendation but the appearances of a natural genius, and of a patient temper, in great poverty. Among the families of eminent condition, there were few which had not, occaſionally, ſome obligation to him, on account of the advice he gave, or the interpoſition he uſed, for regulating the intractable tempers, or reſtraining the licentious or undutiful behaviour of their ſons. Yet the ſtern brow of the reproving preceptor he ſeldom, or almoſt never aſſumed, even with thoſe under his particular charge. He counted much upon the modeſty of nature, and the ſenſe of ſhame in youth, as being the beſt guards of their manners, and which it was improper and unſafe to impair by harſh, and repeated animadverſion. He looked for the bluſh in the youthful countenance; and, where it did not appear, or ſoon vaniſhed, he was apt to reject, or to diſmiſs ſuch pupils, as giving little proſpect of their moral improvement under him. When Critias appeared ſhameleſs ‡, and unmoved, with the private, and calm rebuke he gave him, on account of his diſgraceful paſſion, he took occaſion, in company where the delinquent was preſent, to animadvert upon it. The compariſon he made of his brutal practice was juſt, but ſevere. Critias felt the ſting of the ſimile, and the affront, but not the virtuous ſhame. He withdrew in anger from the moraliſt; and ever after ſhowed himſelf his irreconcileable enemy.

* Memorab. lib. 1. cap. 2. † Diogen. Laert. lib. 2. in Phaed. et in Æſch. ‡ Memorab. ibid.

If we next inquire, upon what theory of the moral ſcience he proceeded, or whether he traced the principles and obligations of virtue from the deductions of abſtract reaſon, or internal ſentiments found in the human breaſt, or from the evidences of a conſtitution of things here below, ſupported upon, and relative to the ſyſtem of an intellectual and moral world; the general anſwer is, that he connected his principles of morals with rational ones in theology, and conſidered both the theory and practice of virtue as beſt eſtabliſhed by this connection. At the ſame time, as he delivered no ſpecial ſyſtem of theology, but contented himſelf with holding forth the juſteſt and beſt conceptions he could form of a *deity*, and other divine beings; he reſolved his theory of morals into the contemplation of man, as an individual, as a father of a family, and as a member of a commonwealth, or more enlarged community. The propriety of this digeſtion of his moral ſcheme will be ſubſequently explained. According to the accounts given of his theological reaſoning by Xenophon, Plato, Diogenes Laertius, and Plutarch, he entertained a contemptible opinion of thoſe philoſophers, who, if indeed they were in earneſt, pretended to explain the whole phenomena of nature upon phyſical principles, or the action of the particles of matter upon one another, without the concurrence of a wiſe and deſigning mind. "Have ever theſe expounders," ſaid he, "of what is inexplicable to us, been found to agree in any one hypotheſis? or, rather, is not the repugnance and contrariety of their * ſuppoſitions conſtantly manifeſted, while ſome aſſert that all things are one, and others hold an infinite diverſity of them? With one party the univerſe is in eternal motion; and, with another, it has no mobility. All things are alternately generated, and corrupted, ſay ſome: There is no ſuch principle as the one or the other, ſay their opponents. But," added he, "after ſo bold an attempt to unfold the moſt intricate proceſs of nature, it might be expected of ſuch philoſophers to tell us, not only what water is, and what air, and fire, and how matter is combined in theſe, or other elementary ſubſtances, but to be able alſo, from their clear inſight into the mechaniſm of theſe bodies, to produce them ready made, and fitted up for

* Memorab. lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 9.

for the occaſions of mankind. But of this, as yet, they give us no hopes."

Upon reading Anaxagoras's book of phyſical philoſophy, he expreſſed much ſurpriſe to find ſo few references made in it to his diſtinguiſhing tenet of the νους, or intelligent mind, diſcovered in the wiſe and harmonious diſpoſition of things. "To me," ſaid Socrates *, "he appears to philoſophiſe much in the ſame manner as a man would do, who, after allowing that I was an intelligent being, and capable of acting upon rational motives, ſhould yet take upon him to account for any particular motions made, or poſitions taken by me, only from the mobility of my body, and the flexible make of my limbs and joints; and ſo ſhould conclude, that, without any will of my own, or command of others interpoſed, I muſt neceſſarily be found at this very hour in priſon, as I am, and ſitting in my preſent poſture. Theſe phyſiologiſts, added he, do nothing more than grope in the dark for cauſes, under the name of phyſical ones, which are neither in themſelves perſpicuous, nor adequate to their acknowledged effects. Thus, while they allow the earth to be upheld, in the firmeſt manner poſſible, they, notwithſtanding, decline confeſſing it to be ſo from a divine power; inſtead of which, they rear up ſome *Atlas* of their own invention, which they would repreſent as mightier, wiſer, and more enduring, than that original cauſe; which, having at firſt made the beſt arrangement of the world, maintains it in that condition."

You admit, ſaid he, to Ariſtodemus, (who was ſceptical in his opinions about a deity preſiding over the world), that there are thoſe among men, who, on account of their excellence in the more ingenious arts, are juſtly admired for their knowledge and ſkill †. Such you reckon Homer in epic poetry, Melanippides in dithyrambics, Sophocles in tragedy, Polycletus in ſtatuary work, and Zeuxis in painting. Do you not likewiſe account thoſe more worthy of admiration, who produce animals, intelligent and active, than ſuch as preſent only pictures and figures of them, which, however juſt, are void of mind and motion? "Yes, ſurely," replied Ariſtodemus, "provided the former be not fortuitous

* Plato in Phaedone, vel de Anima, et ſequent.

† Memorab. ibid. cap. 4. p. 54.

tuitous productions, but the effects of contrivance and design." But what do you understand by a designed work; and how is it to be distinguished from a casual one? Is it to be conceived or defined any other way, but that it is the accomplishment of some useful end, by fit means, in opposition to that which no body can imagine for what purpose, or from what motive, it was produced? It is allowed to be the proper distinction. "You must then grant *," said Socrates, "that the *first makers* of men furnished them with the several organs of sense for the purposes of perception; with eyes for seeing, ears for hearing, and palates for tasting, which are so indispensibly requisite to life, and its preservation. Every part, indeed, of the human frame is marked with like signatures of provident care and skilful design; and which, if but slightly attended to, can never be taken for the effect of chance, or for any thing less than the operation of a wise artist, who, loving his creatures, was the cherisher of their lives. In their procreation, in the fond affection which prompts the parents to rear them in infancy, in their innate desire of life, and in their dread of losing it, corresponding evidences are afforded, that their being, with the continuation of it, was intended, and that for these ends all suitable provisions were ordained.

"Again, you are conscious, Aristodemus, that there is within you a principle of intelligence, which I, and all other men, also experience. Can you suppose, then, that it exists no where but in you, and others of the human kind; when, in regard to your body, it is apparent, that the materials of its composition are borrowed portions of earth, water, and other elements, the great masses of which are found in the world? If mind have no original, or existence, but with us, by what means, or way, do we men come to be possessed of it? Or, are we to conclude, upon the whole system of things we behold, immense in magnitude, and infinite in number, as they are, and yet connected together, that they have had no other arrangement, excepting what blind hazard may have afforded them?" "To this opinion," replied Aristodemus, "I am led, because I have not the sight of the disposers of these things in the universe, after the manner I have access to behold human agency." "No more,"

* In the account of the Platonic philosophy, we shall find who were held to be the first *makers* of men.

more," anſwered Socrates, "is your principle of intelligence, or your ſoul, viſible to you, which yet hath a dominion over your body; and ſo, according to your reaſoning, and becauſe you do not ſee it, you may, if you pleaſe, as well infer, that all your motions and actions are the reſult of chance, and not of judgment or underſtanding."

Thus it appears, that Socrates argued in a diſtinct and juſt manner, for the being and agency of a firſt cauſe in the univerſe, intelligent and good, and of a nature as different from material, and ſenſible ſubſtance, as the human mind, conſcious of its exiſtence, and of its internal powers of action, is, on reflection, diſtinguiſhable from the body *. This original author of other beings, he called *God*, or deity †; and the ſupreme, and all governing *wiſdom* ‡. To mark his exalted perfections above other inferior, and miniſterial divinities, he is announced to be that *being* who framed the world, and contains it; and who, ever performing the greateſt works, is plainly to be diſcovered in them, but, otherwiſe, is inviſible to men.

* "What you advance with reſpect to the gods," ſaid Ariſtodemus, might be granted, if there was ſufficient proof that they regarded the affairs of mankind." "Whatever," replied Socrates, "is admirable in the fabric of human bodies, and diſtinguiſhes them from other animals, teſtifies the divine attention and care of men. But, without enumerating thoſe ſpecialities in their outward form, which appear to be both honourable and advantageous to them, let it be only conſidered what, and how much, you muſt allow the gods have beſtowed upon the human kind, in that their greateſt and beſt gift, the rational ſoul, or mind. It is this that gives them the faculty, which no other animals poſſeſs, of diſcovering, in the ſurvey of the no leſs magnificent, than beautiful, conſtitution of the world, that there are exiſting ſuch divine beings, the authors or promoters of this wonderful oeconomy. What tribe of creatures, beſide the human, is led to worſhip them? With reſpect to the provident ſagacity in which ſome of them appear to excel others, how far is its utmoſt extent ſurpaſſed by that of man; whether it be in guarding againſt want, or fencing againſt the extremes of cold, or heat, or

* Memorab. ibid. lib. 4. p. 287.
† Ibid. lib. 1. p. 6.
‡ Ibid. lib. 4. cap. 3. p. 285.

or in finding remedies for diſeaſes, or in the application of ſtrength? Add to this, all the improvements which memory, joined with reaſon, enables him to make of whatever he ſees, hears, or learns from others. When this is taken into the account, may it not be truly ſaid, that it is given to men to live among other animals with the comparative pre-eminence and dignity of gods? Such ſuperior advantage they have in all natural endowments, both of body and mind. Is there not, therefore, reaſon to conclude, that the regard of the gods is abundantly extended to us? Or, what addition do you imagine ſhould be made, to complete its ſufficiency?"

"I would have them," replied Ariſtodemus, "to ſend us counſellors of our reſolutions and enterpriſes, that we may underſtand which of them ought to be executed, and which forborn. "That they do this," ſaid Socrates, "in intereſting matters, but which lie beyond the reach of human judgment, the divinations, and oracular reſponſes, to which the Athenians, and other nations, have recourſe, afford a preſumption, and indeed an aſſurance. For, why ſhould the gods, who have impreſſed upon human minds the perſuaſion that ſuch admonitions are to be expected about future good or ill, that cannot otherwiſe be known, be ſuppoſed deficient in performing that ſervice which they can eaſily do? or, why ſhould it be thought that mankind have been conſtantly deceived upon this point, without ever finding out their error? It is a fact, however, vouched from hiſtory, that the nations which have flouriſhed moſt in power and wealth, have alſo been remarkable for piety, and reverence of the gods; and that the wiſeſt ages have been the moſt obſervant of their worſhip, and the ſignifications of their will." "Deity," ſaid Ariſtodemus, "ſo far as diſcoverable to men, I do not diſregard; but think it to be much exalted above the need, or requiſition, of my worſhip." "Nay," replied Socrates, "the more exalted in power and dignity that being is who deigns to take care of you, the greater muſt your obligation be to venerate and adore him."

It is Xenophon's juſt reflection upon Socrates's * repreſentation of the *deity*, as all wiſe, preſent every where, and an inſpector of the actions of

* Memorab. ibid. cap. 2. p. 12.

of men, that ſuch doctrine had a direct tendency, not only to reſtrain them from all outward acts of impiety, injuſtice, and every baſe and unworthy practice, but to inſpire his aſſociates with that inward mental ſenſe of virtuous conduct, which would have its happy effect in ſolitude, as well as in public ſociety.

Having thus traced the moſt important points of Socrates's theology, it may be proper, before proceeding to the conſideration of his moral ſcheme, to point out, more particularly, the proper uſe he made of his faculty in the *dialectic*, and the improvement this method of reaſoning received from him. It has been obſerved how well he knew, by the management of the dialogue, to repel, or turn againſt the Sophiſt, his raſh aſſertions, or fallacious arguments. But, by this, we are not to underſtand, that he only ſhowed himſelf a more artful diſputant, and could foil any of the arrogant tribe at his own weapons. If this had been all his aim, and performance, every principle, whether of morals, or other ſcience, might ſtill have remained in ambiguity, and no progreſs been made in the rules of juſt ratiocination. When the Sophiſt dared alledge, that even contradictory propoſitions might be true, what reaſoning could ſuffice for his confutation? It was from the obſervance of this groſs abuſe of human reaſon, that Socrates, perſonating in diſpute the Εἰρων *, as he was called among the Greeks, or the diſſembler of his own knowledge, and the pretended admirer of that of others, aſſerted only, that he knew nothing, and put queſtions to others, but replied to none. Ariſtotle † mentions this laſt circumſtance as an objection to Socrates's method of reaſoning by the dialogue. But the only ground for this ſtricture is, that he made no anſwer to the Sophiſts, or thoſe who aimed at no diſcovery of truth. With others, and more eſpecially with his philoſophical aſſociates, he replied, and advanced aſſertions, with almoſt equal freedom that he put queſtions. If he inclined more to the ſide of the queriſt, it proceeded upon the propereſt motive and view. It was, that, by means of pertinent queſtions ‡ about the point

* Quintilian, lib. 9. cap. 2. Cicer. de Offic. lib. 1. p. 365. † Ariſt. Sophiſt. Elench. lib. 2. cap. 34. p. 252. ‡ Cicer. ibid. de Inventione, p. 67.

in debate, and requiſions of the moſt preciſe explication of the terms uſed in it, he might attain to ſuch an accurate deſcription of the thing, or idea inveſtigated, as might diſtinguiſh it from every other conception, and leave no room for miſtake or dubiety. It is, in ſhort, well known, that Socrates introduced into the dialect, what is abſolutely neceſſary in all true ſcience, the uſe of exact and juſt definitions. The merit of it is allowed him by Cicero, and alſo by Ariſtotle himſelf, the father of logic, and the ſyllogiſm. Indeed, the examples of his ratiocination, given by Xenophon and Plato, are a clear evidence of it. In the latter, there is a parade, and a protraction of the queſtions, previous to the forming of the definition, that is exceſſive, and which, inſtead of reprobating the frivolity of the Sophiſts, appears too like an emulation of their equivocal and trifling diſputation. In the former, there is no ſuch affectation of diſtinctions without a difference, or any reiteration of the queſtions, beyond what perſpicuity in the definition required *. On the contrary, as if Socrates wiſhed to ſtigmatiſe every ſpecies of vague argumentation, we find him declining to enter into a diſpute with Ariſtippus about the nature of good, general and abſtract; and which admitted of no adequate, or unexceptionable definition. He therefore diſmiſſed the fruitleſs controverſy, with ſaying, that he knew nothing of that good in which no individual was concerned, and that was not alledged to be applicaple to any particular ſubject.

Upon entering into the ſurvey of Socrates's moral ſcheme, it may be obſerved to have been, not only comprehenſive of all the virtues and duties relative to human life, but, from its ſimplicity, ſuſceptible of the plaineſt, the readieſt, and leaſt embarraſſed explication. In it, man was viewed as a ſingle perſon, or as ſtanding in a paternal relation to a family, or as connected with a public, or large community. The idea given in each of theſe heads was an intelligible one, and obvious to the meaneſt underſtanding; and the only inveſtigation to be made was, what actions were ſuited to, and moſt becoming, man in theſe ſeveral capacities.

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* Cicer. ibid. lib. 3. cap. 8.

In conſidering the firſt of theſe, it was apparent, and undeniable, that every man was furniſhed by nature with a ſet of perceptions, and active powers; ſeveral of which he could exert independently of others, and without regard to connection with them. But in eſtimating the tendency, and the effects of theſe powers, it was in no reſpect neceſſary to inquire, or to attempt to aſcertain, how they were generated in man, and after what manner their operation proceeded. It was ſufficient to know, by experience, that they ſubſiſted in a certain conſtitutional form; about which nothing could be affirmed with more evidence of truth, than that there was a part naturally ſubjected, and another which ruled *, diſtinguiſhed by the names of body and mind, or the external and internal faculties. The ſway of the latter over the former was no leſs requiſite for the government of the appetites of ſenſe, than for the ſafe conduct of the corporeal motions. Temperance, therefore, in the gratification of theſe appetites, muſt be acknowledged a law, in the human conſtitution, of equal neceſſity and importance with common prudence. Every man owes it to himſelf to be ſo far poſſeſſed of this virtue; firſt, for his preſervation from diſeaſe, and then for the ſecurity and enlargement of what he finds agreeable to him. The good it brings, and the evil attending its contrary, extend alike to the body and the ſoul †. But the habit of it cannot be acquired without a certain vigour of mind, which enables men to aſſume a regular command over their natural deſires; in that degree, at leaſt, as to ſuſpend compliance with them, when either hurtful in themſelves, or obſtructive of their attainment of greater ſatisfaction.

To be in this habit of virtue is more eſpecially neceſſary to men, who are placed in ſituations that call them to attend not only to their own ſafety, and wellfare, but to thoſe of others with whom they are connected. Ill would he perform the part of a father of a family, who, when his children's health required it, could not abridge the hours of his repoſe, or undergo trouble, to procure medicine for them, or ſome means of relief. What ſort of magiſtrate would he prove, who ſhould prefer his private eaſe, or pleaſure, to the moſt urgent buſineſs of the ſtate? In

* Cicer. ibid. lib. 4. cap. 3. p. 286. † Ibid. cap. 5. p. 316.

what eſteem, or of what utility, would the general of an army be, who could not patiently endure the cold of the camp, and the fatigue of the march, and be vigilant in obſerving and baffling the deſigns of the enemy? But, in all theſe caſes, it is manifeſt, that there is a diſcipline of the mind, or a moral one, pointed out by nature to man; and ſo exacted of him, that, without it, nothing in human life could be turned to its proper account.

Other teachers of wiſdom, ſaid Antipho to him, with a ſneer, have commonly ſhown men how productive its ſtudy was of ſubſtantial pleaſure *; but, according to your doctrine, and the practice you enjoin, philoſophy is no better than a ſchool of *penury and patience*. It may be demonſtrated, ſaid Socrates, that the real, and moſt genuine pleaſures, are to be found upon the ſide of moderated appetites, and virtuous temperance, and not on that of the indulged deſires. But, ſince you ſeem to place felicity in multiplied gratifications, I muſt diſſent from your opinion, and ſhall briefly tell you what is mine. To have no wants is the attribute of a divinity. To have the feweſt, therefore, is to approach the neareſt to what is divine. If, to the firſt, the moſt excellent good be allowed to belong, the advancement made towards it, in the ſecond, muſt be accounted an excellence, and a ſimilar perfection.

Ariſtippus, yet more remarkable than Antipho for libertine ſentiments on morals, had often endeavoured to maintain, againſt Socrates, that the life of ſenſual pleaſure was the beſt, and only eligible one. "I ſhall readily grant you," ſaid he, "that the offices of magiſtracy, and other civil functions in your Grecian commonwealths, eſpecially in the manner in which they are commonly executed, muſt be laborious indeed, and, therefore, ought to be accounted impoſitions upon individuals, that no wiſe man ſhould be reſigned to, but by all means avoid. In many reſpects they lay reſtraints upon men, and often interfere with their greateſt pleaſures, and render them drudges to others, their inferiors too, for the ſake of what is called the public good. But what fools are theſe men for ſo doing? And, may they not as well freely confeſs, that they have ſold themſelves to civil bondage, and ſlavery?" "I imagined,"

* Cicer. ibid. lib. 1. cap. 6.

imagined," ſaid Socrates, "that you had already granted, that the rank in civil life to which authority belongs, was preferable to that which is chiefly characteriſed by obedience. But, ſince you appear now to retract that conceſſion, and to eſtimate theſe two conditions of life by a different rule, it may be neceſſary to reſume the queſtion, and to conſider with more attention, Whether thoſe to whom the ſupreme authority, in different ſtates and kingdoms, belongs, or thoſe who are ſubjected to that authority, may be reckoned to live in the moſt agreeable manner? And, in this general view of the queſtion, it may fall to be debated, Whether the Perſians, who are maſters in Aſia, have any advantage, in reſpect of civil felicity, over the Phrygians, who are under their dominion? and, in like manner, Whether the Scythians in Europe, who have the Meotae for their tributaries, or the Carthaginians in Africa, who give law to the people in Lybia, are upon no better footing for the enjoyments of political life, than theſe their ſubjects? If the queſtion be only put, in reference to the commonwealths of Greece, the ſtate of it will be, What difference is there in the two conditions of the rulers, and the ruled, in theſe governments, to render that of the former more diſagreeable, and diſadvantageous to the happineſs of life, than that of the latter?"

"All this inveſtigation," replied Ariſtippus, "may be ſpared, ſince the principle I hold will not be in the leaſt affected by any reſult of it. To me, the preferable condition in life is, neither that of the governing, or the governed, but a middle ſtation between the two; which, being a releaſe from the thraldom of both, and favourable to liberty of action, gives the faireſt proſpect of felicity." "If it were true," anſwered Socrates, "that the condition you point out, for ſhunning what you reckon the hateful extremes, could be ſo ordered, as to be diſconnected with men, it might be allowed, that what you have now advanced has the force of an argument: But I underſtood always, that you meant to live in civil ſociety; and, in that caſe, you will find it no eaſy matter to rank yourſelf, neither amongſt thoſe who rule, or thoſe who obey. In all governments, you know, theſe diſtinctions are fundamental ones; and the men in power, you muſt remember, are apt to uſe great freedom, both in public and in private, as to the treatment of their inferi-

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ors. Altogether undiſturbed, no political ſtate is found to be. Men may ſow and plant, and yet be diſpoſſeſſed of the fruit of their labours, if they have any contiguity with the more warlike; and, it is no uncommon thing to ſee the indolent and daſtardly, even under the ſame governments, inſulted and injured by the audacious." "I acknowledge," ſaid Ariſtippus, "that ſuch occurrences there may be in your turbulent republics; and, therefore, I take care to include myſelf in none of them. A citizen at large, and a gueſt alike, I am every where, but have no concern with any particular community."

"It muſt be owned," ſaid Socrates, "that you have conceived the matter very ſhrewdly. For, ſince the days of Sennes, and Sciron, and Procruſtes *, are paſt with us, ſtrangers are no longer expoſed to inhuman treatment: Yet ſtill, when rulers, in their native cities, find it neceſſary to have laws enacted for their greater ſecurity, and even to guard againſt injuries, by increaſing the number of their friends; whence do you ſuppoſe that a protection is derived to you, which the natives cannot altogether count upon, when you go defenceleſs upon a journey, or enter a city in the habit of a ſtranger, which marks you out to the lawleſs as one eaſily to be aſſaulted? I am a citizen at large, you ſay, and therefore truſt I am ſafe. The public cryer, indeed, in every city, proclaims that all ſtrangers ſhall be protected: But what aſſurance have you that it ſhall be ſo. Is not the care, the aſſiduity, and fidelity of the magiſtrates, in executing their charge, which you began with reprobating, your only ſufficient one? Unleſs, perhaps, you chooſe to ſay, that your apparent inſignificancy rendered you no object of aſſault, or depredation."

"There is a diſtinction," ſaid Ariſtippus, "that I have heard you inſiſt upon, relative to this ſubject, but which I do not well comprehend, between pain or trouble felt by thoſe who willingly undergo it, and that which others ſuſtain, but not from inclination, or choice. Is not the ſenſation of pain the ſame in both; and what difference does it make to the

* Cum fuerit Sciron leſtis, torvuſque Procruſtes,
Et Sennes.
Ovid. Epiſt. 1. Phyl. Demoph. et Metamorph. lib. 7.

the body that bears it, whether the will acquieſce in it or not?" "Is it poſſible," anſwered Socrates, "that you can really think, when voluntary and involuntary bearing of trouble is ſpoken of, that men only uſe a different mode of expreſſing not only the ſame ſenſation, but an equal meaſure and degree of it? Does it create no difference to the man's feeling, whether he be conſtrained to endure hunger and thirſt, or makes it his choice to ſuffer them, only while he is ſo inclined. Admitting the bodily ſenſation to be the ſame, and equal, yet what a diſparity muſt there be in the ſtate of his mind? In the one caſe, there is a ſenſible elevation of ſpirit, excited by the hope of his accompliſhing ſome favourite purpoſe. In the other, ſad dejection takes place, from the ſenſe of conſtraint; and, you may as well conclude the voluntary toil of the huntſman to be no more agreeable to him, than the forced one is to the game he purſues, as imagine, that acting or ſuffering with free will, or contrary to it, is juſtly to be claſſed under the ſame predicament.

"But," continued Socrates, "it is to be further adverted to, upon this ſubject, that pleaſures attained by no effort, and which are, as it were, engendered from the facility of the mind in indulging every deſire, are by no means reckoned thoſe ſalutary to mankind. Aſk the maſters of the *Gymnaſia*, and they will tell you, that a good conſtitution of body is never to be procured in this way; nor does it contribute to men's proficiency in any laudable ſtudy. Nay, it is chiefly by the exerciſe of the tolerant powers of the mind that they can be qualified for noble and worthy undertakings. So the beſt judges of antiquity have declared; and with them ſeveral of the moſt celebrated poets have alſo agreed. To this purpoſe, Heſiod and Epicharmus, among others, might be quoted; but the argument is illuſtrated at greater length, and with peculiar propriety of reaſoning, in Prodicus's fable of the Judgment of Hercules, which repreſents him, at the age of manhood, deliberating with himſelf what courſe of life he ought to purſue, and in this critical juncture to be accoſted by two female forms, the goddeſs of Pleaſure, and Virtue."

To give a verſion of this much admired moral piece, which has been already done with ſufficient exactneſs and elegance, would be ſuperfluous. But, conſidering it not only as having Socrates's general approbation

bation for the ſentiments it contains, but as a compendious view of the arguments he himſelf choſe to make uſe of, in demonſtrating the preference of virtue to pleaſure, we ſhall endeavour to collect the ſeveral topics inſiſted upon in the fable, and the reſult of the reaſoning upon each ſide of the queſtion, as an authoriſed and proper ſupplement to the moral doctrines of the philoſopher.

It was obvious, and granted by all philoſophers, that the corporeal ſenſes were the earlieſt ſolicitors for attention to their objects. With propriety, therefore, it is ſaid in the fable, that the goddeſs of Pleaſure advanced with haſty ſteps, and prevented Virtue in her addreſs to Hercules. This circumſtance, however, is not to be interpreted as if nature, by this precedency given to the operation of the ſenſes, had marked them for any more excellency than that of their neceſſary and immediate uſe in the human frame. Infancy thus precedes manhood, with the diſtinction only of its imbecillity. But the influence of the early and daily repeated gratification of the ſenſes is great, and would, by impreſſing the imagination, prevent the energy of reaſon itſelf, if it were not checked by early diſcipline. This the prudence of parents adminiſters to their offspring; and the more advanced in life readily preſcribe it to the young and unexperienced. Upon the ſuppoſition of its not being, in ſome degree, undergone, there muſt be, what is fancied of Hercules, a more than ordinary vigour of the rational faculty, which, looking forward to the conſequences of actions, forms a proper judgment of their nature and eligibility.

Pleaſure's addreſs to him is in the moſt alluring ſtrain. The way ſhe propoſes to lead him preſented nothing but what was eaſy and agreeable. It was free from all intruſion of pain or trouble, and ſtrewed with whatever was delightful to the ſenſes. The dangers of war, and the labours of buſineſs, were to be far removed from him. The only object of his ſtudy would be, in what manner his ſenſes might be moſt deliciouſly regaled, and what might quicken, and add new reliſh to their pleaſures. This engaging attention was the chief, and only one required of him. Any apprehenſion there needed not be of a penury of theſe delights; or of a neceſſity of purchaſing the means of them by labour of any kind. "The votaries of pleaſure," ſaid ſhe, "may turn by any handle,

handle, or opportunity they can find, other mens toil to their benefit, and uſe all freedom in acquiring gratifications to themſelves."

Such is the pleading the goddeſs of Pleaſure uſes to entice Hercules to become her follower; and it muſt be owned to repreſent, in true colours, that ſcheme of life which the ſenſualiſt, or one diſpoſed to make corporeal pleaſure his ſole object, would moſt readily embrace. In this view of it, two things are obſervable. Firſt, That what is alledged about the facility of gratifying the appetites of ſenſe is a fallacious ſuggeſtion. However the truth may be diſſembled, and the unexperienced mind flattered into this preſumption, it is ſoon found to be a deluſive one. There is a ſtudy, and a labour of its kind, inſeparably connected with the inordinate indulgence of ſenſual pleaſure, and which, beſide being mean, and unworthy in itſelf, is generally productive of a meaſure of anxiety and diſguſt, not leſs than the hardſhips that the practice of virtue is reckoned to require. The minute attentions to ſtimulate, or ſoothe the appetites, and to refine on their gratifications, furniſh a taſk to the voluptuary which he finds not eaſy to be performed. Therefore, in the reply made by Virtue to her antagoniſt, it is denied that the purſuits of pleaſure can be unaccompanied with trouble. Secondly, It appears to be difficult in the extreme, if not impoſſible, to preſerve unviolated, amidſt the incitement of the ſenſual deſires, a principle of juſtice, or common equity, towards other men. Hence, upon this head, the goddeſs of Pleaſure cannot avoid, according to the fable, granting a latitude to her votaries, that renounces all reſtraint in the acquiſition of ſelfiſh enjoyments: And it may, indeed, with reaſon, be doubted, whether there ever was a man in the world who preſcribed no bounds to his ſenſual gratifications, and was eagerly bent on the fulfilment of them, and did not, at the ſame time, on various occaſions, if not in the general line of his conduct, act an unjuſt or injurious part. So true it is, that the diſſolute character naturally involves that of the diſhoneſt and unequitable one.

The ſpeech of *Virtue* to Hercules is introduced with a claim to dignity of character, in compariſon with the ſhameful one of her antagoniſt. The ſuperiority of human beings, under a virtuous regulation of their natural appetites and paſſions, when viewed in contraſt to the un-

regulated lives of the votaries of pleaſure, is aſcertained. The advantage the former have, in point of real pleaſure, is ſhown. To this is added, the conſideration of the honourable action of the man of virtue, and of its attendant, honeſt fame, which diſtinguiſh him above all others, and produce a confidence in the propriety, and ſteadineſs of his conduct, in every ſtation; whether he has to act his part where integrity and fidelity are required, or where induſtry is to be uſed, and danger incurred; whether he be the friend, or the companion, the counſellor in peace, or the aſſociate in war; in all theſe ſituations the excellence of his character is rendered eminently conſpicuous. Therefore, in death, he falls not unhonoured, or ſoon to be forgotten. His friends, his companions, his countrymen, join in revering his memory, and tranſmitting it with grateful applauſe to future generations.

There are ſome arguments inſiſted on by Virtue which deſerve to be ſeparately mentioned. Hercules is put in mind of his parentage, as a motive to virtuous action. The reputed ſon of Jupiter was not to diſhonour his illuſtrious deſcent by a deportment unworthy of it. From the opinion that man, in his original, is more than an earth-born creature, it appears that Socrates derived a ſpecial argument for the exerciſe of virtue. The young hero is alſo told by the goddeſs, that, in conſequence of his conforming to her dictates, he would have the honour of exhibiting her character, in its proper luſtre, before men, and proving to them the happy effects attending its imitation. Thus, example in practice was taught to be the beſt illuſtration of the moral rule. That part of the reaſoning, in which Virtue proves the exceſs and abuſe of natural appetite to be deſtructive of real pleaſure, is farther ſupported by the repreſentation of ſuitable abſtinence as the true *zeſt* of ſenſual pleaſure, and labour the beſt ſweetner of repoſe. "In the practice of both theſe," ſays ſhe, "my friends find their account, by the ſure reliſh they add to all their corporeal enjoyments."

In anſwer to Pleaſure's deſcant upon the eaſy, the careleſs, and ſupine life of her followers, Virtue ſays to Hercules, "My aim, or wiſh, is not to deceive you with vain promiſes of exemption from all trouble, which never can be fulfilled, but to inſtruct you in what the gods have ordained to take place in human life. Their manifeſt appointment is, that nothing

nothing deſerving the appellation of good or excellent ſhould be attainable to men, without due labour and pains. To render them propitious to you, they muſt be worſhipped: To engage the love of your friends, you muſt do them kind offices: To obtain public honours in any community, you muſt prove yourſelf, in ſome remarkable degree, profitable to it. Without culture, the bountiful earth produces not its fruits; nor, without attendance upon the cattle that graze upon it, can they be turned to proper advantage. To render the body robuſt, it muſt be hardened by exerciſe, and accuſtomed to undergo that toil, which the mind judges to be either neceſſary or convenient. To ſubdue enemies, or to protect friends, the diſcipline of war muſt be learned, not from theory only, but by practice in the field." This moral ſentiment expreſſed in the fable, is the explication of that noted verſe of the poet Epicharmus, in which it is ſaid, *That the gods ſell all good things to men at the price of labour.*

We conclude the diſſertations of Socrates upon morals, with obſerving, that he held forth certain laws of a moral and civil kind, as preſcribed by nature to mankind *, and generally acknowledged among them. "They are unwritten," ſaid he, "but they are known and underſtood in all languages, and propagated in all countries. Men never met together, nor could they ever meet, in any general convention, to aſſent to them as convenient. Yet, as if this common approbation of them had been obtained, men in all nations agree, that the gods are to be worſhipped, parents to be honoured, benefactors to be repaid with ſuitable offices; and to theſe we may add another precept of nature, although there may be inſtances of its being contraveened, that *parents and children do not cohabit.* Whence, then, have theſe laws their preſcription; and who are to be reputed their founders? Surely, none but the gods; who have alſo ordained penal ſanctions to them, and which cannot be evaded, as often happens to thoſe annexed to the violation of human inſtitutions. But the authority of theſe divine preſcriptions is ſuch, that the treſpaſs always carries along with it a due puniſhment. The hateful and pernicious effects of the prohibited action are found to

* Memorab. lib. 4. cap. 4. p. 299.

wait upon the tranſgreſſors; a ſanction this which no human wiſdom or power can appoint; and, therefore, muſt be concluded to have its original from the gods. Things that are juſt can only have the ſtamp of their authority; and it appears to be their will, that all human ordinances, under the name of Laws, ſhould be conſiſtent with juſtice.

Upon the whole, it muſt be acknowledged, that Socrates, as a moral philoſopher, merited the high character aſſigned him by antiquity. In treating of the Pythagorean philoſophy, we have ſeen, indeed, a ſurpriſing refinement in this branch of knowledge, and, in ſome reſpects, a ſublimity of ſentiment, and an extended theory of principles and arguments, which we are not warranted to aſcribe to the Athenian ſage, unleſs we admit, as his genuine doctrines, all that Plato has delivered in his name. This opinion, as contrary to that of antiquity, and not reconcileable with what muſt be allowed to Plato's own inventive genius, and extenſive erudition, can never be reaſonably entertained. It is indeed allowed, that, both in the general doctrines, and particular arguments, the diſciple takes a compaſs wide of thoſe appropriated by other authors to his maſter, and, that, therefore, critical judgment is to be exerciſed, and a proper ſelection made from him of the Socratic doctrines. But, in various points, this cannot be done with certainty. In the preceding pages, however, an eſſay towards the requiſite determination has been ventured; but with what juſtice or propriety muſt be ſubmitted to competent judges. There are a few other moral ſentiments, together with Socrates's opinion of the immortality of the human ſoul, that will more properly be included in the next ſection. What we have here to ſubjoin, in farther approbation of his moral ſcheme, may be reduced to one remark. When we conſider the principles and arguments uſed in it, in reſpect of their propriety and ſimplicity, as well as their evidence, and compare them with thoſe of other philoſophers, vamped with metaphyſical ideas, and logical diſtinctions, they muſt be acknowledged to be ſuch as coincide more directly with the general notions of mankind of moral duty, and its obligations. The theological ideas, without being abſtruſe or perplexed, ſerve to illuſtrate and confirm the moral ones; and the ſpecial proof of any principle is reſted, not upon metaphyſical refinements, but traced from the moſt natural conceptions,

and

and experiences of the human mind. Hence it appears, that the ethical ſcience is not the progeny of the ſchools, nor depends upon the reſearches of the learned, for the demonſtration of its principles, but hath, in all its great lines, a more obvious and intelligible foundation, placed in the common ſenſe and reaſon of mankind. And hence it was that Socrates * took his illuſtrations of various moral duties and precepts from the rules obſerved by men in the practice of the common, as well as the more liberal arts of life; and diſcovered, indeed, a peculiar ingenuity he had in turning the obſervations he made on the trades and arts of the potters, the braziers, the leather-dreſſers, and ſhoemakers, into the juſteſt and moſt inſtructive leſſons in the moral conduct of human life.

SECT.

* Plato in Convivio.

SECTION II.

Socrates's appearances in public affairs.—The offences taken againſt him.—His judicial accuſation, and trial.—The capital ſentence pronounced upon him, and the circumſtances of his death.

IN the unhinged condition of the Athenian government, and when it had only paſſed from one ſpecies of tyrannical rule to another, it may be accounted a palpable error in Socrates to have imagined, that ſome ſignal reformation of the depraved manners of his countrymen could be effectuated, by the ſole means of his inſtructing the youth of rank in the ſcience of morals. From his ardent zeal, and aſſiduity in the proſecution of this purpoſe, it would appear as if he had thought of accompliſhing a change in the temper and ſpirit of the people, equal to what Solon had formerly done in the form of the government. In times preceding, ſeveral of the wiſe men, and, hitherto, various of the ſophiſts, had joined political ſchemes to their profeſſion of wiſdom and ſcience; and the oratory of the latter had been ſometimes ſubſervient to the new modelling of ſtates. It has been related, that Socrates had appeared with much reputation in the Athenian army, and, when he betook himſelf to the teaching philoſophy, he did not decline acting in the offices of civil government *. He was a member of the ſupreme council, or ſenate; and was preſent at the remarkable trial and judgment of the ten Athenian

* Xenophon Hiſt. Graec. lib. 1. Memorab. cap. 1.

Athenian commanders, who, although victorious, were accuſed of not burying the bodies of thoſe who fell in the naval action at Arginuſa, with the Lacedemonians. He continued to hold his place in the council, and to perform the functions of it, ſo far as could be done, under the thirty tyrants. In this political ſtation he attached himſelf to no party; but, in every important queſtion, or conteſt, he only conſidered how it became a virtuous man, and an honeſt citizen, to decide and to act *. This integrity in judgment was evinced in the caſe of the accuſed generals. When he beheld that conſtitutional law about to be violated, which required that the trial, previouſly to its being carried before the aſſembly of the citizens, ſhould be authoriſed by the ſenate, he ſtrenuouſly oppoſed this enormity; and, when his colleagues, intimidated with the menaces of the multitude, yielded to it, he alone, deſpiſing all danger, dared to give his voice againſt the illegal procedure.

By this inſtance of intrepid integrity he did not recommend himſelf to the tyrannical partizans; and, at the ſame time, he made a conſiderable forfeiture of his popularity among the common citizens. Some of his *apologues* being taken notice of by the former, he was required to be more ſparing of them, and not to expreſs himſelf in the terms he had done, about *herds of cattle, and their keepers*. To Critias, chiefly, he owed the injunction he received, not to converſe with the youth. His expoſtulations with this apoſtate from moral inſtruction, about the ſenſe in which this order was to be underſtood, ſhowed that he was not eaſily to be turned from his way. Under juſt ſuſpicion of being diſaffected to the tyrants, he was tolerated by them, not from lenity, or good will, but from plain evidence that he was unſupported by party, and that nothing *valuable* could be obtained from his condemnation. He is ſaid, however, to have been acquainted with the enterpriſe ſecretly formed by Thraſybulus, for the delivery of Athens from the inſufferable outrages of the *thirty*, and which proved ſucceſsful.

Another ſet of men to whom Socrates became obnoxious, were the comic writers for the ſtage. Whether from a diſguſt of their compoſitions, and licentious ſtyle, or from a diſapprobation of the extravagant paſſion

* Xenophon. Hiſt. ibid. Plato in Apologia. Plutarch. in Solone.

paſſion of the Athenians for theſe entertainments, he never willingly attended the theatre *. It was only upon the repreſentation of ſome of Euripides's tragedies that he choſe to be preſent; and, even then, in caſe of any ambiguity in the moral ſentiment, he was apt to ſhow diſſatisfaction, and retire. To Ariſtophanes, the boldeſt, and moſt ſatirical of all comic poets, this would appear a piece of philoſophic pride, or formality, which it became him to ridicule. He therefore produced his comedy of the Clouds, in which, although more decency of ſtyle was obſerved than in his other pieces, a *traveſtie* was made of Socrates's character, to the utmoſt pitch of extravagance. He was exhibited as a fantaſtic *virtuoſo*, occupied with frivolous ſtudies, as a wrangler in argument, and one who, ſcorning the deities of his country, ſubſtituted in their place certain *daemons* of his own invention. It is related by ſeveral authors in what manner Socrates received this virulent attack upon him by the maſter of the comic ſtage. He came to the theatre; and that none might be at a loſs to know who the perſonated Socrates was, he ſtood up in a conſpicuous bench; and, when aſked, if he was not provoked at this public ridicule of his character? "By no means," ſaid he, "I rather think myſelf at a great feaſt, where every one enjoys me."

It yet remains to be determined by the critics, what reception the Athenians gave to the comedy of *the Clouds*, upon its being firſt acted; and whether, according to Ælian's account, they were only for a ſhort ſpace diſpleaſed with it, but ſoon applauded its exhibition, and were entertained with the theatrical deriſion of their celebrated philoſopher. That author would create a perſuaſion by no means probable, when the dates of events in chronology are attended to, that Ariſtophanes was excited and bribed by Anytus and Melitus, the ſubſequent accuſers of Socrates, to make an experiment on the diſpoſition of the Athenians to bear the expoſure of him to ridicule, whom they meditated to bring under a criminal trial. But the acknowledged interval of five Olympiads, or more than twenty years, from the firſt repreſentation of this comedy, to the impeachment of Socrates, muſt be regarded as equivalent

* Ælian. Hiſtor. var. lib. 2. cap. 13.

lent to a confutation of Ælian's narrative. The moſt probable opinion ſeems to be, that the firſt acting of the comedy was ſo ill received, and diſcouraged, that many years paſſed before its ſecond repreſentation; and that it might be revived on purpoſe by Socrates's enemies, to vilify him in the eyes of the people, and ſmooth the way to his criminal proſecution.

That Socrates, however inoffenſive, might give diſpleaſure to ſome individuals, and create private enemies, may eaſily be ſuppoſed, when we reflect on the delicacy of the taſk in which he was engaged; as it involved not only the charge, but frequently the approbation, or diſapprobation, of the youth under his diſcipline, in reſpect of their tempers and capacity, and ſometimes a judgment either required by the parents, or voluntarily pronounced by himſelf, about their qualification for particular profeſſions and employments in civil life. It happened in the caſe of Anytus's ſon, that Socrates expreſſed himſelf with freedom about his father's improper deſtination of him for the trade of a leather-dreſſer. It was, however, by ſecretly following this occupation, that Anytus, who took upon himſelf the name of an orator, had much increaſed his fortune. "It ſurely is not neceſſary," ſaid Socrates, "that the ſon of one who has got wealth enough to make a figure in the republic, ſhould be bred to the mean employment of dreſſing hides *." Pure concern for the youth, whoſe diſpoſition Socrates had obſerved to be diametrically oppoſite to ſuch a buſineſs, had given occaſion to this animadverſion; to which ſome raillery againſt the father, who perſiſted in his reſolution, was added. To another than Anytus, the motive Socrates had for interfering would have excuſed the freedom he uſed. But vulgar ſouls take the quickeſt offence. The raillery was conſidered by Anytus not only as expoſing his intention about his ſon, but as a direct ſatire upon himſelf, for privately making his riches by a trade, of which he renounced the name. As the courſe taken by him was not altogether a ſecret in Athens, the ridicule of it, although diſagreeable, could not be deemed a ſlander. While ſome, perhaps, diverted themſelves with Socrates's raillery on the ſubject, Anytus's dark mind

* Memorab. in Socrat. defenſ. Coram Judic. p. 346.

brooded over the affront, and ſought after revenge. A public accuſation of the philoſopher, upon the grounds ſuggeſted by Ariſtophanes, appeared to him the readieſt and moſt eligible, eſpecially as the charge of impiety, which the vulgar citizens were apt to believe, would induce the credit of the other articles. Melitus, a novice at the bar *, and one ready to undertake any litigious cauſe, willingly became his aſſociate; and their party was reckoned complete by the acceſſion of Lyco, a known and practiſed rhetorician. The taſk of impeachment was divided among them, to give it the appearance of an accuſation by three claſſes of men, the poets, the orators, and artificers. The chief articles inſiſted upon were, contempt of the gods of Athens, and the introduction of other divinities; corruption of the youth, and arguing indiſcriminately upon both ſides of a queſtion, ſo as to make reaſon confute itſelf.

It is almoſt unneceſſary to recite the confutations of this unfounded charge againſt the Athenian ſage, which ſeveral of his philoſophic friends thought it their duty to publiſh after his death; but which he, anſwering before his judges, neither ſtudied, nor accounted worthy of his attention. It may be proper, however, to obſerve, that, notwithſtanding he entertained thoſe rational principles of theology which have been mentioned, and ſupported them in conferences with his ſpeculative aſſociates, he did not treat the public religion with outward contempt or ſcorn, but, in this reſpect, ſhowed all decorum, both in his language and behaviour. This, certainly, aroſe not from dubiety, or want of full conviction of the truth of the principles he held †, ſince he animadverted with particular aſperity on thoſe philoſophers, who, ſetting no bounds to their ſcepticiſm, endeavoured to overthrow the juſteſt concluſions of reaſon, for the conſtitution of the world by a divine power. Conſidering the narrow limits of human knowledge, he heſitated not to pronounce the phyſical architects of the univerſe, who excluded the intervention of deity, fools, or infatuated men. Yet, addicted to freedom in philoſophic converſation as he was, he gave himſelf no liberty ‡ in ſpeaking deriſively, or in ſerious reproach, of the religion of his country. To this,

* Plato in Apolog. Maxim. Tyr. Diſſer. 39. p. 406. † Memorab. lib. i. cap. i. p. 8.—9. ‡ Ibid.

this, perhaps, he might be induced, not from prudence and decorum only, but from obſerving, that the contrary practice was more frequently the mark of preſumption and licentiouſneſs, than of ſuperior knowledge, and the dictates of an enlightened mind. He endeavoured, indeed, to reprobate ſome of the more abſurd and glaring of the popular ſuperſtitions, ſuch as thoſe reſpecting auguries and divinations, from unuſual ſounds in the air, or the different flights and incantations of birds; alledging, that if preſages of good and evil were imparted by the gods, it was more credible that they were communicated directly to men themſelves, than by ſuch obſcure conveyances. Upon matters which men had the means of knowing, or the faculty of diſcovering, themſelves, or could learn from others, he declared that the oracles ought not to be conſulted. Theſe were not ſingular opinions delivered by him, but ſuch as were prevalent among the more intelligent claſſes of men. Yet upon theſe pretences did his enemies found their charge of his impiety.

The allegation of his corrupting the youth was ſtill more lamely ſupported; being reduced to two propoſitions, which tallied not well with each other, and yet neither of them amounted to a proper accuſation. The one was, that he acquired ſo great influence over the youth, that they preferred his company to that of their parents, or neareſt relations, and were more obſervant of his advice and directions than of all other commands that might be given them. The ſecond implied the inefficacy of his diſcipline, which, upon ſome individuals, had not accompliſhed the due reformation. As to the reſpect and deference paid to his inſtructions * by the youth who attended him, Socrates ſaid, that he claimed no more, in competition with their parents or friends, than what was allowed to all teachers or inſtructors of others in particular arts, or in caſes where proper habits either of body or mind were to be formed. The maſters of the Gymnaſtic exerciſes required a preferable regard to be given their rules, and ſo did the phyſicians; and the ſame neceſſary conceſſion was made in favour of all other laudable diſcipline. But why was not Alcibiades cured of his ambition, and Critias of his intemperance; by the failure of which they became the authors of many cala-

* Memorab. ibid. in Socrat. Defenſ.

mities to the ſtate? Of ſuch a diſpoſition, ſays Xenophon *, were both theſe youths, that, if the deity had reſigned it to their option, whether they would live a long life, in the manner Socrates directed, or go to death inſtantly, there was little doubt of their preferring the laſt alternative. While they remained with him, they appeared to imbibe the principles of virtue; but early engaging in purſuits adverſe to all moral impreſſions, they ſoon reverted to their natural propenſities. What maſter or tutor, in any ſcience, is made reſponſible for the improvement and progreſs of his eleves, who can, at their pleaſure, eſcape from his diſcipline? The ableſt in this profeſſion can only reckon upon their advancement while they advert to his rules, and do not either deſpiſe them, or chooſe to contradict them in practice. A god he muſt be, and not a man, who undertakes to enſure a ſuperior efficacy to his wiſdom and ability in inſtruction. In correſpondence with this laſt reflection, Socrates taught the neceſſity of ſome divine admonition and aid to the conſummate practice of virtue. It need hardly be ſubjoined, that it was one of Ariſtophanes's fictions to hold him forth to the vulgar as only a more artful diſputant in the manner of the Sophiſts.

When the criminal proceſs was ready to be commenced before the judges in the court of the *Areopagus*, Socrates was aſked by Hermogenes, Whether he had meditated a proper defence? "*I have prepared none*," replied the philoſopher, "*nor ſhall I think of any other, but that which the courſe of my life affords: It is the only juſt and honourable one, and ought to be the moſt effectual for my vindication.*" Upon peruſing a defenſive oration †, preſented to him by Lyſias, the celebrated rhetorician, "it is abundantly fine," ſaid he, "but to deliver it is unſuitable to me." He had ſcarcely ever mentioned the proſecution amongſt his friends. Conſcious of his innocence, and of the honeſt and unhired labours of his life, now accumulated with years, for the good of the commonweath, he conſidered it to be a groſs abuſe of the laws, and contrary to the protection thoſe of Athens promiſed, and the value they ſet upon the known probity of every citizen, if he, or any other virtuous man, could not only be arraigned, but ſuffered to fall a victim to manifeſt

* Memorab. lib. 1. cap. 2. † Cicer. de Orat. lib. 1.

feſt calumny and defamation. To owe his vindication and acquittance, not ſolely to the candour and equity of the judges, but to the public appearance of friends, and the commiſeration that might be excited by the ſtudied periods of a pathetic harrangue, he accounted unworthy of his character, and not altogether equitable in itſelf; ſince the deliverance he might by theſe methods obtain, a meaner citizen, however innocent, could not expect. To theſe ſentiments, he doubtleſs joined a pardonable diſdain of the characters of his accuſers. What he thought of the integrity of his judges is uncertain *; but he believed, that any ſentence they could pronounce againſt him, would redound not to his diſhonour, but to their own, and that of his malicious adverſaries. The court of the Areopagus, though ſtill in reputation for juſtice, had rather declined from the former eſtimate of its judicial procedure ſince the time of Pericles's adminiſtration †, when it underwent a conſtitutional alteration, by the number of its members being too much increaſed. The variation, alſo, of their number, at one time and another, which happened from there being accidentally more or fewer who had the requiſite qualification of admiſſion, was a circumſtance unfavourable to the uniformity of their deciſions.

When the day of trial came, Melitus, Anytus, and Lyco, took each his turn in harranguing the judges ‡. There was, among them, no conſiderable diſplay of oratory, and much leſs of juſt argument. But, had there had been a ſhew of both, the difference would have been imperceptible to Socrates, who appeared not the leaſt attentive to the ſtrain of their pleadings. Yet, when it ceaſed, he ſeemed to be rouſed, and to caſt an indignant look upon his accuſers; to which was added a forced ſmile in eyeing his judges. In an elevated tone of voice, and, as Cicero expreſſes it, rather like one maſter of the tribunal itſelf, than a pannel or ſuppliant, he entered upon his reply. Then, as if reſenting the

* Xenophon. in Defenſ. † Plutarch. in Pericl. Potter's Antiquities of Greece, vol. 1. p. 102.

‡ In the judicial forms uſed in Athens, and alſo followed in thoſe of Rome, much, if not the greateſt part of the pleading, was addreſſed, not ſo directly to the judges, as from one of the parties to the other.

the unmerited impeachment, he aſked Melitus, how he came to underſtand that he diſhonoured the gods of Athens, or ſubſtituted others in their room, or entertained unbecoming thoughts of them, when his public behaviour in attending the ſolemnities of their worſhip, a truth well known to him, as well as all others, bore a contrary teſtimony? "Is it," ſaid he, "in part, or wholly, inferred from my affirming, that a divine voice has frequently reſtrained me in purpoſes of action? Is it not evident, that, in this, I rather maintain the common belief, that what is called *divinity* by us is preſcient, and can foretel, at his pleaſure, future events to men, by voices immediately directed to them. Such are thoſe heard from the ſhrines of the gods, which their prophets and prieſts have the faculty of underſtanding, and the privilege of delivering to others. Is it either more rational, or more pious, to aſſert, that theſe communications are competent to birds and beaſts, but not to men? If I have delivered any thing to my friends, under the name of a divination, let their teſtimony be called for, which can beſt inſtruct, either the veracity, or the fallacy, of what was announced? But none of them, I believe, will ſay that the daemon's admonition erred." Here a murmur aroſe among the judges; ſome of them being offended at his pretending to have an intercourſe with the celeſtial beings, equal to that enjoyed by their prieſts and oracles; and others, becauſe they conſidered what he ſaid about his intelligence by means of a daemon as chemerical or fictitious. Their diſpleaſure was not abated, when he proceeded to declare, that he had the authority of the Oracle of Delphos for his being thus ſingularly favoured of the gods, when it pronounced him *the wiſeſt of men*. This ſtrain, which roſe ſo much to the boaſtful, and upon which he dwelt, without regard to the offence it gave, was ſuch a contraſt to what he was ever known to uſe, or to aſſume, upon any other occaſion, that it was evident to all that he ſcorned the judicial inquiſition upon his character, as what the court of the Areopagites ought not to have admitted, and what he thought they could not admit, in any caſe ſimilar to his, without prejudice or diſcouragement to every citizen, who had lived ſo long in Athens with honeſt fame. To claim, in this ſhape, not juſtice only, but approbation, and this, too, with little deference to the judgment of the court, upon his character, was what the Areopagites could

could not underſtand. If he, as a pannel, gave offence, they, with the pride of ſupreme judges, took it heinouſly. In a precipitate manner they pronounced him *guilty*, by a plurality of their ſuffrages *, which, altogether, amounted to two hundred and eighty one. Before they proceeded to this ſentence, Plato, perceiving that the judges by no means reliſhed Socrates's vindication of himſelf, had aſcended the bench for oration; but he was repelled, by an exclamation to *withdraw*.

From a peculiar form in the proceedure of the court of the Areopagites, in criminal caſes, a ſecond, and final verdict, yet remained to be pronounced by them. By that which they had paſſed, Socrates was found *guilty*, or condemned to ſuffer a legal penalty; but a repetition of the ſuffrages of the judges was neceſſary, in order to determine the amount of that penalty. This uſage, which Cicero † remarks as a ſingularity in the Athenian law, deſerves obſervation, as analogous, although not equal, to that of the verdict of the *jury*, and the ſentence of the judges, known with us. The dividing the judgment into two parts, one for aſcertaining the criminality, and another for deciding the puniſhment, was certainly an approach to what we juſtly eſteem the moſt perfect and happieſt model of the criminal, and even of the civil juriſdiction, by means of *the trial* by *the jury*. It left room for the judges to reconſider the ſentence they had given; and, as it might, on reflection, appear to be faulty, either from too much lenity, or ſeverity, to correct the error by the ſecond and laſt they had to pronounce. The proper effect of the uſage was apparent upon this occaſion. Provoked as the Areopagites were, they could not, in the judgment of Socrates's offence, hold him puniſhable by death, which was required in his impeachment as agreeable to the laws. As was uſual in caſes not capital, the queſtion was put to him, "Having offended againſt the laws, what compenſation do you offer; and for what pecuniary mulct can you hold yourſelf reſponſible ‡?" "For one mina only §," replied Socrates. Alarmed at what

* Diogenes Laert. in Socrat. † Cicer. de Orat. lib. 1. p. 132.

‡ Plato in Apolog.

§ It is to be obſerved, that Socrates's valuation of his dwelling-houſe, and all his moveables, as given by him, in Xenophon's Oeconomics, was no more than five minae.

what might be the interpretation of the judges upon this mean offer, and that they would be apt to think it a burleſque of their ſentence, his friends who ſtood by called out, "thirty," or, as ſome ſay, "fifty minae;" for which Crito, Appollodorus, and Critobulus, declared themſelves ready to become ſureties. But againſt this propoſition Socrates ſtrenuouſly remonſtrated; alledging, that it implied his having committed a public treſpaſs; which was ſo far from being the truth, that he might, for the public and private good he had done, juſtly claim that acknowledgment which Athens had appointed for the benefactors of the commonwealth, to be maintained in the Prytanaeum at the public expence. Unqueſtionable it is, that, without regard to his diſtinguiſhed merit, and character as a philoſopher, which had brought renown and benefit to Athens, and in the eſtimate only of his behaviour, and ſervices, as a man and a citizen, Socrates could not be reckoned to arrogate more honour or emolument to himſelf than he was fully entitled to; and, it may be added, that, if his claim had been allowed, his many good offices were not requited. But the judges were now in no diſpoſition to enter into ſentiments of this kind. As if they had only waited for any further inſtance of his oppoſition to their deciſion, they, upon the reiteration of their ſuffrages, condemned him to ſuffer death, by the addition of eighty more to the former majority; a number which nearly comprehended the whole votes of the court.

Upon this view of Socrates's condemnation, it may be reckoned that he diſcovered too much vehemence of temper, and an unſuitable diſdain of the judgment of a court, before which his trial was competent, and, in theſe reſpects, prompted the unjuſt ſentence paſſed upon him. To thoſe, by whom no allowance is made for the quick ſenſe of reproach and injury in an innocent mind, and for the natural recourſe of virtue, when unworthily challenged, to ſelf-eſtimation, or none for certain ideas of a conſiſtency of character, in which philoſophy places the real dignity of men; the anſwer found in Xenophon muſt be given *, that,

minae, ſcarcely above L. 16 Sterling, but equal in value, of money in the preſent times, to at leaſt twelve times that ſum. Socrates's offered fine of himſelf, being thus a fifth of all he had, was not ſo diminutive, or, on his part, ſo ludicrous, as the judges conceived it to be.

* In Socrat. Defenſ. p. 331.

that, all circumſtances being weighed, it was judged by him more eligible to die, than to prolong his life. This conſideration, ſays that author, which beſt acquits him of imputed temerity, has been generally omitted by thoſe who have taken much notice of his arrogant ſpeech before the Areopagites. To other reaſons aſſigned by him for not properly defending himſelf, this remarkable one was added: From a perſuaſion he had, that there was a peculiar benignity in the divine will extended to men, in his diſagreeable ſituation, he thought he might be called upon to make his exit from life, in a manner which would neither be tedious to himſelf, nor burthenſome to his friends, nor leave room for altercations with his enemies; and that, therefore, he concluded, upon the whole, it was beſt for him to be paſſive, and to expect, rather than to counteract, what deſtiny might have ordained for him.

That the undiſmayed countenance, which Socrates bore during the time of his trial, was only altered to a more chearful look, upon receiving his ſentence, is related by every author who makes particular mention of the ſubject. It is likewiſe generally admitted; that the concluſive part of Plato's apology, in which the judges are more emphatically addreſſed, comprehends the ſentiments expreſſed by his maſter upon that occaſion; and which Cicero, who ſays he never read it in the original without tears, has copied out, with ſome abbreviations *, to the following purpoſe. "Athenian judges: It is not without reaſon that I entertain the beſt hopes, that the doom to which you have conſigned me, may, in its reſult, prove a happy one for me: For, of two things in it, the one or the other muſt be found true. Death muſt either utterly extinguiſh all the ſenſes I have as a man, or transfer me to ſome other place where they may be exerciſed. Which ſoever of theſe conſequences be ſuppoſed, whether death ſhall involve the ſenſes in perpetual ruin, or whether they ſhall, in ſome ſhape, remain, yet death muſt be accounted a gain; ſuch a gain, indeed, it is, in the firſt caſe, as may be reckoned ſuperior to that of many waking days. A night although it be, it is like one paſſed in a profound ſleep, undiſturbed with dreams, and continued, without the meaſure of time, through all ſucceeding

* Tuſcul. Quaeſt. lib. 1. p. 131.

ages. But, if what is generally credited be true, if death be a paſſage to thoſe foreign ſhores, appointed for the reception of men after death, a felicity ariſes, far ſurpaſſing the other condition. An eſcape, it may be deemed by many, from nominal judges to real ones; to Minos and Rhadamanthus, to Œacus and Triptolemus, inveſted not with the title only, but with the character of their function. To have the proſpect of meeting, in theſe regions, with men who have acted a juſt part in life; with Orpheus, Muſaeus, Homer, and Heſiod, Who would not chearfully undertake the journey out of life, and account it no common road to happineſs? In my opinion, it would be worth dying many deaths to be aſſured of attaining what my ſoul wiſhes; and to feel the delight I would have in the company of Palamedes, and Ajax, and other innocent men, who were circumvented and injured by the judgments paſſed upon them. I would even take upon me to ſcan the prudence of Agamemnon in the exerciſe of his ſovereign command over the Greeks, and compare it with that of Ulyſſes and Siſyphus; nor yet, on account of ſuch honeſt criticiſm of their characters as I have uſed among men, would I be apprehenſive of their indignation, or of being *condemned by them*. The few who have acquitted me need not be in the leaſt diſturbed about the fate I am to undergo; but rather cheriſh the perſuaſion, that no real evil can befal a virtuous man, whether in life or in death. His concerns are not overlooked by the immortal gods; nor do I reckon the preſent event a fortuitous one to me. Under this ſentiment, I can entertain no anger either againſt my accuſers, or thoſe who have condemned me; unleſs, perhaps, I may have ſome quarrel with their preſumption, in imagining that it was in their power to do me an eſſential prejudice. But it is now time that I ſhould quit this place, and go to that of death; and that you, my judges, ſhould hold on in the beaten tract of life: But which of theſe courſes is the beſt I pretend not to determine. This knowledge, in my opinion, is competent to no human being, and is the privilege only of the immortal gods." How far more, adds the Roman academician, would it be my election, to be poſſeſſed of the ſoul of this ſage, than to be enriched with the fortunes of all his judges! Although he denies, that, beſide the gods, none knew whether it might be better to live or to die, yet enough had been previouſly intimated

timated by him, to make his real ſentiments of the matter well underſtood. But it was requiſite, in conſiſtency with what he had all along profeſſed, to ſay, in the end, *that he affirmed nothing.*

After his ſentence was pronounced, Socrates was conducted to priſon by the eleven officers of juſtice, and had the chains uſed to ſecure condemned priſoners faſtened upon him. But the commencement of the public ſolemnity of the *Theoris*, inſtituted in memory of Theſeus's eſcape, with his companions *, from the *Minotaur* and Labarinth of Crete, admitted not of any one being legally put to death, until the religious proceſſion made to the temple of Apollo, in the iſle of Delos, was completed. The accidental detention of the famous ſhip, which was, notwithſtanding the change † of every plank and pin, ſtill held to be the veſſel uſed by Theſeus, ſometimes prolonged the finiſhing the ceremonies, by its returning to Athens, for a conſiderable time; and it was extended upon this occaſion to thirty days. Socrates's friends had, by this means, an opportunity of frequently viſiting him when in cuſtody; acceſs to which, at ſtated hours, was permitted them, under little other reſtraint. Their firſt interview with him, as deſcribed by Plato, was attended, on their part, with thoſe confuſed ſenſations of grief and perplexity which the mind feels when firſt ſtruck with deep concern, and reſiles from them, as if unwilling, or incapable, to receive at once all the heavy impreſſion. Socrates's compoſure, and his converſation, which altered not from the ordinary ſtrain ‡, proved their beſt relief; and ſome of them ſoon began to think of another kind of remedy; which was that of his eſcaping from priſon. In the judgment of all, it might have been effectuated with little difficulty, or hazard of miſgiving; but the propoſal was entirely rejected by him, as carrying along with it a departure from character, a treſpaſs upon the laws, and which, were it not attended with theſe objections, would take from him all the reliſh of life.

* Plato in Phaedone, Xenoph. ibid. lib. 4. p. 325. † The caſe of the ſhip, in a long courſe of time, altered in every part by gradual repairs, gave occaſion in the Schools, to treat the queſtion of identity and diverſity of phyſical bodies. ‡ Plato in Critone, vel de eo quod agendum eſt.

To enter into the detail of the arguments uſed by Socrates in proof of the immortality of the human ſoul, as we find them ſtated in Plato's Phaedo, would be an anticipation of the copious dialectic reaſoning of the latter upon this ſubject; the account of which belongs to that of his philoſophy, to be given in its place. We ſhall therefore confine our recital to thoſe paſſages in the Phaedo, which, from the circumſtances marked in the narrative, are, in a manner, authenticated as genuine and real copies of the converſations he held, when in priſon, with his philoſophical friends. They include thoſe of the laſt day of his life.

Upon the morning after the arrival of the ſhip from Delos, and when it was known to his aſſociates that he muſt die before the ſun-ſet of that day, by a draught of poiſon, they met together, and repaired to the jail. Upon entering it, they beheld Socrates reſting upon his couch, with his chains taken off, and Xantippe holding by the hand her ſon, not yet in puberty, placed beſide him. At their appearance ſhe broke forth into a doleful vociferation; and was, by her huſband's deſire, conducted home. He then drew up his leg, and began to rub it with his hand. "What a ſurpriſing thing," ſaid he, "is this ſenſation which men call pleaſure, and how nearly connected with its contrary, pain? Both, indeed, cannot, in the ſame inſtant, be felt by the ſame perſon; yet it appears, that wherever there is a participation of the one, the other is, in a manner, neceſſarily induced. I imagine that Æſop, if he had made the obſervation, would have deviſed a fable about it, upon ſome ſuch idea as this, That the divinity, willing to reconcile theſe two oppoſites to each other, found it could not be done in nature, and, therefore, ſolved the difficulty, by binding their ends together in a cloſs knot; ſo that whoſoever was overtaken with the one, ſhould be ſure to find the other a conſequent to it. The painful compreſſure of my leg by the chain is now ſucceeded by a ſenſible pleaſure." From this parody, it may be underſtood what eſtimate Socrates made of the providential diſpenſation of bodily pain, and pleaſure, in the human and animal ſyſtem of beings; and, conſidering how they appeared to be reciprocated, and to depend upon each other mutually for their production, that the former could not be accounted an abſolute evil, when it tended to quicken the ſenſe, and heighten the perception, of the latter.

It

It having been ſaid, occaſionally, by Socrates, that he believed Euanus ſo true a philoſopher, that he might moſt probably follow him, ſome time or other, in the choice he now made of death; Cebes deſired an explication of this ſentiment; eſpecially as Socrates had always declared it to be a rational and juſt opinion, that men, in general, while in life, were under the cuſtody and ſafe keeping of the gods. "How then," ſaid Cebes, "can Euanus, or any philoſopher, unleſs laid under the neceſſity the Athenians have impoſed upon you to meet death, and to cauſe you to deſire, rather than to avoid it, be ſuppoſed to have the liberty to chooſe between living and dying, and to diſpoſe of themſelves as they pleaſe. In conſiſtency of reaſon, it ought rather to be concluded, that, being, as we are, under the kind tuition of the gods, we cannot betake ourſelves to a better. Irrational ſouls may deſire a change, without underſtanding why they ſhould be ſo inclined; but the reflecting, and conſiderate, will not embrace this courſe, but upon ſome well grounded perſuaſion of improving their condition." Pleaſed with the propriety of the remark, Socrates ſaid to thoſe neareſt him, "Cebes never fails to diſcover his accurate inveſtigation of any unperſpicuous point, and will admit upon no one's authority a controvertible topic to paſs undiſcuſſed. But I will grant him," continued he, "that I ſhould be erroneous not to be concerned about death, if I did not think, that, in the migration from hence, I ſhall go to other intelligent beings, and good gods, and to the company of men who have quitted this life, with a luſtre of virtue not now to be found amongſt us. This hope I entertain, yet deliver it not as an aſſertion to be proved. But there is an argument upon the queſtion by which a philoſopher may be reaſonably determined." Here he was interrupted by Crito looking ſteadfaſtly towards him, as if he had ſomething to communicate. Being aſked what it was? "I am admoniſhed," ſaid he, "that Socrates would do well not to ſpeak too much, leſt, being overheated, as the adminiſtrator of the poiſon ſays, he ſhould be obliged to repeat the draught ſeveral times." "That," anſwered Socrates, "calls not for much attention. It is his office to prepare ſuch a quantity as may ſerve for the repetition of the draught, or for a third, if it be found neceſſary." Reſuming his diſcourſe, he obſerved, "that all true diſciples of philoſophy would be, more than others,

others, liable to a juſt reproach, and expoſe the inutility of their ſtudy, if, accuſtomed as they were to ſpeculate upon death, and conſider themſelves under the natural law of corporeal diſſolution, they ſhould, notwithſtanding, appear ſtartled or diſcompoſed at the approach of an event, which, being inevitable, ought to be rendered familiar to all human minds." Simmias could not help ſmiling at this ſentence; which, as turned in his imagination, implied, that to reſign life upon any occaſion, or demand, was an office to be expected of a philoſopher. "Pleaſantry," ſaid he, "is now unſeaſonable; but it occurs to me, that ſome of our deriding wits would ſay, upon the facility of philoſophers about dying,—That we heartily agree that they ſhould indulge their perſuaſion, and act upon it; and not only yield themſelves to death, but allow us to think that they deſerved it.—I could," ſaid Socrates, "excuſe them for this raillery, were it not flattering their ſhallow conceptions too much, to admit their judgment either about a rule of life, or a ſentiment of death, becoming rational men, and found in the breaſts of true philoſophers."

He was now aſked by Crito, whether he had not ſome particular injunction to give his friends, reſpecting the charge of his children and family? "I have no other," replied he, "but to repeat what you have already heard from me: Study to be yourſelves poſſeſſed of the good of virtue; and then, although you promiſe it not, I may be well aſſured, that any help which you can afford, or I deſire, for thoſe which are mine, will be extended to them; but that, otherwiſe, it will be in vain to expect it." "In what manner," added Crito, "do you wiſh that your funeral ſhould be conducted?" "Bury me," replied Socrates, "in the way you think the moſt convenient; if, indeed, you can ſeize upon *me*, and *I* not eſcape from your hands." Then, with a ſmile, turning to the reſt, "I cannot, it ſeems," ſaid he, "perſuade Crito, that I am that *being* called Socrates, capable of the rational diſcourſe I now hold with you; but he thinks me to be nothing more than the carcaſs which he will preſently behold; and, therefore, he aſks how *I* am to be buried. Be you, my friends, ſureties to him, but in a contrary way from what he would have been for me before the Athenian judges; not that *I* ſhall be ſiſted here, but that *I* ſhall certainly be gone from you.

you. He may then more eaſily endure my death; and, whether my body be burned, or be interred, reſt ſatisfied, that *I* myſelf ſhall ſuffer no diſtreſs. He may, therefore, at the funeral, forbear to cry, in the common language of the deplorers, Socrates is laid upon the pile, or that he is buried in the earth. The expreſſion, believe me, Crito, as in itſelf an impropriety, and derogatory to human ſouls, ought to be corrected. Take courage, then, and ſay, that you lay not *me*, but my body, in the duſt; and let it be done as you think decency, and regard to the laws, require." Upon his coming from the bathing room, his wives, Xantippe and Myrto, followed by two young boys, and another ſcarcely grown up to a youth, were introduced to him. He had juſt ſaid what was neceſſary about his domeſtic affairs, when the keeper of the jail made his appearance. "You know," ſaid he to Socrates, "what is my commiſſion; and your behaviour convinces me, that you will receive it, not as moſt others have done, with wrathful looks, and execrations againſt me. Sure I am not to have your anger or ill will." He retired, ſcarcely reſtraining his tears. "This man," ſaid Socrates, "I have found humane and obliging. Let another be called to bring in the poiſon, ſince he ſeems to be affected, and let us not cauſe him to wait longer for what is to be done." "As yet," ſaid Crito, "the ſun's rays are ſeen upon the mountains: Until they become inviſible, we may continue our diſcourſe." "It is folly," ſaid Socrates, "to pretend to turn to any purpoſe the laſt wing of time, which is no longer ours." Seeing that he was no more to be diverted, Crito made a ſign to a boy that ſtood by him to go out. Preſently came forward *one* with a cup in his hand, and reached it to Socrates. He received it pleaſantly, and held it a while in his hand, without change of colour or countenance. Then, with the eager look uſual to him, when he put a queſtion, he ſaid to the officer, "Tell me now, whether the potion may admit of a ſmall libation from it?" He was anſwered, that the infuſion was not larger that what was judged neceſſary. "I underſtand you," ſaid he; "yet it is allowable, and becoming us, to pray to the gods, that our migration hence may be a happy one. I offer this prayer; and may it be ſo." He then inſtantly drank off the poiſon; manifeſtly compoſed in mind and geſture.

His

His friends were by this time in apparent agitations of grief. Upon obſerving it, he ſaid, "We ought to remember why the women were diſmiſſed, and that it was chiefly to avoid any appearances of diſquiet. I have always heard, that agreeable and gratulatory accents, and not lamentable tones, were appropriated to the hour of our exit from life." They became ſilent. He walked, as he was deſired, until his limbs failed him, holding now and then ſome ſhort converſation. He turned to his couch, and lay in an extended poſture. As the poiſonous juice wrought, his extremities became cold and inſenſible. Retaining ſtill ſome power of ſpeech, he ſaid to Crito, "I owe a cock to Æſculapius, let it be paid him, and not forgotten." He replied not to the anſwer. His body, having only the tremulous remains of motion, was uncovered by the officers, while his eyes expanded in death, were cloſed by Crito.

Every particular circumſtance in the manners, converſation, and deportment of this philoſopher, has been made the object of attention; and, where the ſlighteſt ground for it appeared, of the ſtricteſt criticiſm. In this, the moderns have not only vied with the ancients, but ſurpaſſed them; as if either his defects, or his virtues, deſerved more animadverſion, or more applauſe, than thoſe of all the other philoſophers. Hence his common oaths, by the *dog*, by the *goat*, by the *plain-tree*, under which he and his companions often ſat, have been thought exceptionable, and to require explication. Plato aſcribes the uſe of theſe interjections in his diſcourſe, to the reverence * he had for the names of the gods; which, in him, ſays he, was not a human fear, but a perception tranſcending its greateſt impreſſion; and yet his accuſers conſtructed it a mark of his impiety, and gave it a place in his indictment. It is leſs ſurpriſing, therefore, that his laſt words, in which he deſired a cock to be paid to Æſculapius, ſhould have furniſhed occaſion to various gloſſes, and unfavourable comments. Notwithſtanding he is acknowledged to have always obſerved a decorum with reſpect to the public religion, and although the particular ceremony recommended by him is explained by ſeveral ancient authors in a ſenſe highly moral, he has not been acquitted, but arraigned of giving, with his dying breath, a ſanction to that falſe

* In Philaebo, vel de ſummo bono, ad initium.

falſe and idolatrous theology, which, to his greateſt honour, he is underſtood to have reprobated in his mind. To many, the poiſon inducing a delirium, has been his apology; and yet it is not generally accounted a ſatisfactory one, as it goes upon a ſuppoſition. Supported, however, upon the greateſt probability, a charitable judgment ſhould diſpoſe us to prefer it to an interpretation which conſtitutes a charge or an invective againſt him. But, if it ſhould be contended that there was no delirium, and that this conceſſion ought not to be made, the concluſion muſt be; that, as he did not owe his impeachment or his death to his maintaining, publickly, the belief of one ſupreme being, but taught it in the way other philoſophers did their ſingular doctrines, with reſerve, and under an improper conſtraint, ſo it was not, in providence, permitted to him to give, at his death, any more diſtinct teſtimony to this truth, or to purer principles of religion, than what, during his life, he had exhibited.

The judgment to be formed about his familiar *daemon*, or *genius*, is, in every view of the queſtion, ſtill more intricate and controvertible. After peruſing the various diſſertations of Plutarch, Athenaeus, Maximus Tyrius, Apuleius, and others who have touched the ſubject, we find its obſcurity undiminiſhed, and receive no more ſatisfaction than Timarchus of Cheronea could boaſt of, after deſcending into the dark cave of Trephonius's oracle, in order to procure a ſolution of the myſtery of Socrates's daemon. If, with Athenaeus, we * ſhould be inclined to pronounce the whole ſtory of the daemon, and its preſages, a fiction, to be placed to the account, not of Socrates himſelf, but of his diſciples, who might be induced to invent, and inſiſt upon it, as the moſt popular defence they could make againſt Anytus's accuſation of him for impiety, and that they might more readily fix upon this deception, and excuſe it to themſelves, when, in the language of philoſophy, that intelligent faculty of the ſoul †, which, by its penetration, diſcerns the conſequences of certain actions, and has, as it were, a preſcience of them, was often

 diſtinguiſhed

* Deipnoſophiſt. lib. 11. † Nam in quodam ſignificatu, animus humanus in corpore ſitus, Deus nuncupatur. Apuleius de Deo Socratis, duod. edit. tom. 2. p. 73.

diſtinguiſhed by the name of the *god, or daemon within the mind;* if theſe bold aſſeverations and conſtructions ſhould be admitted, we muſt not only renounce, upon this particular point, the authorities of Plato, Xenophon, and what we find reported to the ſame purpoſe, upon the faith of other diſciples and contemporaries, but go near to ſubvert all the credit of theſe authors, in almoſt every thing they advanced about Socrates's character as a man and philoſopher. We might, indeed, on account of ſuch a treſpaſs upon veracity, in a point of fact, throw aſide their books, as unworthy to be truſted, even where nothing extraordinary is related of him. At the ſame time, we muſt, along with them, condemn the judgments of the moſt intelligent authors, in ſubſequent times, and ſome of theſe too diſpoſed to diſpute a fact, declarative of a phenomenon which they in vain laboured to account for. But Athenaeus's detractive vein, apparent in many of his diſſertations, had a particular impulſe upon this ſubject, from his undiſguiſed malevolence to Plato. Finding, as is * obſerved in Cicero, that ſuch an addition was made to the preſages of Socrates's daemon, by the Pythagoreans and Platoniſts, who eſpouſed the doctrine of guardian gods, or genii, attendant upon men, that Antipater had collected them into a full volume, he takes occaſion to make the unqueſtionable fabrication of the bulk of them rebound upon Plato, and Xenophon, the original narrators of ſome of them, and equally diſcredit their teſtimony, and aſſertions, as to Socrates having any *admoniſhing* daemon.

To reconcile to the character of the Athenian ſage, or at leaſt to our idea of it, his acknowledgement of having frequent admonitions, prohibitory, indeed, and not impulſive, as Plato † and Xenophon report them, from an intelligent *genius* of a ſupernatural kind, is the next, and greateſt, difficulty to be conſidered, if not reſolved. Of all the ancient authors who have treated the queſtion, Plutarch appears to have made the greateſt effort ‡, and, without pretending to be deciſive, to have launched beyond the common bounds of his imagination, in order to reach ſome

* De Divinatione, lib. 1. p. 273. † Plato in Theage, vel de Sapientia. ‡ Plutarch. de deo Socratis. Oper. omn. fol. edit. tom. 2. p. 588. et ſequent.

ſome ſolution of it. But his heſitation leſs reſpects the credit of the fact itſelf, or its compatibility with Socrates's character, than how it might be explained upon ſome principles of philoſophy; and, in the end, he delivers a phyſiological tale, not worth the ſtretch of his fancy, or of our rehearſal. Others think it enough to ſay, that Socrates might as well be permitted, as philoſophers and reformers of ſtates before him had done, to feign occaſional inſpirations from ſome divinity; and not only ſo, but they add, that the purity of his mind, the morality of his life, and his laudable intentions, rendered it highly probable that he might really be the object of ſuch extraordinary favour; and, unleſs all divine communications to men were denied, his participation in them could not be rejected. It is well known, that this laſt ſentiment, which is that of Maximus Tyrius *, has been ſo far recogniſed in the Chriſtian world, that Juſtin Martyr †, Clemens Alexandrinus, Lactantius, and others of the primitive defenders of Chriſtianity, conſidering Socrates as one of the firſt lights of the heathen nations, do not ſcruple to affirm, that his rational, and purer conceptions of the deity, extended among the intelligent, might be rendered, providentially, conducive to the introduction of the Evangelical truths. But it conſiſts not well with this eſtimate of his virtues, or even with that of the probity of his character as a man, and his wiſdom as a philoſopher, to ſuppoſe him either a pretender to ſupernatural admonitions, which were not given him, or under the deluſions of a fantaſtic imagination. Between theſe two extremes, alike repugnant to his character, it muſt be difficult to chooſe; but, if we form an hypotheſis about the intervention of his daemon, as a reality declared by him, there appears to be a neceſſity of aſſuming one of them as a foundation of conjecture; and that we offer is to the following purpoſe.

In ſeveral embarraſſing ſituations, both of a public and private concern, Socrates would often find himſelf called upon in duty to act his part. His delicacy of ſentiment about the morality or propriety of what was to be done, would be apt to throw him into heſitation, and induce

* Differt. 26. oct. edit. p. 264. † In Apolog. prim. ſect. 5. Lactant. de Origine Error. Clemens Alexandrin. in Stromatis, paſſim.

him to decline all action or procedure; from which, however, it would be moſt difficult to excuſe himſelf to others. In this dilemma, a ſtrict moraliſt as he was, he might think it allowable to uſe a pretext, and ſuch a one as would beſt defend him againſt importunity, by calling the reſtraint he laid upon himſelf the *impoſed prohibition* of ſome divinity, which, being announced to him, he could not diſobey. If this deviſe, to which a ſenſe of virtue prompted him, was but once tried, it is evident how he would be involved by the declaration neceſſarily annexed to it, and from which he could not afterwards recede. His daemon, once acknowledged to have given him warning, would be fixed upon him as a cloſe prophetical attendant; and no wiſh he might have would avail to throw its intercourſe with him aſide. His friends, conceiving it to exalt his character, would be the firſt to ſupport the veracity of it, and ſhow an officious zeal in proving, by inſtances, its unqueſtionable truth. But it appears, from what we are told, that Socrates did not encourage them in this atteſtation. On the contrary *, when Simmias deſired particular information about the daemon's ſignals, he declined anſwering his queſtions in ſuch a manner, that his other friends ceaſed altogether from their inquiries. Yet, after his death, many of them took the liberty to comment upon the motions and preſages of the daemon as they pleaſed; until, with other adventitious help, they were ſwelled into a multiplicity of abſurd and ridiculous predictions.

One immediate effect of Socrates's condemnation and death was, to create terror to his philoſophic companions, and to make them fly from Athens, now beheld as hoſtile to genius and ſcience, and inſtead of protection and favour, puniſhing their moſt ſignal appearances with impriſonment, and the hemlock. Elis, of which Phaedo was a native, Megara, where Euclid reſided, Eretria, the chief town in the iſland of Eubaea, and that of Ægina, whither Ariſtippus had retired, were the chief places of their retreat; and in ſeveral of which ſchools of philoſophy were opened, and the ſmall, and ſhort lived, ſects, called the *Eliac*, the *Eretriac*, and the moſt conſiderable of them the *Megaric*, took their riſe. But of theſe, with exception of the laſt, it will not be requiſite to make particular mention.

In

* Plutarch, ibid. et Apul.

In the mean time, the people of Athens, who had ſuffered the proceedings againſt their eminent philoſopher to paſs with little apparent concern, began to reflect upon his death, by a public ſentence, as a matter in which their reputation was concerned. Often more ſenſible to fame than to virtue, and exemplifying, by quick and contrary paſſions, the vivacity, more than the rectitude or propriety, of their ſentiments, Socrates's name and memory ſeemed to recur upon their minds, with apprehenſion of merited reproach for their unworthy treatment of him. Some circumſtances concurred to ſharpen the ſting. Several ſtrangers who came to Athens, from curioſity to viſit him, or to be under his inſtructions, were ſtruck, and much affected, with the account of his being judicially condemned; and, among them, a Spartan youth, having learned, at the city gate, that he *was no more*, would advance no further: But, being informed where his tomb was, he went and laid himſelf down upon it, as in a tranſport of grief, and paſſed the night. In the morning, he affectionately kiſſed the duſt; and, without entering Athens, returned on his way to the Peloponneſus *. Antiſthenes, afterwards the founder of the Cynic ſect, being aſked what was to be done with ſome young men of Pontus, who inquired for Socrates; "Why not," ſaid he, "carry them to Anytus, who, doubtleſs, is wiſer than ever *your Socrates* was." Rouſed by theſe challenges of their inſenſibility to the merit, and ſhameful doom, of their philoſopher †, the citizens broke forth into rage; and Anytus, to eſcape their fury, fled to Heraclea, and there found no protection. Melitus was put to death; and his other adverſaries, or thoſe who bore witneſs againſt him, univerſally abhorred, ended their lives in exile, and in a miſerable manner. The judgment againſt Socrates was eraſed from the public records; and his ſtatue, moulded in braſs by Lyſippus, was erected in the place called *Pompeium*. His friends were entreated to return to the city, that the Athenians, if poſſible, might forget the unhappy cauſe of their retreat; and which they, more than all others, had reaſon to deplore. He was born in the fourth year of the 77th Olympiad, and was ſeventy years old

* Diogen. Laert. in Vita Antiſthen. Themiſtitii Orat. 2.

† Plutarch. de Invidia et Odio

old at his death, which enſued upon the firſt of the 95th of that epoch *.

From the ſignal ardour for excellence in philoſophic ſtudy which appeared to be diffuſed throughout Greece about the time of Socrates's exit, it ſeemed as if the Grecian genius had collected freſh vigour from his dialectic manner of reaſoning. In imitation of it, almoſt every literary work was compoſed in the diſquiſitive ſtile of the dialogue; and, unleſs in phyſical or mathematical ſubjects, the formal diſſertation, or cloſe connected treatiſe, was generally rejected. The natural taſte of the Greeks prompted the uſage, and diſplayed all the luſtre of that compoſition; while only ſome rhetorical performances were deemed to compete with it in fame. The dialectic freedom which Socrates had uſed, and allowed to his diſciples, being alledged to authoriſe the philoſophic doubt in every queſtion, was ſoon extended to a latitude of ſcepticiſm which that philoſopher never approved, but endeavoured to expoſe in the ridiculous characters and fooliſh diſputations of the Sophiſts. In a a ſhort time, no fewer than eight or nine ſeparate ſects aroſe, diſtinguiſhed from one another by particular tenets, and almoſt all of them pretending to be *Socratics*, or at leaſt to correſpond either in their modes of philoſophiſing, or in ſome points of doctrine, with the Athenian ſage. Not that we are to underſtand what Cicero ſays upon this head in the extenſive ſenſe in which it may be taken †, as if Socrates's dialect had introduced controverſial arguments upon the general principles of ſcience, or moral truth and falſehood, unattempted before, or unmaintained in the Grecian ſchools. It would be a groſs contradiction to the account given of the Acataleptics, and of the riſe of the *Eriſtic* ſect, to form this imagination. All that is intelligible from the paſſage in Cicero, can amount to no more than this; that, from a miſapprehenſion, or wilful miſtake of Socrates's diſquiſitive ratiocination upon every queſtion,

* Plato in Apolog. † Nam cum eſſent plures orti fere a Socrate, (quod ex illius variis, et diverſis, et in omnem partem diffuſis diſputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat) proſeminatae ſunt quaſi familiae, diſſentientes inter ſe, et multum disjunctae, et diſpares. cum tamen omnes ſe philoſophos Socraticos et dici vellent, et eſſe arbitrarentur. De Oratore, lib. 3 fol. edit. pag. 186.

queſtion, an unbounded licenſe of diſputation was taken by the ſtudents of philoſophy, who ſoon were ſeen divided into a variety of ſects, holding different, or oppoſite opinions to one another; and yet all of them claimed to be of the Socratic ſchool. But this extravagance of the Grecian genius was not a new phenomenon. It had been already exhibited in moſt ſtriking inſtances. So inſeparable from it was the love of novelty, the paſſion to excel in diſpute, and to broach ſome ſingular doctrine in philoſophy, that it is hardly to be doubted but that theſe, its concomitants, would have been diſplayed in any tract of ſcience that chanced to be opened. Whether Socrates had proved ſuch an inſtructor in the dialect or not, evident it is, that ſeveral of the founders of the new ſects only borrowed ſome of his topics, as a colour to the tenets moſt favoured by them, and which they meant to make the diſtinguiſhing principles of their philoſophy *. Thus, to Antiſthenes, it was enough that Socrates held forth reſtraint of the appetites, patience, a meaſure of hard diſcipline, and a degree of independence on external things, as requiſites of virtue, to derive from this doctrine the indecent, harſh, rugged, and diſdainful, maxims of the Cynic tribe; while Ariſtippus laid hold of a different topic. The ſentiments delivered by Socrates on the pleaſures of friendſhip, and love of the moral beauties of the ſoul and mind, ſerved the Cyrenaic philoſopher as a ground upon which he reared up his ſyſtem of virtue founded on voluptuous ſenſations. But as, in Socrates's perſonal fate, it was teſtified, that no man's wiſdom or virtue is ſufficient to overcome the prejudices, or correct the depravities, generally found in human minds; ſo, in the wilful miſapplication of his doctrines by the more rational and intelligent, it appeared, that it was not enough to have a faculty, as Plato ſays †, divinely given him, ſimilar to the *obſtetrician* art of his mother, to awake and bring forth truths dormant in ſouls lodged in corporeal obſcurity, unleſs he had joined with it a preſervative againſt the corruption and abuſe of theſe truths when ſet in the faireſt light, and acknowledged by thoſe he inſtructed. But they, under no perſuaſion, and laid under no obligation to the contrary, ſoon reputed themſelves amongſt the enlightened as

* Ibid. † In Theaeteto, ad finem.

as well as he; and who might take ſuch liberty as they choſe in the annunciation of theſe diſcoveries, which were not ſaid to be extrinſically communicated, but only recalled to the view of their minds: And hence the diſciple we have mentioned concludes, that the rational faculty, although an inſtrument of knowledge, is not wiſdom itſelf, or ſcience properly ſo called, and which is placed, not in recollection only, that is ſtill changeable, but in intuitive and invariable impreſſions of truth, the privilege of intellect, ever conjoined with what is ſupernatural, and the divine, and therefore the only true and perfect, illumination of the human mind.

SECT.

SECTION III.

Of the Megaric School.—Of Sophiſms.—Of the Philoſophy of Ariſtippus, and the Cyrenaic School.—Of the Cynic Sect.

IN what credit the art of diſputation was held in the ſchools of Greece, appeared by the celebrity of one founded by Euclid of Megara, a town near the Iſthmus of Corinth, which he called by the ſimple name of the *Megaric School*, but to which that of the *Eriſtic*, or *litigious*, was ſoon alledged to be more applicable. There were, however, original authors *, of greater name than himſelf, whoſe books initiated him in the dialectic ſubtleties; and he owed to the gleanings of them from the writings of Parmenides, and Zeno Eleates, the cultivation of his genius, for the diſplay he made of it in all logical controverſy. With this preparation, he became a hearer of Socrates; and the condition into which he was thrown, during the courſe of his attendance upon him, has been remarked, to the equal praiſe of the maſter and diſciple †, by various authors. The Athenians, having a quarrel with the citizens of Megara, carried their reſentment to ſuch a height, as to pronounce it, by a public decree, a capital offence in any of that community to enter their city or territory. Euclid forbore, for a while, his viſits to Athens; but, weighing the danger againſt the loſs he thought he ſuſtained, he reſolved, rather than be excluded from the pleaſure and benefit he received from

* Diog. Laert. lib. 2. quart. edit. p. 141. cap. 18. Thucidides, lib. 1. parag. 9.

† Aulus Gellius, lib. 6.

converſation with Socrates, to run the worſt chance that might happen to him. He walked the diſtance of twenty miles, entered Athens at evening, diſguiſed in a female habit, converſed with Socrates, who deferred his hours of repoſe, and, at day break, returned back on his way to Megara. This hazardous reſort was continued by Euclid for a conſiderable time; ſo much did his deſire of improvement ſurmount apprehenſions about his perſonal ſafety. But, whatever entertainment or advantage he derived from theſe interviews, it appears that Socrates ſoon diſcovered the bent of his genius, and that it was chiefly turned to the ſuperficial and illuſive parts of ſcience. "You underſtand," ſaid he to him, "how to hold an argument with Sophiſts, but not with men." Even his moral theſes were of the enigmatic ſtamp, and required explication before they could be underſtood in any proper ſenſe. He affirmed, that there was but one good *, celebrated under ſeveral names, and called *prudence*, *god*, and *mind*, and by other like epithets; and that to it there were no oppoſites; and that ſuch things had no being. He made it a rule to admit arguments, not by aſſumption, but by inference, and diſcarded altogether the diſpute by ſimilitude. "Every ſuch diſputation," ſaid he, "inſiſts upon things as either being like to others, or unlike: If the former be the ſubject, why not rather conſider the things themſelves to which they are like? if the latter, any compariſon of them is inſignificant." Yet, with all his improvements in the forms of the dialect, it required the ſucceſſion of ſeveral of his eleves to complete the ſpurious and motley breed of them. He lived, however, in much eſteem, and in a condition of wealth that enabled him to entertain a number of the refugees from Athens upon Socrates's condemnation. From him the diſtreſſed friends met not only with that hoſpitality which the ancients regarded as a ſacred duty, but with that affection inſpired by cordial participation in the ſame afflicting ſentiment; and where the entertainer and the gueſts were alike diſpoſed to make the reflections of philoſophy the ſeaſoning of their repaſts.

Eubulides, Alexinus, and Stilpo, the diſciples of the Megaric ſchool, had each his ſhare of reputation; but the firſt of them was reckoned moſt

* Diogenes Laert. ibid.

moſt to excel in what was deemed the ſhining part of their ſkill in diſputation, and to entitle it to the name of ſcience. He collected, under certain heads, and reduced into form *, the yet promiſcuous, and undiſtinguiſhed, ſwarm of the ſophiſms, and added to them by inventions of his own. He not only ſhowed his art in turning ſentences, conſiſting of proper and definite words, into fallacies that did not obſcure their meaning, but tended to perplex the common judgments and concluſions of reaſon with reſpect to intelligible propoſitions themſelves, but he alſo brought them forth † under the diſtinct appellations of the occult and the falſifying argument, and of the electra, the veiled, the horned, and the bald, and the unmeaſurable heap of the Sorites. In this fabrication the ſophiſms became poliſhed weapons, and armour both for attack and defence, not only in the dialect of the ſchools, but in the *forenſic* pleadings and diſputes ‡. For how, ſaid they, could the ψευδόμενον, or falſifying argument be diſcuſſed or reconciled to the axiom of the dialect reaſoning itſelf, that every anounced propoſition is either true or falſe. But, if you ſay "you lie, when you ſpeak truth, you lie; but you ſay you lie, and ſay what is true, therefore you lie" §. Take an example from a queſtion in the civil law. You engage to inſtruct one in rhetoric, as Protagoras did Evalthus, and you receive in hand half the ſum of money agreed upon for payment, but the other he retains until he comes to plead at the bar, and firſt carries a cauſe. He defers the eſſay of his abilities, and no requeſt or ſolicitation uſed by you can bring him to an exhibition of them. You threaten him with a judicial proſecution, and announce to him what, inconteſtibly, muſt be the iſſue of the queſtion: For, ſay you, prevail in it I muſt, whether a ſentence paſs in my favour or againſt me; if the firſt be obtained, your obligation to pay is manifeſt; and, if the other, the conditional agreement is fulfilled; you have pleaded and gained your cauſe; and, therefore, you are no leſs clearly ſubjected to the debt, and the required payment."

* Diogen Laert. ibid. † Atque habebam moleſtos vobis, ſed minutos, Stilponem, Diodorum, Alexinum, quorum ſunt contorta et aculeata quaedam ſophiſmata, ſic enim appellantur fallaces concluſiunculae. Cicero Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 4. p. 25. ‡ Cicer. ibid. pag. 29. § Aulus Gell. lib. 4. cap. 10.

"It is well," replies he, "but, notwithſtanding your irrefragable argument, I accept its alternative. For, if judgment be given for me, I am acquitted, if againſt me, I have loſt my firſt cauſe, and, conſequently, can owe you nothing." The dilemma, it is ſaid, could not be ſolved by the judges, and the cauſe remained in ſuſpenſe, without meeting a deciſion.

It is apparent how much the progreſs of real ſcience muſt have been retarded, when ſuch ſhreds of ratiocination and ſophiſtical ambiguities, inſtead of being only ſported with by the *Tyros* in the dialectic, actually engroſſed the chief attention and ſtudy of the philoſophers themſelves. Zeno's *Eriſtics* appeared to be adopted by them as the quinteſcence of human wit, and his arguments againſt motion to have invincible force, and merit the higheſt admiration. "It cannot be," ſaid Diodorus Cronos, "that any thing is moved *. For either it moves in the place where it is, or in that where it is not; but it cannot be conceived to move, but to reſt in the place where *it is*; nor is it moved where *it is not;* as nothing can act or ſuffer but where it is found." It is added, that the philoſopher having diſlocated his ſhoulder bone, applied to Erophilus, an anatomiſt, to have it reduced, "Hold by your argument," replied Erophilus, "and there cannot poſſibly be a diſlocation." He was entreated to defer the diſpute to another time. The taſte for captious argument, and illuſive diſputation, is ſaid to have ſpread from the deſks of the philoſophers to the public halls of Megara, and infected the citizens amidſt their commerce in the forum, and their diſcourſes in their houſes. Every place reſounded with a jargon that imitated the dialectic controverſies; ſo that the people accoſted one another, on every occaſion, with the air and language of diſputants ready to engage in any argument. This phrenſy, which expoſed the profeſſion of philoſophy, made Stilpo conſider how the ſource of it might be abated, if not reſtrained, in the ſchools. The experiment, however, was of

* Sextus Empiricus. Hypotypos, lib. 2. cap. 22; et adverſ mathemat. lib. 9. pag. 396. His inference from this argument was, that, nothing being moved, nothing could periſh: And ſo ſaid the wits, we may reaſon thus: Since no animal dies in the time when it lives, nor in that when it lives not, it never dies; and, therefore, we are all immortal.

of a dangerous kind; and, like the pruning of a tree, it might cauſe new ſhoots to ſpring forth in greater number than the luxuriant branches. He pretended to hold the aſſertion, that nothing was to be predicated of, or to be in a ſubject, even as an accident to it, but what was the ſame, or of a like nature, with the ſubject itſelf *. Thus, it was incompetent to be predicated of man, that he was good or bad, or of a middle ſtate that he was a runner; for theſe predicates were quite detached from the definition of the creature man, or horſe, and no more particularly connected with it than with many other different things. He endeavoured alſo to remove from the field of logical controverſy the enunciation of terms, denoting ſpecies of beings †, by affirming them to be vague, and undeſcriptive of any thing; for to ſpeak of man, or tree, without meaning this man or that tree, was equivalent to ſaying, that it was a ſomething, not here, or there, but any where to be found." If his intention was, as is alledged, to cut off many ſophiſtical and frivolous arguments, it is plain that he adminiſtered, at the ſame time, ſome freſh fewel for contention; ſo that the remedy might prove, in the iſſue, no better than the diſeaſe.

But if Stilpo, from deſire of fame, did not deſpiſe the laurels to be acquired from eminence in ſubtile controverſy, he appears, in other reſpects, to have bore a character worthy of a true philoſopher. He placed the felicity of life in a mind not ſubject to paſſion. He had given way, for a time ‡, to ſome habits of intemperance; but his renunciation of them, and the virtuous change of his manners, was ſo complete, that none could recollect his former depravities, without obſerving how remarkably he had demonſtrated his victory over them. He owned, that the love of fame was that paſſion which ſtuck cloſeſt to him, and would be the laſt he could lay aſide. In his profeſſional line, he experienced an ample gratification of this paſſion, and in an extent beyond what any

of

* Plutarch. adverſus Coloten. † Diogen. Laert. ibid.

‡ Stilponem, Megaricum philoſophum, acutum ſane hominem, et perbutum illis temporibus accepimus.—Vitiorum etiam naturam, ab eo ſic edoctam, et comperſam eſſe *doctrina*, ut nemo unquam violentum illum, nemo in eo libidinis veſtigium viderit. Cicero, de Fato.

of the Megaric ſchool could boaſt. He drew around him diſciples *, and hearers, from almoſt every ſect and ſchool; and ſeveral men of eminent rank, as well as ſtudents of philoſophy, afterwards famous, might be numbered among them. It was ſaid that all Greece had an attraction to Megara. When he came to Athens, the citizens quitted their ſhops and employments to be entertained with the ſpecimens of his elocution. It was much to the honour of his eloquence, that Demetrius, the ſon of Antigonus, to whom he addreſſed an oration on the ſubject of humanity and benevolence, was ſo captivated with it as to become his conſtant hearer. That prince, upon the taking of Megara by his troops, deſired that a particular inventory ſhould be preſented to him by Stilpo, of what goods he had loſt by the plunder of the ſoldiers. "They have taken nothing from me," ſaid he, "nor can I be robbed, while I am left in poſſeſſion of the diſcipline of philoſophy, and other qualifications attending upon it." Although cautious, and rather reſerved in converſation, and yet, naturally, no diſſembler, a few words that ſlipped from him at Athens about Minerva's ſtatue, occaſioned his being ſummoned before the Areopagites. He had aſked ſome ſilly perſon he met with in his walk, Whether *ſhe*, the daughter of Jupiter, was a god? Yes, ſurely, replied the man. "But," added he, "this ſtatue we ſee is Phidias's work, and not Jove's production;" to which an aſſent was given. "*She* is then," ſaid he, no god." Appearing before the court, he neither denied nor retracted what he had ſaid, but maintained it to be true, that *ſhe* was not a *god*, but a *goddeſs*. He found, however, that the Areopagites would not underſtand this *dialectic* defence; but, conſidering it as evaſive, he was ordered to depart the city. He joined to ſingular acuteneſs in argument a ſurpriſing facility and happineſs in his elocution. Civilized, decent, and ingratiating in his manners, he ſhowed himſelf alſo to be diſintereſted. He lived to a great age; and is ſaid, when he found his exit approaching, to have haſtened it by a draught of wine.

It is to be obſerved, that, to introduce the account of Stilpo, a ſtretch is made over ſeveral of the profeſſors of the dialect in the Megaric ſchool who

* Diogen. Laert. ibid.

who preceded him in time; ſuch as Alexinus, Euphanetus, Apollonius *Cronus*, and Diodorus, alſo called *Cronos*, who was Stilpo's contemporary; with this unhappy memorial of it for him, that being, in the preſence of Ptolemy Soter, unable to reſolve ſome examples of the dialectic given by that philoſopher, he was upbraided with his ſtupidity by the King; a reproach felt ſo ſeverely by him, that it occaſioned a grief of which he died. Unfortunate even his ſurname of *Cronos* proved to him, as being liable, by the removal of only the two firſt letters, to Laertius's epigram *, which left for his proper title that of ὄνος, *an aſs*. Yet, it may be queſtioned, whether he merited it more than ſome others of his dialectical brethren, who laboured with him, but without agreement, to reduce, under ſome general rule, or rules, the truth or falſity of what was called the *Connex* propoſition, which was always introduced with the conditional adverb *if;* as in the example, "If it is day, it is light." But, in caſe the antecedent did not involve the conſequent, ſo that one could ſay, ſyllogiſtically, and conclude truly, and univerſally, but it is day, *therefore it is light;* the queſtion was, with reſpect to any ſuch propoſition, by what *criterion*, or rule of judgment, a true or unexceptionable *connex* could be aſcertained †. It was generally allowed, that it was *aſynactic*, or not truly concluſive, in the ſeveral ways of incoherence, omiſſion, being faulty in its form, and having redundance, or ſuperfluity. Incoherent, when the aſſumptions have no coherence with one another, nor with the concluſion; as if we ſhould ſay, "If it is day, it is light; but grain is ſold in the market, therefore Dion walks;" omiſſive, when ſomething is left out which the propriety of the concluſion requires: For, allowing this argumentation to be true, "riches are either good, or ill, or indifferent; but they are neither ill nor indifferent, therefore they are good;" but there is an omiſſion which vitiates the inference, if it be only ſaid, "riches are either good or ill; but they are not ill, and therefore good." Faulty in form, or when under a looſe and undetermined figure of the ſyllogiſm; redundant, if unneceſſary aſſumptions were introduced, which could not well be carried on to

* Diogen. Laert. ibid. lib. 2. cap. 13. p. 81.—82.

† Sextus Empiricus. In Pyrrh. hypotyp.

to the concluſion. Yet all this was of little ſignificance to determine the judgment of a right *connex*; about which a conſtant diſpute was maintained, and Diodorus, Chryſippus, Philo, and other dialecticians, ſtrenuouſly contended with one another *. We ſhall diſpenſe with the recital of their *dijudicative* reaſons of difference, as Sextus Empiricus has ſtated them, and only obſerve, with Cicero, what ground was afforded, from their variance, to the Academics to ſuſpend their aſſent to the probable truth of certain propoſitions, and to the Sceptics to inſiſt, that there was neither ſufficient nor probable proof to be given of any poſition held to be indubitably true.

We conclude what is neceſſary to be ſaid upon the part of the Dialectic reſpecting Sophiſms, with obſerving, from what Sextus Empiricus delivers † upon this article, that the Sceptics choſe to ſhift the ſolution of them upon the pretext, that the taſk belonged not to them, but to thoſe who held forth the dialectic ſtudy to be a ſcience which diſcovered what was true, and what falſe, and what neutral. "It is enough," ſays he, "for us to ſhow that it cannot be ſuch. But, as to the attention to be paid to Sophiſms, we are not obliged always to enter into a logical diſcuſſion of them. They are marked to us as pieces of falſe reaſoning, with only ſome ſimilitude to truth; and, therefore, no aſſent is due to them, even although we cannot point out, or underſtand, where the fallacy lies. The tricks of jugglers we know to be impoſitions, without being able to conceive by what artifice they are performed; and ſo we may judge of captious and illuſive ſyllogiſms. Notwithſtanding theſe allegations, it is by no means evident how a profeſſed and univerſal ſceptic can conſiſtently hold a concluſive propoſition to be falſe, without ſaying why, and in what way it is to be ſo judged; and of all reaſoners he is the leaſt entitled to object to futility in argument, and to acquit himſelf from an anſwer, by alledging, that there is in it ſome inexplicable ambiguity; when although, if he ſhould not directly maintain, that

* In hoc ipſo, quod in elementis dialectici docent, quomodo judicare oporteat, verum falſumne ſit, ſi quid ita *connexum* eſt ut hoc; *ſi dies eſt, lucet*, quanta contentio eſt? Aliter, Diodoro, aliter Philoni, Chryſippo aliter placet. Acad. Quaeſt. ibid. lib. 4. † Hypotypos, lib. 2. cap. 22. p. 100. et ſequens.

that contradictory propoſitions may be true, yet he approaches as near as he can to this ſubverſion of all principles of reaſon. With reſpect to every axiom, or cleareſt dictate of the human mind, his main conſideration is, how, by ſome perverſe conception, it may be caſt into an ideal intricacy, as ambiguous and unintelligible as the moſt veiled ſophiſm can be reckoned. His paradoxes, therefore, are no more to be regarded than the dialectic falſifications; and if, of them, the great oracle * of the ſceptical ambiguities could ſay, we ſee, before us, the precipice which would throw us into abſurdities, and are under no neceſſity to hold our courſe by it; and, therefore, we turn from it into another path. With equal reaſon, ſurely, and with more propriety, may the rational dogmatiſts ſay, we ſeek truth as a reality in nature, and have in ſome caſes demonſtrative proof, and in others ſufficient evidence, of the diſcoveries of it, but we are not obliged to trace it through all the oblique and deluſive perſpectives that may be preſented of it by profeſſed doubters of the plaineſt concluſions of reaſon itſelf: We are fully ſatiſfied that theſe are ſtudied and artificial deceptions, which, without a fruitleſs labour to explain them, may well be rejected as the counterfits of reaſon, and the extravagant ſallies of the human imagination."

Amongſt the more celebrated ſects, the Stoics, as will afterwards appear, were thoſe who made the moſt uſe of the dialectic ſubtilities. Chryſippus, indeed, may be reckoned a ſecond founder of them, by his prolific invention, and his endeavours to diffuſe them through every branch of philoſophy. Much of his reputation he owed to his dexterous management of the ſophiſms, yet he ſometimes called them, with a ſneer, his *gins* for catching men. They have ſtill ſome rehearſal in the ſchools, to prove the ready conception, if not the depth, of the ſtudent of logics.

Ariſtippus has been mentioned amongſt the diſciples of Socrates; and to him, according to Xenophon, was addreſſed, by that philoſopher, the moral fable of the *Judgment of Hercules* upon Virtue and Pleaſure. It was evidently intended as a corrective to that falſe taſte for the indulgence of the ſenſual appetites and paſſions, which the African youth

* Ibid.

conſtantly diſcovered. The education he had received was nothing more than a nurſery of all his deſires; and ſo indelible were its impreſſions, that he was ſoon obſerved to reliſh none of Socrates's diſcourſes * but thoſe on *love* and *lovers*, and *deſireable good*. He ſtudied only how the ſentiments of the Athenian moraliſt, upon theſe ſubjects, might be ſo interpreted as to give a colour to his theory of human life, and the conduct ſuitable to it. Philoſophy, ſaid Ariſto of Chios †, muſt be hurtful, when its principles are either miſtaken, or induſtriouſly perverted. Ariſtippus had ingenuity enough to diſcover, that, if he could put the affections and paſſions of the human mind, and theſe eſpecially that were immediately produced, upon an equal footing with reflection, rational judgment, and other internal ſentiments, it would be a great ſtep to the proof of his favourite theory; which aimed at vindicating, by plauſible arguments, the life of a *voluptuary*, to which he was naturally inclined.

Thoſe, ſays Ariſtotle, in the beginning of his Ethics, who place the chief good of man in bodily pleaſure, have little or no concern with the ſcience of *morals*. Their theory relates much more *to paſſion* than to action, and conſiders not what is good in itſelf, but what is felt as a pleaſant or painful ſenſation. Hence Ariſtippus aſſerted, that every thing was, to every man, either poſitive pleaſure or pain, good or evil, according as it might be ‡, in the inſtant of time, felt by him; and that it concerned him not to uſe his reaſon or judgment about the paſt or future effect of any object, further than to conſider how, if it excited a ſmooth motion, in which pleaſure conſiſted, it might be continued, or, if a harſh one, which occaſioned grief, it might be avoided. Thus were men required *to know no more, and to do no more, in life*, than what mere infants do, and leſs than what many of the animals below them perform, which act not always according to their immediate ſenſations of pleaſure or pain, but often, in oppoſition to them, undertake what is troubleſome, and endure uneaſineſs in conſequence of their inſtincts for ſelf-preſervation, or for the care of their kind; and even, in ſome inſtances, with efforts bordering on reaſon, for improving their condition.

* Cicero de Orat. lib. 3. p. 186. Diogen. Laert. in Vita, lib. 2. † Cicero de Natur. Deor. lib. 3. p. 251. ‡ Diogen. Laert. ibid.

tion *. It is a falſe aſſertion, therefore, *that all animals ſeek only their particular pleaſure*, and, governed by what preſently affects them, prefer not one ſpecies of it to another. Undirected by reaſon, inſtinct leads them to make a diſtinction, and to purſue that which is placed at a diſtance from them, and is attainable only by a courſe of inquietude, rather than follow their preſent and more eaſy gratifications. Man, in his rudeſt ſtate, without having the ſenſe of any moral duty, or obligation upon him, is impelled by natural feelings, which he cannot reſiſt, to act in a ſimilar manner; and, in many caſes, to neglect an immediate affection for the ſake of complying with a more remote one, and to forego a private pleaſure on account of another of a ſocial, or communicative kind. When reaſon exerts itſelf, and reciprocal offices have enforced the exerciſe of theſe affections, they come to be recogniſed as duties, and are mutually claimed under this idea. Neceſſity and utility conſpire to urge its propriety, and to maintain the juſt impreſſion.

In oppoſition to this proceſs of Nature, it was Ariſtippus's doctrine, that men had nothing elſe to direct their ſentiments of any thing, but what he called the *internal touch*, or the firſt ſimple *affection* imparted by it to the mind. Of whatever kind this might be, whether agreeable or diſagreeable, or in whatever form perceived, it was to be held †, during the time it continued, for all that was truly known of the object. The ſenſes, ſaid he, in many inſtances deceive us, and, therefore, their report cannot be truſted; and what cauſes a particular affection is often obſcure or unknown. What, then, is comprehenſible to us in any object; or what other mode of judgment is left us with reſpect to it? Is it not to be concluded, that every man's immediate feeling is the only real one; and that no farther than his perception goes can he be ſuppoſed to have any underſtanding about it? In this manner did the Cyreniac philoſopher endeavour, by a moſt futile argument ‡, to diſcard every act of the rational faculty in man, and to ſubſtitute in its room blind and variable affection; ſo that any one who, with jaundiced eyes, ſaw all

* Diogen. Laert. ibid. † Sextus Empiricus Adverſ. Mathem. lib. 7. p. 173—4. Cicero Academ. Quaeſt. lib. 4. p. 25. ‡ Ibid. p. 37. Quoniam Ariſtippus, quaſi nullum animum habemus, corpus ſolum tuetur.

objects yellow, or, with diſtorted ones, beheld two ſuns, or, with a diſordered *ſenſorium*, like Oreſtes's, perceived two Thebes on fire, was to be concluded to form a truer judgment of the appearance of objects before him, than he who, under an infirmity of his corporeal ſenſes, had learned from experience that their report was then to be called in queſtion, and the impreſſion received by them regarded not as the true one, and ſuch as it ought to be, but as deluſive and fallacious. Common obſervation, or ordinary accidents, ſuffice to make it generally known, that a diſturbed organ, as the eye compreſſed, or the medium of viſion changed, as in the aſpect of things in water, will cauſe a different perception; and hence none infer, that every ſenſation we have of objects is the true judgment of them, if we except the unſound and diſtracted in mind. So far from confounding the things ſeen with our perceptions, we are almoſt inſtinctively taught to make trial of the veracity of the latter; and, in certain caſes, we learn to uſe methods and contrivances for correcting their errors, and adjuſting them to the appearances of things.

This theory of ſenſations and affections was intended to ſupport one of a like ſceptical kind in *morals;* the ſcience of which Ariſtippus pronounced to be the only one deſerving attention and ſtudy. But no more motely and incoherent ſyſtem of them than he formed to himſelf could be eaſily imagined. Upon any natural propenſities to one kind of action more than another, unleſs, as it might be productive of pleaſure, it could not be founded; and, although he ſuppoſed reaſon might interfere, and give ſome direction, yet his theory afforded no *data* upon which it could proceed. If the report of the corporeal ſenſes was not to be relied upon, and the only teſt of what was true, and what was pleaſant or good, was referable to the immediate *touch* felt by the mind; how was it poſſible to connect one experience of this ſort with another, ſo as to admit any fixed rule of judgment, either about the efficacy of an object, or the tendency of a ſpecial action, to produce pleaſure or pain? In the alledged variation and fallacy of the ſenſes, in the diverſified ſituations in which the mind might receive a contrary impreſſion from the ſame object, there could be no concluſion of reaſon with reſpect to what was eligible, or not ſo; ſince what appeared an object of choice in one

inſtant

inſtant of time, might be reprobated in the next, and the mind be left as much at a loſs to determine which affection it ought to prefer, as if it had received no *touch* whatſoever.

In broaching this ſingular doctrine, it appears that Ariſtippus conſulted more his own particular genius, than reflected attentively on the principles by which human nature is governed. With a verſatility of mind, not eaſily to be conceived, he could, like an accompliſhed player, perſonate the moſt oppoſite characters, aſſume, with equal propriety, the plain cloke of the philoſopher, or the courtier's pompous robe, and ſhow himſelf either the moraliſt or the libertine, the ſage or the buffoon, as moſt ſuited the turn of his humour or his circumſtances *. In theſe various attitudes, as Horace obſerves, he never appeared to counterfit his part, but to diſplay a character natural to him, or that became him. It may be here aſked, How he could reconcile a demeanor ſo variable with his philoſophic principle about the firſt *touch* of the mind, which was, above all others, to be credited and acted upon †? Did he feel himſelf no otherwiſe affected in the moment when the tyrant Dionyſius *ſpit in his face*, than when, upon repreſſing his ſenſe of the indignity, from prudence, he ſaid to his friends, who were ſurpriſed at his apparent compoſure, "*If fiſhermen can endure to be all over wet, for the ſake of catching a gudgeon, why ſhould I be diſturbed with Dionyſius's ſpittle, when my purpoſe is to take hold of a fiſh ‡?*" It is hardly credible of any man, but that his immediate ſenſation, in ſuch a predicament, would be a diſagreeable one, and move his indignation, and that ſubſequent reflection only could render it an incident of indifference to him. Ariſtippus, who, although not reſentful or paſſionate, had much vivacity of temper,

* Omnis Ariſtippum *decuit* color, et ſtatus, et res. Epiſt. 17. lib. 1.

And again, the ſame poet acknowledges, that, when he could not keep pace with the moral maxims of the more rigid ſects, he ſlipped, as it were by ſtealth, into Ariſtippus's eaſier rules.

Nunc in Ariſtippi *furtim* praecepta relabor,
Et mihi res, non me rebus, ſubjungere conor. Epiſt. 1. lib. 1.

† Diogen. Laert. ibid. ‡ The Greek word here uſed ſignified both a fiſh and a tyrant.

temper, could be leſs ſuppoſed, than many others, to want the ordinary ſenſibility upon ſuch occaſions. He muſt therefore be concluded to have been the greateſt diſſembler of his natural feelings, as he was put, at the court of Dionyſius, to frequent trials of them, in a way ſimilar to what has been mentioned. But it is plain, that all the efforts he made as a philoſopher, was to appear unaffected by any unpleaſant occurrence, and to divert any judgment, by others, of what he felt, by ſome quaint or facetious repartee; the faculty of which, it muſt be owned, that he poſſeſſed in a moſt remarkable degree; ſo that, although he might have imitators, few or none could equal him in it. A friend of his * becoming obnoxious to the Sicilian deſpot, he firſt interceded for him, but was not regarded. He then proſtrated himſelf before the king, and obtained his requeſt. What a mean action, and unworthy of a philoſopher, is this that you have done? ſaid ſome of his cenſorious acquaintance. "The fault," replied he, "lies not upon me. Dionyſius is anſwerable for it; who wears, it ſeems, what ears he hath in his feet, and not where, naturally, they ſhould be found."

It ſeems evident that we have not, in Diogenes Laertius's ſummary of Ariſtippus's doctrine, nor in that given of it by Sextus Empiricus and Plutarch †, ſuch an exact account of his tenets as to enable us to diſtinguiſh them from the variations and additions that are allowed to have been made to them by his diſciples, and ſucceſſors in the Cyrenaic ſchool. From his habits of diſſipation, it is to be preſumed, that he did not beſtow much of his time or attention in digeſting his principles, and that he contented himſelf with giving them the ſhew of conſiſtency. We find, indeed, in Laertius ‡, the titles of various literary works, which, upon the report of Sotion, and Panaetius, were aſcribed to him; yet many of the learned were of Soſicrates's opinion, that he had committed little or nothing to writing. It may be underſtood, upon the ſuppoſition of ſome detached pieces being compoſed by him, how there enſued ſuch a tranſmiſſion of the general principles of his philoſophy as has been ſtated. He had educated his daughter, Arete, in the moſt careful manner;

* Diog. Laert. 4to edit. pag. 125.
† Adverſus Colotem.
‡ Pag. 128.

ner; as ſhe diſcovered a ſingular genius for philoſophic ſtudy, ſhe took the ſame pains with her ſon, the young Ariſtippus, who was therefore called *Metrodidactos;* and Antipater of Cyrene, a moſt eminent diſciple of the ſchool, co-operated with them both in every ſtudy, and labour, to unfold and explain what was termed the *Hedonic* ſyſtem, or that which held forth pleaſure, both as the *means* of happineſs, and the *end* for which life was deſired *. It admitted virtue to be a laudable principle in life, ſo far as it might be conſidered as a *ſelection* of agreeable ſenſations; but pleaſure was pronounced not to differ from pleaſure, and the deſire of it to be reſolved more generally into that of the body than that of the mind. In ſome caſes it was allowed, that joy aroſe from affections that were not corporeal; as when men exult in the proſperity of their country, or ſome unexpected piece of good fortune to themſelves. It was added, that it was the part of a wiſe man to be diſengaged from envy, immoderate deſire, and ſuperſtition, which ſpring from vain opinions, although he could not be unaffected with fear and grief, which are accidents to nature.

But, it is a circumſtance to be particularly remarked in this firſt ſketch of the *Hedonic* theory, that, notwithſtanding its general principles were, in a great meaſure, aſſumed by Epicurus, yet a manifeſt contrariety of opinion, in ſeveral important points †, could not, it ſeems, be avoided by theſe eminent retailers of the ſame ſyſtem. The diſagreement was ſo palpable, as to bring into controverſy, and ſerve to expoſe the fallacy of the arguments uſed by them both. This may be afterwards more diſtinctly pointed out, Yet here, it may be proper to obſerve the difference of the two congenial ſects, upon the article of felicity or beatitude. We ſeek particular pleaſure, and not general, as an *end*, ſaid Ariſtippus; and felicity is no more than the ſum of all the ſeveral ſenſations of it, from time to time, experienced by us. Any thing beyond theſe

* Cicero de Officiis, lib. 3. pag. 404. Diogenes Laert. pag. 131.

† Atqui ab Ariſtippo, Cyrenaici, atque Annicerii philoſophi nominati, omne bonum in voluptate poſuerunt; virtutemque ob eam rem eſſe laudandam, quod efficiens eſſet voluptatis. Quibus obſoletis floret Epicurus; *ejuſdem fere adjutor, autorque ſententiae.* Cicero, ibid.

theſe it cannot be accounted; ſince pleaſure conſiſts in the *touch* that is preſent, without being connected with that which went before, or may follow after. Its parts are ſeparate points that are not to be drawn into a line; and, therefore, they can mark no conſtant ſtate. "They have conſiſtency," ſaid Epicurus, "and ſupreme felicity is placed in the abſence of all pain and perturbation, or in the ſettled tranquility of body and mind *." What ſtate of felicity is that, replied the Cyrenaics, in which there can be no ſenſe of pleaſure, as there is no motion excited? It muſt be either a ſtate of inſenſibility, or that of a dull and languid ſuſpenſe between pleaſure and pain. "There is in it †," anſwered Epicurus, "beſide a removal of turbulent emotions, the agreeable recollection of paſt pleaſures, and the chearful hope of thoſe in futurity." The internal motion, ſaid the Cyrenaics again, being, in reſpect of the former, diſſolved, and as to the other not completed, neither of them was to be regarded in the account of the actual ſenſations of pleaſures. "Admitting," replied Epicurus, "that the pleaſures and the pains of the body were only felt from one inſtant of time to another, or while they endure, and, therefore, are not to be reckoned connectedly; yet thoſe of the mind are more impreſſive, have a cloſer, and almoſt inſeparable connection with each other, and more readily and forcibly recur to the imagination and memory than the corporeal ones. Hence men are generally known, in the courſe of life, either to rejoice, or to grieve, far more according to the impreſſions made on their minds by the hope of good, or the fear of evil, than by any actual ſenſations they have of bodily pleaſure or pain; and, therefore, it is that moral philoſophy, which teaches the proper diſcipline of the mind, with reſpect to its hopes and fears, becomes ſo important an object of ſtudy."

Having explained ſo particularly the tenets of Ariſtippus, and the arguments uſed by him and his followers in maintaining them, we ſhall not protract the narrative, by inſiſting on the doctrines of Hegeſias, Anniceris, and Theodorus; who commented on the general principles of their ſect; and, ambiguous as they were, and eaſily ſuſceptible of various.

* Diogen. Laert. ibid. Cicero de Finibus, lib. 2. pag. 56. et ſequent.
† Cicer. Tuſcul. Quaeſt. lib. 3. pag. 253. Diogen. Laert. lib. 10. ad fin.

ous gloſſes, introduced upon them a confuſion of opinions, moſt of them extravagant, and groſsly immoral *. They generally agreed in denying any natural diſtinctions between virtue and vice, and aſcribed them to the influence of civil law or cuſtom. Man, ſaid one party, when conſidered as ſtanding alone, and by himſelf, can have no propenſities, and much leſs obligations, to moral offices. But, as it may be difficult, or diſagreeable to him, ſaid another, to remain in a ſolitary ſtate, and he may engage in that which is ſocial or civil, he muſt be concluded, when placed in that condition, to be laid under the obligation to perform certain duties. If theſe be attended with labour, ſaid a third, and ſuch inconveniencies as are inconſiſtent with the *prudential compoſure* of the wiſe man, they are not incumbent upon him †. Although the tenet, that life or death was in every man's option, was commonly held amongſt them, yet Hegecias, not contented with this aſſertion, took occaſion, from a perſon's being recovered from the point of death, by the care of his friends, to declaim, and to write, upon the abſurdity of ſuch interpoſition; ſince death, in many reſpects, was preferable to life. He was called *Peithithanates*, or *death's advocate;* but, as ſome of his auditors in Cyrene began to deſpatch themſelves, he was interdicted by Ptolemy Philadelphus from ſuch exerciſe of his rhetoric. Theodorus, publiſhing his *atheiſm*, was baniſhed, firſt from Cyrene, and then from Athens ‡. In general, theſe retainers to Ariſtippus's ſchool, from their perverſe and contradictory opinions, contributed to its diſcredit; ſo that, inſtead of being regarded as a nurſery of philoſophers, it was rather conſidered by moſt of the other ſects as productive chiefly of a tribe of *ſenſualiſts*, who endeavoured to reduce all the philoſophy of human life to vague perceptions of pleaſure, without diſtinguiſhing its ſources, or weighing the degrees and ſtability of one kind with thoſe of another; and, upon the pretence that there was no other dictate about the end of life, but the deſire of pleaſure, to hold themſelves exempted from all acts and offices in ſociety, of which that was not found to be the immediate effect. We conclude with obſerving, that Ariſtippus's licentious philoſophy did not

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 2. pag. 135. † Valer. Maxim. cap. 8. —9.
‡ Diogen. Laert. ibid. Seneca, de Tranquillitate Animi, cap. 14. edit. 8vo, p. 527.

appear * to diveſt him, perſonally, of a ſenſe of humanity and friendſhip, or, if one exception be made, of generoſity. Prevalent vanity, joined with the verſatility of his temper, diſpoſed him to think and to act in a way peculiar to himſelf, without regard to conſiſtency, unleſs it was placed in being inconſiſtent. Amidſt various proofs he gave of a liberal and obliging diſpoſition, he choſe to ſet a price upon his philoſophical lectures, and to take money from every one admitted to them. He was the firſt of the *Socratics* who did ſo; notwithſtanding the Athenian ſage had returned his pecuniary preſent, and would receive no ſuch gratuity from him.

In contradiction to the doctrines of the Cyrenaic ſect, and as if it had been not alone to confute, but to pour contempt upon them, appeared about the ſame time, the ſurly preceptors of the *Cynic* ſchool, of which Antiſthenes was the founder, but not the moſt celebrated perſonage it produced. If the former thought themſelves warranted in affirming that the pleaſures of the ſenſes, and the ſmooth motions of the mind, were the chief and only good, the latter aſſerted it to be a demonſtrable truth, that the mind's dependency on extraneous, and accidental affections, or impreſſions, and to which vulgar opinion had aſſigned the denomination of pleaſure or good, was altogether inconſiſtent with ſolid contentment and felicity. To this, the conſtancy of ſentiment, and of action, found in virtue alone, was abſolutely neceſſary †. The wiſdom of life, therefore, ſaid they, is nothing more than the ſcience of virtue, which requires little inſtruction beyond what nature affords, and conſiſts more in action than in ſtudy, or theoretical diſcipline. Aſſume, then, the *Socratic courage;* learn to labour, and to ſuſtain what weak ſouls call hardſhip, and the native force of the mind will diſplay itſelf. Soon it will be proved not to ſeek precariouſly, in exterior things, its true good, but to be the maker and the author of it. Be not dupes to ſilly names, like the Athenians, who boaſt of their being *natives* of their ſoil, and yet can have no more honour from their claim than belongs to the ſnails and locuſts. Let not your conceptions of what is good or ill, honeſt or diſhoneſt,

* Diogen. Laert. ibid. Plutarch. in liberis educandis. † Diog. Laert. lib. 6. p. 322. Ælian, var. hiſt. lib. 9.

diſhoneſt, ſuitable or ſhameful, be formed on common opinion, or regulated by civil laws and cuſtoms; which are divers and arbitrary. Call not any thing ill or good, indecent or decent, offenſive or inoffenſive, but vice and virtue. Account pain, reproach, and poverty, amongſt the neceſſary and laudable labours of virtue; and dread the intoxications of pleaſure as the bane of the mind, and not more eligible than madneſs. If it is to be ſought at all, let it be that kind which follows labour, and not what goes before it. Riches, wealth, and honours, are as naturally deſpiſed by the wiſe man, as they are admired and coveted by the ignorant and fooliſh.

Such were the maxims which Antiſthenes endeavoured to diſſeminate; when, after exhibiting his oratorial faculty amongſt the declaimers, at the Iſthmian games, and next becoming a hearer of Socrates, he, upon the death of that philoſopher, inſtituted a ſchool at Athens. He met with ſome diſcouragement in this undertaking, on account of his mother being no native, but a Thracian or Phrygian; and ſaw, with diſcontent, Plato, and other diſciples of Socrates, admitted to privileges which were denied to him *. Retiring, therefore, to a neglected *gymnaſium*, called the *Cynoſarges*, he made it his auditory. As it was near the temple of the *white dog*, dedicated to Hercules Nothus, and had its name from thence, the diſciples of his ſchool were called *Cynics*, by a double alluſion, as it would ſeem, to the name of the place of their reſort, and alſo to the prominent feature of the ſect, which was ſoon obſerved to be that of a *dog-like* impudence. Antiſthenes, even while he attended Socrates, had affected ſingular ſordidneſs in his dreſs, and often expoſed its tattered parts. Do you imagine, ſaid the philoſopher to him, that virtue conſiſts in a ragged garment; or that pride may not be obſerved to peep through its holes? He now doubled around him his worn out cloke, and made it ſerve for all his veſtments; and, taking a ſtaff, and an empty bag, when he went abroad, he appeared to proclaim abſtinence and ſeverity, in all the uſages of life, to be eſſential to the character of a philoſopher, and to reproach thoſe who pretended to ſuſtain it in another form. But this external figure of philoſophy was

* Suidas in voce Cynoſarges, tom. 2. p. 398. Pauſanias Atticis, lib. 1. p. 33.

new, and had not been beheld in the ſchool of Socrates. The diet, the abode, the unſeemly aſpect, as well as the garb of Antiſthenes, were a ſpectacle to many, but attracted few diſciples *. Although, in the judgment of Theopompus, he excelled all the other *Socratics* in acuteneſs, and had a moſt winning elocution, and, according to Xenophon, his morals were no leſs virtuous, his auditory was little frequented; ſo that, as if aſhamed of the paucity of his hearers, he began to repel the few that came, and to break up his ſchool. *Cyniciſm* was on the point of being ſuppreſſed, when it had ſcarcely made its firſt appearance; and Antiſthenes ſhowed himſelf to be of a temper too weak to ſtruggle with the difficulties of its introduction. He became moroſe, and was heard to ſpeak ambiguouſly about the influence of the motives for throwing away life, or preſerving it; when one diſciple, to whom his lifted ſtaff proved no repulſe, but rather a bold invitation of the ſtroke, awaked his recollection of what perſiſtence will accompliſh; and whom, upon trial, he found to be more than equal to the hardeſt taſks which the moſt rigid philoſophy could preſcribe, and who could reduce, as he thought fit, all the wants of nature, deride the luxuries, and deſpiſe the conveniencies, of life, and ſeemed then moſt pleaſed and happy, when he could live and act in contradiction to all the habits, cuſtoms, and manners, he obſerved to obtain amongſt mankind.

This was Diogenes of Sinope, whom the detection of his father's coinage of falſe money obliged to quit his country of Pontus; and fortune, or the fame of the city, brought to Athens. Antiſthenes, upon whom he had faſtened for inſtruction in philoſophy, and would not leave him until he obtained it, had ſoon various proofs of the extraordinary genius of his diſciple †. When ſick, and in diſtreſs, the philoſopher cried out, "Who will free me from this pain?" Diogenes preſently run for a dagger, and ſhowed it him. "I ſay from my pain, and not from my life," was the reply; for as yet the *apathy*, afterwards inſiſted upon, was not directly profeſſed; and Antiſthenes had not, it ſeems, reſolved the queſtion about the preference of death to life, accompanied with all its pains. When Diogenes came forth with the enſigns of his ſect, which yet

* Diogenes Laert. ibid. † Ibid.

yet appeared to ſuit him better than his maſter, he was aſked, "Half naked as you are, and ſuch a ſpectacle, what do you profeſs to do?" "Hercules," ſaid he, "had only his club and his lion's ſkin *: I make war as he did, but with monſters of a different kind. He, under orders, fought with beaſts; I, of my own accord, encounter the vices and follies of the human mind, and ſtrive to liberate men from them." "But, how frantic and unnatural is it," ſaid another to him, "to declare yourſelf an enemy to pleaſure, and to ſpurn what all men declare to be agreeable?" "You muſt have a ſhallow mind," anſwered he, "which extends not to every ſenſe of pleaſure, if you know not *that* "which ariſes from its contempt, and that it is often eaſier to diſdain than to ſeek it." To fortune, ſaid he, I oppoſe courage; to law, or cuſtom, nature; to perturbation, the ſtrength of reaſon. To have this ability, he added, that a double *exercitation* was neceſſary; that of the body almoſt equally with that of the mind. They lean to, and are ſupported upon each other's vigour; and neither of them can be ſtrong without a conſtant exertion of its natural ſtrength. What practice will do, to beget ability in any performance, is daily beheld in the mechanic arts, and in thoſe of wreſtling and muſic. The practitioners readily acquit themſelves well, in what others can never ſucceed. Rivals, they learn to improve, and to excel one another, in dexterity. We may judge whether they would not accompliſh ſomething more admirable, and more advantageous to themſelves, if they took the ſame pains with their minds. The *exercitations* to which he enured himſelf were of the ſevereſt kind. Naked, and in winter, he embraced ſtatues covered with ſnow. He rolled about in his tub; for why ſhould he want, or wait for the fabrication of a houſe †? He threw aſide his diſh, when he obſerved a boy catch up water in the hollow of his hand; for, otherwiſe, he might have been outdone in bearing neceſſities: And yet he begged; and was as apt to be ſatirical upon thoſe who gave him any thing as thoſe who refuſed. "Although," ſaid he, "all the imprecations of the tragedians have fallen upon me ‡, an exile and a beggar, yet

* Lucian, in vitarum auctione.

† Seneca, oct. edit. tom. 1. p. 528.

‡ Cicero, Tuſculan. Quaeſt. lib. 5. p. 191.

yet I want nothing. How much ſuperior am I, then, as a man, to the king of Perſia, who, in his pleaſures, never has enough, but always deſiderates ſomething more? You needed not," ſaid he * to Ariſtippus, have ſneaked into the courts of princes, could you have cooked your dinner as I now do?" "And Diogenes needed not to have waſhed his herbs," replied Ariſtippus, "had he known how to converſe with men." To thoſe who alledged he ſtrained nature in his efforts to bear wants, he anſwered, "If it be ſo, I do no more than the maſters of the *Chorus*, who always exceed conſiderably in their tone, to keep others in the proper key." When a ſlave, and charged with the tutory of Xeniades's ſons at Corinth, he did not require them to come within many degrees of his perſonal *exercitations*. It is even credible, that ſome of his apothegms, thrown out in the *dialectic* form, were rather a burleſque upon the ſmatterers of logic, according to the mode of the ſchools, than poſitions in theology or morals, really advanced by him. Such was that looſe and ſtraggling ſyllogiſm, by which he is ſaid to have proved, that all things belonged to the wiſe: "*All things appertain to the gods; the gods are the friends of wiſe men; all things are common amongſt friends; therefore all things belong to the wiſe.*" Certain we are, that, being the ſatirical philoſopher of nature's making, he launched his ſarcaſms againſt every

* Si pranderet olus patienter; regibus uti
Nollet Ariſtippus———
is, in Horace's words, Diogenes's ſneer; and Ariſtippus's reply is in theſe terms?
———Si ſciret regibus uti,
Faſtideret olus, qui me notat.—Lib. 1. Epiſt. 17.
The poet gives Ariſtippus's reaſons, why his manner of life was of preferable eſteem to that of Diogenes. The queſtion was evidently of difficult deciſion, as it related to a greater or leſs propriety in two oppoſite extremes; whether to be a king's jeſter, and paraſite, without being diſconcerted, and with the benefit of the office; or, from manly pride, to diſdain ſuch a life, and, in hatred of it, to hug poverty, without being in the leaſt aſhamed of its meanneſs, even although obliged to beg a little from the loweſt of the people. Horace, as an Epicurean profeſſed, and, as he owns, making a trip, now and then, to Ariſtippus's philoſophy, and from other evident conſiderations, could not well avoid pronouncing the Cyrenaic philoſopher's choice of life to be the *potior ſententia*. Yet he does it with ſome heſitation; and rather in the way of deſcanting upon the argument than of deciding in it.

every ſect, and gave ſcope to his ſneers upon every profeſſion but his own *. Was he not another Socrates? ſaid ſome. Yes; if conſidered to be *Socrates turned fool, through too much wiſdom.*

Of all the violences ſuppoſed to be done by him to nature, that committed upon modeſty and decorum may be reckoned the moſt diſguſtful. In Athens, he aimed, abſurdly indeed, at independency on all extraneous help or favour; but it was an independency which had a *wild* virtue for its object. In endeavouring to counteract every ſenſation of ſhame, and maintaining that any natural act might be done with the ſame aſſurance of face as another, he overlooked that *nature* he pretended to follow; and which, if but ſlightly attended to, gave manifeſt indications to the contrary †. At enmity with all cuſtoms and manners that obtained amongſt civilized mankind, as unnatural impoſitions, he ſubverted alſo every exterior image of virtue, and thought he acted beſt her part, when he ſhowed himſelf the *beaſt* of nature, without a ſpark of decorum or modeſty. This, however, proved ſuch a *ſtigma* upon the ſect, that all the practiſed auſterities of its retainers availed not to efface it. In vain did Crates turn all his eſtate into money, and, diſtributing it, or throwing it away, declare, "*Now I am free:*" In vain did Metrocles, to prove his contempt of fame, burn the books of philoſophy he had compoſed; and Menedemus, to impreſs terror and conviction on the minds of the guilty and vicious, iſſue forth into the ſtreets in the frightful figure of one of the *furies*, come from hell to note down, and report, the incorrigibly wicked. Their ſhameleſs demeanor, their inſults upon modeſty, their oſtentation of poverty, while they often took what they wanted with a rapacious hand, rendered them generally odious. If the ſtrong natural genius which appeared in Diogenes, the originality of his ſentences, his making learned pride, as well as riches and luxury, the object

* Ælian, var. hiſt. lib 10.

† Nec vero audiendi ſunt Cynici, ſays Cicero, aut ſi qui fuerunt Stoici, pene Cynici; qui reprehendunt, et irrident, quod ea, quae turpia re non ſunt, verbis flagitioſa dicamus; illa autem quae turpia ſunt, nominibus appellemus ſuis. And again, Cynicorum vero ratio tota eſt ejicienda; eſt enim inimica verecundiae, ſine qua, nihil rectum eſſe poteſt, nihil honeſtum.—De Officiis, lib. 1. p. 368.

ject of his ſatire, and his acquieſcence in a ſtate of ſlavery, created admiration, and procured him followers and applauſe; yet his ſucceſſors in the Cynic order had not the like credit, but ſoon ſunk into diſeſteem, and were accounted as unworthy to be ranked amongſt the philoſophers, as thoſe who, upon Ariſtippus's principles, profeſſed *ſenſuality*, but whoſe manners appeared to be leſs groſs and offenſive in ſociety. Lucian, therefore, was authoriſed to deſcribe either them, or their imitators, as a ſet of audacious miſcreants, who, under the cloke of philoſophy, ſpurning the firſt precepts of morals, conſpired to ſhock the common feelings of mankind.

The hero of Macedonia, in admiration of Diogenes's philoſophic conſtancy, which put him in want of nothing, ſaid, "If I were not Alexander, I would wiſh to be Diogenes." They were moſt oppoſite characters; and yet, both being in extremes, they had one point of coincidence; which was, that each of them valued himſelf upon doing what none elſe was ſeen to perform. Diogenes, therefore, might, in propriety of character, have replied, "Was I not Diogenes, I would wiſh to be Alexander." "What amazing ſtrength of mind * muſt that Cynic philoſopher have poſſeſſed, who could ſo far reſtrain all the propenſities of nature?" ſaid a moſt eminent father in the Chriſtian church. He proves, that the ſeverity of the *Monaſtic life* is neither inconſiſtent with nature, nor involuntarily undergone, ſaid others of the ſame dignified denomination. Wonder we need not that Alexander admired him; ſince he himſelf expected to be admired, and perhaps much envied too; not, indeed, for acting in the ſame manner, or propoſing the ſame end, which the philoſopher did, but for proſecuting his difficult purpoſe with a like invincible ſpirit. What then was admirable in, and what ſought after by, them both? It was unequalled exertion, endurance of hardſhips, and a contempt of pain. This it was, which, in their own, and other men's opinion, exalted their characters; and it was to them the higheſt ſatisfaction to attain this end. But, does the human mind not only chooſe its principal object, but make the purſuit of that object, howſoever attended with apparent trouble, its greateſt pleaſure? Not only

* Auguſtin, in civitate Dei, lib. 9.

only a Diogenes, and an Alexander, bear teſtimony to this truth, but all philoſophers who conſidered the active, as well as the paſſive part of the human conſtitution, and obſerved how much the former predominated, have been unanimous in maintaining it; and all men who ever ſought after a conſtancy in their ſatisfactions, or aſpired to ſuch as roſe above the gratification of the ſenſes, have exemplified and confirmed it by exertions of the active powers of their minds. Does the mind then make its pleaſures; or is pleaſure a thing variable at its will? When moſt active in creating its pleaſures, it is then moſt pleaſed; and, pleaſure being only a general expreſſion for what is agreeable, every man may call by that name the ſenſation he has, when he ſets his mind upon any thing, and deſires to accompliſh, or to attain it, whether it would be ſo felt, or ſo termed by others, or not. Here we touch a hinge of the moral ſcience, which, although already pointed out, requires more particular attention. How are the active powers of the mind moſt ſuitably and worthily exerciſed? What main direction are they capable of receiving? What counſel and aid does the light of reaſon afford; and, what concurrence does natural ſentiment and affection ſupply to fix them in this direction? and, What extenſion, and what animation, moral ideas, and moral practice, receive from the ſurvey of the operations of *mind* in the univerſe, and the general felicity of its influence? Theſe are ſubjects of inveſtigation, that rational inquirers wiſh to ſee again and again unfolded. They are in themſelves highly important and intereſting to mankind; and the evidence of truth to be found in them is rendered more perſpicuous, and indubitable, by concurring teſtimonies. Even where the general ſcheme of the moral ſcience appears to be varied, and one theoriſt to give it a different ground from another, the atteſtation is not invalidated, when it is evident, that the variation ariſes not from the uncertainty of the moral principles themſelves, but from more or leſs extended views of theſe principles; or from a perſuaſion that ſome of them might be inſiſted upon with more propriety, and more ſtrength of argument, than others. To refine in their ſpeculations, and, unneceſſarily, to make innovations, for the ſake of appearing originals, is alſo known to be common to men of the greateſt genius. The maſters in the arts of painting and of ſculpture, deſigning the ſame figure, or the ſame

group, have been ever found, each of them, to interject ſome peculiar idea of his own invention; which, although a comparative novelty, inſtead of deviating from the deſign, was readily acknowledged to lend it more perſpicuity, and a happier illuſtration. Theſe obſervations may be not improperly made, when we are about to ſurvey, alongſt with other parts of the Grecian ſyſtems of philoſophy, that capital one of the moral ſcience, ably, and copiouſly, as we ſhall find it treated, by the diſtinguiſhed founders of the Athenian ſchools, called the *Academy*, the *Lyceum*, the *Porch*, and the *Gardens*.

PART



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Plato had for his parents Ariſto and Potona; the one reputed to be of an ancient Athenian family, and the other acknowledged the fifth in lineal deſcent from Solon. The time of his birth is not more exactly fixed than to the 87th or 88th Olympiad; although it was allowed * to have enſued in the *Archonſhip* of Lyſimachus, and to have been ſix years later than that of Iſocrates, which happened about the time of Pericles's death. He was probably deſtined by his parents for other occupations than thoſe of the Muſes, or philoſophical ſtudy; and the firſt education he received was ſuited to one nearly related to Chabrias, the Athenian general, and connected with others of eminent rank in the commonwealth. His perſonal make and conſtitution alſo ſeemed to have favoured his appointment to the military life; and, in the courſe of the *Gymnaſtic* exerciſes, he is ſaid to have got his firſt name †, which was Ariſtocles, changed to that of *Plato*, from the broad caſt of his ſhoulders and cheſt being often obſerved by his maſters. That he bore, when a youth, a part in ſome military expeditions, and acquitted himſelf with honour, is likewiſe narrated. The frequent factions in the republic, which turned to the prejudice of Chabrias, and his other friends, would tend to diſcourage, and interrupt his attachment to the civil or active employments of the ſtate ‡. His taſte for painting and poetry would contribute ſtill farther to alienate his mind from them. As he had the faculty of compoſing poetical pieces in various kinds of verſe, he began to reckon himſelf a conſiderable adept in them all, when the reading of Homer diſcovered to him his great inferiority in the heroic ſtrain. Naturally ſedate and baſhful as he was, his youthful ardour made him indulge the thought of contending for the Olympic laurel in tragedy; but, upon hearing a diſcourſe from Socrates upon ſuch competitions, he at once renounced all the merit of his poetical works; and, invoking Vulcan inſtead of the Muſes, conſigned them to the flames. His attendance upon the Sage commenced not ſooner than at the age of twenty; and he enjoyed the advantages of it for eight years, until Socrates's death.

Plato

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 3. pag. 163. † Seneca, oct. edit. tom. i. pag. 382. ‡ Ælian. Var. Hiſt. lib. 2. cap. 10.

Plato was received into the Socratic ſchool as a diſciple of whoſe genius the moſt favourable preſages might well be formed; and his cloſe application to ſtudy, joined with the moſt compoſed temper, and regular manners, tended to confirm them. That he poſſeſſed the natural talents of an orator, and, if he had cultivated rhetoric, would have ſhone as a maſter of its rules, we may readily believe, although Cicero * had not given his teſtimony to it. Acquainted with all or moſt of Socrates's aſſociates and pupils, he appears to have diſtinguiſhed Iſocrates by particular marks of his eſteem and friendſhip. The encomium which, in Socrates's name, he inſcribes of him † in his *Phaedrus*, is remarkable not only for the preference of him, as an orator, to Lyſias, but for its correſpondence with the ſentiment held forth in the dialogue, "that ſignal excellence in the liberal arts, and eſpecially in thoſe of *writing* and *ſpeaking*, muſt have for its ſource ſome portion from nature *of a philoſophic genius* ‡, ſuch as Iſocrates early diſcovered." That the finer arts and ſciences have a connection, and that there is not unfeldom in the ſame mind a participation of the faculty for both, was perhaps never more verified than in the inſtance of Plato himſelf §. His Phaedrus, reckoned to have been the firſt dialogue he compoſed, ſhowed how a youthful, warm, and luxuriant imagination could not eaſily moderate its conceptions, and reduce them either to that order and perſpicuity, or expreſs them in the unadorned ſtyle, and ſtrict language, which the delivery of any philoſophic doctrine required. But that, after repeated ſtruggles with his poetic fancy, he could, as much as dialogue compoſition admitted, lay aſide all ſuperfluity either of matter or words, and aſſume the cloſe, energetic, and deciſive ratiocination of the dialect, learned from his maſter, is evident from ſeveral brilliant copies of it in his works. Here we inquire not how far his genius might incline him to carry the flights of his imagination into his philoſophical theories; we only obſerve, that it was ſo profound and extenſive as to render the abſtruſe

* De Officiis, lib. 1. ad init. † Ad finem Dialogi. Cicero in Oratore, pag. 251. ‡ Poſitum igitur ſit in primis, ſine philoſophia non poſſe effici quem quaerimus *eloquentiam*, is a maxim often repeated by Cicero, in Oratore ad Brutum. § Diogen. Laert.

abſtruſe and ſevere ſtudies of geometry, aſtronomy, arithmetic, phyſics, ethics, and politics, not only objects of his attention, but fields of knowledge, in which his capacity enabled him to advance with facility and ſucceſs, and ſoon to become, in almoſt all of them, an eminent maſter.

After Socrates's death, he became a hearer of Cratylus, who had been Heraclitus's diſciple, and alſo of Hermogenes, who adhered to Parmenides's doctrine. The retreat of the Socratics to Megara gave him an opportunity to converſe with Euclid, and thoſe who attended his ſchool. For mathematical inſtruction he repaired to Cyrene, where Theodorus, otherwiſe no eligible preceptor, taught that ſcience with the greateſt reputation. To be acquainted with the philoſophy of Pythagoras he paſſed into Italy, and met with Philolaus, Archytas, and Eurytus, the inſtructed diſciples of the Italian ſchool. His next reſort was to Egypt, to learn of the Prieſts the ſcience of numbers, and the celeſtial motions, ſays one author *; to ſurvey the Nile, and the wonderful canals derived from it, ſays another †; to be informed of the traditions of antiquity, and the opinions of the wiſe men concerning the origin of the world, and the revolutions it had undergone, or might be ſubject to, ſays a third ‡; all which are nothing more than the vague conjectures thrown out by authors, one after another, about what the Grecian philoſopher, in their opinion, deſired particularly to know, or ſuperficial hints of what he might be inſtructed in, when a reſident in Egypt, confeſſed to be the greateſt fountain of general ſcience. Twelve years were requiſite to complete the courſe of his ſtudies ‖, and the information he wiſhed to obtain. But in what manner the former was conducted, or to what the latter amounted, we as little underſtand, as we do the particulars of the proficiency of the many Grecian geniuſes who preceded him in the ſame tract of literary knowledge. Plato, indeed, is not ſo reſerved as others of his countrymen, in making his general acknowledgements of what they owed, in point of erudition, to the Egyptians, and other foreign nations. Yet, if inſtead of introducing ſome of their fabulous hiſtories,

and

* Cicero de Finib. lib. 5.
† Apuleius de Dogmatis Platonis, lib. 1.
‡ Socratic Epiſ.
‖ Strabo, lib. 17.

and occaſional commendations of their laws and uſages, he had given an account of the general ſtate of learning amongſt them, he would have better acquitted himſelf, and the Grecian philoſophers, from the charge of invidiouſly concealing it. We have from none of them who were the moſt capable, and had all opportunity to give the information, any ſuch eſſay or treatiſe. Their early hiſtorians, in whom ſome ſhreds of it are found, were rather unequal to the taſk; their later ones, who had more ſcientific knowledge, were accuſed of ſacrificing the honour of their country for the ſake of embelliſhing their narratives, when extended to foreign nations, with repreſentations of their diſcoveries and improvements in philoſophy, and the arts, which were only known among the Greeks, and could not be pretended to by them. Thus the inveſtigation of what was communicated to the Grecians on theſe ſubjects, and what they originally invented themſelves, was rendered myſterious, and muſt remain doubtful and intricate.

Upon his return from Egypt, about the age of forty, Plato commenced, at Athens, his public teaching of philoſophy. He choſe for it a place in the ſuburbs, called the Grove, or wood of *Hecademus*, from an old hero * of that name who inhabited it in the time of Theſeus, and had given it ſome dedication. It was afterwards, from its marſhy ſituation, accounted unhealthful, and not frequented, until Cimon, the Athenian general, interſected it with drains. It being incloſed with a wall, and naturally agreeable from its ſhaded walks, it became the reſort of the retired and ſtudious. Plato found its air not the moſt ſalutary; but declined changing a reſidence in other reſpects eligible to him. An unmercenary teacher of philoſophy, his *Academy* open to all addicted to liberal ſtudy, ſoon roſe to reputation, and was no leſs diſtinguiſhed † by the eminent quality than by the number of its ſtudents. Not only the great abilities and univerſal literature of its maſter excited admiration, but

* Plutarch. in Sympoſiacis, lib. 8. quæſt. 4. et in Vita Theſei. Pauſanias Atticis, pag. 54. Suidas in voce Ἀκαδήμεια. This Philologiſt alledges, that the word was uſed neutrally, Ἀκαδήμειον, and alſo, that it was contracted ſometimes into Ἀκήμεια, to ſignify a place of retirement, and unfrequented by ordinary people. † Diogen. Laert. et Marſelius Ficinus, in vita.

but his moral lectures on virtue and decorum, his grave manners, and exemplary ſobriety, impreſſed reverence of ſcience, and of the exterior graces that adorn it amongſt all his auditors. Over the Academic porch was inſcribed, "*Let none enter here ignorant of Geometry;*" a ſentence which was underſtood to have a reference to moral, as well as to mathematical ideas *. Long was the memory preſerved of the chaſte and correct diſcipline of his ſchool, and of the many intelligent and virtuous characters formed under it. In ages after, the Grecian and Roman youth, of whatever ſect, could not approach the avenues of the Academy without recogniſing the veneration due to it. And even the virulent detractor † of Plato has inſerted an encomium, accompanied with a ſneer, upon the repreſentatives of his ſchool, as they appeared in his time. "Do you obſerve this man, who expreſſes himſelf in language ſo poliſhed, who is always decently dreſſed, and never does any thing but what is proper and becoming him? you may believe you ſee in him all the boaſt of the Academy." And what other exterior, it may be ſaid, could ſo properly denote a perſon who had education, knew decorum, and had formed to himſelf a ſuitable rule of action and behaviour?

The next particular of Plato's life ſhould be the narrative of his firſt voyage to Sicily, where he went to obſerve the natural curioſities of the iſland;

* Horace, inſtead of Epicurus's garden, appears to have taken his firſt philoſophic walk in the *academic* grove:

Scilicet, ut poſſem curvo dignoſcere rectum,
Atque inter ſilvas *Hecademi* quaerere verum. Epiſtol. lib. 2.

Piſo, according to Cicero's repreſentation, upon viſiting the old Academy, alongſt with his aſſociates, felt a tranſport of veneration, which he expreſſed in the following terms. "Naturane nobis hoc datum dicam, an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum eſſe verſatos, magis moveamur, quam ſi quando eorum ipſorum aut facta audiamus, aut ſcriptum aliquod legamus? velut ego nunc moveor. Venit enim mihi Platonis in mentem, quem accepimus primum hic diſputare ſolitum; cujus etiam illi hortuli propinqui non memoriam ſolum mihi afferunt; ſed *ipſum* videntur in conſpectu meo hic ponere. Hic Speuſippus, hic Xenocrates, hic ejus auditor, Polemo; cujus ipſa illa ſeſſio fuit, quam videmus, &c. In Finibus, lib. 5, in initio.

† Athenaeus, lib. 7.

iſland, and with the ſpecial purpoſe of beholding the *Crater*, and other ſtupendous appearances of Ætna, objects ſtriking in themſelves, and attractive to every mind in the leaſt turned to phyſical inquiries. But how he proceeded, or what was the iſſue of this undertaking, his own writings, and thoſe of others, are ſilent. In place of this deſirable information, we only learn that he was invited to the court of Dionyſius, the elder of that name, deſpot of Sicily. The philoſopher's interview with a king of ſuch a character *, and who had literature enough to value himſelf upon it, ſhould be entertaining; yet the imperfect account delivered, with variations, by every author, hardly merits a recital. That Dionyſius, inſiſting upon the neceſſity and expediency of his abſolute ſway, and, upon being contradicted by Plato, ſhould fall into paſſion, threaten him with death, and diſmiſs him, under the condition of his being ſold for a ſlave, however true a picture of the tyrant, forms but an inſipid paſſage of hiſtory †. Whether the philoſopher, having by this time made Dion, and a few other noble Sicilians, converts to his political principles, provoked the tyrant's jealouſy and rage, we are not well aſſured ‡. Some authors, with Izetzes, refer Plato's expulſion from Sicily ſolely to this cauſe. The connection he formed with Dion, and the honour he had in being the inſtructor of a youth poſſeſſed of natural ingenuity, and liberality of heart and mind, is, together with the ſequel of it, an epiſode too large to be here inſerted, and cannot be related to advantage ‖, but in the light, and at the length, which Plutarch has given it. To that author we muſt turn, and to the epiſtles of Plato, for information about what is curious in the occaſion and circumſtances

* Cicero, Tuſcul. Quaeſt. lib. 5.

† To enliven the ſtory, a circumſtance is told about his landing in the iſle of Ægina, where capital puniſhment had been decreed for every Athenian who came aſhore. He was ſeized, and might have been put to death; but one of the people having ſaid, in jeſt, "It is only an unlucky miſtake made by a philoſopher, and it will be enough to have him ſold," the reſt were put into good humour; and ſo no harder fate befel him. He was redeemed, it is ſaid, by ſome of his friends, for twenty minae. But there ſeems to be a mixture of fiction in ſeveral parts of the narrative.

‡ Diogen. Laert. ibid. ‖ In Dion. Vita.

of his two other voyages to Sicily, upon the ſucceſſion of the younger Dionyſius to the government. From them, joined with ſome anecdotes from Aulus Gellius *, and Apuleius, we may underſtand, if not the whole ſchemes of the philoſopher, and his friend Dion, at leaſt how eager their ſolicitation, and how great their hopes were, of obtaining a grant of a diſtrict of land from Dionyſius, for the purpoſe of eſtabliſhing a republican colony. The ſingular eſteem in which Plato was held by the king, who was as anxious to have his approbation and friendſhip, as he was apprehenſive of Dion's deſigns againſt his government, muſt be conſidered to be conſiſtent not only with the mild trait of Dionyſius's character, but alſo the effect of one peculiar to the times, when philoſophers were called to the courts of princes, as much, or more, for the ſake of reputation and popularity; and, perhaps, with a view to the future celebration of their names, than any real regard to their perſons, or profeſſion. Even the elder Dionyſius, haughty as he was, reflecting on the uſage he had given Plato, and that his fame might ſuffer by it, entreated the philoſopher, by letter, not to make him the ſubject of his invectives. "Employed ſufficiently at the Academy, I have not leiſure to think of Dionyſius," was the reply. Without ſuppoſing the motive that has been mentioned to have operated on the mind of the younger Dionyſius, the whole account of Plato's intercourſe with him muſt be reſolved into a ſort of counterplot to Dion's practices againſt his authority, and a train of artifice that cannot, even with that gloſs, be explained.

But if Plato's deſigns, in thrice viſiting Sicily, were not altogether apparent, his detractors, and thoſe who envied his reputation, were at no loſs to interpret them. What other purpoſe could he have, ſaid they, but to ingratiate himſelf with Dionyſius, to make an eſſay of his bounty, and regale himſelf at the famed Sicilian *meſſes*? Xenophon, alas, joined in the laſt part of the cenſure; he who muſt have known what temperate meals were made at the Academy; and that the greateſt commendation of the ſuppers there was, that none repented of them in the morning. Rivalſhip for Socrates's eſteem had early cooled the regard of theſe his two

* Lib. 17. Apuleius de Dogmatis, lib. 1.

two diſciples for each other; and, as the line they took in life was different, ſo their literary compoſitions marked the diverſity of their genius; while each of them was allowed to excel, at leaſt in all his conſiderable productions, every other competitor. Where their ſubjects coincided *, as in the *Sympoſia*, and a few other dialogues by Xenophon, a compariſon between them could not be inſtituted; ſo tranſcendent was Plato's genius in this ſpecies of writing †. Although others before him had given laudable ſpecimens of it, he was acknowledged, even by thoſe who derogated from his merit, to have been its trueſt original, and nobleſt pattern, and to have perfected its art, and diſplayed all the elegance, accuracy, and propriety, of which it was capable. The ſublime contemplations of ſome of his dialogues, treated in a ſtyle adequate to them, obtained him the name of the Divine Philoſopher ‡; and Jove himſelf, it was ſaid, if he ſpoke Greek, would have expreſſed himſelf in the diction of Plato. Ariſtotle, if he compared his maſter's ſtyle with the ſterility of his own, might well be allowed to call it, as he does, a mixed one §, between proſe and poetry. It is, above all others, ſays Cicero, ſweet, grave, and copious: And Dionyſius Halicarnaſſeus, although he criticiſes it as variable, and even different, according to the ſubjects of the dialogues, admits, in many of them, a ſimilar, and in ſome a higher, commendation.

Beſide the dialogical compoſition being in the manner of Socrates, and in the taſte of the learned amongſt the Greeks, Plato might prefer it the more as a proper vehicle to the parts of his philoſophy that had a foreign air, and which, if held forth in a ſyſtematic form, or in any one leſs agreeable, would not have been reliſhed, or but by a few. It has been obſerved, that he innovated upon the philoſophy of his maſter, and eſpecially incorporated with it many of the doctrines of Pythagoras. Ariſtotle calls him ‖, in moſt things, a follower of that philoſopher, or thoſe of his ſect; and the judgment ſoon formed of his philoſophic theo-

* Athenaeus, lib. 11. pag. 505.—6. † Diogen. Laert. ibid.
‡ Cicer. de Optim. Gener. Orat. pag. 305. Ibid. de Clariſ. Orat. pag. 219. Ibid. in Orat. § De Demonſtratione, lib. 2. ‖ Metaphyſ. lib. 1. cap. 6.

ries was, that, in them, he blended together the reaſonings of the diſciples of Heraclitus, of the Pythagoreans, and the Socratics. In the doctrine about things perceived by the ſenſes, he was reckoned to correſpond with the firſt; in what related to intellect, with the ſecond; and in moral and political ſubjects, with the third. But, in the dialogues, neceſſarily ſupported upon the intervention, and arguments, of two, three, or more perſons, it is not always evident whether the probable opinions delivered by ſome of them be or be not agreeable to the tenets of Socrates, and, conſequently, of Plato, who profeſſed to follow him only as a maſter in philoſophy. The reaſoning, frequently, does not make this point clear, eſpecially in regard to the arguments of two of the dialogiſts, under the general denominations of the Athenian Hoſt, and the Stranger of Elea *. Plato, it ſeems, uſed certain *marks* in his writings, to ſignify Socrates's approbation or diſapprobation of what was advanced by the other dialogiſts; but theſe, as tranſmitted to us, have been found inſufficient to make the diſtinction. The only rule, therefore, that could be given with reſpect to it, was an imperfect one; that Socrates, or Plato, was to be underſtood to hold that to be true, which he explains and aſſerts; that to be falſe, which he confutes; and that to be doubtful, which he leaves undecided. Hence it early became a matter of diſpute, whether Plato was to be accounted a dogmatiſt or not; ſince many of his dialogues conclude not in the direct affirmative ſtrain, but with the Socratic heſitation and reſerve. When he is read along with the forced gloſſes which interpreters and commentators have put upon him, he may appear to ſome as poſitive in his opinions and doctrines as they generally are. But the ancients, who had few of theſe to conſult,

* In Diogenes Laertius we find preſerved nine of theſe peculiar ſignatures, which ſerved, beſide denoting the variations of Socrates's aſſent or diſſent, not always perſpicuous in the dialogical argumentation, to mark his uſe of new words, and figures of ſpeech. But the application of the latter, as well as of the former, proved a ground of controverſy to the learned; who found much the ſame difficulty in aſſigning each of them their proper places, as we know they do in underſtanding the meaning of other ſimilar characters made uſe of by ſome ancient authors, and met with in particular copies of their books. Diog. lib. 3. p. 204. edit. Ægidii Menagii.

ſult, and needed not ſuch help to underſtand him, pronounced a very different judgment of his dialogues, as appears from that of Cicero *, Sextus Empiricus, and others. Even in the Timaeus, he holds forth a phyſical and moral ſyſtem of the univerſe, which he thought the beſt of any delivered by the philoſophers; but neither gives it as his own, nor maintains it to be an indubitable one, unattended with difficulties, and liable to no objections. He is to be conſidered, ſays Themiſtius †, as performing, in philoſophy, a ſervice ſimilar to that which Theſeus did for the city of Athens. Diſjoined as its parts were, and when only ſome one or another of them was chiefly taught in the Grecian and foreign ſchools, he collected them together, and endeavoured to render his works a vehicle of the whole. If this be the juſt view to be taken of his dialogues, the labours of Theodoret, and, after him, of Bayle, and other modern writers, who have taken pains to point out his inconſiſtencies and contradictions, are miſapplied, and cannot claim much attention. He is allowed, indeed, to have invented ſeveral things of his own, and interſperſed them with his dialogical reaſoning; in which he appears to conſider it as an excellence to make every branch of ſcience coaleſce with another, and logic come in aid of geometry, arithmetic of metaphyſics, and even tradition, or poetical fable, in ſupport of phyſical theory. From this intermixture of proofs, beyond what any analogy amongſt the ſciences can juſtify, his arguments are ſometimes unperſpicuous and abſtruſe, and more ſpecious and fanciful than convincing; and to it, joined with what we have obſerved about two of the dialogiſts, the obſcurity complained of in his reaſoning may be referred.

To

* According to Cicero's reckoning, no diſtinction could be made between Plato's old Academy, and that afterwards called the New, which approached to a ſpecies of ſcepticiſm. Hanc Academiam novam appellabant; quae mihi vetus videtur, ſi quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus; cujus in libris nihil affirmatur, et in utramque partem, multa diſſeruntur; de omnibus quaeritur nihil certi dicitur, &c. Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 1. in fine. Sextus Empiricus admits, that Plato might be called by ſome an *Aporeomaic*, or a doubter, and, by others, a dogmatiſt; although he will by no means allow him to be a Sceptic, in his ſenſe of the term. Pyrron. Hypotyp. lib. 1. c. 33.

† Oratio 26. fol. edit. pag. 318. 19. 20.

To enter into the details of the little jealouſies and diſguſts which are ſaid to have ariſen between Plato and his contemporaries, Antiſthenes, Ariſtippus, Æſchines, and others, would be a frivolous labour; and which, as for any inſtruction to be got from it, Diogenes Laertius might have ſpared. He might alſo have omitted ſtating a lame proof of Alcimus's opinion, that Plato was indebted for his inſtruction in the Pythagorean philoſophy chiefly to the poems of Epicharmus; although it was generally allowed, that, by converſing with the early diſciples of that ſchool, and purchaſing the books of Philolaus, he muſt have been acquainted with better authorities. To conclude, then, this ſketch of Plato's life and character, we have only farther to obſerve, that the profeſſion of philoſophy received, in his perſon, the moſt ſignal honours. Upon his appearance at the Olympic games, the eyes of all the ſpectators were turned upon him; and the contenders for the prizes were, for a while, relinquiſhed by the multitude *. His ſtatue, dedicated to the muſes, was ſet up in the Academy by Mithridates, the ſon of Rhodobatus, a Perſian nobleman. Ariſtotle, deſtined as he was by his genius to rival him in philoſophic fame, forſook not his lectures for near twenty years; and, upon his death, erected, according to the cuſtom of the Greeks, an altar to his memory. "To *the Man*," he engraved upon it, "is this altar conſecrated, from whoſe commendation let the vitious and immoral ever abſtain, as a thing not lawful to them. In life, doctrine, and manners, ſubſequent ages will hardly produce his equal." This honour, together with that of an oration writ in a ſimilar ſtrain of praiſe, paid to him by ſuch a judge as Ariſtotle, and who had ſo much opportunity of knowing him, muſt be accounted a tribute, not of gratitude only, but of truth, and which emulation itſelf could not with-hold. In the ſtate of celibacy, and while yet, at the age of eighty-one †, he held the pen in his hand, he is ſaid, upon his birth-day, to have made a ſudden and eaſy exit. He was buried, with much funeral ſolemnity, in his Academic Grove; and his tomb was inſcribed with three epigrams, which Diogenes Laertius has recorded, adding two of his own compoſition.

* Diogenes Laert. ibid. † Cicero de Senectute, pag. 407. Seneca, tom. 1. pag. 382. Pauſanias Atticis, pag. 58. Marſilius Ficinus in Vita.

tion. The fine diſtich which is reckoned to ſupply the loſs of Ariſtophanes's epitaph is commonly aſcribed to Plato, who held him in eſteem, and recommended his comedies to Dionyſius's peruſal, when he deſired information about the popular manners and uſages of the Greeks. The time of his death coincides with the 13th year of the reign of Philip, the Macedonian king, which commenced the 1ſt year of the 108th Olympiad.

He was ſucceeded in the Academy by Speuſippus, his ſiſter's ſon, who followed the doctrine, but not the moral or generous example of his kinſman *. He was paſſionate, addicted to pleaſure, and mercenary. The natural infirmity of his conſtitution iſſued in a paralytic diſorder, which made him melancholy, and, as was believed, a ſuicide in his old age. Yet the account of him which we find in Plutarch †, far from being ſo unfavourable, is contradictory to theſe ſtrokes Laertius has given his character, the traits of which the acceſs of his diſtemper might vary, or render of a doubtful caſt. His abilities as a philoſopher were proved by ſeveral pieces written by him, chiefly in the form of *Commentaries* and *Dialogues;* and they muſt have had at leaſt the eſtimation of merit, if, according to Phavorinus, Ariſtotle thought them worth purchaſing at three talents. He preſided in the Academy only eight years, in the muſaeum of which he erected the ſtatues of the *Graces*. Finding his conſtitutional debility increaſe, he invited Xenocrates to take the charge of the Academic diſcipline.

Xenocrates, the ſon of Agathenor, a Chalcedonian, was that noted diſciple of Plato, whoſe natural dulneſs contraſted the penetrating genius of Ariſtotle ‡. His reſpectful attention, and attachment to his maſter, were alſo the more remarkable, when compared with the indifference, and rather petulant manner, of his aſſociate in the Academy. Yet his apparent defects were, in ſome meaſure, compenſated, by abſtinence from all diverſions and pleaſures, conſtant application to ſtudy, and, notwithſtanding his ſlow capacity in other reſpects, by his readily conceiving,

* Diogen. Laert. in Vita. † De Adulatione, et in Vita Dionis.

‡ Diogen. Laert. lib. 4. Ælian. Cicero, Epiſt. ad Atticum, lib. 1. et in Officiis, lib. 1.

ceiving, and being evidently ſenſible to, all the precepts of virtue. As he grew up to manhood, the gravity and auſterity of his manners appeared to have the ſoftening of innate humanity and benevolence. Innocence and integrity, expreſſed in his general deportment, commanded eſteem and reverence, even without the aid of the *Graces*, to which Plato often adviſed him to ſacrifice. When joined with other Athenian envoys to the Macedonian court, he would accept of no preſents from Philip, and declined going to the feaſts and entertainments which that prince gave with the view of corrupting his colleagues. Upon the report of the negotiation being demanded at Athens, and his anſwering, that he pretended not, for his part, to have done any thing in it, the people were about calling him to an account for negligence; but they ſoon underſtood in what ſenſe his aſſociates had ſhown themſelves more active. Being obliged in court to deliver his teſtimony, upon oath, the Athenian judges, when he ſaid, "I now declare the truth," roſe from their ſeats, and inſiſted, that no other confirmation of his veracity was requiſite; and his ſimple aſſeveration was afterwards admitted in all the tribunals.

Several of the vulgar debauchees had ſometimes thrown themſelves in his way, in ſcorn of his gravity *; but none had preſumed to intrude upon the place, and time of his prelections to his ſtudents, until Polemo, the moſt diſſolute and daring of the ſons of riot, ruſhed into his ſchool, and, intoxicated as he was, and with all his *Bachanalian* attire, ſeated himſelf under his eye. Xenocrates obſerved him; and, without being in the leaſt diſcompoſed, turned his diſcourſe to the becoming virtues of modeſty and temperance †. The lecture, accompanied with a reprehenſive look, had the effect of diſpelling Polemo's intoxication. He ſtole off the garlands that wreathed his neck and head. His aſſured countenance changed to dejection; and, after his retirement, much to the

* Diog. Laert. in Polem. Valerius Maximus.

† ——————Quaero, faciaſne quod olim,
Mutatus Polemo, ponas inſignia morbi
Faſciolas, cubital, focalia; potus ut ille,
Dicitur ex collo, furtim carpſiſſe coronas,
Poſtquam eſt impranſi correptus voce magiſtri. Hor. Sat. 3. lib. 2.

the confuſion of all the votaries of irregularity, Polemo was found a convert to the ſtudy of morals and philoſophy. Xenocrates's refuſal of a preſent of fifty talents, ſent him from Alexander, by his ambaſſadors, was in the character of a philoſopher, and alſo not indecent in the manner of it *. He invited them to ſupper in the Academy, at which the meat and drink preſented were of the plaineſt kind, and of ſmall coſt. Next day, being aſked by them to whom they ſhould pay the money, "I thought," anſwered he, "that, from yeſternight's ſober meal, you might have underſtood how little I had occaſion for ſuch a ſum; however, that I may not appear to diſdain your maſter's liberality, I ſhall be indebted to him for thirty *minae*," which was only equal to half a talent, or the hundreth part of what was offered.

In philoſophy, Xenocrates adhered cloſely to the doctrines of his maſter; ſo far at leaſt as they were conceivable to him †. He inſiſted ſtrenuouſly upon the principle, that the human ſoul was not corporeal, but a ſelf-moving number, which had the greateſt power in nature. In his eſtimate of things external to the mind, he undervalued, and rejected their utility, beyond what Plato had done. Hence Cicero ‡ calls him the ſevereſt of the philoſophers. He vulgariſed much in his notions about the planets and fixed ſtars, and heſitated between making one divinity, or more gods of them. His compoſitions were numerous; and, amongſt them, thoſe on the elements and rules of rational diſcourſe received great approbation. His death enſued in the 25th year of his regency in the Academic ſchool, and the 82d of his age, correſponding to about the 116th Olympiad.

Polemo, reclaimed from all his diſſolute habits to the practice of virtue, and a proficient in philoſophy, became Xenocrates's ſucceſſor in the Academy. Crantor, his fellow diſciple, from his eminent reputation, might have pretended to the honourable place, and his competition for it was generally expected; when affection and reſpect made him decline. Retiring, upon the accident of ſickneſs, to the *Aſclepian* temple,

* Cicero, Tuſcul. Quaeſt. lib. 5. et Tuſc. Quaeſt. lib. 1. pag. 118. lib. 4.

† Ibid. Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 1. et 4.;

‡ De Officiis, lib. 1.; et Acad. Quaeſt.

many were perſuaded that he meant to inſtitute there a ſeparate ſchool *. But, although he was followed thither by numbers of the ſtudents, he gave this indication, amongſt others, that he had no ſuch purpoſe or deſire. Arceſilas, his lover, coming to him with the requeſt of a recommendation to Polemo, he not only granted it, but, upon the recovery of his health, went himſelf to attend the lectures given in the Academy. "I was attracted," ſaid he to Polemo, "when a con-diſciple, by his equal tone of voice; which on no occaſion was either too much elevated or depreſſed." It was a ſymptom of that ſingular compoſure, miſtaken by ſome for obduracy of mind, by which that convert to philoſophy diſtinguiſhed himſelf. He confeſſed that he admired in Xenocrates his apparent innocence and his dry manner, and wiſhed to have a ſtrain of his gravity; which, ſaid he, operates in the human character as the deep Doric tone does in muſical compoſition. He, who had experienced the ſway of the paſſions, when once yielded to, had his reaſons for preſcribing it as a maxim in the practice of morals, "not to relax the aſſumed tone of the mind, but rather to be pertinacious and obſtinate in preſerving its uniformity." "It becomes us," ſaid he, "to diſcover our chief addreſs and ability, not in the dialectic art, but in the actions of life; ſince, for admired ſkill in the firſt, we ſhould rather bluſh, if untaught to maintain the conſiſtency and order of our affections." Urbanity, however, which was natural to his birth and fortune, he ſo retained, as to make it perceptible in the midſt of all his internal conſtancy. To the ſtudy of philoſophy, he joined the reading of the more dignified poets; and uſed to call Homer the Epic Sophocles, and Sophocles the Tragic Homer. "I am well pleaſed," ſaid he, "with thoſe paſſages, in which, as the comic wits ſay, Sophocles ſeems to have had ſome deep mouthed Moloſſian dog at his ſide at the time he compoſed; and no leſs, when, ſoftening his ſtrain, he makes deſcription flow like the limpid ſtream; or, ſoaring only as the Attic bee, diſcovers the ſweet ſpoils he has gathered from the flowers of Parnaſſus." He lived in honour and eſteem at Athens; although he made choice of privacy and retirement. A ſmall garden ſerved for his auditory; in which

* Diog. Laert. in Polem.

which he pronounced his lectures, oftener when walking than ſitting. The lodges the ſtudents of philoſophy built for themſelves nigh his receſs, ſhowed their attachment to his diſcipline. Of his compoſitions there are ſaid to have been a conſiderable variety, as he lived to old age; but ſcarcely any character of them remains, beſide Antiochus's approbation of them mentioned by Cicero *; and, as to his philoſophical ſpeculations, unleſs ſo far as they were reckoned in general to correſpond to thoſe of Plato and Xenocrates, nothing is to be collected worthy of notice.

The ſucceſſion to the Academic ſchool, upon Polemo's death, is not ſo diſtinctly aſcertained, but that a doubt has been made, whether Crantor ſhould not be included in it. Moſt probable, however, it appears, that, notwithſtanding his fame was great as an academician, he never attained to the regency, and even that his death preceded that of Polemo and Crates. He was the firſt, according to Proclus, who wrote commentaries on Plato's works. But his moſt valued production was that upon *Grief*, which Cicero calls a ſmall but precious treatiſe †, and Panaetius recommended to be got off, every word of it, by memory. Crates, therefore, is to be reckoned the fourth ſucceſſor in the Academy; with reſpect to whom no particulars related are ſo memorable, as the intimacy and friendſhip between him and Polemo. Their ſtudies, their exerciſes, and their amuſements, had been the ſame in youth, and continued to be ſo through their advanced years. Thus known to have been inſeparably connected in their minds, taſtes, and diſpoſitions, one ſepulchre is ſaid to have received them both, and one epitaph to have adorned their memory.

Arceſilas, who had ſtudied under Autolychus, the mathematician of his own country, and Theophraſtus, Ariſtotle's diſciple, at Athens, had introduced himſelf, by his acquaintance with Crantor, into the Academy. By his advancement to the regency, its name ſubſequently came to be altered to that of the *Middle Academy*, partly from the circumſtance of his deviating, in an important point, from Plato's doctrine,

* Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 4. pag. 35. † Ibid. pag. 36.

and more eſpecially becauſe his ſchool was followed by another, called the *new* one, for a ſimilar reaſon. But the explications of theſe diviſions of the Academy muſt be preceded by the account of Plato's philoſophy, which, therefore, becomes the ſubject of the ſections that follow.

SECT.

SECTION II.

Of the Diviſion of Philoſophy by Plato;—of the Dialectic and Metaphyſical parts;—Sketches of the Reaſoning in both.—Of Ideas, and the Participation of them.—Arguments for the Immortality of the Human Soul—Conceptions of Deity and Providence.—Vanity of Phyſics without reference of Natural Acts to Ends.

PHILOSOPHY, or ſcience in general, was divided by Plato into two parts; one *theoretical*, and the other *practical*, or *effective;* and to theſe the *dialectic* might be joined * as neceſſary, and conducive to the explication and proper underſtanding of both. In reſpect of its object, *theoretical* ſcience was deemed to be converſant about *eſſences*, primary and immutable, and what might be termed the *things that are*, and ſuch as were firſt cauſes of other things; and, in this view, it communicates to the human mind true and divine knowledge, or *wiſdom*, properly ſo called. Then, alſo, it demonſtrates truths ſo intelligible, that they cannot appear otherwiſe; as, in the proved theorems of mathematics, and numbers, which, therefore, beget juſt contemplations. It further comprehends the inveſtigation of the motions and revolutions of the *celeſtial* bodies, together with that of the fabric, and the productions of the earth, and of the original conſtitution of man; whence ariſes all *phyſical* doctrine, which has for its foundation rational or probable *opinion*. The *practical* part of philoſophy conſiders man's actions and paſſions, and

more

* Dialog. de Regno, vel Civilis.

more eſpecially as they are relative to his place here below amidſt terreſtrial beings, and his particular condition, whether as an individual, or as a part of a family, or a member of a commonwealth. It, therefore, inſtructs him in morals, in oeconomics, and in politics.

Philoſophic ſcience may therefore be defined the *ſtudy and deſire of divine wiſdom, conjoined with the prudential knowledge of good and evil in human life, and of theſe things in it that are neutral or indifferent.* To ſuppoſe that ſcience conſiſts * in the perception of external objects, with obſervation of their differences from one another, and a diſtinction of their ſeveral qualities and effects, is a ſuperficial and imperfect view of it. The acts of the mind relative to all theſe, whether it notes them or numbers them, or diſtinguiſhes their properties and energies, may ſtill amount to no more than to a conception of them as *ſingulars*, which is the ſimpleſt appearance of rational judgment, and cannot be deemed ſcience, that has for its object general truths. The natural capacity of the human ſoul may be proved, in many inſtances, to go further than to the diſtinguiſhing of one and many, great and ſmall, in objects, or of what is uſeful and hurtful, agreeable and diſagreeable in actions; ſince, untutored, and without inſtruction, it can form to itſelf a conception of unity, magnitude, utility, pulchritude; ideas of a general nature, and a ſpecies of intelligence, which ſurpaſſes the reach of the ſenſes, and cannot be aſcribed to the impreſſion of corporeal objects, unleſs the effect be imagined greater than the cauſe. Philoſophy, therefore, cultivates this faculty of the ſoul as the beſt help to her inquiries, both in phyſical and in moral ſubjects.

From the more narrow and limited views of ſcience, taken by philoſophers, various abuſes of reaſon, and many abſurd and groſs aſſertions, have ariſen. Amongſt other inſtances which might be given, that of Protagoras is a remarkable one. Finding it to be the phyſical principle of Heraclitus, Empedocles, and of the generality of the philoſophers, and, along with them, that of the two greateſt poets in their kind, Homer and Epicharmus, "that all things flowed," this famous Sophiſt

* Plato in Dialog. de Repub. lib. 7. Apuleius de Dogmate Platonis. In Æthicis. Diogen. Laert. ibid.

Sophiſt grafted upon it this ſingular and extravagant tenet, "that ſenſation was ſcience," and that every man's opinion * of every thing was true, and he the meaſure of all things, as exiſting, or not exiſting, to himſelf. It is obvious with what plauſibility he might ſupport his *dialectic* poſition upon his phyſical principle. If all things, in every inſtant, flowed, then nothing could be properly ſaid to be one thing more than another, but only to have an apparency of exiſtence; ſince what flows *never is*, but always, at moſt, *about to be*. But, as has been already ſhown, he might inſiſt, that this apparency, however inſtantaneous, was all that could be reckoned upon in human opinion, or judgment of any thing, and, therefore, muſt be held, whether various or not, alike true to every man according to his ſenſation. Although this poſition has had a particular confutation, we ſhall here add that of Plato, as we find it ſtated by him † in the dialectic manner. "Protagoras affirms, that every man's opinion of every thing is true ‡. *He does.* He then thinks it to be ſo. *Surely.* And he thinks the contrary opinion to be falſe? *No.* He *only ſays, he knows it not.* Is it then a thing to him unknown, or what he is ignorant of? *It is ſo.* And he thinks it to be ſuch? *Yes, in a manner.* But ſay how? *As of a thing out of his thought, and not exiſtent there.* Can any perſon be ſenſible of a thing not in his thought, which has never been, and may not be there? *What elſe is his ſenſe of nothing?* So Protagoras's opinion or judgment of any thing is true, and yet oppoſed to nothing. As ſtanding, therefore, by itſelf, and having no contrary, it can neither be reckoned true nor falſe. It is only a ſimple and unrelative opinion, which, indeed, is no more than a modification of thought. *But, allowing that an opinion, in order to be denominated true, muſt have a contrary; yet Protagoras may ſtill ſay his opinion is true, as it, and*

* Ariſtotle, in ſcorn of this poſition, ſays, in anſwer to it, ſuch is the ſcience of the ſenſes, that, if a man only puts his finger between his eyes, and under his ſight, it will be viſible to him as one and two. Metaphyſ. lib. 1.

† In Theaeteto, vel Dialog. de Scientia.

‡ Sextus Empiricus's argument againſt Protagoras is juſt and in point. If, ſays he, it be true, that whatever a man thinks of any thing is true, it muſt alſo be ſo, when he thinks every, or any, opinion he has of any thing to be falſe. What then becomes of the firſt propoſition? Adverſ. Mathem. lib. 7. pag. 209.

and no other, appears to him to be ſo.—Here you revert to the firſt ſtep of the diſpute, and, therefore, the queſtion muſt be repeated, Is there any difference betwixt a thing appearing to be true, and a man's knowing or thinking it to be ſo, and what is the difference? *Protagoras only ſays he has the ſenſation of its being true.* Does he ſay he has the ſenſation, without thinking he has it? *No.* When he thinks he has it, does he know, or does he not know, that he has it? *He knows that he has it.* When any thing is known to him to exiſt in his ſenſation, does he know, or does he not know, its contrary to be, or not to be, there in the ſame inſtant? *He knows it not to be there.* If he knows that it is not in his thought, he muſt be ſenſible that he knows it not. *What then?* Obſerve only what is the reſult of the argument. *What indeed?* It is a riddle fit for the *Sphinx* to utter. Protagoras's opinion of every thing is true; and yet, from only appearing to be ſo to him, it may be otherwiſe. He thinks it to be true, while he knows not in what it differs from any thing whatever. Beyond his ſenſation or thought, he knows nothing to be true; and yet he knows this farther for a truth, *that he does not know;* or, in other words, he is obliged to confeſs, that his opinion about any thing is not to himſelf the meaſure, nor his affirmation with reſpect to it, the rule of all his knowledge."

Such is Plato's dialectic reaſoning, in the Theaetetus, when it proceeded in the manner of *induction;* and which is exemplified in ſeveral other of his dialogues, eſpecially in the Gorgias, Hippias, Euthydemus, and Protagoras, where he expoſes the boaſted wit, and confutes the futile aſſertions of the Sophiſts. It has been obſerved how properly Socrates employed this ſpecies of argument againſt them. It was of two kinds, one merely controverſial *, or *Eriſtic.* When it inferred things that

* The examples of this miſerable ſophiſtry were: "Man is either an animal, or he is wood and ſtone; he is not the latter, for he is animated, and moves himſelf; and therefore he is the former. But, if an animal, he is a dog or an ox. When the queſtion was put, Is your father the ſame with my father? the anſwer was, My father is either another father than your father, or the ſame If, then, he is another than your father, as being *another*, he will not be a father; and if he be the ſame with my father, being the *ſame*, he is my father. Diogen. Laert. lib. 3. pag. 195.—6.

that had ſimilitude, to be the ſame, or upon a queſtion being put which had an alternative, the anſwer to it, either way, could always be rendered contradictory to itſelf. The other, which proceeded not by contraries, but by conſequences, was admitted to be juſt both in rhetoric, and in the dialectic, with this diſtinction between them, that, in the former, it could only prove particular truths from *particulars*; but, in the latter, univerſal ones could be inferred from them. In rhetoric, the inquiry is not about the juſtice or injuſtice of any action, or whether, ſpeculatively conſidered, it may be right or wrong, but only whether or not *ſuch a thing was done*. The proof*, therefore, is taken from the allegation of ſome particular circumſtance known, or diſcoverable, and which was moſt likely to have attended the action in queſtion, if done; and it goes no farther than to eſtabliſh the actual doing of it by a particular perſon. Thus the ſecret murder may be proved to be the act of him, who, ſoon after its perpetration, has been found lurking, and ſtained with blood. But the dialectic having, for its object, the diſcovery of ſpeculative truths, aſſumes a particular one, in order to eſtabliſh an *axiom*, or ſome general propoſition. In this manner, if we inquire whether the human ſoul be immortal, the firſt queſtion to be aſked is, Can the living be from the dead? or, is it in nature that ſuch a phenomenon takes place? In anſwer to this, it muſt be acknowledged, that, in various inſtances, it is proved that *contraries* are from *contraries*; ſo generation comes from corruption, waking from ſleeping, the greater from the leſs; and the ſame truth holds converſely. Plato, therefore, taking it for an axiom, that contraries generate each other, inſiſts upon it, in his Phaedo, as a concluſive argument for the immortality of the ſoul. It is that kind of proof adopted in the ſcience of geometry, which often, indeed, ſuppoſes the contrary to what is implied in the propoſition, and, from an inference of one thing after another, conſequent to that ſuppoſition, evinces ſome groſs abſurdity to be incurred by it. Converſant as Plato was in geometry, he is reckoned to have been the firſt who introduced this ſpecies of reaſoning into the dialectic; the parts of which laid down or illuſtrated by him, are reducible, *firſt*, to the queſtion, What a thing is

* Cicero de Inventione, lib. 1. pag. 67. et ſequent.

in its nature or eſſence, and what are its accidents? and *then*, for the inveſtigation of both, to diviſion, definition, analyſis, induction, and ſyllogiſm. His knowledge of the ten *Categories*, or of ſuch a diviſion of the *genera* of things, and the *modes* of *beings*, as was equivalent to that famous ſummary of all the conceptions of them by the human underſtanding, is evident from his dialectic argumentation under one or other of *theſe* heads, and particularly in the ſpecimen given of it in the *Parmenides*. It is alledged that he might owe to Archytas of Tarentum the knowledge he had of the Categories.

The abuſe of the *dialectic* by the Sophiſts was carried to the groſſeſt extreme. They inſiſted, that contradictions might be proved by it to be conſiſtent; and eſpecially, that *non-entity* might be deemed to have a reality of being as well as *entity*. Hence we find, in the *Sophiſt* of Plato *, a piece of motley argumentation about the pretenſions of a thing *that is not*, to contend for exiſtence with *that which is*; and ſome of the nugatory

* In Sophiſt. vel de Ente. Amongſt other frantic allegations upon this hideous topic, it was ſaid, *that which is not*, being the contrary of *that which is*, as an *oppoſite*, muſt be *ſomething*. Although a *negative*, it occurs to the mind as a *poſitive*. If it were an abſolute *non-entity*, it could not be expreſſed by any *epithet*; and yet, in arithmetic, men ſpeak not only of one, but of many nothings. As it was an early queſtion amongſt the philoſophers, what *ſpace*, or that which is not body, but contains it, was to be reckoned, and whether it might be ſomething or nothing? ſome of Plato's commentators refer the part of his *Eriſtic* diſputations, here adverted to, about *that which is not*, and *that which is*, to that controverſy, which afterwards became a celebrated one with the ſchoolmen. In modern metaphyſics, the axiom, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, which was generally maintained amongſt the ancient philoſophers, has been impunged, not ſo much for its being contradictory to creation by *omnipotent* power, but upon the ſceptical ground of our having no proper idea of power in general, or of any neceſſary connection betwixt a cauſe and its effect; unleſs ſo far as the one may be obſerved to follow the other. If we reaſon upon this topic *a priori*, and not from experience, it is ſaid, we may conclude, that *any thing may be produced from any thing*. And why, indeed, may we not as well ſay from *nothing*, as from an inconceivable ſomething, or an undetermined any thing? ſince, *for ought we know*, or can reaſon about *nothing*, it may not only have, as the *Eriſtics* alledged, epithets competent to it, but occult properties and powers. Hence it ſeems, that, to an adept in ſophiſtry, there may be no more difficulty in conceiving bodies to be generated by ſpace than that they are contained in it.

tory and ridiculous reaſons uſed in the prepoſterous conteſt are ſpecified. To ſtigmatiſe the broachers of theſe ſoleciſms, under the name of *dialect* reaſoning, was not the only view the philoſopher had in reciting them. As there were phyſical philoſophers, ſuch as thoſe already mentioned, who, maintaining the inceſſant fluidity of all things, expunged, upon this theory, the reality of objects, whether corporeal or incorporeal, and others, who, holding their immutability, rendered them incomprehenſible, it was Plato's aim to introduce his doctrine with reſpect to *entity* in general, as oppoſed to *non-entity*, and his conception of real being as diſtinguiſhable from that which was only apparent and variable, and to ſupport theſe *theſes* upon the dialectical ground, which then was beſtrewed with a variety of puerile conceits, and fallacies, unworthy of being called arguments. Yet, as they were impoſing, and had, with many, the credit of logical acuteneſs, the philoſopher, it ſeems, thought it might be a recommendation of his genius, to ſuch judges, to play the Sophiſt in ſome of his dialogues *; and it would be a miſtake to think, that the moſt frivolous of them were, in that age, accounted as deſpicable as they might afterwards appear, or as they are now juſtly deemed by us. Careful, however, and concerned he was, not to throw the dialectic reaſoning into this illuſive channel; and, therefore, as the propereſt guard againſt ſophiſtry, he required every argument to proceed upon definitions of the terms uſed in it; and the rule pointed out by him for definition † has been ever ſince ſuſtained by Logicians as the beſt general one. It preſcribes, firſt, the aſcertaining the *genus* of the thing to be defined; and then ſuch a diviſion to be made of that genus as may di-

* In proof that Plato argued ſometimes *eriſtically*, or in the contentious manner of the orators, and ſophiſts, for the ſake of pleaſing the Greeks in this falſe taſte, the following paſſage may be quoted from Cicero, De Oratore, lib. 1. p. 112. Sed ego neque illis aſſentiebar, neque harum diſputationum *inventori*, et principi, longe omnium in dicendo graviſſimo, et eloquentiſſimo, *Platoni*; cujus, tum Athenis, diligentius legi cum Carneade, Gorgiam; quo in libro, in hoc maxime admirabor Platonem, quod mihi, in irridendis oratoribus, ipſe eſſe ſummus orator videbatur: *Verbi enim controverſia jamdiu torquet Graeculos homines, contentionis cupidiores, quam veritatis.*

† Ibid. in Sophiſt. et in Theaeteto.

ſtinguiſh the ſpecies that may be comprehended under it. By taking the firſt of theſe, or what may be called the *ſpecific difference*, and adding it to the genus, an adequate definition will be obtained. Thus, for inſtance, if a Sophiſt ſhould be *metaphorically* called a *Fiſher*, and we would find the definition of his employment, we muſt firſt conſider what, amongſt the common occupations of life, a fiſher is to be reckoned. He is, in *general*, a man of craft; but his craft *differs* from that of others, as it is directed to the ſurpriſing certain animals fit to become his prey; and he exerciſes it not for his pleaſure but his profit. Under theſe predicaments, a Sophiſt may be juſtly defined, one whoſe occupation and craft conſiſt in enſnaring the unwary, for the ſake of gain to himſelf.

The *analytical* method of reaſoning is alſo uſed by Plato, although often not ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed from that of *analogy*, or of the *induction*, already explained. In the former of theſe, the aſſumption is taken from any ſtate, or quality, in a ſenſible object, and applied to a mental or intelligible one. When the ſyſtem of all things is held to be one, and connected, as in Plato's theory, the analogical argumentation muſt be admitted to be juſt and concluſive. Hence the aſcenſion is made by this philoſopher from ſenſible things to primary *intelligibles*, or ideas. Amongſt the examples of the *analyſis* *, more of the *inductive* than the proper kind, we may reckon that argument uſed by him for the ſoul's immortality, which is taken from its being inceſſantly moved. It cannot, argues he, have conſtant motion, and owe it to any foreign impulſe, unleſs a progreſſion were abſurdly allowed from finite to infinite. It muſt, therefore, be held to be ſelf-moved, which is the ſame thing with being the principle of motion. But a principle, in the nature of things, is conceived to be that which is ungenerated; and, where generation takes not place, there can be no room for corruption. It follows, then, that the human ſoul, poſſeſſed of motion, not derived, but of its own eſſence, and not as a contingent quality, but as an inherent principle, muſt be pronounced to be of a nature ſo permanent, that the attributes of incorruptibility and immortality are to be aſſigned to it. There is likewiſe another more looſe mode of the inductive proof, which proceeds upon various ſuppoſitions, made one after another,

* De Legibus, lib. 10.

other, in order to conſider what will follow upon each of them, and to determine in favour of that which includes ſome principle not aſſumed, but either generally admitted, or granted to be true. Plato often employs it for procuring unexceptionable definitions; and the inſtances of it are moſt remarkable in the Theaetetus, the Parmenides, and Gorgias.

As the dialectic, even under theſe preſcribed rules, was apt to run into diffuſe diſputation, the more accurate diſciples of the Socratic ſchool ſaw the neceſſity of ſtating their queſtions and arguments in a cloſer form. In proportion as they aimed more at general concluſions, their propoſitions would be expreſſed in more general terms; and it would be ſoon perceived how, by a certain arrangement of the terms, the premiſſes, if not denied, muſt neceſſarily lead to the concluſion. Thus was the *ſyllogiſm* introduced into the dialectic; which, from a truth *known*, infers another *not known*. In Plato, ſeveral examples are found of the *categorical* or ſimple, of the *hypothetical* and the *mixed* ſyllogiſm; but its preciſe figure in each of them is not always obſerved. As the *dialogue* did not well admit of this formality, it was leſs an object of attention. More anxious to repel the inſults of the Sophiſts upon all juſt reaſoning, than to preſcribe to real inquirers after truth, the particular modes of argumentation, the philoſopher diſcovers his acuteneſs, chiefly, in purſuing the former through all their ſubterfuges in diſputation; and has given, in his Euthydemus, and ſome other dialogues, the proper keys for their detection.

Etymology, or the proper uſe of words and *ſyntax*, and the rhetorical art, as conſtituted upon theſe, are ſubjects of the dialectic *, copiouſly treated by this eminent inſtructor in its various branches. But it would be a mangling of the Cratylus, the Phaedrus, and the Gorgias, by any one

* The dialogues of Plato have been diſtinguiſhed, according to their ſuppoſed *energies*, firſt into thoſe of the *Gymnaſtic* and *Agoniſtic* kind, and then ſubdivided into thoſe called *Majeutic*, *Pyraſtic*, *Endectic*, and *Anatreptic*. The 1ſt, Signifies the *nurſing* the dialectical ſtudent in the knowledge of his art. The 2d, The trial and exerciſe of his powers. The 3d, His uſe of demonſtrative proofs. And the 4th, The ſubverſion of the arguments of the antagoniſt. Diogen. Laert. lib. 3. p. 193. The number of his genuine dialogues is reckoned, in whole, to amount to fifty-ſix, and that of his moral epiſtles, which remain, to thirteen.

one not attempting a tranſlation of theſe dialogues, to deliver a ſummary of the topics they contain. Thoſe who are in the leaſt acquainted with Plato's compoſitions, know, that, in them, he uſes all the freedom of the dialogue; and that he often takes occaſion, when a diſcourſe is introduced upon any of the liberal or practical arts, or on the moral virtues, to illuſtrate them in ſuch a manner, that, while he delineates the particular art, or the virtue, he unfolds or demonſtrates ſome general truth of the intellectual, or Theological kind. This is remarkably evinced in the *Gorgias*, where the rhetorician's art is examined, and proved to be perfected, not by the beſt rules of elocution, or the faculty of perſuaſion alone, but by the orator's poſſeſſing the maſtery of his paſſions, and, as a proficient in the moral ſcience, capable of inſpiring his hearers with the principles of it. After ſeveral compariſons of the profeſſion with other employments, and illuſions to the unworthy and venal aims of the common tribe of Rhetoricians, ſuch tranſitions are made, at every new gloſs of the ſubject, to ſome theory, either mythological or moral, civil or political, that few of the dialogues abound with ſo great a variety of inſtructive topics and obſervations. In this manner does Plato ſhow his poetical genius in the dialogue to be comparable with that of Homer in epic compoſition; for, while he cannot be ſaid to forſake his ſubject, or to forbear the diſquiſitive reaſoning of a philoſopher, he finds it eaſy, in his theory, to connect the ſenſible world with the intellectual, and make every hinge of his argument ſerve as a decent paſſport from the one into the other.

In the Platonic philoſophy, *metaphyſics* are comprehended in the dialect part; nor is the ſcience of the former ſo much ſeparated from *phyſics*, but that the true ſyſtem * of the latter is held forth as the ſource of all real knowledge in metaphyſics. However eſſential the difference be reckoned between corporeal and incorporeal *beings*; however to be diſcriminated matter from forms, ſubſtances from qualities or accidents, in the viſible world, and in the human compoſition; there is ſurely a *link* in the chain of cauſes and effects, there is a *tye* of natural things, in whatever

* Plato's diſciple, Xenocrates, is alledged to have firſt divided the ſciences into the Dialectic, Phyſics, and Ethics.

whatever manner it may be accounted for, which proves that theſe two diſtinguiſhable *beings* may, and do, conſiſt together; and, thereſore, the reaſoning about the one muſt have a connection with that upon the other. Various and oppoſite have the hypotheſes of philoſophers been about the general ſyſtem of things; eſpecially when it was conſidered by them either as *one*, *eſſentially*, without any diſtinction of qualities, or as *two*, with ſuch difference of one thing from another, that each could never exiſt in the ſame manner, and be *as one* with the other; although it was poſſible that certain attributes of the *one* might be communicated to the other. Amongſt ſpeculative philoſophers, two have been mentioned, Parmenides and Protagoras, as holding the moſt contrary opinions, and the confutation of the principle of the latter has been given. Beſide the groſs abſurdity of that of the former, which reprobated motion in the world, the hypotheſis of a one *genus* of all things is unintelligible, ſince it contains a finite and an indefinite idea, a *genus* of one and any thing, or of a nothing known; and it can be more certainly affirmed that there are different ſpecies of things, than that they are *one-all*, undivided, and infinite. Plato, however, choſe to diſcuſs the argument with Parmenides, and his diſciple Zeno, in another manner. The firſt he knew to have been in intimacy with the two Pythagoreans, Diochetes and Amenias; and that, having owed to the latter his converſion to the ſtudy of philoſophy *, it might be preſumed that he would not be altogether averſe to entertain ſome principles of their ſyſtem, which he had early learned. His theory of the *one-all*, and *immoveable*, derived from Xenophanes, required much explication; and it was not unlikely that, now in his old age, he would be diſpoſed to give ſuch an account of it as might correſpond to that theory which Plato had framed, and which appeared to him the moſt plauſible one for reconciling the two oppoſite ſyſtems, that then divided almoſt the whole of the philoſophers about the mobility or immobility of all things in the world.

It is at leaſt, upon ſuch a ſuppoſition as this, about *Parmenides's* temper in philoſophiſing, that Plato is reckoned to have compoſed his noted dialogue of that name, in which he introduces Socrates, then young, commencing

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 9. pag. 560.

commencing the diſpute about *ideas*, with Zeno and Parmenides. After being for a while maintained between the firſt and the ſecond, it concludes with a moſt ſubtile and elaborate deduction of the conceptions of the laſt of them upon the intricate ſubject; but in ſuch a manner as was agreeable to Plato's theory about the exiſtence and nature of *ideas*.

" But, without impugning the inference made by you *," ſaid Socrates to Zeno, " I would put a queſtion upon it. Things, you ſay, cannot be like and unlike, when they participate of one *ens*; yet, may it not be conceived that there are certain *ſpecies* of things, or *ideas* of likeneſs and unlikeneſs, *apart* from the things themſelves, in which I and you, or any two perſons, participate, and, therefore, agree in calling ſome things like, and others unlike, or ſaying, that they are ſimilar to one another, or diſſimilar, according to this common and participated *idea*; and, conſequently, that things are to be accounted not one alone, but divers, and many alſo? Argumentation only trifles, when a ſuppoſition is ſo framed, that *genus* and *ſpecies* not being diſtinguiſhed, it infers, that no difference can be made in things, and that, being in one ſtate, they cannot move, being like one another, or unlike, neither of theſe conditions is convertible into its oppoſite. No one admires his ingenuity in reaſoning, who undertakes, in ſenſible things, to prove himſelf to be one, and many; ſuppoſing his head to be one thing, his feet another, and his hand a third; and yet he, participating in theſe many, to be one perſon. But, if he ſhould affirm that one is many, or, as has been already ſtated, that likeneſs and unlikeneſs, one and multitude, ſtate and motion, when taken for ſeparate ſpecies, or ideas diſtinct from one another, and ſtill offer to prove them to be one, ſuch an argument, if it could be formed, would be curious indeed, and deſerve admiration. You, Zeno, I ſhould wiſh to make trial of that dialectic acuteneſs, for which you are famed, upon this ſtate of the queſtion." After ſome pauſe in the diſcourſe, Parmenides ſaid, " It appears that you would have us underſtand that ideas, which are incorporeal ſpecies of things, may be conſidered in three ſeveral ſhapes; as they are apart by themſelves; and, alſo, as they exiſt in the things which participate of them; and you

* Plato in Parmenide, vel de uno rerum omnium principio, vel de Ideis.

you ſeem to intimate, that their ſimilitudes or images, participated of by us, are another diſtinct ſtate of them; and, under theſe predicaments, you preſume it may follow, that they are *one*, and many." "It is my meaning," replied Socrates. "You muſt then ſuppoſe that there is one differential, and ſpecific idea of what is good, and what is juſt, and what is honeſt, and of other things of that nature." "I think it conceivable," ſaid Socrates. "Do you imagine the ſame with reſpect to ſenſible things as of man; for inſtance, that, beſide the perception of this or that particular man, there is what may be expreſſed by the term *homoniety*, or an *idea* of man in general; and ſo, likewiſe, of fire and water? and, deſcending lower ſtill, it may be aſked, if it obtains in mud, and ſtraws, and grubs *, and ſuch minutiae of nature?" "About the latter," anſwered Socrates, "there is a difficulty; but I pretend not to reply to every objection, and wiſh rather to hear your reaſoning on the general queſtion."

"It is involved in much perplexity," ſaid Parmenides, "and you are yet too young in philoſophy to be aware of all the contradictions attending ſuch an hypotheſis. For, let me aſk you, Does not every thing that participates of ſpecies do ſo, either in part or in whole; or, is there any other mode of its participation?" "There is no other," anſwered Socrates; "yet why, in the preſent queſtion, may it not be imagined that the participation is of one whole?" And thus," anſwered Parmenides, "you would have one and the ſame thing, exiſting ſeparately in ſeveral things, to be no more than one in them all; contrary to every arithmetical or geometrical idea." "Not ſo contradictory as you apprehend it," ſaid Socrates, "is my notion; ſince, at leaſt, it may be repreſented by the conception we have of one and the ſame *day;* which, although no more than one in exiſtence, is yet, as ſuch, preſent, in every inſtant of time, with many things, and ſtill is not conceived to be divided from

 itſelf,

* It appears not only from this allowed difficulty, but from the general ſtrain of the dialogue, that Plato was well aware of ſome unanſwerable objections that might be made to his ſtrange theory of ideas; and, therefore, he, at firſt, delivers it, not ſo much as having the evidence of truth, but as what might afford grounds of curious and plauſible reaſoning. It muſt be added, indeed, that, as he had the view of making it a part of his ſyſtem, he tries all his dialectic ſubtility in its ſupport, and hides, often, the fallacy of it, by a dexterous and inimitable acceleration of his argument.

itſelf, or reduced to any partition of its unity." "It is but a ſlender covering for a contradiction which you have hit upon," anſwered Parmenides; "and you muſt be ſenſible that it will never bear either a phyſical or dialectic examination." Socrates having then aſked, in what way it was poſſible that ſpecies of things, or ideas, could be participated of in the ſhape of *one* by many, if it were not either by wholes or by parts, a ſubtile diſcuſſion enſues of the intricate point; which, without attempting to copy the almoſt inexplicable ſtrain of the dialogue, may, perhaps, be rendered intelligible, from the following view of Plato's theory of ideas, collected not from the *Parmenides* only, but from other paſſages of his works that ſerve to exhibit it.

Manifeſt it is, from the cleareſt reaſon, that we ſee, hear, and feel, not *in*, but *by* the miniſtry of the corporeal organs; and that the ability of diſtinguiſhing what is ſeen, what is heard, and what is felt, depends upon a faculty ſuperior to the ſenſes *, and that nothing is comprehenſible to us as one, or the ſame, equal or unequal, like or unlike, but in conſequence of the power of the mind to conceive it under one diſtinct idea. This conception of a thing in the form of a ſpecific idea, as much proves the ſeparate exiſtence of ideas, or incorporeal ſpecies of being, or eſſences, as the notice we have from the ſenſes about external objects affords an evidence of their *entity*. A juſt phyſical † theory, therefore, may reſolve the principles of the univerſe into three, *Deity*, *matter*, and *forms* of things, which may be called *ideas*. The latter are the *exemplars*, after which all things were made in the viſible world. Ever exiſting, they are immutable and permanent in their nature; while all corporeal things, conſtituted of matter, and of their ſignatures, are unſtable, and in perpetual mutation. They are, in reſpect of the rational ſouls of men, *primary intelligibles;* but ſuperior beings can only contemplate them in their eſſential forms. The common notions which men have of things ‡ from their ſenſations, or from the images of them in the *phantaſia*, are not ideas, but various, unconnected, and tranſient perceptions of ſingulars. Upon them, no certain knowledge can be founded, no ſcience built, no demonſtration formed. Hints only, and inlets

* Plato in Theaeteto, vel de Scientia. Platonis, lib. 1. Plato in Parmenide.

† Apuleius de dogmate

‡ In Sophiſto, vel de *ente*.

inlets they are, to thoſe ſcientific attainments which ariſe from the capacity of the human mind to conceive, and to contemplate things, as they are conſtituted in the order of nature, which has made ſingulars reducible to certain ſpecies, or combinations of them, while the latter, upon a proper inveſtigation, may be pronounced to be, at the ſame time, *one* and *many*.

True philoſophy muſt ever reject, as contradictory to common reaſon, the hypotheſis, that all things are of one nature, or kind of being *, and that body differs not eſſentially from ſoul, and matter from form, or mind. Nor are thoſe philoſophers to be admired for their penetration, who, admitting a diſtinction of the *genus* of things, maintain that the whole ſubſiſt under one condition; either that of ſtate or of motion. Did they, inſtead of advancing, as ſome of them do, that the univerſe is alternately made conſiſtent with itſelf, and *one* by concord; and many, and different things, by diſcord, ſay only what is more intelligible; that the two conditions of ſtate and motion are found in it; and then conſider what beings are the uniform and permanent, and what the multifarious and changeable, they would probably form a juſter theory, if they did not arrive at the truth. They might, perhaps, learn not only to diſtinguiſh the different attributes of corporeal and incorporeal natures, but how they may, in the caſe of our perceptions, improperly called *ideas*, be ſo combined, that the ſeemingly contradictory propoſition of a one and many, in the ſame thing, may be affirmed. Every thing in nature that is one hath a particular eſſence, but not in itſelf, as a ſingular, but only in connection with its claſs of incorporeal and ſpecific forms †. The ſight and perception of a man, a tree, or a mineral, is no more than the ſenſible exhibition of an intelligible idea, which is itſelf an eſſence, independent of any individual of them; and, unleſs it were ſuch, every man's mutable or different perception of the ſame thing might be deemed its ſpecific form, that may exiſt, or not exiſt, according to his pleaſure. But natural reaſon reprobates this confuſion, and the mind, in every inquiry into the nature and qualities of objects, endeavours to arrange its perceptions of them under certain general

 heads,

* In Sophiſta, vel de *ente*. † In Parmenide.

heads, whence may be formed a diſtinctive notion of them; and it has ground to infer that this conceived notion may be true, and, according to the real nature of things, not relatively alone, and from its appearing ſo, but becauſe it has, in the univerſe, its intelligible form, which is reflected to us, although imperfectly, through the medium of ſenſible and particular objects. The ſpecific idea, therefore, is to be conceived as *a one* whole, in and by itſelf, and, at the ſame time, as the foundation and cauſe of the ſubſiſtence of the many *ſingulars* comprehended under it. It both combines, and makes a difference, amongſt the claſſes of beings that have eſſence only in communication with it. The ideal form is one thing, and the individuals it contains, another, but, taken together, (and ſeparated altogether, in nature, they cannot be), they may properly be pronounced to be *one* and *many:* For, what is unity in the *ſpecies* is multitude in the *ſingulars;* what is identity in the one, is diverſity in the other; and what is ſtate in the former is motion in the latter *. Theſe are different properties, which diſtinguiſh intelligible things from ſenſible, real, and permanent eſſences from the imaginary and tranſient, and the intellectual world from the corporeal. To be at one, and to ſtand, is competent to the firſt; to be never the ſame, but to flow, is the characteriſtic of the ſecond. All human ſcience depends on the recognition of the exiſtence and operation of both theſe kinds of *beings* in the world. It cannot take knowledge of the indefinite number, or what may be called the infinity of ſingulars, unleſs ſo far as they may be reduced to conceptions of *ſpecies*, under ſeveral *ties* of a *one* being, or nature, which render them intelligible, by their having ſimilarity, or diſſimilarity †. Neither is *one*, abſtractly conceived, and without being ſuppoſed to be the foundation, and to have the power of number, the object of ſcience. *Unite* is not multiplied, nor added to, from itſelf, but receives augmentation by being joined with *another*, and not the ſame, unite. By combination with this other, the perception of an equal number is obtained; and *equality* appears to be the reſult of identity and diverſity. Ideas, therefore, under the deſcription of them that has been given, may be reckoned to operate, in regard to human ſcience, as

* In Sophiſta. † In Parmenide.

as *contraries* are allowed by philoſophers to do, in natural things. By the combination of two oppoſite elements, a *third* is produced, which, although participating of both, diſcovers the predominant power of one; for, if they were ſuppoſed to be of equal power, they would deſtroy each other, and nothing could be generated from them. Still, it muſt be confeſſed, that ideal forms are only *, after a manner, repreſented to human minds, by faint likeneſſes of them: So the images of bodies are ſeen in water, or in different mirrors. But, as mathematical lines, and figures, and arithmetical numerations, tranſcend bodies, and exhibit a kind of ſcience detached from them, ſo the intelligent power of the mind, when duly exerciſed, riſes to higher conceptions, and ſuch as, if not adequate, are yet analogous to the incorporeal, and unchangeable forms of things. Theſe abſtract ſpeculations are therefore to be cultivated as the beſt preparatives to the ſcience of *univerſals*, which reſembles the knowledge of ideas, the only invariable exemplars of truth.

The conceptions of one and another, identity and diverſity, ſtate and motion, are not varied in the human mind, but always preſented to it † in the ſame light. Neither does it err in referring like things to likeneſs, as their ſource; what appears good to goodneſs; fair to pulchritude; uſeful to utility; and ſo, alſo, it may be ſaid of their contraries. As types of unchangeable ideas, they are the foundations of ſcience, and demonſtrable truths. But it is otherwiſe with the perceptions ariſing from the co-operation of the external ſenſes, and the memory. The verity or falſity of what is apprehended, then depends upon the exactneſs of the picture taken into the imagination, which, from negligence or confuſion, may ſometimes adopt an erroneous one, or the memory may fail in recollecting the firſt communicated, and juſter image. Thus, a perſon having only ſlightly obſerved the countenance and geſture of Socrates, may, on meeting with Plato, imagine, from ſome fancied likeneſs between them, that he beheld the maſter, and not the diſciple. Evident it is, from inſtances of this kind, that a meaſure of deception attends our paſſive and leſs intelligent faculties; ſuch as thoſe of the ſenſes,

* In Theaeteto, et in Dialog. de Republica, lib. 7. Diogen. Laert. lib. 3 pag. 173.

† In Theaeteto.

ſes, imagination, and memory. When under the correction of *common ſenſe*, born with men, they can produce no more than true *opinion*, always to be diſtinguiſhed from the ſuperior reach of the dialectic, or *ſcientific reaſon*. Rational judgment is the firſt opening of the mind to it; but, being converſant with ſenſible things, or thoſe of a mixed nature, it cannot obtain the denomination of *intellectual* knowledge, and only can have that of *natural underſtanding, not without the intervention of ſenſe.* Pure intellect, indeed *, is only competent to the unembodied ſtate of the ſoul; which, as has been obſerved, not only underſtands that ſhe *knows ſome thing*, but alſo, that *ſhe does not know others*, and, therefore, muſt be ſuppoſed, either, from her conſtitution, incapable of apprehending them, or, from her preſent condition, under an *oblivion* with reſpect to them. Yet, that the human ſoul hath a *wing* of knowledge, which may be called *reminiſcence*, ſuperior to memory, appears evident from what is performed by her, when recollected, and in *diſcourſe* with herſelf. The imagination may be compared to a waxen tablet, paſſive altogether to the figures imprinted upon it. The images and notions of things, collected from ſenſe and memory, in the *phantaſia*, are but like unconnected lines, and figures, traced out for the ſoul's inſpection, which avails to convert them into an intelligible character. She comprehends the reformation of them ſhe has made, and recogniſes her faculty in it, not as a new acquiſition, or as derived from the perceptions of the ſenſes, but as an original one poſſeſſed by her, and almoſt ſuppreſſed; until recollected, and revived by palpable memorials of abſtract and intellectual knowledge, found within herſelf.

In connection with what Plato delivers about the *reminiſcence* of the human ſoul, we may here introduce ſome of his arguments for proving its immortality. The proof of it, taken from the ſoul being the principle of motion, has been mentioned; and that which holds forth the Pythagorean doctrine of its pre-exiſtence to the body, more properly coincides with his *phyſical* theory. But there are arguments of the dialectic kind, inſiſted upon in his Phaedrus and Phaedo, and other dialogues, which deſerve attention.

That

* Ibid in Theaetet.

That life ſhould be from death, as death comes from precedent life, is no inconſiſtency, either in reaſon or in nature. *Contraries*, which have no *medium*, are juſtly aſſumed, in human apprehenſion, to be generable from each other; for no reaſon can ever be aſſigned, why the one ſhould be reckoned to pre-exiſt, or to be ſubſequent to the other. Light and darkneſs, weak and ſtrong, hot and cold, and the vigilant or dormant ſtate of any creature, are repugnancies, which exiſt not at once, and in the ſame ſubject, but any ſuppoſed alteration of one of them implies the intervention of the other. Hence, in the corporeal world, natural generations appear to take place, in the way of conſtant and perpetual rotation, either from a compoſition of their parts to their diſſolution, or from this to that of their temporary combinations. This viciſſitude is not only ſeen in mineral bodies, and in vegetables, but alſo in ſome creatures, having apparent life, which ſeem to die, only in order to be revived. If it were otherwiſe appointed, and the courſe of nature had an unſurmountable boundary, if her exertions were confined to one tenor, iſſuing in a termination that had no *recourſe*, it would be highly credible that all things were ſubjected to one action, and one paſſion, and that the one was finally, and forever, to be concluded in the other. *Endymion*, once fallen aſleep, as the poets feign, could never awake, or the primitive huddle of nature into one confuſed chaos, or *dormitory*, might be verified. But this hypotheſis is reprobated by all things that we ſee in nature, which exhibits, inceſſantly, a circuit of action, a paſſage from motion ſuſpended to motion renewed, and from debility to vigour, or elſe in the contrary career. Is, then, the human conſtitution, or the ſoul, which is the active principle in it, to be looked upon as an exception to the general rule of procedure that univerſally obtains in nature, of which it is a part? Or, are we to imagine that nature here alone fails, and wants the power to renovate this portion of her works? The preſumption lies ſtrongly on the other ſide of the queſtion; and it may well be inferred, that the ſoul becomes not quieſcent in the death of the body, but that, having in herſelf the power of animation, ſhe loſes it not, but continues to exert it in ſome new corporeal form.

Yet,

Yet, why may not the human ſoul, although a diſtinct eſſence from the body, be worn out with action, and, after various tranſitions from one corporeal vehicle to another, at length be diſſolved, and vaniſh into air? In reply to this queſtion, it is to be conſidered, what is meant by diſſolution, and whether it can be underſtood to be that kind of paſſion which the ſoul may be ſuppoſed to undergo. When we ſay of a thing, that it can be diſſolved, it is conceived to be not a ſimple eſſence, but one compounded of parts, ſeparable from one another; and that, in conſequence of this ſeparability of its parts, it may loſe the conſiſtency of its form, and be reduced either into a different one, or into a variety of concretions and figures. But, how does it appear that the ſoul's eſſence conſiſts in any compoſition of parts? There is nothing more evident about this internal principle, than that its rational thoughts and conceptions are not diviſible into parts, and that the ſuppoſition of it implies the greateſt abſurdity *. Partaking of intellect, its eſſence muſt be conceived to be congenial to that of things incorporeal and intellectual; to ideas that are one, and indiviſible and immutable, and, therefore, everlaſting. But, may not its eſſence conſiſt in a harmony ſupported upon its connection with the body, and, therefore, ceaſing with it? This allegation excludes its pre-exiſtence, which is probable; but, conſidered without regard to that probability, it may be proved in itſelf to be abſurd. Every kind of harmony, whether that of artificial ſounds, or of voices, or of words, or of all theſe taken together, is ſtill reſolvable into its conſtituent parts, and can riſe to no other ſpecies of it than what they are capable, jointly, to produce. But, into what concords of the bodily ſenſes, of ſeeing, hearing, touching, and taſting, is it poſſible to trace the rational faculties of the human ſoul; which perceives and contemplates objects of a nature entirely different from them? It may be further aſked, Why, if in native congeniality with the body, it ſhould at all appear adverſe to bodily affections, and, inſtead of correſponding with, be often obſerved to oppoſe and to controul them: It urges, occaſionally, the enduring of thirſt and hunger, ſevere exerciſes, and the hardeſt diſcipline; and, as Homer juſtly repreſents his

* In Dialog. de Republica, lib. 10.

his hero in ſoliloquy, it rouſes itſelf to fortitude in maintaining ſuch oppoſition. "Bear, yet, this grief, *my heart*," ſays Ulyſſes, "for a heavier thou haſt known." This ſpeech would be ridiculous if the ſoul's chief qualification was to harmoniſe with the bodily appetites; and, if its eſſence were not evinced to be ſomething more divine than harmony itſelf; a principle poſſeſſed of intelligence in itſelf, and qualified to have the command of the corporeal nature, and to act in imitation of celeſtial beings, diſengaged from its thraldom.

What leſs than immortal duration can be aſcribed to the ſoul, which, to every thing that receives it, is the principle of life? It cannot be where death is; no more than equality can conſiſt with inequality, ſtraight with crooked *, hot with cold. For, it is to be obſerved, that the argument of contraries being generated from contraries, would here be erroneouſly applied. The queſtion is not, whether oppoſites in nature, ſuch as generation and corruption, may alternately ariſe from each other; but whether, as convertible conceptions, the one may be ſubſtituted in place of the other, or, both being ſuppoſed the ſame ideal ſpecies, they may co-exiſt in one ſubject at the ſame time? We ſay not of the contrary elements † of fire and ſnow, heat and cold, that they have a common eſſence, and are generated together; but only, that they may be ſucceſſively produced. Their oppoſite natures are conſidered as irreconcileable with each other; and that, where one of them intervenes, the other is reckoned either to periſh or to fly off. Such is the theory to be held with reſpect to the human ſoul; which, as the principle of animation to body can never alter, or be converted into its contrary, or that which is void of life. In the diſeaſe and death of the body, it becomes not corruptible and mortal; but, preſerving its ſpecies, and withdrawing from its contrary, it remains entire, and unhurt, in every corporeal change.

Whatever periſhes in nature, is deſtroyed, not by a foreign, or adventitious evil, but by an intrinſic one of its own ‡, or its particular defects. The ſource of the evil muſt be found in the thing itſelf. So we

* In Phaedone. † In Philebo, vel de Summo Bono.
‡ In Dialog. de Repub. lib. 17.

may obſerve corruptions to take place in natural bodies, which are, from their heterogeneous, or weak conſtitution, liable to decay. But what can we reckon that inherent evil, or imbecillity, to be, which is ſufficient to deſtroy the ſoul? No tearing aſunder, no torturing, ſuch as brings death to the body, can operate upon its eſſence; and, although it be granted that vitious paſſions are its bane, they cannot be deemed its natural, but its moral deſtroyers. The ſoul which is inflamed by them, muſt be owned to be ſtill, wickedly, alive: And well it would be for mankind, if, in proportion to the rage of the immoral and violent paſſions in any one, his ſoul's energy was found to be impaired, and to be precipitated into natural deſtruction. But experience proves that this does not hold; and that the ſufferings of the ſoul are not of the kind that can affect its *being* or eſſence, but ſuch as are exterior to it, and which ariſe from its unhappy condition in the body. In this reſpect, indeed, its caſe may be ſaid to reſemble that of the *marine* Glaucus, who, according to the poets, being ſunk into the grottos of the ſea, has his former manly figure and ſhape almoſt wholly reverſed, by ſands, and weeds, and ſhells, encruſting him around. Yet, viewed in the light in which the ſtudy and love of philoſophy places the human ſoul, it appears to emerge from its diſadvantageous circumſtances, and to give palpable indications of its affinity to a ſuperior nature, and more exalted ſphere of intelligence, and ſuitable action. Even here, in the inveſtigation of truth, and in the keen exerciſe * of its reaſoning faculty, it ſeems to approach to that retreat from the body, for which it is natively qualified. Inſenſible, then, to the ſolicitations of the bodily ſenſes, it is altogether alive to its rational conceptions, and ſurveys with delight every diſcovery it makes of what is true, or what is good, as an anticipation of its future attainments in the knowledge of both; when the body, and its affections, ſhall form no impediment to its progreſſion

Philoſophers have therefore juſtly concluded death to be the migration of the ſoul from the body; and that their ſtudies in life ſhould be directed to render it as pure and uncontaminated with corporeal paſſion as poſſible, and ſuch as is conſonant to the nature, and divine qualities of

* In Phaedone.

of the ſoul. A ſtudied purification of the mind, from the contagions of the animal life, happily ſupported on the principles of true philoſophy, is to be regarded as the commencement of the life of the gods, which is an immortal one. Its adepts may be ſaid to be initiated in their myſteries, and to live already with them. In reaſon, therefore, they may be preſumed at death to go to the region of the intelligent, and the good, whom they reſemble, and to dwell with them in a ſtate exempted from earthly perturbations, and adapted to that mental tranquillity, and contemplation, after which they have ſo eagerly aſpired. But there, the ſouls diſtracted * with ſenſual paſſions, cannot arrive, but remain, according to the common opinion of men, hovering about the tombs and ſepulchres; and they may, indeed, be ſuppoſed to undergo a long courſe of tranſmigration from body to body, until their purification be fully accompliſhed. Acknowledged it muſt be, that what philoſophers have imagined about the ſtate of diſembodied ſouls, can be no more relied upon as a certainty than the fictions of the poets. But the agreement of both in the perſuaſion of their immortality, and the conſtant tradition of it in every age, and nation, muſt be admitted as a ſignal teſtimony in behalf of a truth, naturally cheriſhed in the human mind, deſirable to all men, and formidable to none but the depraved and vitious, who require, and ought to ſuffer ſuch a check as the conſideration of it affords.

We ſhall now conclude the dialectic and metaphyſical part of Plato's philoſophy, with tracing the notions of *deity*, and the divine perfections, expreſſed by him; the underſtanding of which has occaſioned diſputations amongſt the learned; according to their different interpretations of his meaning in ſome obſcure paſſages of his works.

Upon the ſubject of the intellectual world, neither philoſopher nor poet can uſe proper †, or adequate language. If there be names ‡ expreſſive of the real nature and eſſences of things, they can be found only amongſt the gods. But what appellation is competent to the *one*

* Ibid. in fine; et in Phaedro, vel de Pulchro. † In Phaedro, et in Crotylo. ‡ De Legibus, lib. 10. Cicero de Nat. Deor. lib. 1. Maximus Tyrius, Diſſert. 1.

being, which is too perfect to be genus, or ſpecies, or difference; and, therefore, it is hardly permitted to men to pronounce *what he is*, who is above eſſence. In an abſolute ſenſe, it can never be done. Yet thoſe are not to be imitated *, but rather condemned, who infer that the human mind is not to be turned to the ſtudy of his conceivable and relative excellencies. Without ſome conception of the *one* eternal and immoveable principle, the cauſe of other principles, and the original mover of what may be moved; all things, according to Protagoras's doctrine, may be reckoned to flow on, incoherently, and no conſiſtency be found any where, either in the intellectual, or in the viſible world. Order and beauty, rule and government, would be univerſally obliterated, and no more to be traced in the celeſtial ſpheres, than in the tranſient dreams of men; or elſe we muſt adopt the groſs and incomprehenſible notion of Euthydemus, and ſay, that all things are of one nature, and in one condition, and that there is no diverſity of being, power, or agency, in the world. The one ſuppoſition admits no reality, but that of the perpetual motion of all things, and the other only holds forth that of a one invariable ſtate of them. By the firſt, they are not a whole; by the ſecond, they are a whole immeaſurable †. But, as it is apparent to our bodily eyes, and other ſenſes, that corporeal things are diverſified, and mutable in their ſhapes and motions, ſo alſo the mind perceives, that they are reducible to diſtinct forms, and hence rendered ſuſceptible of menſuration, and intelligible. This is a mental conception, with only the hint of it borrowed from external objects. A recogniſance follows it, that theſe forms of being are not imaginary only, but realiſed in ideas incorporeal; which conſtitute the meaſures of things, otherwiſe incomprehenſible. In the ſyſtem of them, although many, a one is always predominant; which marks their ſameneſs and ſtate. The foundation, therefore, of whatever is intelligible, and true, being placed in the domination of *one*, the original of all ideas muſt be found in a *one* exiſtent being, whoſe eternal idea is the ſource and the archetype of them all ‡. This is deity; who, true in himſelf, has put the ſtamp

* De Legibus, lib. 7.

† Plato de Repub. lib. 6.

‡ Ibid. lib. 6. ad fin.

ſtamp of truth, not on fleeting corporeals, but upon real eſſences; and hence both the power of knowledge which human ſouls, and other intelligent beings have, and the reality of what is known by them, are ultimately referable to him.

Views of being in general, and eſpecially the knowledge of the *one exiſtent*, beyond eſſence, are only attainable by the mind abſtracting its contemplations from every picture, or image of what is corporeal or ſenſible. Even thoſe may fall ſhort of this knowledge who inveſtigate him, from attention to the progreſſive ſcale of beings, and joining together in their conceptions, whatever is beautiful, intelligent, and wiſe, in their frames, regard him as the conſummation of them all *; if he is imagined by them to be a compoſition of powers and qualities. He is one uncompounded, and principally diſcoverable to men under one idea, which is that of the *good;* or the cauſe not only of intelligence but of being, eſſence, enjoyment, and pleaſure, to all the conſtituents of the intellectual world, and to the inferior order of rational ſouls, animating bodies here below. The fecundity of this perfection, exemplified in his influence and agency in the univerſe, is to be taken in ſtrict conſiſtency with his indiviſible unity; and, therefore, when we denominate him the *fair*, and good, and connect wiſdom with beneficence, we expreſs one perfection implied in another. For, to be beneficent, there muſt be knowledge.

True, indeed, it is, that we participate immediately, not of the good himſelf, but of what is generated by him, of that offspring, or *ſon* of his, as we may call the world, which bears his image. Human ſight is not in the ſun, nor yet the ſun in the eye that ſees, but only the emanation of light from him †. So we may conceive the influence of this offspring of the good to be diffuſed throughout the whole intellectual world, like the ſolar rays in the viſible one. Every eye that feels them turns to the ſun, the diſpenſer of light; and a ſimilar motion and propenſity is found in the intelligent ſoul to diſcover and contemplate the ſource of all its knowledge; who, ſince he is the cauſe that other beings underſtand, cannot himſelf be indiſcoverable by them.

Yet,

* De Repub. lib. 6. ad fin. † Ibid.

Yet, what groſs abſurdities have the poets, thoſe great dealers in ſenſible imagery, propagated about the *gods*; and, how have even the moſt admired of them perverted every rational conception of the *divinity* *? So illiberally have Homer and Heſiod aſperſed, and belied the father of the gods and men, that hardly the veſtige of a godlike character is left to him. According to their theology, Olympus, the manſion of the celeſtials, is often diſturbed with the quarrels and conteſts of the deities, who are repreſented as acting towards one another, and to mankind, with caprice, envy, and diſſimulation. In diſtributing the lots of human life, Jove is ſaid to be provided with two coffers; one, the repoſitory of good, the other of ill; and, although he generally makes nearly an equal mixture of them, yet, at times, he is ſo inconſiderate, or unmerciful, as to aſſign to ſome an entire portion of evil unmixed. Nothing is more repugnant to all our rational conceptions of the nature and actions of deities, than ſuch fictions concerning them. That which is good in itſelf is never hurtful; and the more perfect, in felicity of nature, any being is, the more he enjoys of what is agreeable and excellent, the more undiſturbed poſſeſſion he hath of wiſdom and power, ability and ſtrength, the farther is he removed from any diſpoſition to evil, or the production of that which would infer a change in his ſtate, or the deſire of ſomething contrary to it. Therefore deity, who is the good, cannot be deemed the cauſe of evil in the world; but, as beneficent, he is the producer of felicity. Whatever evils are experienced amongſt mankind muſt be attributed to another ſource; the inveſtigation of which may be comprehended in the phyſical part of philoſophy.

Mutability is competent to an infirm or wrong ſtate of being; and not to that which is ſufficient and right. The works of nature, or of art, which have the moſt ſoundneſs and ſtrength in their fabric, are the leaſt liable to variation in themſelves, or to be altered by external accidents. *God*, and all things which we call divine, are in the beſt ſtate; and, therefore, they are removed from change. To fancy, with the poets, that the deities aſſume viſible and particular ſhapes, and this, too, in order to terrify, to delude, or to impoſe upon mankind, is impious, and

* De Legibus, lib. 2.

and ſuch theology as all rational minds ought to reprobate; and what, in regard to their morals, the vulgar ſhould never learn, or hear, even in the way of fables, either in verſe or in proſe. It is the property of every divinity to have one ſimple and uncompounded nature, without duplicity either of form, or other quality. Deity, therefore, is not fallacious, but true. He deceives not; nor ſuffers deception. By falſe viſions, or ambiguous ſignifications of his will, he miſleads not; and, as he cannot miſtake from ignorance of what is true, ſo he finds no inducement or occaſion, as may happen to men, to uſe fallacy or diſſimulation.

If, in connection with theſe abſtract views of deity, we proceed to a phyſical theory of the world, it may receive a better illuſtration than what Archelaus, or even Anaxagoras, has produced. Attempting, both of them, to trace a proceſs of nature, without admitting an original and efficient principle to be the cauſe of what is wiſely, or benignantly done in nature, they have neither delivered a ſyſtem that can be underſtood, nor furniſhed a ſufficient reaſon why we ſhould affirm that one thing is made correſpondent to another, or intended to anſwer a particular end. When phyſics have been thus diveſted of every recommendation to ſtudy them, it is time to relinquiſh the Ionian ſchool, and the vague theories of the Greeks in general. We muſt inquire what the philoſophers of other nations have advanced about the origin and conſtitution of the world. Some theory of it may be found amongſt them, which, if not entirely complete and ſatisfactory, may yet be conſiſtent and probable; and, without pretending to demonſtrative evidence, prove no inconſiderable enlargement of our knowledge.

SECTION

SECTION III.

Introduction to Plato's Phyſical Philoſophy.—Reprobation of a Fortuitous Coſmogony, or by Combinations of the Natural Elements.—Soul, and not Body, the Principle of Motion.—Theory of Motion, as diverſified in the Sublunary and Celeſtial Regions.—The World Generated, and not Eternal.—Its Origin and Conſtitution, according to the Traditional Theory of Timaeus Locrius.

SOME men there are, and theſe too ranked amonſt the philoſophers and the wiſe, who aſſert, that all things which are, which have been, or ſhall be, owe their origin either to nature, or to fortune, or to art. The greateſt and moſt ſplendid productions, they aſcribe to the two former of theſe cauſes, and the leſſer to the laſt *. Thus, ſay they, the elements of fire, water, earth, air, and all bodies which are compounds of them, the ſun, the moon, and the ſtars, have their efficient cauſes in nature and fortune; which principles, although deſtitute of ſoul, or mind, by a happy chance, combine cold things with hot, humid with dry, hard with ſoft, and, in general, contraries with contraries, in ſuch a manner, that a contemperament of the whole is the reſult. The circular expanſion of the heavens, and whatſoever it contains; the animals and the vegetables of the earth; the regular ſeaſons of the year; require, according to them, no intelligent principle, no deity, either for their being or their arrangement. Nature and fortune, working together, are

* Dialog. de Legibus, lib. 10.

are held to be ſufficient for both theſe effects: Yet, art and deſign are allowed by them to be eſſential to the exhibition of works that fall within the reach of human abilities, but which bear no proportion to the dignity and beauty of thoſe beheld in the ſyſtem of the world. Painting, muſic, and other ſuch arts, although imitations only of natural things, are admired as wonderful proofs of human wit and invention. Even medicine, agriculture, and the gymnaſtic arts, that are not exerciſed but in communication with nature, are placed to the account of intelligence and wiſdom in man. The ſum of it is arrogantly ſwelled by referring all political ſcience, the device of laws, and the inſtitution of civil government, not to certain propenſities and principles found in the human breaſt, or to hints taken from what is ſeen in nature, but ſolely to the ſtudy and artful contrivance of men, who, therefore, vary them according to their pleaſure. They add, that the opinions framed and propagated about the gods have no other ſource or authority; and are to be conſidered as ſuggeſted from political conſiderations, and ſupported upon credulity and prejudices, eaſily communicated to the generality of mankind.

To hear ſuch glaring falſehoods uttered by men, in the face of that wiſe conſtitution of the world, which barbarians as well as Greeks acknowledge and revere, and the benign influence of which they themſelves muſt feel, in the grateful viciſſitudes of day and night, and the no leſs pleaſing than admirable oeconomy of all things around them, may well excite the indignation of the rational and conſiderate part of the human ſpecies. But it becomes us not, ſays the philoſopher, to be in anger, becauſe their minds are perverted, and, unhappily, to that degree, as to call in queſtion the truth of what has obtained the conſent of all nations, that there are *beings divine* as well as human, gods as well as men. It may belong to the legiſlature to preſcribe ſuitable reſtraints to the communication of theſe pernicious errors. Yet the language of the philoſopher, to ſuch as are addicted to them, muſt be diſpaſſionate and cool, more eſpecially when directed to youthful minds, whoſe taints of impiety are rarely permanent. An admonition, ſuch as the following one, ſhould be given them: "You are yet only in the firſt experiment of your rational faculties. It is beyond a doubt, that, in the progreſſion

of time and experience, you will come to think differently, in many points, from what your preſent obſervations may ſuggeſt. The ſubject under conſideration is of far more moment, than, as now, it may appear to you; if, indeed, it be a truth proved from numerous examples, that, by entertaining juſt ſentiments of the gods, men are diſpoſed to act in a more virtuous and laudable manner. *Wait*, therefore, you ought; and we entreat you to *wait*, for the requiſite aid which more mature reflection will afford; before you decide upon a queſtion that muſt affect the whole tenor of your lives. Notwithſtanding the pride you may aſſume to yourſelves, from eſpouſing theſe opinions as deep and ſingular diſcoveries, we will not diſſemble with you; they cannot be reckoned either profound or new. Others have gone before you, and your aſſociates, in the tract of them; and ſome few, or more, may be found, in every age, inclined to them. To none of them, however, whom we have known, has it happened to carry along with them the ſame convictions of their truth, from youth to riper years. Differing, frequently, from themſelves, they could leſs keep pace with one another. They have halted, ſome at one ſtage of their doubt, about the being of the gods, and a divine ſuperintendence of human affairs, and others at another. To whatever cauſe or motive this fluctuation of their opinions may be aſcribed, the doctrine to be inferred from it is obvious. Let no ſpeculatiſt of this kind be preſumptuous or precipitant; let him be ſure that he has collected all the powers of his reaſon, and has exerciſed them, free from prepoſſeſſion or bias, previouſly to his determining upon what he is to adopt as his fixed and invariable judgment."

If we underſtand theſe theoriſts aright, who ſay that fire, earth, air, and water, are the principles of all things, and that their compoſitions, and decompoſitions, conſtitute what they call *nature*, their meaning muſt be, that theſe elementary bodies are prior in exiſtence to what is diſtinguiſhable from them, and is known by the name of *ſoul*, or *mind*. This is, undeniably, their poſition, if they alledge that life, ſenſe, perception, thought, and will, which characteriſe the latter principle, are no more than a certain mechanical diſpoſition of the former; and they indeed attempt to account for them only in this way. But this tenet, implied in their theory, appears to be demonſtrably falſe; ſince it may be proved, that

ſoul,

ſoul, and not body, is the principle of all motion; without which, generations, or changes, could not take place in the corporeal world *. Of matter, or body, our only conception is, that it is ſomething extended, and therefore viſible, and what may be touched, and therefore capable of being impelled extraneouſly; and, when any of its parts are moved, that they may move others. As a moveable, it may be reckoned ſuſceptible of ſeven diſtinct motions; to any one of which, more than to another, it cannot be ſaid to be, of itſelf, inclined, or directed. Being equally indifferent to them all, it muſt, therefore, remain at reſt; unleſs ſomething adventitious afford it impulſe and direction. Matter, then, which cannot be proved to have ſelf-motion, without a particular mode of it, or, having different or contrary tendencies at the ſame time, can never be the principle of things variouſly moved and generated as they are in the world. But *that* which we only know to have ſelf-motion as its eſſential property, and alſo the power of moving other things, is ſoul. Nothing, therefore, but this principle can be ſuppoſed to have begun motion in matter, and communicated ſuch degrees and modes of it, as might conduce to the formation of the elementary ſubſtances that have been mentioned; and, through their mixture, or tranſmutation, to that of other more compounded ones. Thus the concluſion muſt be, that ſoul is a principle in the world antecedent to body; which could not be formed without its motive power and intervention. Hence, alſo, it follows as a corollary, that all the innate properties and attributes of ſoul, conſidered as pure ſoul, its thoughts, reminiſcences, volitions, and moral affections, are under the ſame predicament, and prior to the primary ones of body, its lengths, breadths, depths, or ſolidity. In nature, likewiſe, as in reaſon, it is evinced, that the activity of the former gives the law to the inert and paſſive diſpoſition of the latter. The corporeal forms would, for ever, roll on, promiſcuous and variable, without conſiſtency in the particulars, or conformity in the whole, were not theſe determined by the ſway of a ſoul energetic and intelligent, which agitates the heavens as well as the earth, and gives ſpeciality to the motions viſible in them.

* In Legibus, ibid.; et in Timaeo, et Epinomide.

In theſe two regions of the world, it muſt be confeſſed, that the diverſity of the movements is moſt remarkable; to ſuch a degree, indeed, that it may be aſked, Is it one ſoul, or more than one, that preſides in them? or, can the ſame informing principle be reckoned to differ from itſelf in its energy and operations? The queſtion is not eaſy to be reſolved. It muſt be remembered, that what we advance about the intellectual world is ſtill under the caution, that we ſhould have a diffidence of our conceptions, as inadequate to the object; and, therefore, apt to fail, or to miſlead us. Yet, to account for the apparent diverſity of the animation, and arrangement of the celeſtial and ſublunary worlds, may we not ſay, that ſoul, imparted by him who framed them, as a common principle to both, muſt, of neceſſity, vary in its agency, when conjoined with things ſo different in their nature as thoſe which are uniform, and ſtable, and thoſe which are divers, and changeable. Such contrariety evidently obtains in the heavenly and in the earthly motions. The former are governed by one law, which is that of the circular motion; the latter, as if under no regulation, diſcover, even in their elements, a repugnancy to union; and the ſoul that animates fire, water, earth, and air, appears always to run into incongruities, or, as we may expreſs it, to *madden* in their various compoſitions, and tranſmutations. We can form no clearer notion of what we call a ſtate of ſome things, and a diverſity in others, than by conſidering the peculiar propriety of the circular motion, compared with all other modes of it. Whatever is ſo moved, changes not its centre of motion. Although its parts paſs through ſeveral ſpaces, they, together with the whole, always bear the ſame proportion to it; and uniformly return, as it were into themſelves. This may be deemed the propereſt image of the action of intellect, and of the ſtated order and conſiſtency that prevails in the ſpheres of pure intelligences, or in the fixed ſtars; whoſe eſſences are in conformity with one intelligent ſoul, or informing principle. But in the region of the planets, and in the ſublunary world, the caſe is not the ſame. There, the elements are not of equal capacity and temperament. The animating principle has not, therefore, the ſame exertion. It forms not a common centre to things of a heterogeneous kind; but, according as they

they alter their place, ſo their centres of motion are changed *. Hence, even the ſun, moon, and the five planets, although chiefly fiery ſubſtances, and nearly congenial to the celeſtial ones, are moved in particular orbs by themſelves, and in directions contrary to the circumvolutions of the ſtars. Every one of them may be preſumed to be ruled by ſome divine intelligences; ſo that *all things may be ſaid to be repleniſhed with divinities.* Yet, through all theſe powers of motion, animation, and intelligence, the efficiency of the *one* is manifeſted; both in the general order, and in the particular poſitions of the works that are made.

There is no part, not even the leaſt, of theſe works, that does not occupy that rank and place which is adapted to its nature and qualities †. Whether that part acts, or is acted upon, it is apparent that *God* has wiſely diſpoſed of its action and paſſion. The parts, it is true, are formed with a reference to the whole; and not the whole with a reſpect to the parts. No intelligent architect, or maſter in any rational art, ever proceeded by a different rule; and yet he is not judged, from its obſervance, to have contemned or neglected the parts. On the contrary, his attention to their juſt proportions is the more evinced by it; and their fitneſs, their beauty, and utility, are proved to be calculated upon a ſcale of the greateſt magnitude. "The univerſe, indeed, of which thou, O man, art a ſingle part, was not conſtituted for thy ſake; but thou waſt produced as an appendage of it. Doeſt thou complain of the eſtabliſhment of things upon this principle; without which, a whole, compoſed of a variety of parts, could not have exiſted? or, art thou ignorant that thy particular good, and that of all ſingular *beings* in the world, is conſulted ſo far as their nature admits, or their deſtination requires? That there is ſuch a provident care extended to the inferior and minuter parts of the general ſyſtem, may be concluded from the appointment of theſe intermediate powers, which are qualified to act in particular ſpheres, and alſo from the accommodation of incongruous things to wiſe and ſpecial ends. Pure intellect, indeed, connects not itſelf immediately with body; but, through the interpoſition of ſouls, variouſly endowed, its

† In Timaeo. ‡ De Legib. lib. 10.

its influence, leſs or more, is univerſally diſtributed. We ſay not, preciſely, in which of three conceivable ways theſe ſouls operate on bodies, or a congeries of bodies, aſſigned to them. Whether, in their action, upon the celeſtial ſpheres, or on the elements terreſtrial, they become incorporated with them in the manner human ſouls are with bodies; or whether they effectuate the animation of them by the intervention of ſome medium; or whether they poſſeſs, in themſelves, ſome wonderful virtue, to communicate, by their will only, ſuch motions to bodies, may be accounted an uncertainty; but there can hardly be a doubt, that, in one or other of theſe ways, all corporeal movements in the world are accompliſhed. Over the *whole* the *intellectual king* ever preſides, and rules. The ſource *, and cauſe, *he*, of all things that are fair; they are around him, and for him, not in him; who † is the unmoved mover of the ſpheres intellectual and corporeal; the ſtable centre, upon which their ſeveral circles turn; with ſuch efficacy that the purpoſes of good, and beneficence, either of the phyſical, or the moral kind, are conſtantly, and generally, promoted."

Such are the outlines, and general gloſſes, which Plato gives of that theory of the viſible and inviſible world, which he acknowledges to have been borrowed from the philoſophers of foreign countries, and introduced into Greece, chiefly, by Pythagoras, and learned and ſtudied by ſome of the diſciples of his ſchool, and moſt accurately compiled by Timaeus of Locris. As the principles of the natural, or corporeal world, were held, in it, not only to be connected with, but to depend upon, thoſe of the incorporeal one, the account of them neceſſarily involved both phyſical and theological, or metaphyſical reaſoning. He choſe, as has been obſerved, to inſert, at firſt, into his dialogues, only ſuch ſhort ſketches of them as the dialectic argumentation admitted; and, perhaps, it required both time and application, on his part, before he could diſcloſe the whole ſyſtem of the phyſical and theological tenets in the manner he has done in the Timaeus. It is generally allowed that

* In Epiſt. ſecund. ad Dionyſium, et in Epinomide, et in Philebo.

† —— Stabiliſque manens dat cuncta moveri,

is a noted verſe of Boetius's poetic eulogy of the *Deity*. Conſol. Philoſoph. lib. 3.

that he compoſed it in his old age; and, upon the ſuppoſition that he did then dogmatiſe, it is held to be that theory of the univerſe which met with his higheſt approbation. What ſcientific abilities he had to give it illuſtration, we have, in part, already ſeen; and we ſhall find, in the ſequel, that he employs them to advantage; although the principles are there delivered more in the didactic and traditionary ſtyle, than in that of the dialectic and argumentative. His ſublime conceptions of the *Deity* are, as it were, more realiſed to our view, in his repreſentation of the acts of the *maker* of the world. His mathematical, and ſcientific ideas, are ſtill applied to his ſubject; and thoſe errors in aſtronomy, which, in former recitals of them, appeared inſufferable, are overlooked, or obliterated, in the ſtriking perſpective he gives of the ſymmetry of the celeſtial ſpheres. We conſider not ſo much whether they have only an apparent, and not a real revolution; or whether the planets be fiery bodies, and what diſtinction is to be made between them and the fixed ſtars, as we are pleaſed with his ingenious and well imagined arrangement of them; and yet more delighted to find, that, although not viewed with the eyes of Galileo, they have been to men, in all ages, conſpicuous and dignified monuments of the *divine wiſdom* and *power;* and, if their wonderful motions have been, in ſome generations, aſcribed to certain intelligent beings, either acting immediately upon them, or interpoſing ſome myſterious medium of their energy, and, in others, to a *ſubtile fluid*, no leſs inexplicable, or to the gravitation of bodies, according to their bulks, to a centre, conſidered as a law impreſſed upon them, that ſtill the ſame great truth is evinced to all rational and contemplative minds, that their order and diſpoſition have one original cauſe, and the correſpondence and conſtancy of their motions, *one* ſupreme, and eternal efficient.

In particular branches of philoſophy, it muſt be granted, ſays Plato, that ſome of the nations called by us barbarous, have the advantage over the Greeks. For ſuperior knowledge in aſtronomy, and other ſciences connected with it, Egypt and Syria have been indebted to the ſerenity of their ſkies, which being more conſtant than in the climate of Greece, enabled them to obſerve, with greater exactneſs, the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. With the earlier uſe, or invention of letters, and writing,

ing, joined to the antiquity of their ſtates, they have alſo ſurpaſſed us, and other nations, in forming records of ſignal changes and alterations * which parts of the earth and of the ſea have undergone, at intervals of time, by convulſions, deluges, or conflagrations. But, notwithſtanding the prieſts of Egypt make this their boaſt, and call the Greeks *children* in ſcience, and *novices* in the hiſtory of the *globe*, it may be juſtly aſſerted that we have, in general, improved, or reduced to a more conſiſtent form, whatever informations we have received from them. The diſcourſe of Timaeus the Locrian, upon the ſubject of the generation of the corporeal world, may bear teſtimony to the aſſertion. After a proper admonition with reſpect to the kind of evidence to be expected in treating the arduous ſubject, ſo variouſly canvaſſed by philoſophers, and making the invocation of the gods a ſuitable *exordium* to it, his diſquiſition proceeds in the following manner.

With regard to the *whole* of things viſible to us, whether we call it by the name of the world, or of the heavens, or by any other appellation, the *firſt* queſtion to be ſtated *is*, "Hath *it ever been without a beginning of its generation, or, did it owe its production to ſome anterior principle* †?" Evident it is, that, ſo far as it is viſible and tangible, it is *body*; for that is corporeal which moves the bodily ſenſes; and, from their being moved, an opinion ariſes in the mind, that ſomething exterior to them exiſts. But, in every ſpecies of body, it is plain, from obſervation, that the exiſtence it has is in ſuch conſtant mutation, from one inſtant of time to another, that it can only be truly ſaid to begin to be. What thus appears to be in a courſe of generation, without having an aſcertained form of exiſtence, muſt be concluded to derive all its perceptible qualities from an adventitious cauſe; otherwiſe they muſt come from nothing. Therefore the material world, rendered viſible to men by the ſenſible qualities of bodies in it, muſt have had an original maker, and a parent, who produced it, *becauſe he was good*. The perfection of his own idea, and not any ſecondary or generated image of things, was ſubſervient to its formation. He knew, that, in all things that might be produced in corporeal nature, nothing could appear fair, or

* In Timaeo. † Ibid.

or the work of intelligence, that was void of *mind*. To connect this principle with what otherwiſe was unſuſceptible of it, he gave mind to ſoul, and a ſoul to body. Hence the world is adorned with whatever is beautiful and beſt in the nature of things; and may be reckoned not only to have animation, but to be endowed with intelligence. It is one, as made after the image of *one;* which is not number. Fire and earth were made the two extremes of corporeal ſubſtance; and, if the world had been an extended plain, without being ſpherical, and having depth, one *mean* would have ſufficed for the purpoſe of combining them; as is evident in aſſigning the comparative proportions of numbers, and of lineal, or plain figures. But, where ſolidity was to take place, two became requiſite, to reduce the proportions of the parts to ſome equality. Therefore, air and water were produced as the two *means*, and to ſerve, as far as poſſible, for ties of congruity between themſelves, and the two extremes; ſo that their rule might be; as fire is to air, ſo is air to water; and, as air is to water, ſo is water to earth; or in the converted ratio. Bound together in this chain of concords, the four elements of the world cannot be diſſolved, unleſs by the will of him who brought them into combination. Beyond the circumference of the world, nothing was left, and nothing could be found, to alter their proportions, or to impair their harmony. To render it the moſt capacious of all forms, and figures of bodies, that might be produced in it, he made it a *ſphere;* that figure, which being, every way, like itſelf, appears to be the moſt perfect and beautiful. Around it a poliſhed *expanſe* was thrown, to give its extremity the fineſt finiſhing; and, having the endowment of mind and intelligence, the circular motion, as the only competent one, was appropriated to it.

The figured, and ſoul-informed body of the world, was alſo, by its *Architect*, ſevered into two parts; made globular both; but the one contained within the other, and the leſſer of them divided into ſeveral circles or orbs. The one diviſion was diſtinguiſhed by its ſpheres moving in the ſame plain, and being carried round in an uniform courſe. The other, with orbs, having different centres, could only perform its revolutions unequally. The firſt was thrown to the right ſide of the *Pole* of the world, which paſſes through the earth's centre; and the ſe-

cond to its left: And hence the revolution of the heavens, properly ſo called, or of the great exterior ſphere, is from eaſt to weſt; and that of the planets in the contrary direction. In the former, every thing is continuous, and nothing divided; in the latter, ſeven circles, at intervals from each other, take place; and in theſe revolve the ſeven planetary globes, of which the earth is reckoned one: The reſt are, the moon, neareſt the earth, the ſun next, and then Lucifer, Mercury, Mars, Jupiter, and, higher than theſe, Saturn. But *, notwithſtanding this diviſion of the world into two parts, and the ſeparation of the indiviſible and celeſtial nature from the diviſible, or corporeal and mixed, the informing ſoul, which is one, is, by a wonderful effort of its maker, ſo contempered, as to harmoniſe with both; and to animate that which has identity, and that which has difference, and form the tie of the intellectual and corporeal ſyſtems.

If we deſire to trace the generation of the planets, as prior, or ſubſequent in time to each other, or conſider their affinities as gods celeſtial, we muſt be content with ſuch traditionary accounts of them as the firſt poets have given, upon the report of the ſons of theſe gods, or the terreſtrial heroes, who learned, from their fires, the heavenly genealogies. The *earth* is allowed to be the firſt and moſt ancient of them all. It is fixed in its place, to be the keeper or obſerver of day and night; while around it the heavens revolve, and the ſun throws his light over the whole choir. The heavens ſhow the one univided circular motion; of which

* Boetius gives the Platonic notion of the middle or mixed nature and agency of the ſoul of the world in theſe lines:

Tu triplicis medium naturae cuncta moventem,
Connectens *animam* per conſona membra reſolvis.

His communication of diverſified motion to the two circles of the conſtellations and planets is thus expreſſed:

Quae cum ſecta, duos motum glomeravit in orbes.

He is then repreſented as performing himſelf the circular motion, by making his circuit around the unfathomable mind:

In ſemet reditura meat; mentemque profundam,
Circuit———

And by this action a ſimilar movement is excited in the heavens.

———Et ſimili converrit imagine coelum. Conſol. Philoſ. ibid.

Book II.

[illegible]

bitants. To you I resign the formation of the creatures proper to each of these sublunary regions. I leave you with the power of producing mortal natures, what I have done in the immortal; wherein no work of nothing proceeds from my immediate operation. You [illegible]

ed with the elements, and ſeminal principles of theſe ſeveral tribes of beings. Go, therefore, and imitate, in their frames, the wiſdom and contrivance you account admirable in your own."

To prevent errors in their procedure, the general line of life, and the qualities peculiar to each of the intended claſſes of animals, were pointed out to the divinities; and, in a more particular manner, inſtruction was given them with regard to the conſtitution of *man;* that ſingular ſort of creature, in which were to be combined the incorruptible ſubſtance with the corruptible, the corporeal ſenſes with the mental powers, and the appetites and affections of an earthly animal with the deſires and aims of a celeſtial god. The *Father* of all, himſelf, reaſſumed the remaining mixture of the undivided, and diviſible ſubſtance, employed in making the ſoul of the world; and, tempering it in the ſame *cup*, in due proportion, conſtituted of it all human ſouls. A number of them, equal to that of the ſtars, being formed, to every ſoul a ſtar was aſſigned, in the manner of a *vehicle;* and then, to all of them, the nature of the univerſe, and the laws that bound each particular nature, were declared. "The lot of you all in the ſtars," it was ſaid to them, "is equal; and ſo is your future deſtiny. But, obſerve, it is that of being inveloped in mortal bodies, and experiencing, in them, generation and corruption. From the deluſion of the ſenſes, paſſions will ariſe; love, mixed with pleaſure and pain, and what is conſequent to theſe, fear and anger, along with ſimilar and diſſimilar inquietudes. But, you are to know yourſelves, and to remember your original, that places you in a rank ſuperior to other terreſtrial animals. It will be your diſtinguiſhing privilege to have a ſenſe of religion, and a reverence of the gods, and to cultivate, along with it, the great principle of *juſtice*, which will teach you the due government of your own affections, and alſo make you admire order and harmony in things around you, and promote them in your ſpheres of action. By virtue of theſe principles, you will become victorious in your combats with inordinate paſſions, and, upon thus finiſhing your appointed courſe in mortal life, your recompenſe will be the happy return of every one to that ſtar, which is adjuſted to his temperament and good genius. But the neglect of this inſtruction, or failure in the requiſite performance, will be attended with diſmal conſequences.

All

All who, in this way, offend, will incur the moſt diſagreeable transformations, and paſs through a long and painful circuit of other animal bodies; a ſufferance which will not terminate, until the ſtains contracted from corporeal affection be done away, and a reſtoration to the purity of their primitive condition enſue. Being thus admoniſhed of the danger of corporeal depravation, it becomes you to beware of it, and to be ſenſible, that, if perverted by vice, you ſuffer for it, the conſequent evil is chargeable upon none but yourſelves." Having made all theſe diſpoſitions and appointments of things, the *Deity reſted in himſelf.*

The order given by the Father of the world, to his ſons of celeſtial dignity, was obeyed. They employed their utmoſt pains, attention, and ability, in preparing bodies of a make, and contexture of parts, ſuited to the reception of thoſe human ſouls which were to be ſent down from their ſtars; while the ſeminal virtues ſown in the air, in the water, and in the earth, helped to the generation of thoſe of the various ſpecies of the brute creatures. Farther we need not proſecute the hiſtory given in the Timaeus of the origin of man, and how the excellencies of his conſtitution being abuſed, or overbalanced by its defects, meaſures were taken for the ſupport of the one and the remedy of the other. It is obvious to what moral view the line of the narrative leads, and that it goes, partly on the authority of tradition, or probable conjecture, partly upon moral and ſyſtematic concluſions about the goodneſs and ſufficiency of all the divine works, to account for the apparent mixture of good and evil in the world; a queſtion which, as divine revelation can only reſolve, philoſophy better endeavours to eſtimate the amount of the evil, than to aſſign the original cauſe of its introduction and prevalence.

But, it being one great object in Plato's philoſophy to prove that there can be nothing morally *ill*, or culpable, either in the original conſtitution of the world by the Deity, or in his ſupreme rule over it, he calls our attention to a principle eſſential to all corporeal nature, that of *matter*, when conſidered as void of all form, and yet neceſſary to the *being* of it in every bodily thing. It was called, in the philoſophy of Pythagoras, *neceſſity*; and Plato applies to it the ſame epithet. Nothing, ſays he, but what is good and fair, could proceed, either in purpoſe or in act, from that divine *Being*, whoſe firſt demonſtrated perfection was his

his goodneſs. But matter, the receptacle and the nurſe of forms, was not, by its capability of them, altogether adequate to the excellence of his plan and workmanſhip. Although, in the generation of the world, it was brought under the controul of mind, there was in it ſuch a repugnancy, or defect, that what was leſs perfect in the frame of the ſublunary ſyſtem was to be aſcribed to its influence. The intelligent ſoul of the world, however predominant in power, and adorned with all virtue and efficacy, was, itſelf, of neceſſity, a commixture of the undivided and diviſible nature, which otherwiſe could not be combined. Through its agency, a boundary was ſet to the infinitude of matter *, and its motions were circumſcribed; but in the conjunction of fire, and earth, air, and water, its inſtability was ſtill apparent. None of theſe elements could be reckoned any more than fleeting forms of body, generated in its boſom, and convertible into one another. Whether ſuch an *entity* as this ſhould be deemed a ſubſtance, may be queſtioned; ſince we comprehend it only by an *adulterate* kind of reaſoning. Yet, wonderful to conſider, it was aſſumed as a principle in the world, and not only made to miniſter to the divine purpoſe, but to participate, itſelf, of what was divine and intelligent! Although permanent forms could not be ſtamped upon it, their ſimilitudes were; and, in the directions given to its ſeveral portions, by the ſoul of the world, it was conſtrained to affect, in general, what was fair and good, and to imitate faintly the exemplars of them, in the celeſtial regions. Intelligent ſouls do not offend againſt rectitude, but through want of recollection, miſtake, and ignorance; as views of their behaviour, in a moral light, may ſufficiently prove.

Plato excuſes himſelf, in the Timaeus, from introducing into his ſubject, of itſelf ſufficiently intricate, a topic which he had before enlarged upon. Yet, upon the debated queſtion about *ideas*, he finds it proper to repeat his ſentiment. "Are there," ſays he, "or are there not, ſpecific forms, or *ideas*, of things exiſting by themſelves, and apart from the matter, or ſubject, in which they may be rendered perceptible? or, Are we to hold them to be no other ways realized as eſſences, but as they are reflected to the human ſenſes from corporeal objects? Let reaſon,"

* In Philebo.

ſon," adds he, "and not preſumption, determine the point. But, if intellect, and true opinion, be two *genuſes*, as I apprehend them to be, there muſt be ideas ſubſiſting by themſelves, and comprehenſible, not by the ſenſes, but by the intelligence of the mind. If, on the contrary, as ſome would have it, intellect and true opinion differ in nothing from each other, then all things repreſented by the ſenſes muſt be held certain and true. But my ſentiment is, that they are two diſtinct things, neither generated together, nor in a ſimilar manner. For to us they are diſtinguiſhable, as doctrine is from perſuaſion; the one being inſeparably connected with juſt reaſon, and the other disjoined from it. The firſt is, in no reſpect, variable by perſuaſion; and the ſecond liable to alteration, by means of it. Of true opinion, every man may participate; of intellect the gods are ſharers; and along with them, in a degree, ſome few only of the human race. This being the caſe, it appears agreeable to reaſon, that there is an idea, the ſame in itſelf, ungenerated, and indiſſoluble; which receives nothing that is foreign into itſelf, nor does it paſs into any other thing; and is not, therefore, perceptible by the ſight, or any of the ſenſes, but only by the intelligent mind. For the other thing, next to the idea, which bears its name and ſimilitude, is perceived by the ſenſes, is carried about by another, and is now engendered, and now obliterated, can be no more than the object of opinion excited by the ſenſes." Strange and abſurd, in an inconceivable degree, as this hypotheſis will be pronounced, of ideas exiſting ſeparately by themſelves, independent of either a corporeal or mental ſubject in which they are generated, it muſt be confeſſed to be the doctrine of Plato. It was the ſolution, which, probably, he himſelf had invented, of the great queſtion amongſt philoſophers, about ſtate and motion in the world, or the proof of there being truths eternal, and immutable, in the nature of things, as well as variable and tranſient perceptions. In vain would we endeavour to acquit Plato of broaching this moſt extravagant conception, at leaſt as what he thought a requiſite, and not improbable conjecture, and ſay, with Ammonius, Simplicius, and other reconcilers of the doctrines of Plato and Ariſtotle, that no more was meant by the former, in his theory of ideas, than their ſubſiſtence in the divine mind, and, when the world was produced, their impreſſions being ſtamped on material

material ſubſtances. The Stagyrite would, upon this ſuppoſition, have had no ſufficient ground to impugn and explode, in the manner he does, the ideas of Plato, which would have approached near to, and been almoſt the ſame, with his own *ſubſtantial forms* in the phyſical world; with this difference only, that Ariſtotle, maintaining the eternity of the world, of courſe ſupported the eternity both of the generation and corruption of his ſpecific forms. But, adopting this interpretation, we muſt look upon the Parmenides of Plato, which yet is accounted a ſingular effort of his genius, not only to be a piece of falſe philoſophy, but ſuch a medley of ſuperfluous and unmeaning ſophiſtry, as perhaps never came from the pen of any philoſopher; and we muſt join in the predicament with it, various alluſions to the ſame theory about ideas in ſeveral other of his dialogues. It appears to be a miſtaken, or an arbitrary gloſs of Plato's text, to ſuppoſe, that what he calls the *fields of truth*, acceſſible to ſouls in their pre-exiſtent ſtate, and in which they contemplated intelligible forms, was the mind, or intellect of the Deity. The one eternal idea, which admitted neither of multiplicity, or diverſity, was only comprehenſible by the *deity* himſelf, and could not be legible to inferior intelligences. It became ſo, as we may more juſtly underſtand Plato, by emanent forms from it, as the archetype of them all. For, as has been ſaid, all things are *around him*, not *in him;* who is above eſſence. In the ethereal heavens are exhibited ideas, which are incorporeal eſſences of things, in themſelves the ſame, and ever permanent. They are more or leſs clearly read by the ſeveral orders of celeſtial beings, according as they approximate nearer, or recede farther from him, the fountain of intellect and truth.

With reſpect to what has been ſaid, of the celeſtial divinities being employed in the formation of man, and other terreſtrial animals, it may be obſerved, that Plato appears to have had no notion of any of theſe works, even in their corporeal parts, being accompliſhed by an agent that had not itſelf the knowledge of organiſation, and that to aſſign a blind undeſigning cauſe of them, ſuch as that of a *plaſtic* nature, which Ariſtotle adopted, was conſidered by him as an abſurdity in philoſophy. In the detail he enters into of the ſtructure of the human body, and the ſymmetry of its parts, he takes frequent occaſion to mark the divine artifice,

artifice, and the wonderful contrivance diſplayed in them. The deſcription given by him, although but an outline, when compared with the *anatomical* one of *Galen* *, an eminent admirer of his, is ſufficiently ſtriking: And, indeed, the argument is ſo perſpicuous, and the proofs it admits of are ſo forcible, that it may be ſaid, the multiplication of them hardly increaſes its evidence. In the inveſtigation of the *uſes* of the parts of the human frame, if fifty of them be proved the wiſeſt that could be, and others are found to anſwer their ends, although we know not preciſely in what manner, the demonſtration of an intelligent deſigner of them muſt be owned to be complete. The diſcovery of ſome hundred of theſe uſes, which Galen minutely unfolds, may more amuſe or aſtoniſh the mind, but, unleſs to a moſt ſceptical, or prejudiced one, it adds little to the meaſure of rational conviction.

The range which Plato takes, in his theory of the natural elements, in his account of their ſubſerviency to the compoſition of bodies, animate, and inanimate, in his explications of various phenomena, in the region of the air, and in the globe of the earth, alongſt with his analyſis of the diſeaſes incident to bodies organiſed, like the human, and the remedies of which they are ſuſceptible, all together ſhow the great extent of his genius, and the fertility of his imagination, adequate to every ſubject that required either accurate obſervation, or ingenious reaſoning; and that, if he frequently errs, it is becauſe the age he lived in had not attained to theſe diſcoveries, which a ſtricter attention to the proceſs of nature, and a ſucceſſion of reſearches and experiments have produced. It appears, that, although from ſome accidental diſguſt between him and Democritus, he did not correſpond with that philoſopher, he was well acquainted with the principles of the Atomical philoſophy, and that his knowledge in mathematics and geometry qualified him for the exacteſt ſtudy of phyſics, in every branch. Of this truth the Timaeus affords ſeveral proofs that might be quoted; and theſe not unreſpectable by modern phyſiologiſts. In preferring the abſtract to the analytical ſpecies of ſcience, he doubtleſs followed the bent of his genius; and, notwithſtanding his ſyſtem be vamped with ſome chimaeras, his ſpeculative ingenuity

* De Uſu Partium.

genuity is to be admired. Attachment to ſuch ſpeculations proved, indeed, the retardment of human knowledge, and, for ages, miſled it, in phyſiology and aſtronomy. But whether phyſics, as now made the object of ſtudy, independently of the ſcience of incorporeal principles, may not, by defective or fallacious experiments, often lead to deluſion, deſerves the attention of thoſe who would conſider all the phenomena of nature as explicable from the obſervation only of the qualities of bodies. The analyſis of many of them, we know, long and induſtriouſly ſought after, and often believed to have been completely diſplayed, has proved erroneous. The *chemical* principles, reckoned to be the components of all other phyſical ſubſtances, have been found, in numberleſs inſtances, incomprehenſive of their *ſtamina*. Notwithſtanding the ancient doctrine of *occult* qualities has been exploded, it ſtill appears impoſſible to baniſh it altogether from this boundleſs field of inveſtigation; in which the *wiſdom of nature*, conſidered as a ſenſible exhibition of that which is ſupernatural and *divine*, muſt always outreach the limited ſurvey that can be taken of it by human minds.

We ſhall here conclude the phyſical part of Plato's philoſophy with a *Note*, reſpecting a point which the peruſal of his works ſuggeſted to his firſt Chriſtian interpreters, and that has been ſince inſiſted upon by ſome of his learned modern expounders.

Note.—The point to be conſidered is, Whether the Grecian philoſopher may be underſtood, from the import of ſome paſſages in his dialogues and epiſtles, to have entertained ſome notion of a *Trinity* of perſons in the *divine nature*, conſonant to what is revealed in the *ſacred ſcripture*, and embraced as an article of the Chriſtian faith? In ſtating this queſtion, it is, in the firſt place, to be obſerved, that ſeveral of the early *fathers* of the Chriſtian church, ſuch as Juſtin Martyr *, Tertullian †, Clemens Alexandrinus ‡, Origen, and Euſebius, aſcribe to Plato a theological doctrine, either much the ſame with, or moſt ſimilar to that of the Chriſtian *Trinity*. As a foundation for this opinion, the great

* Apologia, ſect. 41. et 76. 77. † Tertul. Apolog. cap. 21.
‡ Strommata. Clem. Alex. et Praepar. Evangel. Euſebii, paſſim.

great ſpeculative principles upon which the philoſopher builds his theological and phyſical ſyſtem, and that have been called the *Ternary* of Plato, were referred to by them. What has been ſhown, both in the dialectic and phyſical part of his philoſophy, may prove, indeed, how all things that exiſt, are reduced by him, and comprehended, under *three* principles. In the abſtruſe reaſoning in the Parmenides, there is ſaid to be, One, without any thing; One, which is ſeveral things; and, One, and ſeveral things. Equivalent to theſe, in the Timaeus, are ſtated, Deity, Idea, Matter; to which correſponds the triple ſyſtem of the univerſe, the intellectual world, the intelligent, or rational, and the viſible. Nor is this all the ground upon which Plato is repreſented as a *Trinitarian*. In more diſtinct proof of the allegation, ſome paſſages, in which he uſes metaphyſical expreſſions, are adduced. When he calls the Deity *, the Eternal King, and Father of all things, and the world produced by him, *his ſon*, his λογος, or *word* of wiſdom made manifeſt, the ſenſible image of his underſtanding and power, and the mirror reflecting the rays of his otherwiſe incomprehenſible divinity, his meaning, in theſe expreſſions, taken in connection with what is clearly delivered by him in his epiſtle to Hermias, is referable, ſay they, to a firſt incorporeal and animating principle, declared to be the adorned ſoul of the world, and having *perſonality* †: For there Plato recommends a ſolemn *adjuration*, by the *God*, the *conductor* of all things, preſent and future, and by the *Father God* of that *conductor*, and their *cauſe*.

It may be here aſked by ſome, Why ſo reſpectable a number of the Chriſtian theologiſts choſe, from ſuch paſſages in Plato, to maintain, that the ſacred myſtery of the *Trinity*, acknowledged to be only revealed in the ſcriptures, might yet be ſo well known to the learned of the heathen world, as to be interwoven with their theories of the univerſe; and how the cauſe of Chriſtianity could be advanced by holding this opinion? From what is intimated in their writings, it appears, that they had a ſpecial inducement for adopting this controvertible, and otherwiſe, perhaps, unneceſſary aſſertion. The doctrine of the *Trinity* being impugned by ſome of the philoſophers as implying a plurality of Gods, or

 inconſiſtent

* In Epiſt. 2d, et in Epinomide. † In Epiſt. 6ta.

inconſiſtent with the unity of the *Deity*, it ſeemed a ready, and no improper way of removing this objection, to ſhow, that ſome of the wiſeſt of the philoſophers, ſuch as Pythagoras, Zeno, Cleanthes, and eſpecially Plato, who aſſerted the principle of a one eternal and undivided deity, did yet, in the contemplations of his nature, expreſs themſelves in terms analogous to thoſe uſed by the Chriſtians, and underſtood in the ſenſe of there being *three perſons* in the divine nature. In conſequence of this argument, they endeavoured not only to find in the *Ternary* of Plato a repreſentation of the *Trinity*, but to prove that he, and other philoſophers, could not have approached ſo near to the diſcovery of this ſacred truth as they do in their works, without ſome knowledge of the Moſaic ſcriptures, or other inſpired prophetical writings, under the Jewiſh diſpenſation. In ſupport of the laſt point, it is well known, that Joſephus's authority is chiefly appealed to *; and that the vouchers quoted by him, Clearchus, Ariſtaeus, and Hermippus, as authors of credit, are much called in queſtion. Amongſt the moderns, however, the argument has been taken up, and proſecuted with great diſplay of ancient erudition, by Auguſtinus Steuchus †, Marſilius Ficinus, and Joannes Picus de Mirandola, and, more lately, by Voſſius and Bochart.

Upon this learned controverſy, the note here introduced cannot expatiate, and much leſs can it pretend to decide. When we conſider, that in moſt of the ſpeculations formed by philoſophers, concerning this vaſt univerſe, as having a beginning, and being produced by a firſt *cauſe;* the obvious, and marked perfections of that Deity would be, and have, in reality, been, his *goodneſs*, his *wiſdom*, his *power;* and that, in his motive to create, the firſt would be apparent; in his orderly, and ſuitable arrangement of all things, the ſecond; and, in his conſtant preſervation and maintenance of them, the third; it may be contended, that the coincidence (ſo far as it may be reckoned ſuch) of the Platonic Ternary with the revealed doctrine of the *Trinity*, is rather to be accounted accidental, than derived from traditional authority, and that, too, referable to the Moſaic, or ſcriptural antiquities. When it cannot be truly affirmed, that Plato deviated from what appears to have been the

* Contra Appion, lib. 1. † De Perenni Philoſophia.

the received courſe of philoſophiſing, which generally proceeded upon the aſſumption of two original principles; whence reſulted a third; the opinion, that he took his ſtatement of three principles, not from this common theory, but from tradition, may be deemed a precipitant and arbitrary one.

Upon the other ſide of the argument, if it be inſiſted upon, as a fact, that he advanced this theory, as he found it in the Pythagorean ſyſtem, it muſt be confeſſed that a difficulty ariſes, ſufficient to reſtrain deciſion in the queſtion: For, notwithſtanding all that may be ſaid about the improbability, that either Pythagoras or Plato, would ſeek for, or meet with any philoſophic or theological information amongſt a people, in ſuch humble circumſtances as the Jews, there is ſtill reaſon to adhere to what has been before remarked upon this topic, that, with regard to the early philoſophers, who travelled into foreign countries, for inſtruction and knowledge of every kind, this conſideration did not operate; and that, as to the difficulty of conceiving how any ſpeculative and abſtruſe doctrine could be tranſmitted, from one nation to another, without the groſſeſt miſtakes, it is to be remembered, that, as amongſt the Egyptians, ſo, amongſt other nations, this was done by means of ſymbols, more than by writing; and hence the curious inveſtigation of the former in all reſearches into ancient knowledge. If it be ſaid, that the Jews, whoſe divine law laid them under a ſolemn prohibition of ſenſible repreſentations of the Deity, could have no ſacred ſymbols; and that, accordingly, nothing of this kind was known amongſt them, but the *ineffable name;* it may be aſked, Did the veneration of their law hinder them from the breaches of it, and falling into acts of idolatry; or, are we to believe that their learned Rabbis never did, in imitation of other nations, preſume to ſymboliſe? The contrary will be acknowledged; and that they early attempted it in their manner of writing the *moſt holy* name. Their conſtant concealment of this from inquiſitive ſtrangers is not credible; eſpecially, when liable, in their captivities, to be ſcorned as a people deſtitute of ſpeculative knowledge. The Aſſyrians and Egyptians muſt, therefore, have had ſpecial information of their theology and antiquities; and whether Plato, who, as well as Pythagoras, was a diligent collector of foreign theology and ſcience, had not met with

with ſome traditions, or writings, of a *Coſmagony*, nearly reſembling, if not the ſame with the ſcriptural one of Moſes, may be remitted to the judgment of every unbiaſſed peruſer of the Timaeus; when he reads, *That the one and good formed the celeſtial and ſublunary ſpheres, making a diviſion between them; that he ſaw that his work was good, and had pleaſure in it; and, after attending to the compoſition of man, that he reſted in himſelf;* and theſe are not the only ſimilitudes.

To conclude the argument, although not to determine in it; May we not ſay with reaſon, that ſeveral of the heathen philoſophers were led, not caſually, but partly from moral reaſons, and partly upon traditional grounds, to the acknowledgement of three principles, or original cauſes of all things, which were erroneouſly and abſurdly conceived by them, and in no explication reconcileable with the revealed doctrine of the *Trinity;* yet, that their *ſtumbling* upon the verge of a ſacred truth might, providentially, be made ſubſervient to its proper diſcovery in due time, and to have the effect of preparing mens minds for its reception? Convinced from the revelation of it, the moſt intelligent of them might be, that, as the works of God, in the natural world, could not, in their production, contrivance, and extent, be fully underſtood by them, and, as the human frame itſelf was, in ſeveral reſpects, unintelligible, and a myſtery, much more muſt the divine nature and eſſence be myſterious, and have a veil, through which ſuch limited conceptions as the human cannot clearly penetrate.

SECTION

SECTION IV.

Openings of moral ſentiments in Man;—his mixed conſtitution, how adjuſted.—Pleaſure not the ſame with eligible good.—Prudence an eſſential conſtituent of Virtue.—Aſſimilation to the Deity the end of human action.—Immortality in a Species of it, exemplified in all the productions of Nature.—The Contemplative Philoſopher.—Principles and views of political governments.

UPON mankind, the gods have beſtowed no faculty, or privilege, more valuable and precious than that of philoſophiſing. As, without the bodily organ of ſight, neither the ſtars, nor the ſun, nor the heavens *, could be perceived, but their order and congruity be as a *blank*; ſo bereft of philoſophy, which opens the eye of the ſoul, mental contemplation would ſleep; neither cauſes nor effects could be known; and human reaſon, and human action, would be alike involved in obſcurity and confuſion; yet, as the corporeal eye obſerves, not in vain, the heavenly motions, but receives a picture of their uniformity, ſo the rational faculty, excited by philoſophic ſtudy, awakes to a more diſtinct conſideration of the principle by which they are governed: A model, it appears, to which the thoughts and movements of the ſoul may be conformed; and a rule divine, for the proper direction and conſiſtency of its aims and affections. The ſenſe of hearing, alſo, conſpires with that of

* In Timaeo.

of the ſight, to give the impreſſion of mental harmony. Why are modulations imparted to the human voice; why have men ſenſibility to the concords of muſic *, but that they may learn from them that moderation of the paſſions, that compoſure of the irregular affections of the ſoul, which theſe perceptions are naturally fitted to inſpire? Surely ſomething more, than an irrational ſenſe of pleaſure, was intended by their being peculiarly aſſigned to the human race. That they were beſtowed by the *Muſes* for a nobler end, all converſant with the productions of theſe ſiſters of harmony well underſtand: For, even the regular cadence, or *rhythmus*, uſed by the poets, is known to have its effect, not only upon the ear, but upon the mind, and to beget in it congenial meaſures and graces.

What theſe graces are, and in what manner the human ſoul is ſuſceptible of them, philoſophy preſumes to unfold; not altogether, indeed, as a ſcience of human invention, or ſeparated from ſuch a ſenſe of divine things as a contemplation of the univerſe may afford; but under a perſuaſion, that the wiſdom of human life is marked out by the preſcription of the Gods †, and can only be truly learned in connection with a pious ſentiment of their order and appointment. That an order is taken, and an oeconomy preſcribed by them, is evinced, even from the mixed compoſition of human nature. In it, although the corporeal and incorporeal ſubſtances are joined, and the irrational ſoul with the rational principle, in the former of which the iraſcible and concupiſcible paſſions are found, and, in the latter, the deliberative faculty; yet theſe are not confuſedly thrown together, but in a manner which ſhows, that an eſſential difference obtains between them. Nature does not divide things that are alike, and congenial, but thoſe which are not the ſame, and diſagree. That the intelligent principle might ſuffer as little as poſſible from the impulſe of the animal appetites and paſſions, and, at the ſame time, be kept in mind of its divine original, and its aſcendency over them, it is ſet apart in an exalted place of the corporeal frame. It is ſeated in the head, as in a tower or citadel, whilſt the latter are degraded below it by their poſition. They are diſtinguiſhed into the iraſcible

* De Legibus, lib. 2. in initio. † In Theaeteto, et in Menone.

cible and concupiſcible paſſions; from a diverſity rather conceivable than real; ſince both are only converſant about joy or grief, temporary and mortal. By theſe ſprings they are conſtantly moved, and are incapable of knowing any other motives of action. They cheriſh, without diſtinction, all bodily affection, and give ſupport to its influence over the whole man. The rational ſoul ſpurns ſuch attachment, and holds it in contempt. Conſcious of inherent faculties, ſuperior in kind, and more enlarged than thoſe of the ſenſes, it aſpires to cultivate and improve them. It glows with an ardent deſire for the diſcovery of truth, independent of ſenſible objects; and, convinced that its deſtiny is not confined to mortal good, it ſeeks to attain that which is imperiſhable and immortal.

But how does philoſophy pretend to adjuſt this complex conſtitution of human nature; how does it reconcile ſuch jaring principles, and make them co-operate to one end? To anſwer this queſtion properly, ſome ſeries of reaſoning will be requiſite; yet a general reply to it may be given in a few words. To leſſen the conteſt of the diſcording principles, reaſon dictates one plain rule *. Let each of them be allowed its proper food and aliment; and, then, each of them will more eaſily admit of a diſcipline effective of their agreement. But the maxim is not to be underſtood, as if the rational principle were to be occupied ſolely with its ſeparate contemplations, and the iraſcible left to follow its career, and the concupiſcible ſuffered to purſue its peculiar gratifications. For, beſide that ſuch a life is, evidently, inconſiſtent with itſelf, and could not be ſupported by any creature; there is a meaſure ordained in nature, for the ſuitable expanſion of the powers of beings, both animated and intelligent, whether they be thoſe of knowledge or thoſe of action. The intelligence, even of *celeſtial* beings, is commenſurate to their ſpheres; and, although all corporeal things are made for the ſake of the incorporeal, and human things on account of the divine, yet, in the mixed condition of humanity, the conſideration and ſtudy of both its conſtituent parts is neceſſary, and the culture of each of them re-

 quired,

* In Timaeo, in fine.

quired, in proportion to its importance *. Man's knowledge cannot be, altogether, abſtract and contemplative, but muſt include that of himſelf, and of human condition. He muſt underſtand not only what is true, in the nature of things, but likewiſe what is good and uſeful in the affections and actions of mankind. *Know thyſelf*, therefore, was † that inſcription in the Delphic temple, which was declared to be moſt divine and worthy of a God. It directs, indeed, to the recognition of the intelligent ſoul, as the principal part of the human conſtitution, and what is, properly, the *man;* and that its nature is ever to be diſtinguiſhed from what communicates with, and appertains to it; for ſuch are the corporeal appetites ‡ and paſſions. With reſpect to the agency of theſe, the diſcerning principle only can judge, whether it tends to good or to ill. The iraſcible kind appear to have utility in repelling what is offenſive, or injurious to the man: The *concupiſcible* (ſo to call them) in affecting, and procuring, what is pleaſant and agreeable. Yet both of them are conſtantly inclined to exceſs; ſo that neither the harm that is apprehended, nor the pleaſure that is ſought for, is reduced to any meaſure, unleſs the reaſoning faculty interpoſe to preſcribe it. Experience ſoon diſcovers to it, that a degree of pain may frequently be more eligible than pleaſure; and, therefore, that the latter is not to be eſtimated as a genus of good in itſelf §. Evident, indeed, it is, that, in the inſtitution of nature, the one, as well as the other, is ſubjected to the diſcipline of reaſon; and that, in order to the attainment of real good in life, if the *quantum* of fear or grief ſhould be diminiſhed, ſo that of joy or pleaſure ought alſo to be moderated.

In correſpondence to this rule, philoſophy teaches to obſerve a *mean* in all the irrational affections of the ſoul, whether they proceed from appearances of evil or good. This is the natural, and, therefore, the beſt condition of man, and human life; when the feweſt, and theſe the leaſt hurtful impreſſions, are made upon the tranquility of the mind. The conſequences of violent paſſion, and unruly appetite, are, by this courſe,

* In Philebo, vel de Summo Hominis Bono, ad fin. † In Alcibiade primo, vel de Nat. Hom. ‡ Dialog. de Republica, lib. 4. § Ibid. lib 9.

courſe, happily avoided; and the calmer and milder affections, which nouriſh life, and prolong it, and the ſtudies and purſuits which invigorate the ſoul, without the ravage of its faculties, are cheriſhed and improved. Nature, not overpowered, or agitated, by the exceſſes of grief, or of joy, is neither diſguſted nor ſatiated with life, but feels its reſtoration to that equal ſtate, in which the *goods* of the mind, and thoſe of the body, are together beſt obtained.

How widely different from this is the vulgar life of mankind; whether it be that of the ambitious of dominion, or of the covetous of wealth. In any ſcene of it no equality of enjoyment is known; but, as it happens, deſire of pleaſure is ſucceeded by a ſurfeit of it; fear, by preſumption, grief, by ecſtatic joy; or elſe dejection, from diſappointed paſſion, takes place; timidity, from apparent difficulties, and ſorrow, mingled with envy, from deſpair *. The extremes of the paſſions never fail to follow each other in this manner, where, to none of them, a boundary is fixed. Even the effect of theſe of the joyful kind proves by no means happy; when the gratification of the appetite, or paſſion, is only regarded; and, no attention being paid to what the body can admit, or the ſoul endure, inſtead of their being kept in a healthful and ſound ſtate, the premature decay, or languor of both, is incurred.

Men, however, there are, and theſe not a few, who maintain that pleaſure is a real good in itſelf †; and that the former epithet may well ſtand for a definition of the latter. But, ſurely, they ought to explain what ſpecies of pleaſure they mean; otherwiſe, there muſt be the greateſt ambiguity in their definition. Nothing is more evident, than that a vaſt diverſity of taſtes and opinions, with reſpect to what is called by the general name of pleaſure, obtains amongſt mankind. So much do they diſagree, that ſome not only reject what others approve, under this vague term, but pronounce that kind of pleaſure which varies from their own to be, not any thing good, but an evil. In this way of reckoning there muſt be, it ſeems, both good and evil pleaſures. How, then, can all pleaſures be held forth under the denomination of good?

* De Republica, lib. 8. † Ibid. lib. 6.

Common reaſon reſts not in this deluſion; and philoſophy directs to ſome more juſt and determined conception of what nature has ordained to be the real good of man *. The idea of the one firſt and ſupreme good is not, indeed, of eaſy attainment; and, in order to only a partial apprehenſion of it, much cultivation of the mind, by philoſophic ſtudy, becomes neceſſary. But, ſo far as we may underſtand *good* to be a quality, either of the object of human affections, or of the affections themſelves, it may be diſtinguiſhed into that which reſpects the ſoul or the body; or what may be called good divine and human †. In theſe two kinds of it, there is, evidently, a greater and a leſſer ſpecies; yet they have a neceſſary connection; and the human good, depending upon the divine for its efficacy, is generally found in conjunction with the latter. It is of the nature of all good to have *utility* ‡; and, where this qualification is derived, not from accidental circumſtances, but from the rational and active powers of the ſoul, it obtains the appellation of *virtue*, or of that good, which, although human in its operation, has an original truly divine.

Would we then form a conception, not of the *one abſolute* good, but of that which, in the condition of human nature, may be accounted the neareſt in affinity to it; we muſt reckon it to have the properties of *perfection*, *ſufficiency*, and *eligibility* ‖. The moſt perfect it ought to be in the ſpecies of good; ſufficient in the degree, ſo as to ſurpaſs all other examples; and eligible, as having native delight, and cauſing deſire; but deſirous of nothing beyond itſelf. If we ſhould place it in pure mind alone, unaffected with pleaſure or joy, even although all diſquiet was removed, it muſt be owned, as has been ſaid, that ſuch a life, however ſuitable to more exalted intelligences, would be as little eligible, as competent to creatures of the human frame. If, again, we ſhould reſolve the greateſt good of our nature into ſenſations of pleaſure, deſtitute of mind, and the reflections of reaſon, it would imply a ſort of life, of all others the moſt abſurd and prepoſterous §. It is difficult, indeed, to conceive what a ſtrange and chimerical exiſtence it would prove, in which

* De Republica, lib. 6.
† De Legibus, lib. 1.
‡ In Menone, vel de Virtute.
‖ In Philebo.
§ Ibid.

which there would be joy inſtantaneous, but never continued; and the ſenſe of pleaſure, and that always evaneſcent. It could be compared to nothing more properly than to a *ſponge*, no ſooner wet than dry; or to the *oyſter*, or the *muſcle*, that alternately opens and ſhuts its ſhell, according to the flux or reflux of the waves. Hardly, indeed, can it be ſuppoſed, that the moſt abject votaries of pleaſure would make choice of this kind of life. In the eſtimate, therefore, of real good, pleaſure, as an ambiguous term, and by ſome taken in its worſt ſenſe, cannot be admitted to ſtand in competition with mind, nor upon an equality, either for perfection, or ſufficiency with wiſdom, ſcience, or rational knowledge *. There is, however, no occaſion to quarrel with the word, becauſe it has been abuſed; and much leſs to reject, as ſome would do, the proper idea that may be aſſigned to it, as if nothing was to be underſtood by pleaſure but what was ignominious. Real pleaſures certainly there are, as well as falſe and deceitful ones; temperate as well as exceſſive; ſome more ſteady, and others more inconſtant. Although, by the indiſcriminate admiſſion of theſe, or their unlimited accumulation, any human ſubject of them would be found in a moſt deplorable caſe. yet no juſt objection can lie, even from the ſtricteſt philoſophy, againſt a proper ſelection of pleaſure, and aſſuming it in a certain meaſure and degree, as an ingredient in human good. Of five degrees, by which we may conceive the *perfect*, the *ſufficient*, and the *eligible* kind to be conſtituted, pleaſure can only claim the laſt †. Firſt of all, in this eſtimate, we muſt place the *one abſolute* good, the principle and the meaſure of univerſal nature: Next to it truth; to which commenſurable ideas and pulchritude appertain: In the third rank, mind and wiſdom: In the fourth, the properties of mind, which are the ſciences, and arts, and right opinions. In the fifth, thoſe pleaſures which are accompanied with no diſquiet; ſuch are the pure and unmixed ones afforded by the ſciences; and, laſtly, let the pleaſures of ſenſe follow after them with a moderate pace.

But, ſince to the expetible and ſufficient good of man, a mixture of pleaſure is allowed to be requiſite, Why ſhould there be ſo much reſerve expreſſed

* In Philebo. † De Legibus, lib. 4.

expreſſed with regard to the latter, and its degradation to the loweſt claſs be thus inſiſted upon? In reply to this queſtion, it may be affirmed, that the ſcale of good, which has been traced, is properly adjuſted in its degrees; and that, to an impartial eye, it muſt appear, that the precedency, in each of them, is given to things, in their nature, more allied to true good than pleaſure can be reckoned. Mind has certainly, in itſelf, more pulchritude than the pleaſure of the ſenſes. Men, who purſue the latter immoderately, are often put to the bluſh; or they ſeek to conceal from the obſervation of others their ſhameful deſires. All the acts of mind and reaſon have meaſure and moderation, without which real good cannot be found. But, compared with them, how vehement, impetuous, and headlong, are the *oppoſite* ones of pleaſure? Every votary of Venus is ready to ſwear, that he may well be pardoned by the Gods; becauſe he is not maſter of himſelf. There is, then, no error committed, or any treſpaſs made upon the value of pleaſure, by placing it in the loweſt degree of good. Upon the ſuppoſition that the *ſciences*, as the daughters of mind and wiſdom, were to deliver their opinion about pleaſure's admiſſion into their company, they would ſurely give it with caution; and not, as Homer and the poets have done, ſuffer it to be incorporated with them. Their ſentence would be, not only to mark the pure and the true, together with the natural and the neceſſary kinds, for having privilege of aſſociation with them, but to except againſt all the intemperate, the overſwelling and tumultuary ſpecies. They would wiſh to have even the approved ſort, rather in their train, than always by their ſide; and they might juſtify their verdict in the manner following: "To us a flood of pleaſures is altogether unſuitable; and ſuch of them as run to exceſs are inconvenient. In the way of our progreſs they would throw many impediments. Too apt are the ſouls in which we dwell to be perverted by the inſatiable deſire of pleaſure. Under its influence we may be retarded, but can never advance in knowledge. Negligence, and ſelf-oblivion, are always the concomitants of immoderate joy. Willing we are to admit the pure, and the true, the ſound, and the temperate delights, as our familiar and domeſtic friends. Theſe being the natural attendants of virtue, we readily embrace. But the rage of pleaſure, with its depravities, can be in no concord

concord with mind. In man, wiſdom and pleaſure ought to be tempered together, as they are in the univerſe. There the viſible good, ever keeping an equal tenor, is neither defective nor redundant; but, being in harmony with itſelf, and its ſubject, is, therefore, permanent, and everlaſting."

With regard to all things, divine and human, it is a law eſtabliſhed, that mind, or reaſon, not only predominates, but becomes the leading principle, and neceſſary ingredient, in whatever is truly excellent and good. Temperance, juſtice, and fortitude, may be as truly reckoned the primary perfections of the human ſoul, and its proper *goods*, as health, beauty, and ſtrength, are allowed to be bodily excellencies, and benefits *. The former, if not always the procurers, are at leaſt the conſervators of the latter. But, what is more particularly to be remarked, neither of them can be accounted either perfections or utilities, but as they are accompanied with prudence. Separate from this faculty of the mind, they could be only accidentally under theſe predicaments; and, as it happened, either advantageous or prejudicial. If, therefore, prudence does not conſtitute the whole of virtue, as found in the human ſoul, it certainly forms its moſt eſſential parts. It takes that courſe with the irraſcible and concupiſcible paſſions, which, on account of their indocility, is the only proper one for moderating their exceſs, and rendering them implicitly ſubſervient to virtue. It allows to each of them a certain extent of energy and gratification; and endeavours, not by inſtruction, but by habit, to make them bear a meaſure of reſtraint and controul. Known it is, that the mere animal part of the human frame may be brought, by cuſtom, to be, as it were, obſervant of a rule. How much more may this take place in the appetites and paſſions †, which ſeem to join to ſenſibility ſome traces of reaſon. It appears, at leaſt, that the reſentful feeling, which we call *indignation*, makes either a nearer approach to reaſon, or is more readily impreſſed with its dictates, than what is experienced in the other blind paſſions. Violent anger often carries alongſt with it a ſenſe of the injurious nature of the paſſion, and reluctantly gives ſcope to its rage, or finds it quickly ſucceeded by compunction.

* In Menone, ibid.

† Dialog. 4 de Republica.

compunction. Indignation, alſo, ſometimes riſes in the ſoul againſt the extravagant deſires of the ſenſes. What is reported of Leontius, the ſon of Aglaion, exemplifies this. In aſcending from the Piraeus to the city of Athens, he underſtood that there were to be ſeen, on the other ſide of the north wall, a number of human bodies, which lay dead, and expoſed near the ſhore. Strongly inclined to look upon them, he was yet reſtrained by a feeling of horror. He turned his face another way, and, in conteſt with himſelf, covered his eyes. When he found, notwithſtanding all efforts againſt the gratification of his ſight, that he could not reſiſt it, he advanced towards the ſpectacle with his eyes wide open, and then indignantly exclaimed, "Look on, ye wretched eyes, and, ſince you will have it ſo, be ſatiated with this pleaſant view." It is thus, we may be ſenſible, that the indignant paſſion frequently oppoſes vehement deſire *; and hence there is ſome ground to conclude, that, ſo far as ambition, or the luſt of power, may be connected with an indignant temper, its votaries are in leſs danger of loſing the ſenſe of virtue than thoſe who give way inſenſibly, and without any check in their minds, to the allurements of ſenſual pleaſure.

To the ground-work laid by *prudence*, in the human ſoul, for preſerving the ſenſe, and ſupporting the practice of virtue, may be fitly added certain ſtudies ſalutary and improving to the mind, and alſo ſome practical inſtitutions and arts, found to be conducive to the temperament of the body. Amongſt the former are, chiefly, to be reckoned the ſciences of geometry, aſtronomy, and the powers of numbers; and, analogous to them, the theory of ſounds, and muſical harmony †. The Gymnaſtic exerciſes, when joined with muſic, are well adapted to promote the ſoundneſs of the bodily frame, and the compoſure of the paſſions. By their means, not only abſtinence, patience, and hardineſs, may be learned, but, alſo, ſedateneſs of ſoul, lenity, and the milder affections, be inſpired. The concord of the iraſcible with the concupiſcible paſſions may, in this manner, be attained; while, to each of them, a kind of nutrition, alongſt with diſcipline, is diſpenſed. Inſtead of ferocious animation, men may learn fortitude, that calm and intrepid temper

* De Repub. lib. 9. † Ibid. Dialog. 4. et 7.

temper of the ſoul, which holds no object to be awful, or action fearful, when reaſon, or a ſenſe of duty, requires the encounter of the one, or the performance of the other *. Inſtead of a liſtleſs propenſity to pleaſure, the virtue of temperance may be acquired, by which the ſoul's maſtery over the corporeal appetites is proved, or their concord with its more manly affections aſcertained. If, to theſe two moral qualities, as the dictates of prudence, be united that of *juſtice*, the practical virtues required of man may be reckoned complete. For *juſtice*, conſidered not in reference to any particular act or diſpoſition, but as having a reſpect to the whole moral conſtitution of the ſoul, enjoins, beſide the agreement of its rational and irrational parts †, that each of them ſhould act in in its own place, and not intrude into the function of another. Let the lower and baſer appetites and affections, when not refractory to reaſon's voice, but ſubmiſſive to her commands, follow their objects, and be ſolaced with ſuch good as may be found in them. No otherwiſe is the oeconomy of the animal nature to be maintained; and, ſo far as the human conſtitution participates of it, a ſimilar regulation muſt take place. In civil policy, and that of a well governed city, we may alſo obſerve the good effect of the preſcribed rule; nor is there any other of more avail to the public peace and welfare, than that which obliges each of the ſeveral claſſes of the community to perform *only* its proper buſineſs.

That which is good and uſeful is alſo *fair*. Virtue, therefore, which has the former qualities, cannot be deſtitute of the latter excellence ‡. Every thing beautiful hath its proportions and meaſures, which diſtinguiſh it from what is uncircumſcribed, and reduced to no determined form. If there be in human life that which gives it deſignation, or any ſpeciality of character, it muſt come from virtue; which, as has been ſaid, makes the rational and irrational parts of the human nature to have conſiſtency, and determines, to one end, the action of both. Nothing but what is, apparently, good, or uſeful, or fair, is lovely and deſireable; yet many are the deceptions of men, from an admiſſion of falſe

* De Repub. Dialog. 4.
† Ibid. Dialog. 9.
‡ In Timaeo, et in Philebo.

images of theſe qualities. It can hardly be conceived that any love evil, as *evil*, or eſteem what is deformed, as *deformed;* and, when a wrong approbation is given, it may be generally concluded to proceed from an erroneous imagination, or a miſtaken judgment, and not from the *will*, or real purpoſe of the mind. Every ſpecies of *imprudence* has, commonly, ſome epithet of reproach or ſcorn affixed to it, that expreſſes its evil nature or deformity; whereas, on the contrary, *prudence*, which carries in its train temperance, juſtice, and fortitude, can be no otherwiſe characteriſed than as the promoter and perfecter of the beſt good, both of ſoul and body. The value of the former, above that of the latter, is manifeſt. Bodily good, like bodily beauty, is changeable *. It is made up of various and contrary things; and, therefore, it can have no determined eſſence †. But every virtue is not, *ſimply*, a quality, but alſo an active power of the ſoul, which depends not on external circumſtances, nor is variable by them, but, participating of the eſſence of good, which is incorporeal and divine, it is fitted to ſurvive the body, and become immortal, together with the ſubject in which it inheres.

After all, it muſt be remembered, that things which have peculiar excellence are difficult ‡. Virtue, which is the nobleſt and beſt endowment of human nature, is not of eaſy acquiſition. To be poſſeſſed of it, men muſt become *real* philoſophers, or inveſtigators of truth, as found in intelligible ideas, and in the ſtable eſſences of things §. There are abuſes

* In Philebo. † De Republica, lib. 5.

‡ It is not to be underſtood upon what grounds it has been alledged, that *bodily* qualities were little, or but ſlightly diſtinguiſhed, by the philoſophers of Greece, from the virtues of the ſoul and *mind*. In the Platonic philoſophy, the latter were held to be, not only *rational* excellencies, in contra-diſtinction to the corporeal and irrational affections, but, in ſo far as they might participate more of the powers of reaſon and intellect, they were deemed qualities or excellencies of a divine nature. In Ariſtotle's Ethics, although the principles of morals are taken upon a lower ſcale, we ſhall find that the diſtinction between corporeal qualities and the mental virtues is explicitly marked. According to the doctrine of the Stoics, the *virtues* are powers of the ſoul in a manner created by itſelf, and independent of all bodily diſpoſitions. And even Epicurus acknowledges, that the former have a preference to the latter.

§ De Repub. lib. 6.

abuſes of philoſophy, by its common profeſſors, which have made it incur obloquy and reproach: And, amongſt other errors they have committed, it may be reckoned a fundamental one, that the *ethical* part is too much conſidered as a ſcience by itſelf; which teaches what is convenient, and what is uſeful, in the conduct of life, without reſpect to more ſublime principles that obtain in the *univerſe*. They think it ſufficient to ſhow this action to be good, and that juſt, one prudent, and another generous, detached from any ſenſe or perſuaſion, rational or contemplative, of the exiſtence of ſuch *intelligibles*, as goodneſs, juſtice, wiſdom, and bounty. To know goodneſs, it is neceſſary to have ſome idea of a one abſolute good, the original of all examples of it. If to perceive it in *ſingulars* be advantageous and inſtructive to human minds, to contemplate it in the archetypal idea, muſt prove of ſtill more efficacious and beneficial influence upon them. To the omiſſion of this doctrine in philoſophy may, perhaps, be aſcribed the inconſiderable effect that its moral precepts are obſerved to have upon ourſelves *, and other men †. There is much in what may be called the *circumduction* of the mind to its proper objects, and ſuch as lead it to form general ideas, or enlarged views of truth. By following this courſe of ſtudy, the mind acquires a divine vigour in the purſuit of knowledge, which is not eaſily relaxed. Let the eye of the ſoul, therefore, be early ſet upon the contemplation of the virtues, as having their ideal and permanent forms. Let it not be darkened by the fumes of paſſion, or dazzled by the glare of ſenſible objects, and the happieſt effects may be expected to enſue. The beam of truth upon the mind will be clear, lively, and delightful; and the attraction to virtue powerful, in proportion to the ſuperiority of its native charms, above all other objects.

What, then, is the *end*, and what the ſcope of human life and action? It can be pronounced, according to true philoſophy, to be nothing leſs than an *aſſimilation* to the Deity, or to be conformed to the will and purpoſes of the *intellectual mind* ‡, that rules the univerſe. Since the human ſoul is properly *the man*, and that heaven born ſoul a participant

* In Menone, vel de Virtute.
† In Repub. lib. 7.
‡ In Timaeo, in fine.

of immortality, the ſcope of its action muſt riſe to this importance and dignity. Attached, as we are, to mortal bodies *, and converſant with corporeal things, tranſient and periſhable, yet the whole terreſtrial nature, which is animated, and more eſpecially the human, aſpires to immortality, and makes inceſſant efforts to attain it. Whilſt no corporeal ſubſtance, inanimate or animated, continues the ſame, but, having a ſhort lived vigour, verges to decay, the faculty of generation, common to both, avails to reproduce and perpetuate their kinds. By this means, all plants and vegetables tranſmit an offspring. To this courſe, the animals of every ſpecies are irreſiſtibly impelled. Whether of the earth, of the ſea, or of the air, they feel the ſame propenſity, and appear to live not ſo much for themſelves as for their progeny, or for the preſent time as for futurity. In this manner, men, ſubſtituting their repreſentatives, appear to themſelves to immortaliſe their being. Conſumed by years, they are ſeen to be renewed in the forms of their children. Whilſt they find not only their bodies change, but that opinions, manners, cuſtoms, and even principles, and motives of action amongſt mankind, vary; yet they are ſtill prompted to act in one ſhape or another, as if a kind of immortality was their hope, as well as their deſire; and, on account of ſome remarkable deed or performance, might be their lot in the world. Notwithſtanding the *ſciences* themſelves, alas! are known to fluctuate, ſome branches of them drooping in their reputation, or elſe the knowledge of them being forgotten, yet the human mind acquieſces not in the thought of their fame altogether failing, or, becauſe of ſome apparent inconſiſtencies, that the connection they have with one another, and, when well underſtood, their perfect harmony, may be overlooked. *Reminiſcence* of their original, and their rational foundation, inſpires the more agreeable perſuaſion and confidence of their being tranſmitted from age to age; and, alongſt with them, the memory of their improvers. Thus it is, that, although what is human and mortal cannot be ſtable, and always the ſame, like that which is divine and immortal, there is, in the inferior nature, a manifeſt emulation of the higher; and, where actual immortality is unattainable to man here below, the image of it is eagerly and conſtantly purſued.

Hence

* In Convivio, vel de Amore.

Hence the love of glory, and of fame after death, is ſeen to animate the minds of men to ſuch a degree, that, for its ſake, no toils or dangers are accounted too great to be undergone. The flame, indeed, is moſt alive, and brighteſt, in the nobleſt minds; in thoſe men, whoſe lives and actions give them aſſurance that they ſhall be ever remembered with honour and applauſe. So it ſhone forth in *Alceſtis*, the ſpouſe of Admetus, when, for his recovery from a dangerous ſickneſs, ſhe made a voluntary ſurrender of her life. It was felt by Achilles, when, to revenge Patroclus's death, he entered again into that martial ſtrife, which he knew would inevitably prove fatal to him. Codrus, alſo, teſtified its influence, when, in order to obtain a victory for his country, he threw himſelf upon the ſwords of the enemy. The more ſingular theſe, and others, appeared in virtuous action, the more eminently they ſhowed themſelves poſſeſſed of the natural deſire of an immortality *in fame*; ſince, beyond the date of mortals, their preſent being could not be prolonged. To theſe may be added the diſtinguiſhed poets, ſuch as Homer and Heſiod, the fathers of a nobler progeny than that of natural children; and whoſe productions have told to many generations with what minds and imaginations their authors were endowed. Wiſe legiſlators, alſo, may be taken into the catalogue; they who, by their deep ſtudy of human nature, and their ſuperior underſtanding of what was perfective of it, became the reformers and conſervators of whole communities of men, and, therefore, had given to them, while they lived, the pledges of a long enduring fame.

But, if more addicted to contemplation than action, and more recollected than enterpriſing in the affairs of life, the philoſopher in ſolitude, or only converſant with a few, would proſecute his ſtudy of the ſupreme and ultimate good, let him lay the foundation in the culture and improvement of the principle of *love* in his ſoul, that powerful principle, by which all things in nature are actuated, and all creatures, in their various capacities, are ſwayed. In the rational part of them, its object is that which is fair and good. Let him begin, then, with obſerving the beautiful in bodily forms, the lines that mark, and the arrangement of theſe lines, by which their beauty is compoſed. When, from the ſur-

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vey of one pattern of it *, he paſſes to another, and a third, and finds that its ſignatures, in each of them, are ſimilar, he may rationally conclude, that there is a beauty which is one and the ſame in every corporeal ſpecies. He will not, therefore, be captivated with one of them more than another, nor prefer one ſpecies to another, but raiſe his thoughts and admiration to that general idea of beauty which appears to be common to, and diffuſed amongſt them all. But, with more efficacy will the beauty perceptible in *minds* preſent itſelf to him, and peculiarly engage his regard, as being the ſource of that which is corporeal and viſible, and fraught with manifold charms. It can be produced in himſelf and in others, be contemplated and contemplate, receive luſtre and give it, and beget a mutual and laſting intercourſe of the ſame delights and joys. The laws that bind ſocieties together, the offices to be performed in civil life, and between one man and another, are regarded as exhibitions of this mental beauty, and, being attentively ſtudied by the enamoured philoſopher †, they are taught to others; who, alongſt with him, behold in them the connection and uniformity of all the perfect virtues, and ſee, as in a mirror, that to be prudent, to be juſt, and to be temperate, is to poſſeſs, and to be adorned, with the faireſt rays and luſtre of beauty.

To increaſe yet more the ſequeſtered philoſopher's love and reliſh of that beauty peculiar to the intelligent mind ‡, the contemplation of the more abſtract ſciences offers itſelf to him. It furniſhes the ſteps by which he may aſcend to views of what is divinely fair in the conſtitution of the heavens. Through theſe celeſtial fields, indeed, the range is wide; and, in this life, the circuit of them cannot be made: Yet, from progreſſive ſpeculation, it may with aſſurance be collected, that there exiſts *one* eſſential *pulchritude*, which is itſelf an *ocean*, as comprehending every ſpecies of beauty viſible in body, or intelligible in mind, in divine wiſdom, or in human ſcience. From it every ſemblance, every trace, every ſhadow of what is comely in the world is derived, but without diminution of its unchangeable plenitude. The viſion of it, if attainable to

* In Convivio.

† Apuleius de Dogmate Platonis, 8vo edit. tom. 2.

‡ In Convivio.

to any in mortal condition, muſt be by the eye of the mind being opened in the manner pointed out; and, if once beheld, the images of beauty, before conceived, will be rendered faint amidſt its inimitable ſplendor; and ſo, alſo, will the attractions to all other objects of love be abated in the ſoul. Perfected, in ſo high a degree, may the *aſſimilation* to God be in the *man*, who, by his rational exertions, by his unwearied ſtudy and meditation of truth, and his ſucceſsful teaching of it to others, proves himſelf not the theoriſt only of exalted ſcience, but the producer, in himſelf, and others, of the moral and divine virtues. Accounted, therefore, and called, he muſt be the lover and imitator of God; or that elevated *being*, whoſe ſoul and mind bear the image of the immortal and divine nature; and thence, ſurely, is reached the dignified aim and end of his life and actions.

If, not in reſpect of abſolute excellence and dignity, but of competency, eligibility, and general uſefulneſs to mankind, the preciſe queſtion be put, whether the contemplative life, or the active one, is moſt to be preferred? an anſwer to it may be made without difficulty *, and from recollection of what has been already advanced. The two faculties of man, for the one and the other life, it has been ſaid, are joined together in human nature, and cannot be altogether ſeparated. They have, in regard to good, and utility in life, a neceſſary connection with, and a conſtant influence upon, each other. Unleſs, therefore, an eſtimate were to be made of theſe faculties in a ſeparate view †, of their vigour and extent in particular men, and the greater or leſs operation they might have in different circumſtances, the determination of the queſtion either way muſt be vague and unſatisfactory; and thus the poſitive and juſt one only can be, that contemplation, joined with action, or that life in which both faculties are exerted, is to be choſen as the *deſirable* one, and the *beſt*.

In what political ſtate of ſociety men may be governed in the happieſt manner, is another point which bears ſome analogy to the preceding one. Ever ſince legiſlators and laws have been known, the diſputable queſtion has been ſtated: And no wonder it ſhould have ſo happened; ſince,

* In Philebo. † Maximus Tyrius, in Diſſert. 6.

ſince, beſide the ſubject being of arduous diſcuſſion, and requiring the greateſt extent of human wiſdom *; the moſt intelligent founders of laws and ſtates have not conceived the ſame, but different notions of the purpoſes and ends of their inſtitution. By ſome of them, the main end propoſed has been victory in war; and, by others, the advancement of the arts of peace. Foreign commerce has been enjoined in one community, and prohibited in another. Hence the laws of Minos in Crete, and of Lycurgus in Sparta, differed, in their political principle, from thoſe of Solon in Athens; and yet more from thoſe of Charondas in Carthage. Neither is this diſagreement to be accounted for from the varying circumſtances of theſe ſtates. What regard was paid to this conſideration appears to have been only a ſecondary one; whilſt the aſſumed principle, whether that of war or of peace, was, without examination of its rectitude or utility, made the baſis and directory of all the particular regulations, diſciplines, uſages, and manners of the people, as a political community. In the one ſyſtem, fortitude was weighed againſt prudence and juſtice, and allowed to preponderate; and, in the other, intemperance in pleaſure, and the deſire of wealth, in oppoſition to bravery, was admitted to have a ſimilar aſcendency. Evident it is, that, in each of them, an extreme was gone into, and an error committed. But, without particularly examining which error was the worſt, it may be advanced as a general truth, that war is ſtudied and undertaken, not for its own ſake, but for obtaining peace; and that to promote the former, the latter is ſeldom ſought after. But, neither is peace itſelf, although a deſirable object, to be regarded as the ſole end of legiſlation. It may be attended with evils no leſs pernicious to the community than thoſe of war. The wiſdom of the legiſlator muſt, therefore, in a great meaſure, conſiſt in preventing, as much as poſſible, or in remedying the diſtreſſes, or the corruptions, incident either to the warlike or the peaceful ſtate of the commonwealth. To train the minds and bodies of the citizens in ſuch a manner, that they may not decline the hardſhips of the field, nor be indifferent to the ſweets of domeſtic repoſe, and to render the laws and inſtitutions of government productive of this nice contemperament

* De Legibus, lib. 1.

contemperament of pain and pleaſure, muſt be the effort of his mind, and the proof of his political genius. In vain will this be attempted, according to the maxims of the legiſlators that have been mentioned, and who do not appear to have founded their policy upon *virtue*, as a general principle, but only to have made choice of that ſpecies of it, accounted by them either the moſt ſplendid, or the moſt profitable, or the moſt agreeable. When we conſider what prepoſſeſſions even the wiſeſt of men are apt to entertain in favour of this, or that kind of virtue, and that its partial exerciſe can only produce the partial attainment of public or private good; it is ſurely requiſite to lay a broader foundation; and, if we would thoroughly inquire into the happieſt ſtate of civil ſociety, to have it in contemplation what the united power of the virtues may accompliſh; and whether that community which is moſt enlightened with virtuous principles, and moſt prompted to the exerciſe of them, does not abound with every benefit, divine and human, attainable by men.

Upon taking this view of the queſtion about the moſt preferable civil government, and conſidering it to be the ſame with inquiring, what is the beſt ſtate of political ſociety, it appears that Plato, for the reſolution of it, compoſed his ten books of a *republic*; the ſcheme of which, however viſionary, gave him opportunity to hold forth, and diſplay, in all their extent, his theological and moral, in connection with his political principles. The former, he knew, could in no ſhape be ſo effectually recommended to the attention of the Greeks, as by placing them in a treatiſe upon a *republican* form of government, repreſented as the moſt perfect of any. The very idea, although merely ſpeculative, was to them a moſt pleaſing and acceptable one; and, therefore, under favour of it, he introduces often, and in a more copious ſtrain than in his other dialogues, ſketches of his moſt abſtruſe theories, or ſublime doctrines. In his books of laws, which properly exhibit his ſcheme of the beſt policy in a ſtate, he is more reſerved upon theſe ſubjects. Yet, even there, he ſtill carries, though more ſuccinctly, his great principles alongſt with him; and, as if he diſclaimed entering upon the queſtion about the beſt government, when ſtated ſeparately from them, he delivers it as his fixed ſentiment, and what could not be controverted, that mankind, in no ci-

vil eſtabliſhment, could be governed to the beſt advantage, unleſs their *kings or rulers were philoſophers, or philoſophers placed in the functions of magiſtracy.*

Were we to give credit to ancient tradition, and the poets, kingly government was the primitive one amongſt men; but it was a government divine, in which a divinity preſided * ; a reign called that of Saturn, and the Golden Age of the World, ſo celebrated in poetic ſong; and that the elapſe was the more to be deplored, becauſe its return was not to be expected, until a revolution of the ſpheres, in a direction the reverſe of the preſent, took place. The ſuperintendence of mankind, ſay they, was ſubſequently committed to other divinities; and Jupiter, Apollo, and Minerva, were held to be the ſeveral revealers of the Cretan, Spartan, and Athenian laws. Plato, although he criticiſes theſe laws, admits that they could not proceed from an inferior authority. He takes occaſion, however, in one of his books of laws †, to trace the progreſs of human ſociety, from its rudeſt ſtate in diſperſed families, inhabiting the caverns of mountains, to their aſſociations in larger tribes, and their confederacies in towns, ſlightly fenced with mounds of earth, or impalements of wood, which, in time, became populous and walled cities. The natural effect of theſe combinations is marked, by him, with the accuracy and the ability of a philoſopher; and the political variations reſulting from their ſeveral ſtages are pointed out ſo diſtinctly, that the origin of almoſt every known form of government may be deduced from his obſervations. Applicable they are allowed to be, not only to the riſe of the different ſtates in Greece, but alſo to the policies of other nations. In eſtimating the comparative excellence of any civil government, he obſerves, that the public education, and diſcipline, of its members was ever to be regarded as the ſureſt teſt of their perfection; and that this diſcipline muſt always proceed upon the pureſt and ſoundeſt maxims of morality. With attention to this, he ſhows, that the advancement, or the decline, of regal, as well as popular governments, was cloſely connected; and he exemplifies the truth of his aſſertion from the revolutions that enſued in the Perſian monarchy after the death of Cyrus; which

* Dialog. de Regno, vel Civilis. † De Legibus, lib. 4.

which were not terminated until the promotion of Darius Hyſtaſpes to the royalty, who applied ſome remedies to the defects of education amongſt the princes and nobles.

Amongſt all the ancient principalities, or regal governments, he affirms, that there was hardly one in which deſpotiſm, or the exerciſe of arbitrary power, was known; and that the juſt portrait of the ſway of theſe princes * might be ſeen in the old poets, and in Homer, who gives to Agamemnon, as titles of the ſame import, thoſe of *king* of men, and *paſtor* of the people. Of all other civil governments, he alledges, that the regal and the popular ones were to be accounted the ſources; the reſt being no more than ſeveral compoſitions of theſe two †. If we include, in the numeration of the governments, the abuſe into which each of them may be converted, the ſum of their kinds will be ſix. Thus, we may reckon a government of *one perſon*, and the corruption of it, which is *tyranny*; and that of an *Ariſtocracy*, or of a ſelect body of the citizens, reſolvable, by abuſe, into an *Oligarchy*, or the domination of a few of them; and, laſtly, a *Democracy*, in which the whole community of citizens hath ſupremacy in legiſlation and rule. Its degeneracy, as various, has no particular mark, and we can only aſſign to it that which is common to the changes in the others, *tranſgreſſion of the laws*. The regal government might be accounted the moſt preferable; if kings were to be found, like thoſe of the *bee hives*, endowed by nature with all the qualities requiſite for ſovereign ſway: But, as matters are otherwiſe ordered amongſt mankind, their civil communities muſt be allowed to conſult for the general good, and, having inveſted ſenates, or councils, with authority for framing a body of laws, to take meaſures for their due adminiſtration.

When Plato conſidered the fluctuation of the ſtates of Greece between one and another of theſe political forms, he judged that a monarchy, governed by written laws ‡, was more eligible than any of them for the enjoyment of life; but, if it was intemperate and arbitrary, that it was the moſt grievous and intollerable to its ſubjects. Amongſt the commonwealths, he declares an Ariſtocracy the moſt, and Democracy the leaſt,

* In Minoe, ad fin. † In Dialog. de Regno. ‡ Ibid.

leaſt, deſireable; unleſs upon a corruption of the other republican forms; and then the popular one might be the *beſt* of the *bad*. A *ſeventh* government, however, is deſcribed by him; in which a king, held ſacred like the Egyptian monarch, and holding inviolable the ſalutary laws, that he, in council with the wiſeſt of the ſtate, had enacted, might well preſide as ſupreme ruler, and revive, in a great meaſure, the image of the reign of Saturn. In his political ſpeculations, therefore, it appears that Plato was no enthuſiaſt, either for republican or monarchial government, farther than as humanity, and public virtue, and public good, might be conceived to be moſt regarded and advanced in the one, or in the other. His enthuſiaſm was, evidently, for the prevalence of philoſophy, and that of the moral kind, inſeparably connected with the civil improvement, and beſt diſcipline of men; a ſpecies of enthuſiaſm, of all others the moſt allowable and the nobleſt, which the true philoſopher, as the friend and the lover of the human race, cheriſhes in his ſoul; whilſt the political bigot adores his illiberal and home-ſpun creed, or exults, not in the benevolence, but in the imagined ingenuity, or novelty of his ſyſtem.

From attention to the recital of Plato's political opinions, we had almoſt omitted what is advanced by him upon the ſubject of *law* in general *, and about bearing injury †. In a philoſophic view, and according to ſtrict reaſoning, law, ſays he, as *law*, is not to be defined the *inſtitute* of this or that particular community, which may be differently framed in one city, and another, no more than we would properly define gold by the variable form, or ſize of any particular portion of it; or *ſpeech*, by the things that are ſpoken; or *ſight* by the things that are ſeen. To ſpeak, to ſee, to hear, are organs, or faculties of the ſenſes, by means of which we hold diſcourſe, or are enabled to perceive, diſtinguiſh, and declare, the difference of objects. Every civil *inſtitute*, or ordinance, is a declaration of ſomething enacted, or required as a legitimate rule of government. But what is it that makes it legitimate, and according to a rule? Not, ſurely, the bare declaration. In order to its being accounted ſuch, there muſt be a perſuaſion that it is founded in reaſon, and

* In Minoe. † In de Legibus, lib. 5.

and may be ſcientifically explained, like a maxim in any rational art or ſcience. A *law*, therefore, is, in its proper ſenſe, an *invention* of truth, which is one and the ſame in all ages and nations. When it correſponds not to this diſtinction, it may be called a decree, a requiſition, or an edict, but not a legitimate rule or law, proceeding upon reaſon. But how, then, it may be ſaid, have communities of men differed ſo widely in their civil inſtitutions, and ſome of them admitted that to be a legal and juſt appointment which others have reprobated? Error, with reſpect to what is true, and what is right, is indeed too common with men; but do we, therefore, conclude that truth, and rectitude, and juſtice, are variable, according to their different opinions? The wiſdom of legiſlation ceaſes not to be found with the wiſe, or thoſe who have profoundly ſtudied the political ſcience, although, with others, it may be an unknown and unſearchable myſtery. The laws, therefore, of able legiſlators have been diſtinguiſhed from falſe imitations of them in the world; and antiquity has reported their authors to have been aſſiſted in their intelligence by the gods.

Of all the civil virtues, as *Juſtice* is the principal, ſo, of the vices *, injuſtice, or the commiſſion of injury, is the worſt. To a philoſopher, there are ſeveral arguments that will preſent themſelves †, ſufficient to convince him that it is better to ſuffer than to do an injury. In the caſe of wrong being done to him, he may even be made ſenſible that retaliation, which is always attended with violence, is not the beſt way to diſcredit, or to reſtrain the prevalence of wrath and outrage in ſociety. But, with him, it will be a main argument to *reſpect himſelf*, and to maintain an equal temper of mind. He who inflicts pain upon another, muſt himſelf feel the reſentful paſſion, or, at leaſt, loſe that balance of his temper and affections, which a true philoſopher will ever account a prejudice to him of the worſt kind. By it he will loſe what is far more valuable to him than the poſſeſſion of wealth, the calm and agreeable reflection, that, through life, he has neither been injurious, nor created diſtreſs to any around him. Whether it be, that the very infirmity of old age itſelf may require this pleaſing review of his conduct; or whether,

* In Gorgia. † In Repub. lib. 1.

ther, in the anxious days of life drawing near to its end, the doctrine, often formerly derided by him as an idle tale, that there are ſhades below for the puniſhment of the unjuſt, may then ſo far affect his imagination as to make it appear a doubtful point; in every ſuch ſituation of body, or mind, he can take to himſelf, or receive from others, no conſolation, in any degree equal to that of recollecting, that he has done injury or injuſtice to no man; nor has been perfidious in his vows to the gods; or diſingenuous or unfaithful in his promiſes and engagements, either to individuals, or ſocieties of mankind. In Pindar's ſtrain, this conſciouſneſs of integrity and innocence is the ſweeteſt nurſe, and the moſt ſoothing hope of failing age. To beget ſuch a ſenſe of the difference of being juſt, or being injurious, Plato reckoned, that the moral diſcipline preſcribed in his *republic* might be effectual. In the leſs perfect form of civil ſociety, ſketched out in his books of *Laws* *, he refines not, in the ſame manner, upon the topic of bearing injuries, but delivers a proper, yet a varied ſentiment. "Worthy to be honoured," ſays he, "is the man who commits no injury; and ſtill more deſerving is he, who ſuffers it not to be done to any perſon, without giving information of what he knows of it to the public magiſtrate: But moſt of all is the man to be applauded, who joins himſelf to the adminiſtrator of juſtice, and aſſiſts him with all his power in proſecuting and puniſhing the oppreſſive and injurious." The virtues are diſtinguiſhed by Plato into the imperfect and perfect kinds; the former being thoſe of nature's giving †, and the latter acquired by diſcipline, and the leſſons of reaſon and philoſophy; and the ſame virtues are called by him *mediocrities*, as well as *heights*; becauſe they have neither redundancy nor defect. But theſe diſtinctions, and ſome other properties of the virtues mentioned by him, need not be inſiſted upon; ſince ſuch of them as deſerve attention will be found to obtain it in other theories of Ethics, that are to be diſplayed. Here, then, we conclude the account of his moral doctrine, and, with it, our whole ſurvey of the Platonic philoſophy.

To

* De Legib. ibid. † Apuleius de Dogmate Plat. lib. 1.

To the particular remarks upon this philoſophy, it may be added as a general one, that, however erroneous and reprehenſible in ſome of its doctrines, it hath, in reſpect of its theological and moral principles, a marked pre-eminence above any other in the Grecian ſchools, and which might well entitle Plato to be called by the diſtinguiſhing name of the *divine* philoſopher. The views it affords of the goodneſs, the wiſdom, and the providence of the Deity, muſt be owned worthy of admiration *. There is a conſiderable authority for aſſerting that Plato held the opinion, not of matter being ungenerated, or co-exiſtent with the Divinity, as ſtated in the *Timaeus*, but that God made the world viſible, and inviſible, out of no pre-exiſting ſubject; his will alone being ſufficient for the conſtitution of things. How far his theory of the triple world may be conſidered as a ſyſtem of theology and morals, more ſublime, and more connected in its principles, than any of the ſpeculative ones ſubſequent to it, will beſt appear by comparing it with that of Ariſtotle, which bears the neareſt affinity to it, and yet exhibits important variations; and to the account of which we now proceed.

PART

* Hierocles de Providentia et Fato, ex Photii Bibliotheca.

PART VI.

SECTION I.

Of Ariſtotle.—His inſtitution of the Lycaeum, and the fame of his School.—The Stile of his Writings; and the fate that for ſome time befel his Works.—His Principal Succeſſors in the Lyceum.

ARISTOTLE was the ſon of Nicomachus and Phaeſtias; and Stagira, a ſmall town in *Thrace*, inhabited by a Grecian colony, the place of his nativity. His parents derived their pedigree from Machaon *, the ſon of Æſculapius, celebrated by Homer † both as a phyſician and a hero; and Nicomachus, inheriting from him the healing art, exerciſed it in the court of Amyntas, father to Philip King of Macedon. His illuſtrious ſon is reckoned to have been born to him in the firſt year of the 99th Olympiad, and to have attended Plato's Academy in the 17th year of his age. He is ſaid to have been of a ſlender make in his perſon, and to have had ſmall eyes, a weak voice, if not a defective articulation. His firſt appearance amongſt the academicians drew their remarks on the ſingular finery of his dreſs, from his wearing rings, and other ornaments: But Plato, obſerving his ſteady application to ſcienti-

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 4.

† Iliad, lib. 11.

fic ſtudy, and his rapid progreſs in its various branches, had ſoon reaſon to pronounce him the *daemon* or *genius* of the Academy *. Yet, although he obtained this diſtinguiſhing appellation, he rendered not himſelf the favourite diſciple of his maſter. A look or air, expreſſive of ſcorn, whether natural to him, or aſſumed, joined with a pertinacity in argument, created a diſlike of his colloquial diſputations amongſt his aſſociates, and became diſagreeable to Plato himſelf. He continued, however, his attendance upon the Academic lectures for the courſe of near twenty years.

While Plato yet taught in the Academy, Ariſtotle withdrew to Mitylene, where philoſophy had its profeſſors; and, upon Speucippus's ſucceeding to the regency of the Athenian ſchool, deſpair of rivaling, by any inſtitution of his, the matchleſs fame derived to it by Plato, ſeems to have occaſioned his betaking himſelf to a private retreat †. This he found in its moſt eligible form, in conſequence of the friendſhip he had contracted, at the Academy, with Hermias, Prince of Atarna, in Myſia. But the felicity of it was terminated, at the end of three years, by the unhappy fate that befel his aſſociate in it. His regret of Hermias's death was teſtified by the moſt ardent expreſſions. He wrote a hymn to his memory, under the title of *A Poean;* and dedicated a ſtatue to him in the temple of Delphos. Another proof he gave of his affectionate regard to the family of his deceaſed friend was no leſs conſpicuous; although we may well ſuppoſe that he followed his natural inclination in giving it. He eſpouſed Hermias's virtuous ſiſter, when diveſted of a large inheritance, and reduced to apparent want. His love of her approached to adoration. His fame for ſcientific knowledge was now ſpread abroad; and Philip, the father of Alexander, already acquainted with the character of Nicomachus, and his family, thought it a moſt fortunate circumſtance that he had a ſon, in the public opinion, ſo thoroughly qualified to take the charge of the education of the Prince of Macedon ‡. The letter he wrote, giving Ariſtotle the invitation to this office of honour and truſt, diſcovered the noble ſentiments Philip entertained of the value of literature, and of the eminent proficients in it.

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* Philoponus de Mundi Æternit. † Ibid. ‡ Aulus Gellius.

"I may tranſmit to him the ſceptre," ſaid he, "but you can render him worthy of it." Alexander was then in his fifteenth year; and his admitted preceptor excceded, by one or two years, that of his fortieth.

The charge committed to Ariſtotle was executed by him with equal ability and diligence. Erudition, in all its parts, was unfolded by him to his pupil; who diſcovered a particular fondneſs for Natural Hiſtory, and the knowledge of Medicine. But he was, moſt of all, captivated with reading the Iliad of Homer; which occaſioned his preceptor to take upon himſelf the taſk of amending various errors in the text, and to preſent his pupil with a correct copy of that immortal work. Alexander put the higheſt value upon it, laid it always under his pillow, and found, at laſt, a repoſitory moſt ſuitable to it in a caſket of the richeſt perfumes, ſelected from the ſpoils of Darius's tent. By Ariſtotle, no leſs attention was paid to the forming the *morals* of his pupil, and communicating to his mind the principles and ſentiments of virtue and generoſity. He continued in the exerciſe of his charge for eight years, equally reſpected by the King * and his ſon, until Alexander, after his acceſſion to the throne, made his warlike preparations for invading the Perſian empire. Ariſtotle, whoſe conſtitution was rather infirm than robuſt, and who could not diſengage himſelf from the ſtudies of a philoſopher, nor quit his proſpects of fame in that profeſſion, obtained leave to betake himſelf to Athens, the eminent ſeat of the Muſes, and the delightful reſort of the votaries of literature.

To enter into a particular diſcuſſion of the queſtion, how far Ariſtotle's reputation was concerned in recommending to Alexander's confidence his relation, and diſciple, Caliſthenes, who was acquainted with Hermolaus's conſpiracy againſt the monarch, and concealed it, at leaſt for a time, would be introducing an *epiſode* that belongs to hiſtory to inſiſt upon, and would too much engroſs our preſent narrative. It is, therefore,

* Amongſt other rewards and gratuities from Philip, it is ſaid, that Ariſtotle obtained that of having Stagira, fallen to deſolation, rebuilt by the King's order. There was alſo, near Mieza in Macedonia, a place of *ſtudy* conſtructed for him; and, in Plutarch's time, its ſeats of ſtone, and ſhaded walks, were ſtill ſhown to the curious.

therefore, ſufficient to obſerve, that, as Ariſtotle had his enemies, who ſpread the ſtory of his ſending to Caſſander ſome of the water of *Styx*, in order to poiſon the King *, ſo Caliſthenes's behaviour was turned by them into an impeachment of his fidelity. It does not appear that Alexander extended his ſuſpicion to Ariſtotle, or conceived any ſuch unfavourable impreſſion of his conduct, as the contrary allegation would infer. The ſon of Philip was not a diſſembler, like his father. But, in place of evidences of diſguſt, coolneſs, or diſregard, which he would have readily ſhown, we find the teſtimonies of his good will, and reſpect to his former preceptor, continued, in the correſpondence, by letters, he held with him †; in making, at the requeſt of the philoſopher, his conqueſts ſubſervient to diſcoveries in natural hiſtory, and procuring, and tranſmitting to Greece, at a vaſt expence, that rare collection of Aſiatic animals, of every ſpecies, for Ariſtotle's inſpection, and to enable him to compile that admired methodical treatiſe of their various ſtructure and generation found in his works; but which, being only a part of his ingenious labour, makes that which is loſt to be ſtill juſtly regreted.

During Xenocrates's regency in the Academy, and in the ſecond year of the 111th Olympiad, Ariſtotle made his appearance in Athens, and, with ſignal reputation, inſtituted his ſchool, called the *Lycaeum* ‡, from a place in the ſuburbs where it was held, and which had been fitted up by Pericles as a *gymnaſium*, for the exerciſe of the military men of the city. Its *porticos*, and covered walks, upon the banks of the Ilyſeus, being much frequented, had alſo procured it the name of the *Peripaton*; Ariſtotle's diſciples, who had their ſtated hours of perambulation there, and were generally obſerved to hold, at the ſame time, their colloquial arguments, ſoon had the appellation of the *Peripatetic* philoſophers aſſigned them; and which, afterwards, became the diſtinguiſhing one of his followers. As the number of the ſtudents in the Lycaeum increaſed, its founder ſaw the propriety of following the method adopted by Xenocrates in the Academy, for their general diſcipline. An Archon was choſen

* Plutarch in Alex. vita. † Plin. Hiſt. Natur. lib. 8. cap. 17.

‡ Suidas in voce, Lexicon, fol. edit. pag. 486. Cicero, Academ. Quaeſt. lib. 1. Diogen. Laert. ibid.

choſen from amongſt themſelves, every ten days, to ſuperintend the due obſervance * of the ſtated rules of the ſchool; which, being thus authoriſed, and ſupported by every ſtudent in his turn, were put upon the moſt favourable footing for obedience. Scientific lectures were given, and exerciſes preſcribed to the ſtudents †, both in the Dialectic and Rhetorical form; yet a great difference was made in the manner of communicating the doctrines of philoſophy. To one claſs of hearers, or the generality of them, Ariſtotle delivered what were called his *Exoterica*, or ſuch an explication of his principles as was ſuited to ordinary capacities, that could underſtand the τὸ ὅτι, the ſuperficial common place argument, but had not penetration enough for the διὰ τί, or the more accurate and abſtruſe reaſoning upon the point. To other approved and confidential diſciples were imparted his *Eſoterica*, or *Acroammatica*, or thoſe ſtudied and profound diſcuſſions of the argument, which ſhowed the genius of the maſter, and his ability in diſplaying the truth of his tenets ‡. So far did the ancient opinion ſtill prevail in the ſchools, that the depths of philoſophy were not only inacceſſible to common underſtandings, but ought to be reſerved for the information of men of a certain rank in civil ſociety. In the perſuaſion that Ariſtotle, by ſome publication he made, had tranſgreſſed this maxim, Alexander wrote him a chiding letter. He, it ſeems, who conquered whole nations, ſtill diſtruſted his aſcendency over them, if any, but a few men, were permitted to equal him in knowledge, or the gifts of the mind.

The application given by the diſciples of the Lycaeum to every kind of literary and ingenious ſtudy was moſt remarkable. So intent were they upon proficiency, that, from their conſtant peruſal of a variety of books, which Ariſtotle had taken care to collect, the eleves of the Academy called them the *readers*; as they themſelves devoted more of their time to contemplation. Their inſtructor is ſaid, by Strabo ‖, to have been the firſt who formed a regular library; and that Ptolemy Philadelphus was directed by him as to the proper method of arranging the celebrated

* Ammonius in Vita Ariſtot. † Cicero de Oratore.

‡ Clemens Alexandrin. Strommata, lib. 5. Aulus Gellius, lib. 22. Plutarch. in Vita Alexandri. ‖ Lib. 13.

celebrated one which he founded. That Ariſtotle might ſuggeſt, and exhibit the beſt diſpoſition of literary works, in any collection of them, may well be allowed; but that no conſiderable libraries were known before his time, is neither probable, nor conſiſtent with the accounts of hiſtory *, which mention ſeveral princes, and private perſons of an anterior age, who diſtinguiſhed themſelves by making collections, and having repoſitories of books. But whatever advantage Ariſtotle derived from his acceſs to an extenſive peruſal of the literary works of others, this can be only reckoned an accidental help to the diſplay of the amaſing powers of reaſon and reflection which he naturally poſſeſſed, and that may be ſaid to have qualified him to ſurvey, with the diſcerning eye of a philoſopher, every object of human underſtanding. In fact, we know that he extended his inquiries to almoſt all the phenomena which the natural world preſents, or the mind of man conceives to be ſubjects of rational, ſcientific, or curious inveſtigation. But we ſay not, with ſome of his extravagant admirers †, that he treated them in a manner ſo complete, as to ſurpaſs every known exertion of the human intellect, and exceeded all preceding philoſophers in his inventions. This elogium is not to be admitted but partially, and with conſiderable reſerve; ſince, in Phyſics, he did no more than trace the ſame ground, and inſiſt upon principles analogous to thoſe of his predeceſſors. Fertile he was in the invention and ſubtility of his arguments, but not in the conception of ſuch great principles as render their authors real originals in ſcience, and are found to afford new lights for diſcoveries and improvements in ſome or all of the moſt important branches of philoſophy.

The merit and praiſe he muſt be allowed of introducing, and exemplifying, a ſtricter method of philoſophiſing than what had been before obſerved in the ſchools of ſcience. In every doctrine, and theory, he excluded mixtures of poetic and fabulous parts ‡, which, in ſome degree,

* Amongſt them are reckoned Polycrates of Samos, Pyſiſtratus of Athens, Euclid of Megara, Euripides the poet, and ſeveral Kings of Pergamus.

† Ammonius in Vita. ‡ Simplicius in Prooem. ad librum de Categoriis.

gree, ſtill prevailed; and he endeavoured to ſubject every hypotheſis, or poſition, to the ſcrutiny of reaſon and argument. He framed, with penetration and acuteneſs ſuperior to all others, the rules of juſt reaſoning, and of the proof demonſtrative, and inconteſtible. When this his accurate manner of philoſophiſing was conſidered, together with the univerſality of his genius, that appeared to meet every ſubject of ſtudy with a like faculty of intelligence, and his elaborate performances upon the different parts of philoſophy, ſome of the ableſt judges in antiquity, when his works came to be peruſed by them, heſitated not to pronounce him the moſt excellent in all ſcience *, and the Prince of Philoſophers. But did this encomium imply their approbation of his phyſical and moral theories, as, upon the whole, in reaſon, or truth, preferable to all other ſyſtems of philoſophy? By no means; unleſs we underſtand by the *judges*, thoſe who were of his ſchool, and profeſſed a rigid adherence to his doctrines; and, even amongſt thoſe under the name of attached diſciples, there was not, nor could there well be, an entire aſſent to all his tenets and poſitions; ſince ſome of them were but obſcurely, or not ſufficiently, explained in his *Eſoterics*; and hence we ſhall find his immediate ſucceſſors in the Lycaeum at diſagreement, and, in ſome points, plainly diſſenting from him. Cicero, who ſpeaks of Ariſtotle in the magnificent terms referred to †, and which ſeem equivalent to the exalting him above all the profeſſors of ſcience, declares he muſt always be underſtood to except Plato. The philoſophers of other ſects, who commented on parts of his works which they thought moſt ingenious, did not, therefore, eſpouſe his general principles, or acknowledge him their maſter in philoſophy. Such ſervile adoration he did not obtain, until a dark age of literature came, in which their being as little of liberal inquiry, as of genius for philoſophy, its diſciples were diſpoſed to embrace

* Atque inter hunc Ariſtotelem, et *illos*, hoc mihi viſum eſt intereſſe, (ſays Cicero), quod ille, eadem acie mentis, quo rerum omnium *vim*, *naturamque* viderat, haec quoque aſpexit. De Oratore, lib. 2. And again, Cum omnis ratio diligens diſſerendi duas habet partes, unam inveniendi, alteram judicandi; utriuſque *princeps*, ut mihi quidem videtur, Ariſtoteles fuit. In Topicis, init.

† Ariſtoteles longe omnibus, (*Platonem ſemper excipio*), praeſtans et ingenio, et diligentia. Tuſculan. Quaeſt. lib. 1.

brace him as an infallible guide; and, revering him as an *oracle*, to believe, that, where his text was obſcure, it was to be explained into ſome profound meaning; which, being inexpreſſible by any known words, might be denoted by new invented ones, that had either a very dubious ſenſe, or no meaning at all. And thus, at length, was Ariſtotle, ſome of whoſe nice diſtinctions afforded a handle to theſe fictions, *enthroned* as the firſt philoſopher by the ſchoolmen of the later ages.

For thirteen years he continued to teach philoſophy in the Lycaeum with much approbation; yet not with the extended fame of the Academic diſcipline. The ſtile of his lectures, eſpecially when compared with that of Plato, was accounted, by ſome, frigid and abrupt; but it is acknowledged to be that ſpecies of diction which is moſt adapted to ſubjects of philoſophy, when treated with accuracy; and, in Cicero's judgment, beſide being nervous and conciſe, it wanted not that agreeable fluency * which marks a rich vein without ſuperfluous ornaments; for, in the knowledge and uſe of apt and copious expreſſion, he might be ranked with the firſt of the rhetoricians. The obſcurities, therefore, imputable to him, aroſe not from a defective, but a ſtudied brevity of ſtile, and from various diſtinctions, either ideal or logical, of ambiguous explication, or incomprehenſible. Whether, on account of his expreſſing himſelf too freely with reſpect to ſome tenets of the common theology, or that the prieſts of Ceres were, at any rate, diſpoſed to ſuſpect ſo profound a philoſopher, he incurred their animadverſion, and a charge of impiety was drawn up againſt him. He is ſaid to have been the firſt who wrote a defence of himſelf in anſwer to ſuch a *judicial* accuſation, in which he was encouraged by his friends to perſiſt; but he choſe not to abide the precarious iſſue of the trial †. "I wiſh not," ſaid he, "to ſee the Athenians

* *Quibus* eo minus ignoſcendum eſt, quod non modo rebus iis, quae ab *illo* (Ariſtotele) dictae, et inventae ſunt, allici debuerunt; ſed dicendi quoque, incredibili quadam cum *copia*, tum etiam *ſuavitate*; In Topicis. Comparing him with the other writers on Rhetoric, he ſays, Ac tantum inventoribus ipſis, ſuavitate, et brevitate dicendi praeſtitit, ut nemo illorum praecepta ex ipſorum libris cognoſcat, ſed omnes ad hunc, quaſi ad quendam commodiorem explicatorem revertantur. Cicer. de Inventione Rhetor. lib. 2.

† Ælian. Var. Hiſt. lib 3.

Athenians commit a *ſecond* violence upon philoſophy;" alluding to the notorious one in the caſe of Socrates. He withdrew to Chalcis, in Euboea, near the Euripus, where his death enſued in the 3d year of the 114th Olympiad, at the age of ſixty-three; but the manner of it is variouſly, and fabulouſly related. The copy of his *laſt will* is one of ſeveral curious relicts of the diſtinct, but conciſe, form of ancient *teſtamentary* deeds, recorded by Diogenes Laertius; and, if indited a ſhort time before his death, may be reckoned an evidence that he died a natural one, and with the greateſt compoſure.

The fortune that, for more than a century and a half befel his voluminous works, amounting, according to Laertius, to four hundred books, or ſeparate treatiſes, was ſingular and ſurpriſing; ſo that their eſcaping perdition appeared to be a matter merely accidental. They had been conſigned, alongſt with his library, to Theophraſtus, who ſucceeded him in the Lycaeum, and by him they were bequeathed to Neleus *; who changed his reſidence from the Athenian territory to that of Troas. The heirs of the latter, ignorant of the valuable treaſure that had fallen into their hands, conſidered the books as no more than a faſhionable kind of houſehold furniture, until they heard that the King of Pergamus ranſacked all places for ſuch writings. Fearing, then, that they might be violently ſeized upon †, they ſhut up the whole collection in a cloſe humid cell. In this periſhable condition they lay buried for a long time, and would, probably, never have been produced to the light, but for the vanity, more than for the love of literary ſtudy, which characteriſed Apellico, a rich diſciple of the Peripatetic ſchool: At Athens, it was part of his oſtentation to collect books, and to purchaſe them at the deareſt rate. The witleſs felons of philoſophy heard of his *premiums*, and opened their vault. The volumes of Ariſtotle and Theophraſtus were now brought forth to thoſe he employed, with all the injuries of moths and mouldering upon them. Apellico cauſed them to be copied out; but, in the obliterated places, this was done in a very imperfect manner ‡. His library, afterwards, became a part of Sylla's pillage

* Diog. Laert. in Vita Theophraſti.

† Strabo, lib. 13.

‡ Plutarch. in Vita Syllae.

of Athens, and was carried by him to Rome. Even there, neglect was ſtill like to have followed the works of the Stagirite, and his diſciple, if the attention of Tyrannio *, the famous grammarian, had not reſcued them from it. The curators of Sylla's library required much importunity and ſolicitation for leave to take copies of them when diſcovered. The tranſcribers Tyrannio could employ were but illiterate and undiligent ones; ſo that, in a performance which required more than ordinary knowledge and pains, if ſome errors were corrected, we may well ſuppoſe that various others would be committed by them †. Under theſe diſadvantages, the productions of Ariſtotle's genius remained in obſcurity; and, in Cicero's time, were peruſed by very few of the philoſophers themſelves. Strabo and Plutarch obſerve, that the diſciples of the Lycaeum muſt have been, when ſo long deprived of theſe originals, at a loſs to underſtand, in various reſpects, the principles of their maſter's philoſophy, which they could only have communicated to them, *traditionally*, by his ſucceſſors in the ſchool. Their ſect, therefore, in the *Auguſtan* age, made no conſiderable appearance at Rome; and, if Lucretius be excepted, ſcarcely do we find, amongſt the Roman poets of that period, any alluſion to the Stagirite's doctrines, or philoſophical fame. This obſervation, indeed, is not to be extended to thoſe Grecian philoſophers who reſorted to Rome in Auguſtus's reign; ſome of whom are mentioned by Simplicius and Ammonius, as having wrote expoſitions upon Ariſtotle. After Andronicus Rhodius's firſt publication of his works, in the beſt form he could produce them, and with a commentary, his example of ſtudying, and illuſtrating them, was, in a ſhort time, followed by ſeveral others.

Here much conjecture is formed about the reaſons or motives which induced Ariſtotle and Theophraſtus to forbear, during their life time, the publication of their works; the neglect, or non-performance of which, expoſed them to the hazards that have been mentioned. It is one of thoſe queſtions which ought to be diſmiſſed as more curious than important;

* Cicer. Epiſt. ad Quinctum Frat. lib. 2.

† Rhetor, autem, ille magnus, ut opinor, *Ariſtotelica* ſe ignorare, reſpondit: Quod quidem minime ſum admiratus, eum philoſophum Rhetori non eſſe cognitum, qui ab ipſis philoſophis, praeter admodum paucos, ignoretur. Ibid. in Topicis.

important; especially as the proper solution of it requires a knowledge of collateral facts and circumstances, with which we are altogether unacquainted. We know not, but from the construction of ancient authors, whether the matter proceeded from design, or from want of sufficient care. Provisions suitable, both for preserving their works, and for the convenient publication of them, may have been made by the one and the other philosopher, and yet some unforeseen and uncommon accident have caused a disappointment of their purposes. But the current persuasion was, that either respect to Plato, whose philosophical opinions, in several points, were impugned, or else a diffidence of success in a competition with him, who then stood upon the summit of literary fame, was the occasion of, at least, a temporary delay, on the part of Aristotle and Theophrastus, about the delivery of their works to the public. The first allegation contradicts a noted practical apothegm *, which being first Plato's, was adopted by Aristotle; the second must be considered as an excess either of modesty or of prudence; and it is also connected with another point that deserves attention. With what measure not of respect only, but of justice, in stating their tenets, are we to reckon that Aristotle proceeded in his account of Plato's doctrines, and those of the many other philosophers mentioned by him †? In general, he is allowed to be just and exact in reciting their principles; and various of them would be, to us, indistinctly known, or altogether unintelligible, if his rehearsals were set aside. Yet the manner in which he criticizes them, without appearing arrogant and censorious, has been justly observed to be rather morose and detractive; and what one, more disposed to combat their opinions, than to give them a full and impartial explication, would be apt to assume. That he studied most the confutation of other philosophers, and showed singular ingenuity in it, with the manifest view of vacating the throne of science for his own ascension, according to the remark of a great modern restorer of learning, cannot be denied. Notwithstanding the reverence paid by him to Pla-

* Amicus Socrates, *amicus Plato*; sed magis amica veritas. Ammonius in Vita Arist. † There are some exceptions, either to his justice, or his accuracy, which will be afterwards observed.

to's memory, and his often omitting his name when he controverts his doctrines, his antipathy to *Platoniſm* is ſufficiently evident. Whether his own ſyſtem placed ſcience and philoſophy in a more advantageous light, will beſt appear from the ſurvey to be taken of it.

Ariſtotle's ſucceſſor in the Peripatetic ſchool was Theophraſtus, his favourite diſciple, whoſe firſt name, *Tyrtamus*, of harſh pronunciation, was changed by him into another, implying the divine excellence of his elocution *. Upon application by the ſtudents in the Lycaeum for the nomination of a Regent, when Ariſtotle was apparently threatened with death, the philoſopher, knowing them to be divided in their ſentiments with reſpect to the comparative merit of Theophraſtus and Eudemus, ſignified his choice between them in a delicate manner. Calling for a cup of Leſbian, and another of Rhodian wine, as if for a trial of his taſte for the one or the other, "*This*," ſaid he, of the latter, "is ſtrong, and pleaſant enough; but the ſofter, and more palatable to me, is *that of Leſbos*," which was Theophraſtus's country. His meaning was underſtood; and his determination generally applauded. His prudence, and great application to ſtudy, are equally commended; and Cicero calls him the moſt elegant and learned of the philoſophers †. He was alſo liberal and beneficent; and his manners and character were in ſuch general eſteem in Athens, that, when Agonides preſumed to accuſe him of impiety, a proſecution for defamation was immediately admitted againſt himſelf. He continued, from the time of Ariſtotle's death, to teach philoſophy, not in the Lycaeum, but in a private garden, preſented to him by Demetrius Phalereus, who had the charge of the *Oligarchy*, ſet up in Athens by Caſſander, the ſon of Antipater. He had generally an audience of two thouſand ſtudents. The interruption which the Peripatetic, and other ſchools of philoſophy, met with in his time, ceaſed at the end of a year; when Sophocles, the ſon of Amphiclidas, the procurer of the arbitrary decree againſt them, was himſelf condemned to pay a heavy fine. His engaging manner, joined with his extenſive knowledge in philoſophy, procured him the friendſhip of Caſſander,

* Diogen. Laert lib. 5. p. 290. Aulus Gellius. Cicer. in Oratore.

† Tuſculan. Quaeſt. lib. 5. p. 181.

ſander, and of Ptolemy, the ſon of *Lagos*. The comic poet Menander is ſaid to have been his diſciple *. The many volumes compoſed by him were a teſtimony what his maſter's tuition, favoured by his happy genius, could accompliſh in literature. In the account of ſeveral natural phenomena, he differed from Ariſtotle; and ſome other ſubjects were more fully illuſtrated by him. In his treatiſe on a *Happy Life*, he is criticized by Cicero, for aſcribing too much, and more than his maſter had done †, to fortune, and exterior circumſtances; whence the felicity of the man of virtue was rendered, in a degree beyond what it ought juſtly to be accounted, dependent upon them. In the laſt period of life, and when he had attained to the age of eighty-five, he complained that men's lives fell ſhort of thoſe of the deer and the ravens; and, by that abbreviation, their proficiency in wiſdom and in virtue was prevented. Is it unſeaſonable, when the faculties for farther advancement in both are naturally, and generally, diminiſhed?

Strato Lampſacenſis, and Lyco of Troas, the diſciples of Theophraſtus, were his ſucceſſors in the regency of the Lycaeum, and they were followed by Ariſto Ceius, Critolaus Phaſelites, and Diodorus, with whom the account of the ſucceſſion is reckoned to terminate ‡; although the ſchool had ſeveral other reputed maſters, or leaders of the ſect. We carry our obſervations only to the firſt of them. The philoſopher of Lampſacus followed neither the tract of ſcience adopted in the ſchool, nor the theories upon which Ariſtotle proceeded. He ſcarcely concerned himſelf with any of them but *Phyſics*; and, in them, his general principles were reduced within the ſhorteſt compaſs. For an *univerſal cauſe* of every thing *that is*, he ſought no farther than to what may be called an *omnipotent nature*; in which, although void of ſenſe, and formal

* Tuſculan. Quaeſt. lib. 5. p. 181.

† Theophraſtus, autem, vir et oratione ſuavis, et ita moderatus, ut prae ſe, probitatem quandam et ingenuitatem ferat, vehementius etiam fregit veteris diſciplinae auctoritatem; ſpoliavit enim virtutem ſuo decore, imbecillemque reddidit. Acad. Quaeſt. lib 1.

‡ Demetrius Phalerius, learned in philoſophic diſputation, as well as an orator, Heraclides Ponticus, and Neleus, are reckoned amongſt them. Diogen. Laert. ibid.

mal being *, all energy, called *divine*, was to be found, and to which the occaſion of every particular phenomena might be traced. In this wonderful hypotheſis, ſo far as it can be turned into a meaning, the ſubject, and the accidents to it, are held to be one and the ſame; what is moved is alſo the mover; what is operated upon, operates; and the general cauſe of all things is no other way diſtinguiſhed from an effect, but as it has the vague name of *nature* aſſigned to it. But *nature*, it ſeems, is to be conſidered as a *power*, or *force*, eſſential to *matter*, and diffuſed univerſally through all its portions and particles. Taken in this ſenſe, *nature* muſt include two ideas of *being*, one paſſive, and the other active; unleſs we ſuppoſe power *active* upon no ſubſtance whatever, or nothing. There are, therefore, two principles of things, and not one alone, in the univerſe. *Yet, allowing that there is ſuch a diſtinction made in our conceptions, they may ſtill be regarded as one, eſſentially, ſince they are always found to be united.* Do we know, or can we pronounce any thing farther about the eſſence of matter, than that it is a *ſomething*, having extenſion, or parts exterior to parts; and, if we join to this the idea of its ſolidity, or reſiſtance to being penetrated or moved, it muſt be conceived, on that account, to oppoſe every change of its ſtate, and to be the *contrary* to all *agency*. There are, therefore, no two ideas more diſtinguiſhed by us than *power*, and the *matter* or ſubject upon which it acts. However conjoined in the viſible world, however wonderfully connected in the human frame, we early learn to ſeparate them in our conceptions, and to conſider them as diſtinct principles of things, and ſo marked to us by different properties. To the knowledge of the eſſence of the one, or of the formal operations of the other, our ideas do not reach; and the philoſopher's pretenſion to it may be claſſed with the crude notion of the peaſant. Strato *Phyſicus* ſcorned, as a dream, Democritus's conſtitution of the world, and all bodies in it, from atoms, rough or ſmooth, angular or round, encountering one another in a *void*. His ſkill, it ſeems, lay more in the *mechanic* powers, and theories of the laws

* Nec audiendus ejus auditor *Strato*, is qui *Phyſicus* appellatur; qui *omnem vim divinam* in natura ſitam eſſe cenſet; quae cauſas gignendi, augendi, minuendive habeat; ſed careat omni ſenſu, et figura. Cicer. de Nat. Deor. lib. 1.

laws of motion. Let nature, ſays he, veſted *only* with infinite force, be the univerſal agent, and it is *demonſtrable* how all things *that are*, or *can be*, may be adjuſted by her, and brought to an equilibrium. To exert her might, and give to the portions of matter all conceivable meaſures of impulſe, is the whole that is requiſite. A general arrangement will be the reſult. Every particle of matter will find its place according to the degree of its velocity, and have its gravity or levity, its deſcent or aſcent, in exact proportion to it. There remain no ſpecimens of Strato's theories of bodies in motion; but we may preſume that this part of ſcience was not better diſcuſſed by him than that of the powers of atoms was by other philoſophers, whoſe ſyſtems he contemned *. His *nature*, however powerful it may be apprehended, would appear not over wiſe in *mechanics*, and the laws of motion, and, in his repreſentation of her courſe, be found an inconſiſtent and fallacious architect of the world. In Cicero's opinion, the mechanic philoſopher, and the phyſiologiſts †, alike diſplayed their ingenuity in vain, upon a ſubject ſo immenſe and complicated, as could not be properly ſurveyed by the human faculties, and in which a depth of obſcurity muſt ever be found. But it appears to have been their great boaſt, that they could ſet aſide a *deity*, or divine wiſdom in the world, and yet ſhow that the work of it might be done according to their ſhallow theories, or by the ſubſtitution of ſome name, in place of a real *being*, and an intelligent cauſe.

SECTION

* Somnia cenſet (*Strato*) haec eſſe Democriti, non docentis ſed optantis. Ipſe autem ſingulas mundi partes perſequens, quequid aut fit, aut fiat, naturalibus fieri, aut factum eſſe, docet, ponderibus et motibus. Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 4.

† Ibid. Nec Stratoni tamen aſſentior.——Latent iſta omnia, Luculle, craſſis occulta et circumfuſa tenebris; ut nulla acies humani ingenii tanta ſit, quae penetrare in coelum, terram intrare poſſit: Corpora noſtra non novimus; qui ſint ſitus partium, quam vim quaeque pars habeat, ignoramus.

SECTION II.

Of Ariſtotle's Diviſion of the Parts of Philoſophy.—His Dialectic, or Logic.—Its extent, as an Inſtrument of Science, conſidered.—His Ontology, or Metaphyſics.

ARISTOTLE divided philoſophy into two parts; the one reſpecting action, called *Practical;* the other, employed in contemplation, denominated *Theoretical* *. In the firſt, he comprehended *Ethics* and *Politics;* conſidering *Oeconomics* as a part of the latter. In the ſecond, he included *Phyſics*, or the inveſtigation of all ſubſtances, corporeal and incorporeal, with their attributes and accidents; and he ſubjoined the *Dialectic*, or, as it was afterwards called, *Logic;* which, although not properly reckoned a part of philoſophy, he held to be the moſt perfect inſtrument of ſcience †. He found, ſays Themiſtius, philoſophy collected indeed into a body, but confuſedly huddled together, and the kinds of arguments proper to one branch indiſcriminately blended with thoſe belonging to another. Into the different diſputations, which, before his appearance, were as tumultuary as the armies of the *Medes* previous to *Cyaxares's* diſcipline of them, he knew how to introduce order and method. He was the firſt, adds Ammonius ‡, who ſeparated the rules of reaſoning from the points in queſtion; and, by his delineation

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 5. 4to edit. pag. 238. fol. edit. p. 168.

† In Oration. 33.

‡ In Ariſtot. Vita.

delineation of them, taught the exact and ſcientific method of demonſtration, in the knowledge of which his predeceſſors were generally defective; ſo that they might be ſaid to reſemble men who could wear ſhoes, with little or no underſtanding how they were fabricated. Theſe encomiums have chiefly a reference to the improvement, and, as it was accounted, the perfection, given by Ariſtotle to the dialectic, or that kind of proof of what was true, competent to ſcience.

Dialectics, in the extenſive ſenſe of the term, and as it was uſed in the ancient philoſophy, comprehended grammar, rhetoric, and *logic*; which laſt epithet was never ſingly put to ſignify what we now underſtand by that of *Logics*, or the art of reaſoning. Whatever related to it is, even by Ariſtotle, expreſſed in two words, and called *dialectic reaſoning* *; and he only ſpeaks of treating a ſubject *logically*, or in the looſer dialectic form, as diſtinguiſhed from the ſtricter analytical one, or that of the *ſyllogiſm*. To aſk who invented the dialectic art, or in what ſchool of philoſophy it was firſt taught? is the ſame thing as to inquire by whom, and where, any direction or rule, however ſimple, was firſt preſcribed in ſtating a diſputable queſtion, or a propoſition, and in giving a reſponſe to the one, and in admitting, or objecting to, the truth of the other? No ſchool of ſcience could ſubſiſt for any time in any credit, without ſome rules being obſerved, if not preſcribed, with reſpect to this, which common reaſon would ſuggeſt; ſuch as, that the queſtion, or propoſition, ſhould be expreſſed in plain and intelligible terms; and that the anſwer ſhould not be evaſive, but direct, and to the purpoſe; and the admiſſion, or negation, be either abſolute, or with exception. When we are told by Simplicius †, and others, that *Archytas* of Tarentum had wrote a treatiſe upon the ten *genera*, or Categories, under the title of περὶ τῶν παντὸς, can a doubt be entertained, that the propriety and neceſſity of *dividing*, or ſeparating, a queſtion or propoſition, as to its general import, from another, apparently analogous to it, and giving ſome definition of its terms, had been long before underſtood, and a convenient practice, in both theſe reſpects, followed in the Pythagorean

* Ariſtot. Poſt. Analytica, lib. 1. cap. 18.

† In Comment. ad Categorias.

gorean ſchools? Can we ſuppoſe that Pythagoras, deeply converſant in arithmetic and geometry, and accuſtomed to the demonſtrative proof, would not, ſometimes, in phyſical and moral ſubjects, throw his reaſoning into a ſyllogiſtical form, the ſame with, or equivalent to that uſed in logics? Every A is B: Every B is C: Therefore, every C is B: Or no A is B: Every C is A: Therefore, no C is B. Is it not rather preſumable, that the maſters and diſciples, both of the Pythagoric, and Ionian ſchools, would, in the courſe of their diſputations, not only often frame their arguments ſo as to coincide with theſe examples of the firſt figure of the ſyllogiſm, and one of its moods, but alſo exemplify its other two figures, and ſome of their moods, in a juſt manner *. Ariſtotle, while he claims the invention of the ſyllogiſtic rules, acknowledges that there were many examples of them to be found amongſt the teachers of rhetoric and philoſophy, although it appeared that they had not conſidered, or well underſtood, upon what principles they were conſtructed. He likewiſe alledges, that the mathematicians reaſoned generally according to the firſt figure. By the time that Plato opened his Academy, what with the *dialectics* of Zeno Eleates, Parmenides †, Euclid of Megara, and his followers of the Eriſtic tribe, beſide the improvements in definition made by Socrates, it appears, as has been ſhown in the Platonic philoſophy, that reaſoning in the ſyllogiſtic form, either categorical, or mixed, or hypothetical, was then commonly practiſed in the ſchools, and that a general theory of the Logical art, inaccurate, indeed, and incomplete, had obtained. There remained, therefore, that to be done, which, in every art or ſcience, requires both ingenuity and preciſion. To *Logic* was to be given all the perfection it could receive; and this was what Ariſtotle performed to admiration.

It is, in reality, Ariſtotle's elucidation of the art of reaſoning that is moſt to be admired, ſince the utmoſt reach of the art itſelf, as the *organon* of ſcience, proved to be of no conſiderable extent. It emulates, indeed, and attains the certainty of mathematical demonſtration, but requires an apparatus much more complex than what is needful in the ſcience

* Sophiſt. Elench. cap. 34. Ariſtotle's Opera Omnia, Graec. et Lat. fol. edit. Aureliae, Allobrogum, pag. 252. † Diogen. Laert. in Euclide, lib. 2.

ſcience of numbers, or of geometry. We allude not, here, to the ſtructure of the ſyllogiſm, in its legitimate figures and modes, but to the far leſs perſpicuity of the ideas, and, conſequently, of the terms expreſſing them, held forth in a logical propoſition, compared with a mathematical one. Inſtead of a few clear definitions, ſuch as we find in Euclid, we muſt look into the chapter of the ten Categories *, and there, perhaps, not find a term, under which that uſed in the propoſition can be diſtinctly ranged. The commentaries upon what is meant by ſubſtance, and by qualities or accidents, are to be attended to. We muſt then, for aſcertaining the relation the predicate has to the ſubject, have recourſe to Ariſtotle's four *predicables* †, which, by other Logicians, were reckoned five in number; and, in either account of them, find a greater *deſideratum* than in the Categories. But, allowing all this circumſpection to be unneceſſary, and that, by means of alphabetical ſignatures only,

* The Categories are ſaid to be *univocal* terms, without any article prefixed, or note of compoſition joined to them, but to which names, and definitions, do in common belong: Each Category being a genus of its kind, they were held altogether to expreſs whatever could be the ſubject or *predicate* of any propoſition; and their numbers fixed to ten, under the following denominations: Subſtance, Quantity, Relatives, Quality, Action, Paſſion, Time, Place, Poſition, and Habit, or *having*; Ariſtot. in Categ. cap. 5. et ſequent. Various terms there are not reducible to any certain Category; ſuch as thoſe denoting *oppoſitions* in ſeveral kinds, or extremes in the ſame ſpecies. Under which of the ten genera is the diſtinction of the terms Black and White to be comprehended? or which of them includes *privation*, as well as habit; as when we ſay of light, and darkneſs, that they are alternately ſucceſſive, or co-exiſtent in the ſame ſubject? Ariſtotle certainly found the Categories tranſmitted; and, moſt probably, made no alteration in them; unleſs he introduced the diſtinction of *ſubſtance* into *primary* and *ſecondary*, as analogous to his phyſical theory, which will be explained. With all defects imputable to them, they may ſtill ſtand in competition, for propriety and univerſality, with any ſet of philoſophical *predicamenta* that have ſince been produced.

† With regard to the reſtriction of the *predicables* to four or five, it is to be underſtood as connected with the diſtribution of all propoſitions into five claſſes; in each of which the relation of the *predicate* to the ſubject was variable, according as the former might be either the *genus* of the latter, or a ſpecies of it, or its ſpecific difference, or ſomething proper to it, or only accidental. A predicate, therefore, could have annunciation only in one or other of theſe modes of relation.

only, as ſubſtituted by the Stagirite in place of logical terms, the ſyllogiſtical demonſtration ſhould be admitted to proceed, as the guide to ſcientific knowledge, it is of importance to underſtand to what lengths it can go, and what appears to be the amount of its diſcoveries of general truth. Let the concluſions of the three figures of the Categorical ſyllogiſm be collected, to decide this point; and it will be manifeſt, that their whole reſult is no more than the eſtabliſhment of one general principle, that "whatever is affirmed or denied of any idea, as a *genus*, may be affirmed or denied of all the ſpecies, and the individuals appertaining to it." The fourteen modes of the three figures make no ſtretch beyond this narrow rule of reaſoning; and, with reſpect to the *modal* ſyllogiſms, which ſtate an affirmative, or negative, in a propoſition, as neceſſary, or contingent, poſſible, or impoſſible, they may be reckoned the *fluxions* of the ſyllogiſtic art; which, after Ariſtotle's diſcovery of them, and his amazing pains to render them intelligible, remain ſtill in obſcurity, hardly reducible into conſiſtency or form, and, being ambiguous in themſelves, afford no conception of what is demonſtrable by them, or to what account they could be turned in ſcience.

Could Ariſtotle be under a deluſion as to the extenſive operation of his ſyllogiſtic proofs in ſcience? It is not to be imagined; unleſs we inſiſt on the apothegm, that the greateſt genius may, in ſome one point or other, diſcover prepoſſeſſion, or a propenſity to error. But we may, without any imputation of prejudice, or imbecillity, account for the prodigious labour he beſtowed in perfecting the argumentative art. It was regarded, notwithſtanding the abuſes it had undergone, as the concomitant, and even the teſt of all juſt progreſs in ſcience. It preſented a field for the diſplay of ſingular acuteneſs, and accuracy of conception, in a ſubject of the moſt abſtract kind; with which, although many pretended to be converſant, yet few or none had ſtudied it theoretically by itſelf, unleſs in a ſuperficial manner, or as it might be made a vehicle to looſe reaſoning and ſophiſtry. To give it the form and face of a ſyſtem, that might be completed to a degree beyond what any before him had conceived, was an object of ambition to the enterpriſing mind of Ariſtotle. This would be motive enough for commencing his theory; and, it might be almoſt finiſhed before he conſidered the *ultimatum* of its efficacy.

ficacy. His four books of Analytics, divided into *prior* and *poſterior*, teſtify what a diſtinct and comprehenſive view he took of his dry, and apparently barren ſubject, ſo as to bring forth out of it a theory of the categorical ſyllogiſm, having one ſubject, and one predicate, ſuſceptible of three forms, or figures, diſtinguiſhed from each other, by different poſitions of the *middle term*, as ſubject, or predicate, in the premiſſes, and which were reſolvable into three, as the whole that could take place; although a fourth poſition might have been deviſed, and which was not hit upon, until the famous Galen made the diſcovery. His ſyllogiſm, however, might be reckoned no more than a different arrangement of the firſt figure. It belongs to thoſe who treat, profeſſedly, the ſubject of Logics, to ſhow with what preciſion the legitimate moods of the three figures of the ſyllogiſm, which have reſpect to its propoſition being either an univerſal affirmative or an univerſal negative, or a particular affirmative, or a particular negative, are diſtinguiſhed from the illegitimate and falſe kinds. They may mark the exactneſs of his rules for the converſion of one propoſition into another, and obſerve the ſpecial, and almoſt unqueſtionable, claim he has to the invention of *topics*, or general heads of every kind of queſtion or argument, together with the methods * of treating them pertinently, and to moſt advantage. It is preſumable that the ſchools of philoſophy had furniſhed nothing of this kind, but what was merely futile, or came from the mints of the ſophiſts †. Hence we find the high value Cicero put upon this treatiſe, as a rarity in ſcientific doctrine, and which he had ſo carefully ſtudied, as to be able, when upon a journey, and at ſea, to compoſe, from memory, an extract of its general principles; and, chiefly, upon theſe, applied to juridical queſtions, to produce that noted diſſertation of his, which bears the ſame title with the original. Without farther tracing particulars, it muſt be acknowledged, that no conſtituent, or adjutory part of the ſyllogiſtic argumentation, or of the dialectic and rhetorical, was omitted by Ariſtotle, and that we can quote few performances marked with more philoſophic attention and ingenuity.

If,

* Diogen. Laert. 4to edit. pag. 283.

† In Topicis, ad Trebatium.

If, ſtill, it be urged that the ingenuity in deviſing the prolix rules of the art, ſupererrogated upon the art itſelf, conſidering its limited powers, it ought to be remembered, that every eminent ſchool of philoſophy had its favourite ſtudy, which was either a particular branch of the ſciences, or preparatory to advancement in them. The Pythagoreans contemplated numbers. Plato joined to theſe the theories of geometry, and of mathematical lines, and figures. Ariſtotle choſe the dialectic, and made it what it was not before, a regular ſtudy, and, at the ſame time, an exerciſe for the minds of his diſciples, who might, even when *tyros*, learn from it the elements of ratiocination, and gradually acquire the faculty to argue, diſtinguiſh, divide, and define, in a ſuperior manner. To excel in this art was, for ſome time, the pride and characteriſtic of the Peripatetic ſchool; but it appears from Cicero's * account, that many of its eleves declined the practice of the more nice and formal dialectic, and contented themſelves with the eaſier part of it, ſuited to rhetoric.

There are ſome general theories with reſpect to the rational faculty, to juſt reaſoning, and the demonſtrative proof, delivered by Ariſtotle, which merit particular attention, although ſeveral of them cannot be reckoned peculiar to him, or before unrecogniſed in the ſchools †. All human knowledge, attainable by diſquiſition, and that may be termed *diſcurſive*, muſt proceed upon a general notion of what is the ſubject of diſcourſe, and be, ultimately, reſolved into ſome principle, ſelf-evident to the mind, and of which it will require no other proof but what is found in its own immediate conception of truth. About things unknown there can be no proceſs of reaſoning. But, in theſe cognoſcible by us, there is perception, *intelligence*, and demonſtration. The former two are the ſource and foundation of the latter; for *nothing is found in the mind which was not antecedently in ſome of the external ſenſes;* yet, as the perception of what is true or falſe ‡ reſts not with them, farther than their teſtimony goes with reſpect to ſenſible objects, the judgment of all ſpeculative truth is found in the mind itſelf; which, therefore, poſſeſſes *intelligence*,

* De Finib. Bon. et Mal. lib. 4. pag. 85. Ibid. lib. 3. pag. 78.
† Analytic. Poſter. lib. 1. cap. 1. ‡ Diogen. Laert. ibid.

intelligence, or a ſpecies of knowledge diſtinct from that called *ſcience*, or demonſtration. By means of this faculty, certain principles are perceived to be true, *intuitively*, and without demonſtration *. Such is the axiom, *It is impoſſible that the ſame thing ſhould be, and not be, in, and according to, one, and the ſame reſpect.* It is not to be demonſtrated; or, if we apply demonſtrative proof to it, the probation muſt run into an endleſs ſeries; for no principle can be advanced that hath in itſelf more perſpicuity. Analogous to this firſt *negative* principle, is that which is the firſt *affirmative* one: *It is neceſſary that every thing be predicated affirmatively, or negatively, of another.* Between contradictory propoſitions there can be no medium: Yet no abſolutely certain affirmation can be made about things future, contingent, and mutable. All ſcience and demonſtration are, therefore, converſant about truths neceſſary, unchangeable, and alſo univerſal: Nor can they have ſingular things, or individuals, for their object, unleſs, by *induction*, theſe can be collected into a genus. And for this, there is no reaſon to have recourſe to Plato's ideas †, ſeparate from ſingulars. It is ſufficient, that, in them, certain common natures, or ſtates of being, are to be noted, which, in any inſtant, can be predicated of them; and ſo a kind of demonſtration may be formed ‡. Thus, ſcience is, in one reſpect, of *univerſals*, and, in another, not; or, both, of generals and particulars.

There is nothing more to the credit of Ariſtotle's judgment, in his four books of Analytics, than his pronouncing firſt principles of reaſon, or axioms, not to be demonſtrable. Yet he ſeems to forget this maxim, when he inſtitutes a proof of the certainty of his ſyllogiſtical demonſtration. To demonſtrate axioms, is much the ſame as attempting to define the common names, that ſtand, in any language, for ſimple ideas; the effect of which is, that, in the definition, ſeveral terms, or more than one, are employed to expreſs an idea which has no compoſition. As definitions, in this caſe, create confuſion, ſo axioms, demonſtrated, tend not to ſtrengthen, but to perplex, the evidence of common reaſon. What ſcience has not its definitions, and axioms, and ſome of theſe, although

* Metaphyſ. lib. 1. cap. 3.—4. Analyt. ibid. † Analyt. Poſt. lib. 1. cap. 8. et 11. pag. 109. ‡ Metaphyſ. lib. 14. cap. 10. pag. 758.

although juſt, and indubitably true, liable to the exception of a wrangler or a ſceptic? A ſtraight line, ſays a mathematician, is the ſhorteſt one that can be drawn between two given points. It may be ſaid, that this is neither a definition nor a deſcription of a ſtraight line; but the aſſignment of a ſpecial property, which, when conſidered, diſtinguiſhes it, indeed, from every curve; yet, to one who never adverted to this property, it is a problem held forth in place of a definition. Sextus Empiricus, and with him, perhaps, Mr Locke might inſiſt, that the ideas of a ſtraight line, and of a curve, could only be got from eye-ſight of the one, and the other, and that the alledged property of the firſt, not being immediately perceptible, could make no part of its ſimple idea, and, if even it were conjoined with it, by reflection, and compariſon, the proof of its reality could not be an abſtract one, but muſt reſt entirely in the repreſentation of the ſight or the feeling. It need not be added what objection the ſceptic might make to the evidence of the ſenſes; which, if not to be relied upon, the mathematician could never aſcertain what is to be underſtood by a ſtraight line. But ſtill the difference between it, and a crooked one, may be obvious to the perception of a child; who, without acquaintance with their names, or the leaſt conception of their properties, will be obſerved to diſtinguiſh them in things ſet before him; and, perhaps, to prefer what is ſtraight as the moſt agreeable in figure. This, and other ſigns of intelligence natural to man, are early given, before the dawn of the reaſoning faculty is diſcoverable, or any inference drawn, either from action or paſſion. When the power of reaſon operates, and eſpecially when it is much occupied with the contemplations of abſtract ſcience, the influence of natural intelligence is weakened. The ſenſe of its importance is, in a manner loſt; until, in the refinements and perplexities of over-ſtrained reaſon itſelf, it becomes manifeſt, that, without an appeal to it, extravagant concluſions will be formed, or the ſciences labour in vain for demonſtrative proofs of many of their principles.

Notwithſtanding there be a natural perception of the truth of axioms, or firſt principles, they cannot be ſaid to be *innate*, or to be born with us; for they may, if no occaſion of recogniſing them be preſented, remain dormant, or unknown to men, through the whole courſe of their lives.

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* Analyt. Poſt. ibid. cap. 13.

the eyes; but it ſurvives them not. The *agent* intellect only is perpetual, and immortal in a ſeparate ſtate; yet there we can have no remembrance of what is paſt; for this ſuppoſes a paſſion of which the intellect, *in act*, is incapable. And thus did Ariſtotle preſent to the votaries of his philoſophy, in the ſcholaſtic ages, a ſpeculation about the human ſoul, which, if not inconſiſtent with its immortality, was altogether dark and ambiguous. *Pure* intellect appeared to be conſidered by him as ſomething foreign to the human nature, that could not be connected with, or act upon body, but by *ſympathy*, or in ſome inexplicable way; while the intellect *patient*, or, as it was interpreted, the *ſenſitive* ſoul, which had its accommodation and exiſtence in the bodily part, was pronounced to be, alongſt with it, deſtructible and mortal. But, although there was a danger, among a claſs of men who looked to Ariſtotle's page for the confirmation of ſeveral of their religious and moral tenets, as well as thoſe of ſcience, that many might be thrown into perplexity about the ſacred principle of the human ſoul's immortality, it would yet require a more than ordinary ſubverſion of their underſtandings, by the Stagirite's metaphyſical diſtinctions, before they could adopt the abſurd reveries of the philoſopher upon this fundamental point.

With reſpect to the corporeal ſenſes, and the perception of external objects, Ariſtotle's doctrine may require a more particular attention, not only on account of the ingenuity of his inveſtigations, but that we may be enabled to form a judgment of ſome late repreſentations of it, in which his theory, or that of his commentators, about our ſimple perceptions of objects, our general and abſtract ideas, is ſtated in a peculiar light, and ſuch as, in accuracy and truth, is alledged to be ſuperior to that held forth in the modern philoſophy. Senſation, as it obtains in all animals, is, in general, defined by him, an *alteration, or paſſion of the material organ, cauſed by ſomething exterior to it* *. This mutation ariſes not from the organ itſelf, which is paſſive, and has only the *potentiality* of motion. It is, therefore, the impreſſion or effect of ſome ſenſible object acting upon it externally. What is combuſtible does not burn itſelf, but remains unvaried, unleſs it be kindled into a flame. To proper

* De Anima, lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 491.

by him as inferring that which is local, and of the corporeal kind. Harmony, or a compoſition of contraries, the ſoul of man is not allowed by him to be; nor yet a rare body conſiſting of the finer elements; ſince this would be to leave unaccounted for all its perceptions and knowledge, as well as its affections and paſſions that are beyond the efficacy of the corporeal elements. He then delivers his noted, but obſcure definition of the human ſoul *, that it *is a ſubſtance incorporeal, having the firſt* ἐντελέχεια *(perfection or form) of a natural body, organiſed, and with life* †. He defines it, alſo, more plainly, to be *that* by which we *firſt* live, feel, and underſtand, and to be diſtinguiſhed by three faculties, the vegetative, the ſenſitive, and the rational, or intelligent; the two inferior being comprehended by the ſuperior one, as a triangle by a ſquare. Neither is it to be conceived, according to the opinion of ſome philoſophers, to be diviſible into parts, with one for appetite, another for paſſion, and a third for reaſon. Yet its nature was repreſented by him under two ideas; for, in the intellect itſelf, he introduces one of his intricate diſtinctions between a one, the *agent*, and another, the *patient* ‡. As, in every nature, ſays he, there is a ſubject, or *material*, that renders it capable of being of this or that ſpecies, and alſo an efficient cauſe, that *actually* makes it ſuch, ſo, it may be concluded, that this difference alſo obtains in the immaterial principle, or rational ſoul. In one reſpect, intellect ſeems to be ſuch, that it has the *potentiality* of becoming all things; and, in another, it poſſeſſes the *efficiency*, or habit of this. So light makes colours *actually*, which, before, had only a potentiality of exiſtence. But the intellect *patient* is not *organical*, or blended with body, nor partakes of corruptible paſſion, any more than the other; yet it is not ſo ſeparated from body as to exiſt without it ‖. Being a principle whoſe action is corporeal, it uſes the inſtrumentality of the bodily organs; as the motion of walking implies the intervention of feet, and the ſenſe of ſight that of the

* The meaning of the invented term ἐντελέχεια was a perplexity to Ariſtotle's commentators, and occaſioned endleſs conjectures and diſputes amongſt the ſchoolmen. The Patriarch of Aquileia, Hermolaus Barbarus, in deſpair of finding its ſignification, had recourſe to the invocation of a Daemon, as the only means to diſcover the myſtery. † De Anima, lib. 3. cap. 9. pag. 507.

‡ Ibid. cap. 4.—5. pag. 503.—504. ‖ Ibid. lib. 3. cap. 3. pag. 488.

may be framed; and that, although the organ of ſenſe be that in which the ſenſitive faculty *primarily* exiſts, it is not the ſame with it, or with the thing perceived. It may indeed form the *ratio*, or mode of the interior ſenſation; and, therefore, in the caſe of a too violent impulſe upon the organ, the perception of this *ratio* is either diſturbed or deſtroyed.

In conſequence of the perception of external objects, *phantaſmata* correſponding to them are excited; or, in other words, thoſe impreſſions made on the ſenſes remain in ſuch a manner with them, that, notwithſtanding the objects be removed without the reach of the ſenſes *, or when the latter are obſtructed, certain images of the former are preſerved in the imagination, both in a ſtate of waking and ſleeping. If ſucceeded by others, or obliterated for a time, they can alſo be recalled, and varied and modified at the pleaſure of the ſoul. Are then theſe images acquired by ſenſation, and that become as it were more internal, and detached from ſenſe, by their place in the *phantaſia* to be conſidered as the ſame, or ſomewhat different from the received picture, or ſimple impreſſion of the object? According to Ariſtotle, the *imagination*, as well as the act of reaſon or judgment, is a faculty diſtinct from that of ſenſation or perception. The latter, he obſerves, is, in all animals, and the former only in ſome. It exiſts in them from their birth, but the other does not; and, while the one is always converſant with preſent objects, the other holds forth and ſurveys thoſe which are abſent. The *phantaſia*, therefore, is not ſenſe, but an energy of the ſoul, that is connected with it; ſo connected, that it cannot be where ſenſation has not, previouſly, exiſted †. It is, further, his aſſertion, that the intellect, itſelf immaterial, and ſeparated from ſenſe, has the power of forming *ideas*, in a manner altogether abſtracted from ſenſible impreſſions, or ſingular images of objects formed in the *phantaſia*. Thus, it conceives the idea of magnitude, ſeparate from any particular dimenſion of body, and of heat and cold, hardneſs and ſoftneſs, without regarding individual things affected by theſe and other qualities. In numberleſs inſtances, its particular conceptions are turned into *univerſals*; and, in the mathematical ſciences,

* De Anima, lib. 3. cap. 4. et cap. 7. pag. 505. † Ibid.

ces, its contemplations of lines, figures, and numbers, are to be reckoned entirely of the abſtract kind.

In this inveſtigation of the human ſenſations, and of general and abſtract ideas, it is to be obſerved, that Ariſtotle does not always deliver a poſitive opinion, but expreſſes himſelf in the ſtile of an inquirer, and with that heſitation and dubiety which the difficulty of his ſubject might ſuggeſt. After aſſerting that nothing can be learned, or known, by any one deſtitute of ſenſible perceptions, and that he who contemplates muſt neceſſarily do ſo from his *phantaſmata*, he puts the queſtion *, In what reſpect may the firſt conceptions of intellect be reckoned to differ from the phantaſmata? Is it becauſe the ſucceeding ones are different, and yet theſe exiſt not without images in the phantaſia? Some of his interpreters, and chiefly Simplicius and Philoponus, have endeavoured to reſolve, or to elucidate the point, by making a great diſtinction between ſenſible perceptions and ideas of things †; and their comments have been lately adopted by ſome learned expounders of the Peripatetic philoſophy. An idea, ſay they, is not a mere perception of an external object, or of the ſenſible qualities of any corporeal ſubſtance, collected into one picture, as it may be in the imagination, but ſome conception of its internal and intelligible form, which renders it diſtinguiſhable from every other material compoſition, and, therefore, to be known under characteriſtical marks of its particular nature and eſſence. The perceptible qualities of bodies are ever ſubject to alteration and change, ſo that no determined notion of them can be attained. But the immaterial principle, or, as it may be termed, the internal form, or *mind*, gives them the identity, and conſtancy of nature they have; and to it, therefore, all our knowledge of them muſt be referred. To the operation of this principle, it is owing, that not philoſophers only, but alſo the vulgar of mankind, are enabled to diſcern certain fixed and uniform natures, amidſt the apparent variety and changeability of the objects that ſurround them, and which otherwiſe could not take place. It is added, that this theory, as it ſtands oppoſed to that of the *materialiſts*, ought to be embraced by all

* De Anima, cap. 8. pag. 506. † Vide Lord Monboddo's Ancient Metaphyſics, vol. 1. pag. 51. and Harris's Hermes.

Theiſts, if they would be conſiſtent in their principle of an eternal mind in the univerſe.

With what obſcurity and perplexity Ariſtotle's doctrine of ſubſtantial forms is attended, has been already obſerved. But, as it is, in this manner, held forth under particular gloſſes, and enforced by a moſt intereſting argument, it will deſerve a more preciſe examination. Its revivers appear to prefer the epithet of an *intelligible form* to that of a *ſubſtantial* one uſed by Ariſtotle, which, indeed, has no more propriety than if he called it a *phantom of ſubſtance*. The verbal correction, however, will be hardly found to ſet the point in a clearer light. In an inquiry into the nature of corporeal ſubſtances, or what their eſſences are, it will ſurely be admitted that no poſition can be regarded as any thing more than a hazarded one, and merely hypothetical. When the contexture of their perceptible parts, and their different properties, are, with difficulty, inveſtigated by us, and cannot, by all the elaborate reſearches in phyſics, be ſufficiently aſcertained, what can we pronounce, with aſſurance, about their internal conſtitution, or the unſeen and hidden principle of their corporeal eſſence, which has been called by philoſophers the *ſubſtratum* of their ſenſible qualities, but that our preſent conceptions reach not to this *ground-plot* of the Creator's viſible works? If we ſhould affirm, with the Peripatetics, that all the qualities of bodies are produced by an eſſential form, the queſtion will be aſked, How does the human mind take knowledge of this form? a queſtion grounded upon the doubt ſtated hy the Stagerite himſelf. Its idea, ſay his diſciples, may ariſe in the intellect, from the notice the ſenſes have taken of the perceptible properties of any ſubſtance. Does, then, all the knowledge of it conſiſt in this intelligence afforded by the ſenſes? As conceived in the intellect, reply they, it is a knowledge of a peculiar and ſuperior kind. Let, then, the expounders of the Peripatetic doctrine ſay, to what this intellectual underſtanding, or mental idea, amounts; they who pretend to be acquainted with the extraordinary powers of intellect, and, after Ariſtotle, may call the ſoul the *form of forms*, and advance his paradox *, that *knowledge in act is the ſame with the thing known, and that which knows is*

* De Anima, lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 504. Ibid. cap. 7. pag. 505.

is in a ſort of identity with the ſubject of its contemplation. To them it belongs to give the definition of any one ſubſtance in nature, according to their conception of its eſſential or intelligible form. But, upon this requiſition, they have been, hitherto, either ſilent, or evaſive in their replies; and Ariſtotle's obſcure definition of the human ſoul might well prove a diſcouragement to any ſimilar attempt.

With regard to the aſſertion, that the phyſical tenet of ſubſtantial forms has a neceſſary connection with the ſupport of Theiſm, it can only be ſaid, that, ſo far as it is evinced to ſtand in this affinity, it is a laudable one, and thoſe who hold it forth advantageouſly, in this important view, merit approbation: But, in Ariſtotle's theory, no relation of this kind can be traced, unleſs, in order to find it, we take the ſtrained interpretation of his doctrine from his commentators, who conſider his *forms* as a ſpecies of Plato's ideas exiſting in corporeal ſubſtances, and deriving their origin from the eternal mind. That philoſopher, however, did not ſuppoſe that his ideas could be embodied in matter, the inſtability of which admitted not of laſting impreſſions, but only of faint and fleeting ſhadows of them, like the reflections of bodies in water. It was alſo his tenet, that, ſeparate from the intervention of ſoul, *mind* could not be connected with matter. Ariſtotle himſelf admitted, that there were bodies void of animation, as well as animated; and it has been obſerved, that he aſſigned no ſubſtantial forms to plants, and allowed them only a ſort of vegetative ſoul, which was denied them by his diſciple Theophraſtus *, who ranked them with things inanimate. But the modern Peripatetic philoſophers inſiſt upon an internal principle, under the names of an intelligible *form*, a *ſoul*, or *mind*, which operates in the unorganiſed mineral, and ſtone, as well as in the animal and vegetable productions. They are, therefore, to be aſked, What we are to underſtand by a principle ſo diverſified, and whether they may mean by it one ſoul of the world, ſuch as Plato held, giving animation and life to the whole ſyſtem, in conſequence of its being endowed with various faculties; or a plurality of incorporeal principles, ſo different from each other, that one may be called a *motive* ſoul, another a *vegetative*, an-

* Porphyr. de Abſtinentia, lib. 2.—3.

other an *animal*, another a *rational*; and yet all theſe inſufficient without adding a *formal* ſoul, correſponding to the particular modifications of the leſs regular and anomalous maſſes of matter. Without ſome clearer explication of the inward principle than has been given, we cannot pronounce the admiſſion of it to be the *teſt* of Theiſm, and of validity enough to mark with the deſignation of Half Theiſts, or Materialiſts in Philoſophy, all thoſe who may diſſent from it; eſpecially when it is conſidered what illuſtrious and venerable names might be included in the proſcription; thoſe of Bacon, Boyle, Locke, Newton, Clark, Baxter, and others, who eſpouſed no ſuch theory, and of whom, it would be a reflection on human reaſon itſelf, to alledge that they had not juſt and ſound views of Theiſm; and that, notwithſtanding few of the uninſpired of mankind are known to have done its principles equal honour by their writings, they had miſtook the proper grounds of its defence, and unwarily, or ignorantly, betrayed its cauſe.

Theſe remarks may be concluded with obſerving, that, in philoſophical ſpeculation, a Theiſt will find reaſon to conclude it to be an indubitable truth, that the *things which are ſeen were not made of things which do appear* *; or, that matter and motion, even ſuppoſing them always to have co-exiſted, could never have conſtituted the frame of the viſible heavens and the earth; but that, as their exiſtence, ſo their motions, the arrangements of their parts, and their diverſified natures, have proceeded from the *word*, and according to the appointment of God: Yet, as to the phyſical mode of this divine, and all-wiſe ordination, he will not, even upon a review of all the theories of philoſophy, be preſumptuous enough to decide. He may entertain an apprehenſion that the Peripatetic doctrine, with regard to the eſſences of things, obſcure, and ſuſceptible of various explications as it is, may not militate ſo far againſt the Materialiſts as its adherents conceive it to do. The generation of corporeal forms, in the boſom of matter alone, has been always their topic, and only reſort for the account of them; and, unleſs the contrary doctrine be ſtated in an explicit and unequivocal manner, free from confuſion of corporeal and incorporeal principles, ſome handles may be given to

* Paul's Epiſtle to the Hebrews, ch. xi. v. 3.

to conſtructions of it favourable to their argument. This ſuggeſtion is not a vague or groundleſs one, but what was verified in the uſe made of Ariſtotle's ſubſtantial forms by his diſciple Strato Lampſacenus, who reſolved them into the ſole effects of matter once univerſally moved, and thence capable of converting itſelf into all the phenomena of nature.

Ariſtotle proſecutes his inveſtigation of the faculties of the ſoul, by explications of its powers of memory and *reminiſcence*, its different conditions in ſleeping and waking, the phenomena of dreaming, and whether *divinations* from it were probable or improbable. To follow him in the detail of his ſpeculations and arguments, upon theſe heads, would here prove tedious. Let it then ſuffice to obſerve, with reſpect to the firſt of them, that, after aſſerting the connection of memory with the images in the phantaſia *, he diſtinguiſhes what he calls *reminiſcence* from the ſimple recalling to mind former impreſſions, or that ſpecies of memory which is obſervable even in brutes. He conſiders the firſt as a peculiar act of the rational ſoul, when, by recollection, and paſſing from one idea to another, it gets into that train of thought which leads on to the recogniſance of that particular object, or of that ſpecial truth, that had been formerly known, but was forgotten. Experience proves the reality of this mental operation. According to his theory, ſleep is the impotency of the ſenſes, as waking is their active and lively ſtate †. It is not merely a deficiency, but a reſtriction of their energy, which enſues from a certain affection of the common ſenſory, then compreſſed as with a band or chain. He aſcribes this obſtruction of the ſenſes, not unphiloſophically, to the concoction of the aliments, and the evaporation aſcending from it to the brain; a proceſs of nature which takes place, leſs or more, in all animals. He obſerves, that the propenſity to ſleep is ſtronger or weaker, according to the quantity of the evaporation, which is always increaſed from the more concocted ſtate of the aliments, and the heat that attends it. Hence melancholy perſons ‡, little diſpoſed to

* De Reminiſcentia, lib. 1. cap. 1. pag. 524. † De Somnio, et Vigilio, cap. 1. pag. 529.; et ibid. cap. 3. ‡ It is Ariſtotle's obſervation, repeated by Plutarch, that great geniuſes are moſt ſubject to melancholy. Plut. in Vita Lyſandri.

to ſleep, are found to be of a frigid conſtitution, and deficient in the interior warmth requiſite for the digeſtion of food, or, being *atrabilious*, to want the humidity conſiſtent with proper evaporation.

Of all the concomitants of ſleep, dreams are the moſt ordinary, and the moſt unaccountable; and Ariſtotle owns the motions and images excited in the *ſenſorium*, when all the avenues to it are ſhut up, to be a very ſingular and ſurpriſing phenomenon. He reckons, however, that they may be explained from the remainder of the motions impreſſed on the ſenſes in vigilance *, or ſome *ſimilitudes* of them, which are abſorbed, and retained in the ſenſory. Thus, ſays he, in the movements of air or water, one portion of either being propelled, a like motion in another at reſt is generated; and a ſeries of it goes on for a time, in ſuch a manner, as if the alteration of the ſtate of each enſued by a ſympathetic affection. He conſiders it as demonſtrable, that motions communicated to the ſenſes, when they are awake, muſt affect them, in a certain way, in their obſtructed ſtate. If men walk from bright ſun-ſhine into the ſhade, they ſee not, for a little time, diſtinctly, on account of the rays of light having been diffuſed over the organs of viſion, and followed with a temporary adherence to them. Colours, long and ſteadily looked upon, are felt, as it were, to poſſeſs the eye, and exclude the immediate perception of others different from them. He infers, therefore, that the ſenſes, in ſleep, may have ſuch retention of the impreſſions made upon them, as will account for their reproduction in the ſenſory, when otherwiſe inacceſſible to images; and his concluſion is, that dreams are nothing more than a ſpecies of this recurrence, imperfect, and attended with confuſion. This ſolution of dreams can only be regarded as a ſuperficial one, and by no means adequate to their complicated phenomena; which, notwithſtanding the treatiſes, or eſſays, ancient and modern, upon the ſubject, ſtill require a more ſatisfactory explication †. The opinion with reſpect to divinations by them, the philoſopher ſtates problematically, and as a queſtion of curioſity, and what may admit of argument, but not of diſcuſſion, upon any certain principles. He contents

* De Inſomniis, cap. 2. pag. 534.

† De Divinat. per Somnia, cap. 1.—2. pag. 539.

tents himſelf, therefore, with ſaying, that the common notion of them is not to be altogether contemned, or eaſily eradicated; and, after ſome alternate reaſoning, he leaves the point in dubiety; which is, by ſome, aſcribed to his reſerve in expreſſing his ſentiment, when it might contradict an opinion connected with religion, and generally embraced by the multitude. Having, at ſo great length, unfolded Ariſtotle's Phyſics, we come to the diſplay of his Moral Philoſophy.

SECTION

SECTION IV.

Ethics not properly denominated a Science.—Three States of Human Life.—Virtue the only true efficient good of the Mind.—Perfect Felicity a ſpeculative idea.—Virtue perfected by acts and habit.—Whether placed in Mediocrity.—Definition of the Felicity competent to Man.—Eſtimate of Ariſtotle's Moral Scheme.

ACCORDING to Ariſtotle's diviſion of Philoſophy, *Ethics* was that part of it which reſpected action, and, therefore, called Practical. The term ἠθικὰ, as uſed by the Greeks, being derived from the radical word ἦθος, cuſtom, he obſerves *, had a propriety in it, and a ſpecial reference to the ſubject of *morals*; ſince, whatever ſeeds of them nature may be ſuppoſed to afford, they receive their character, improvement, and perfection, from right inſtitution and uſage. In a ſtrict ſenſe, no moral virtue can be reckoned implanted by nature; otherwiſe it could not be deemed of more merit than gravity is reckoned in the ſtone, or levity in the flame, and as little capable of improvement. For a like reaſon, it would be yet more abſurd to ſay, that any act of virtue was contrary to nature, ſince this would be much the ſame as to aſſert, that the ſtone might mount upwards, or the flame have a deſcent, againſt its natural tendency. But nature needs to be ſtrengthened by reaſon and habit, in order to excite the faculties of man, and improve his condition; and that branch of philoſophy which has for its object the moral rule

* De Ethicis ad Nicomachum, lib. 2. cap. 1. pag. 13.; et Magnorum Moralium, lib. 1. cap. 6. pag. 112.

rule of life, or man's proper actions, muſt be acknowledged to be different from ſcience, or, at leaſt, to be, only in a limited ſenſe, a ſpeculative one *. It propoſes what is to be done for the attainment of an end, rather than what is to be contemplated as true. Its aim is to accompliſh in the individual, and for his benefit, what a wiſe policy effectuates in a city or ſtate, when it is improved and perfected by the participation and obſervance of juſt and ſuitable laws.

Nature, it may be granted, has imparted to men certain propenſities to moral functions, which, in ſome degree, diſpoſe them to acts of juſtice, temperance, and fortitude. But theſe can be reckoned to be no more than mere inſtincts competent to children, and perceptible even in the inferior creatures. The more rational, and elevated ſtate of man, requires a more determined ſenſe, and *form*, of the moral virtues in his ſoul, and that they ſhould be eſteemed and deſired by him as his propet good †. They are in themſelves eſtimable, and have a peculiar recommendation, which is not thought due to the faculties of the intellect, ſuch as natural wit, penetration, and memory. Theſe are not termed virtues; nor, excluſive of their proper uſe, can they be accounted ſuch, in the ſenſe we underſtand the moral qualities that have been mentioned to come under that denomination. For there is, in the latter, a praiſe extended to the perſon who exhibits any of them, as acting from free-will, and choice, a proper part; and an approbation is given, not to the excellence of the virtue alone, but alſo to his laudable performance of it.

Human virtue, and human good, are relative to man's nature and condition ‡. His ſoul conſiſts of two parts, the rational and irrational. The one is adapted to contemplate, and to judge, and the other to deſire, and have the enjoyment of good. What the eye is to the body, by giving help and efficacy to all its other powers, ſuch reaſon and reflection eminently prove to the human ſoul. By the intervention and counſel of the intelligent faculty, all the important motions of the ſoul may receive a main direction; and, by a preference given to the virtuous pro-

* Ethic. ad Nicomach. lib. 1. cap. 1. † Magnor. Moral. Ibid. cap. 5.
‡ Ethic. ad Nicomach. lib. 1. cap. 13. pag. 12.

penſities, they may be rendered ſteady and permanent from cuſtom and exerciſe. It conſtitutes gradually that ſingular endowment of the mind called *prudence* *; which, beſide the judgment formed, and the choice made of certain objects and purſuits, as moſt worthy in themſelves, and productive of the greateſt good, avails to regulate the energies of the ſoul with reſpect to theſe, and to qualify them in ſuch a manner, that they may be found to correſpond, moſt effectually, to the end propoſed. As it cannot be called ſcience, ſo neither is it, properly, to be termed art; although it bears ſome analogy to it. Having a cloſe affinity to virtue, it may rather be defined, *a habit of the ſoul, conjoined with reaſon.* Separate from it, indeed, no virtue, truly ſo called, can be reckoned to exiſt in the mind. Hence, by ſome moraliſts, all the virtues were held to be *prudential* conſiderations †. Socrates, who improperly called morality a ſcience ‡, gave them the name of *reaſons*, or *rationalities*. Under this conception, they muſt all be ſuppoſed to center in the intellect; and, conſequently, the natural appetites, and affections, about the regulation of which they are converſant, muſt be ſet aſide, as unconnected with them. This miſtake was corrected by Plato, who conſidered the conceptions of the intellect, and the movement of the affections, as together conſtituting the foundation of *moral virtue*; yet he, in the proſecution of his ſubject, went beyond the true philoſophy of *morals*, by his manner of explaining good, not in relation to human virtue, or to human affections, but in a general and abſtract ſenſe, unapplicable to the theory before him, and that, conſidered in itſelf, muſt be pronounced altogether

* De Moribus ad Eudemum, lib. 5. cap. 5. pag. 183.; et ibid. cap. 13. pag. 188.

† Magnor. Moral. lib. 1. cap. 1. pag. 108.

‡ This is by no means to be taken as a juſt account of Socrates's Moral Philoſophy; who, if he called *Ethics* a *ſcience*, and the virtues *rationalities*, conſidered them as conformities in man to the general principle of reaſon, predominant in the univerſe, but not, therefore, abſtract theories, disjoined from the conſideration of the human affections and paſſions. On the contrary, it has been ſhown, that Socrates's theory of Morals, although connected with the ſublimer principles of Theology, was calculated for the practical exerciſe of virtue, and that he inferred the ties and obligations to it, from the view of man as an individual, as a father of a family, and a member of a public community.

altogether fictitious and imaginary. For, what can we underſtand by a one general idea of good, extended alike to ſubſtance, quantity, quality, and all the reſt of the categorical epithets, and which would alſo imply that there was but one ſcience of good ſufficient for underſtanding the ſeveral and diſtinct ſpecies of it? an imagination illuſive, and which, if adopted as true, can be turned to no account in the exerciſe of any uſeful knowledge or art in human life.

Nature has implanted in all men the appetite or deſire of good, ſo generally and conſtantly, that none of them can be truly ſaid to deviate from it *. We need not aſk, What every creature, which hath the uſe of reaſon, ſeeks as its natural wiſh, and purſues as its chief aim? It may, without heſitation, be pronounced the good, the well being, and the felicity of life, and which, although called, among the learned, by other names than theſe, yet they, together with the vulgar, mean but one and the ſame thing. The opinions, however, with reſpect to what is conceived to be good, are far from being uniform. All men take not the ſame pains, nor have they equal capacity to judge of the quality of the object which may preſent itſelf, not in one, but in ſeveral ſhapes and appearances. Hence, health, riches, honours, and fame, have each their different votaries. To aſſign the reaſon, or motive, why one of them is preferred to another, may be difficult; yet, in general, it is to be obſerved, that the predilection often ariſes from men's inclination to chuſe that condition which aſſures a deliverance from the ſpecial calamity, or diſadvantage, under which they happen to labour. Thus, the poor, for an obvious reaſon, think wealth the moſt deſirable good; and the ſickly, or infirm in body, place it in health and vigour; while thoſe, who, having ſenſibility, are expoſed to ſcorn or reproach, conclude it to be inſeparable from reputation. And, in like manner, the ſame perſons, in diſſimilar ſituations, ſee it in different forms.

There are three ſtates of human life, to the one or other of which the felicity of man may be ſuppoſed to be referable; the life of pleaſure, of contemplation, and of action. The firſt, taken in the ſenſe of the vulgar, muſt be conſidered as little different from that of the irrational

* Ethic. ad Nicom. lib. 1. cap. 1.

animals below us. It is a courſe of paſſion, and not of action; and, like all the opinions of the multitude, it ſuggeſts only a vague idea of good, under the general denomination of pleaſure *. It admits not, therefore, of being treated as a ſubject of moral import, or diſcipline. The ſecond, directly oppoſite to it, is the moſt noble, and might be to man, were the human faculties ſuited to it, preferable, in reſpect both of excellence, and of good, to every other condition †. For thoſe are not to be regarded who ſay, that it is ſufficient for man, mortal as he is, to be intelligent in what relates to mortal condition. It becomes him, rather, to the utmoſt of his ability, to carry his aim beyond the narrow boundary of human life, and to act, in all things, in a conſiſtency with the moſt exalted, and beſt part of his nature. By this means the happineſs deſired by men may be enlarged ‡, and rendered complete. But it muſt be acknowledged, that perfect felicity is a ſpeculative idea, which holds forth a celeſtial *energy*, found only in the life of the gods: For, as man's being, and nature, are different from theirs, ſo what conſtitutes his felicity cannot be the ſame. He is not framed for a ſolitary enjoyment, ſuch as that of contemplation. As a ſocial creature, he is neceſſarily

* Ethic. ad Nicom. cap. 3.; et ad Eudem. lib. 1. cap. 8. † Ibid. cap. 7.

‡ To the preceding note, it may be ſubjoined, that, while Ariſtotle animadverts on the moral ſchemes of Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, as too abſtracted and theological, he yet, as far as his Theology could go, coincides in his main principles with them, and here directly copies the ſentiments of the latter. Beſide thoſe expreſſed in the text, nearly in Plato's words, he adds, according to his doctrine, and in a ſimilar ſtrain, that, by contemplation, an image, if not the reality of the life of the gods, might be attained, and that, in proportion to the length it went, and the aſſiduity with which it was exerciſed, ſo much this divine ſimilitude would be advanced in degree, and, of conſequence, felicity produced, not eventually, but in the very acts themſelves, no leſs noble than beneficial. Ethic. ad Nicomach. ibid. This remark is made, not for the ſake of calling attention to this paſſage alone, in which Ariſtotle, with the appearance of diſſenting from Plato, and other philoſophers, and giving his ſentiments the ſhow of originality, does, in fact, no more than repeat what was delivered by them, but that it may be taken notice of, as a charge that may be often brought againſt him; and of which, notwithſtanding his many unneceſſary and frivolous diſtinctions, the juſt grounds are diſcoverable in various parts of his phyſical, as well as his moral philoſophy.

farily connected with others around him, and deſires to act, not for himſelf alone, but in concert with thoſe of his community, and both to perform and to accept a meaſure of ſuitable offices. The life of action, therefore, or the ſocial and civil ſtate, muſt be concluded the moſt natural and proper one to him; and in it muſt be comprehended the felicity of which he is capable.

That good is ſupreme, and the beſt, which is deſirable in itſelf, and for the ſake of which other things are deſired *; itſelf being ſought after on account of no other object. This is the proper idea to be affixed to perfect felicity. But honour, wealth, ability of mind, and even virtue itſelf, although deſirable in themſelves, are yet choſen in order to happineſs. Their ſubſerviency to that end, and their efficiency of it, are therefore to be conſidered, and that degree of theſe properties is to be aſſigned to each, which experience and reflection diſcover to be, not apparent only, but real, and well founded. But it is evident, that honour, wealth, and fame, beauty and ſtrength of body, and even ingenuity of mind, are productive of felicity only according to the uſe to which they are turned, and that, being miſapplied, they have a contrary tendency. The meaſure of them, alſo, that may be thought conducive to happineſs, can never be aſcertained, but muſt be allowed to vary, according to men's different tempers, and their ſituations in life. Deſirable, therefore, as they may be in themſelves, they can only obtain the name of good in a ſecondary and imperfect ſenſe. They are helps, and miniſter to it, in concurrence with ſome other principle, which is that of virtue, the only efficient of the good of the mind; that good which, in dignity and value, can be proved the ſuperior and preferable one to every other ſpecies of it. Congenial with reaſon, it may be accounted, and, like that pre-eminent faculty itſelf, the gift of the gods, or ſomething divine and venerable †. Attainable always by the voluntary exertions of the mind, it cannot, like any good that is external and fortuitous, be expoſed to accidents, or be loſt by the injuries of time and fortune, but has the ſame ſtability with its principles.

How,

* Ethic. ad Nicomach. cap. 5. † De Mor. ad Eudem. lib. 1. cap. 7. pag. 150.; et ad Nicomach. lib. 10. cap. 7. pag. 102.

How, then, does virtue differ, as a principle, from that of the prudence of the mind, without which it can hardly be ſaid to exiſt? No otherwiſe than as reſolution, and voluntary action, differ from the counſels of the mind previous to them. When, in conſequence of a judgment formed of the beſt good, and a choice made of it, in preference to that which is deſirable in an inferior degree, the mind proceeds to a courſe of action adequate to its attainment, then is exhibited that excellence of the human ſoul called Virtue, and recogniſed as the production of its nobleſt energies. But their ſcope is not fully reached, until virtuous action be matured, and confirmed by habit and perſeverance. There may be an aptitude in the muſical inſtrument for harmony *, and ſkill in the profeſſor of muſic; there may be a well conceived plan in the mind of the undertaker of a building, and preparation made of the fitteſt materials for it; but, until the piece of muſic be played, or the edifice reared, the one cannot be called a performer, or the other an architect. So it is in the matter of human virtue †. It muſt be found in the act, and is not conſummated but by the habit. Men whoſe lives are

* Magnor. Moral. lib. 1. cap. 35. pag. 127.

† Evident it muſt be, that habit forms the chief diſtinction of a virtuous mind from its oppoſite. One man is hardly to be *morally* known from another by a ſingle action, unleſs it be ſome extraordinary inſtance of virtue, which we believe to be inconſiſtent with, and impracticable to, a vitious mind; or, on the other hand, ſuch an enormous tranſgreſſion of every moral rule as appears irreconcileable with any ſenſe of virtue. In other caſes, a ſingle action is not to be accounted ſufficient evidence of a man's general temper and character. As it may have ariſen from a tranſient humour, or accidental circumſtances, and, as perſons known to be of a contrary diſpoſition may, for once, have acted in the ſame manner, the repetition of the action, or ſome performance ſimilar to it, becomes indiſpenſibly neceſſary; otherwiſe the proof of the character muſt be defective. There is, however, this obvious difference betwixt a virtuous and a vitious action ſingly exhibited, that, in the one, there is only a doubt entertained about the motive, or the power of the motive to it, and, therefore, a heſitation about the meaſure of commendation that is due, and whether it ſhould be extended to the general character; but, in the other, there is the idea of poſitive ill; and the dubiety is not about approbation, which can never be given in any degree, but whether the vice marks the character as wholly depraved, or as only partially corrupted, and ſtill leaving room for the intervention of the energies of virtue.

are deſtitute of all manly and becoming action *, are no more to be reckoned virtuous, than thoſe who are addicted to ſleep all their days; and ſuch whoſe virtue amounts only to a few ſingle and incoherent acts cannot be reckoned to poſſeſs that temper and diſpoſition. Habit alone forms the character of the mind, and that of virtue, little promoted by theory or inſtruction, owes its advancement chiefly to uſe and practice. The diſcipline the mind receives in the early ſtages of life, from cuſtom †, is well known. Men like or diſlike, are fearful or bold, active or indolent, as uſe has diſpoſed them. Nothing that has difficulty is readily, or juſtly, performed, until the doing of it be rendered eaſy and familiar by habit, which, having a powerful influence on the human ſentiments and actions, muſt, therefore, be acknowledged neceſſary to the exerciſe of every virtue. Hence are inſtituted, in all ſtates duly governed, thoſe regulations which tend to train the bodies of the youth to manly vigour, and their minds to the early taſte and practice of the laudable virtues. If it be objected, that virtue is debaſed by thus depending on extraneous and caſual ſupports for her energy, it muſt be remembered, that the irrational appetites and paſſions upon which ſhe acts, and turns to her purpoſes, appear no leſs foreign to her nature, and unworthy of her ſervice. But we find not fault with the pipe, or the muſical inſtrument, of whatever material it is made, while juſt notes and harmonious meaſures can be produced from it.

Virtue, which is thus proved to require that ſteadineſs, and permanency, ariſing from habit, may, likewiſe, be ſuppoſed to include, in its idea, an unlimited exertion, or ſuch an unrelaxed continuation of its impulſe, in all inſtances, that exceſſes of it need never be apprehended as unſuitable. But this is ſo far from being true, in the morals of life, that a contrary rules takes place; and both reaſon and experience conſpire to prove, that virtue conſiſts in a *mean* between two extremes; and theſe a little reflection will diſcover to be *exceſs* and *defect*. In the aim or action of virtue, we may intend and *will* too much, as well as too little; and, where this is the caſe, we muſt infer, as we do with reſpect

* De Mor. ad Eudèm. lib. 2. cap. 1. pag. 151. † Ad Nicomach. lib. 10. cap. 17. pag. 102.

ſpect to two unequal magnitudes, that the *mean* between them is that which is leſs than the greateſt, and greater than the leaſt. Every function, whether of body or mind, ſerves to bring to our view this general rule *, as preſcribed by nature, that *a meaſure is to be obſerved* †. The food which, uſed in due proportion, nouriſhes the body, when taken to exceſs oppreſſes it. Moderate exerciſe recreates the ſpirits, while that in which no rule is obſerved tends to debilitate, or to deſtroy them. As every corporeal action may be either overdone, or fall ſhort of the requiſite meaſure, ſo any exertion of the mind may be too vehement and tranſporting, or, being remiſs, prove ineffectual and abortive. The extremes, in both inſtances, being faulty, men generally agree in condemning, alike, the exceſs and the defect.

If we were to conſider the line of the virtues and vices as a ſeries of energies, and to find a ſcale of arrangement for them, it would appear that the former, having a conſiſtent and regulated energy, would ſtand together in the middle of the ſcale, while the latter, marred by defect or exceſs, would be properly disjoined from each other, and thrown off into the two extremes. So much is *mediocrity* the firſt feature of virtue, that, when tarniſhed in any degree, its character ſeems to be obſcured, or loſt. Without this predicament, the moral qualities are often hardly diſtinguiſhable from their contraries; but under it they may be well known. Fortitude would be improperly defined a total abſence of fear, in the place, or time, of danger. He who is afraid of nothing is ſtupid or delirious; and he who is intimidated on ſlight occaſions is a coward, or a fool. The virtue of fortitude, therefore, is found in a meaſure of courage alike diſtant from theſe extremes. Temperance is the *medium* between a too great and a too little compliance with appetite; and juſtice that between the exceſs of taking, or receiving, and the defect of giving. In a variety of other caſes, it may be ſhown, that, to have the virtue, we muſt adhere to the *mean;* which is ſo much the more the characteriſtic of a moral office, as vice can never be reduced to any ſuch ſtandard.

* Eſt modus in rebus, ſunt certi denique fines,
Quos ultra, citraque nequit conſiſtere rectum. HOR.

† Ad Nicomach. lib. 2. cap. 5. 6. 7. pag. 18.

ſtandard. For, as Pythagoras ſaid, there are many ways of error, and of evil doing, but only one of truth, and of doing well; and, it muſt be owned, that, to ſpeak of a *mean* in that which is, in itſelf, exceſſive, or defective, is abſurd.

Ariſtotle gives a table of the ſeveral virtues *, calculated according to his moral rule, and explains how properly they may be inveſtigated by it. Yet, after all his reaſoning upon the point, he is obliged to confeſs, that, if ſtrictly taken, it fails of being true †; and that the *mean*, conſidered as the *criterion* of virtue, may be proved to have conſiderable variations ‡, and to incline rather to one or other of the extremes, than to be placed between them. The fortitude of a military hero certainly admits of a difference in degree from that of an intrepid, but peaceful citizen; and, in the day of action, it may be rouſed to a pitch beyond all ſenſe of fear §. The temperance of Milo is not the ſame with that of an ordinary man; and the abſtinence, exemplified, and laudable at a feaſt, would be blameable exceſs in one engaged to wreſtle, or to run, at the public games. It is, more eſpecially, evident, that the affections and paſſions that are allied to virtue muſt be allowed a ſcope, and extent, tranſcending the mean. Humanity, ſocial affection, love of our

* Ad Eudem. lib. 2. cap. 3. pag. 153. † Ad Nicomach. lib. 2. cap. 4.

‡ It appears here, from Ariſtotle's holding forth the truth of his moral rule, with all its proofs, in one paſſage of his Ethics, and his retracting, or correcting it, in another, that he had not at firſt collected all his thoughts upon the ſubject he treated; and it is plain from other inſtances, that, at times, he wrote without having thoroughly digeſted his ſentiments. In the great variety of his writings this could not well be avoided; and, in the compilement of theſe for publication, place would be given to many pieces drawn up in the inquiſitive form, and which, probably, had ſerved for exerciſes in the Lyceum. It ſeems, indeed, to be a miſtake too common in reading the works of this philoſopher, as well as of Plato, to imagine, that, becauſe a ſyſtem of principles was aimed at in both, and much ſtudy employed by them to complete their theories, therefore every important queſtion was to be found *dogmatically* reſolved by them. But the contrary to this is manifeſt in many parts of their works, which often diſcover them to be more inquirers than dogmatiſts.

§ Ad Nicomach. lib. 2. cap. 5.

kindred and country, muſt be owned to have in them ſo much of the nature of virtue, that they can hardly be reckoned to run into extremes. Even the untender paſſions, when excited by juſtifiable motives, cannot well be reſtricted to mediocrity. Anger, indignation, and reſentment, on account of violence or injury done to a brother or a friend, are no more to be limited by any preciſe rule in morals, than natural ſympathy with our kindred, or patriotic affection. The dictate of the moſt rational philoſophy muſt therefore have regard to the particular ſituations of perſons, and the circumſtances attending the caſe; and, if it mark, as a faulty exceſs, the degree of reſentment for a ſuffering friend, or of grief for a loſt one, it muſt be conſidered, that generally none, but he who is influenced by theſe paſſions, can know, or underſtand, all the juſt or excuſeable reaſons and motives he has to be impelled by them.

Upon theſe accounts, it is acknowledged by Ariſtotle, that his general rule of mediocrity is ſo far invalid, that, where one of the extremes, whether the exceſs, or the defect, participates more of virtue than the other *, the mean muſt be drawn nearer to it; and this happens in various inſtances. Thus, the entire want of fear is more conſonant to fortitude, than even an ordinary diſpoſition to timidity. Temperance conſiſts more in the reſtraint, than in the indulgence of the appetites; and frugality is oppoſed, not ſo much to parſimony as to profuſion. From this fluctuation of the *mean*, and the difficulty, in many caſes, of determining how far it may be morally allowed to approach the extreme upon either ſide, the philoſopher obſerves †, that ſo few men are to be found poſſeſſed of ſtrict and perfect virtue. The exact diſcernment of it, and the practice, where its criterion thus becomes ambiguous, can be the excellence of thoſe alone, whoſe minds aſſiduous ſtudy and reflection have enlightened. He, notwithſtanding, maintains, that mediocrity, fixed according to right reaſon, is not only a certain and inſeparable characteriſtic of virtue, but that moral principles muſt be rendered looſe and vague, unleſs it be regarded as a general maxim, although it may admit of conſiderable latitude: And it muſt be confeſſed, that holding

* Ad Nicom. lib. 3. cap. 8. pag. 20. † Ibid. cap. 9.

holding the principle of a certain *meaſure* in all things, is the beſt corrective to extravagant opinions that may be vented on the ſubject of morals, whether deduced from abſtract reaſoning, and ſpeculative ideas of right and wrong, or from natural inſtincts and affections, or from the combination of both.

There is, however, one general rule, with reſpect to the variable mean, which prudence ſuggeſts, and that ought always to be kept in mind. It is founded upon the philoſophic maxim, that all moral action is converſant either with pleaſure or pain, joy or grief. Theſe being the two great motives that induce men to like or to diſlike, to act or to forbear, it is evident in which of them the defect of proper affection, and action, and the exceſs of what is improper, will commonly be found, and that the natural propenſity to pleaſure will draw too powerfully to its extreme, to allow virtuous motives to operate, and worthy actions, conſequent to them, to be performed without reluctance, when ſome degree of trouble and hardſhip is to be endured. Of this hazard, the diſciple of virtue will be ſufficiently aware. He will, ſays the philoſopher, dread the ſide on which the exceſs lies, as if it were Calypſo's iſland of enchantment. That way the helm of the veſſel will not be ſet, or the prow turned, but both rather in the contrary direction; ſo that the averſion to labour and pain may be overcome by manly reſolution and laudable habits.

Here it may be proper to recollect what length we have proceeded in aſſigning the proper characteriſtics of moral virtue. It has been ſaid to be that energy of the mind which its counſel approves as the beſt, and that prudence conducts, and habit confirms, and which, in reſpect of the vigour, or remiſſneſs of the affections and paſſions, may be held, in general, to conſiſt in mediocrity. To this deſcription, it muſt be added, that virtue is not merely a ſpontaneous *, but a voluntary action, and ſuch as proceeds from the free choice of the mind. This properly diſtinguiſhes it from all irrational, inſtinctive, and indifferent energies, and becomes the teſt of the virtuous and vitious ones. After this ex-

* Ad Nicom. lib. 3. cap. 5. 6. 7. 3 et ad Eudem. lib. 2. cap. 7. 8.

kindred and country, muſt be owned to have in them ſo much of the nature of virtue, that they can hardly be reckoned to run into extremes. Even the untender paſſions, when excited by juſtifiable motives, cannot well be reſtricted to mediocrity. Anger, indignation, and reſentment, on account of violence or injury done to a brother or a friend, are no more to be limited by any preciſe rule in morals, than natural ſympathy with our kindred, or patriotic affection. The dictate of the moſt rational philoſophy muſt therefore have regard to the particular ſituations of perſons, and the circumſtances attending the caſe; and, if it mark, as a faulty exceſs, the degree of reſentment for a ſuffering friend, or of grief for a loſt one, it muſt be conſidered, that generally none, but he who is influenced by theſe paſſions, can know, or underſtand, all the juſt or excuſeable reaſons and motives he has to be impelled by them.

Upon theſe accounts, it is acknowledged by Ariſtotle, that his general rule of mediocrity is ſo far invalid, that, where one of the extremes, whether the exceſs, or the defect, participates more of virtue than the other *, the mean muſt be drawn nearer to it; and this happens in various inſtances. Thus, the entire want of fear is more conſonant to fortitude, than even an ordinary diſpoſition to timidity. Temperance conſiſts more in the reſtraint, than in the indulgence of the appetites; and frugality is oppoſed, not ſo much to parſimony as to profuſion. From this fluctuation of the *mean*, and the difficulty, in many caſes, of determining how far it may be morally allowed to approach the extreme upon either ſide, the philoſopher obſerves †, that ſo few men are to be found poſſeſſed of ſtrict and perfect virtue. The exact diſcernment of it, and the practice, where its criterion thus becomes ambiguous, can be the excellence of thoſe alone, whoſe minds aſſiduous ſtudy and reflection have enlightened. He, notwithſtanding, maintains, that mediocrity, fixed according to right reaſon, is not only a certain and inſeparable characteriſtic of virtue, but that moral principles muſt be rendered looſe and vague, unleſs it be regarded as a general maxim, although it may admit of conſiderable latitude: And it muſt be confeſſed, that holding,

* Ad Nicom. lib. 3. cap. 8. pag. 20. † Ibid. cap. 9.

holding the principle of a certain *meaſure* in all things, is the beſt corrective to extravagant opinions that may be vented on the ſubject of morals, whether deduced from abſtract reaſoning, and ſpeculative ideas of right and wrong, or from natural inſtincts and affections, or from the combination of both.

There is, however, one general rule, with reſpect to the variable mean, which prudence ſuggeſts, and that ought always to be kept in mind. It is founded upon the philoſophic maxim, that all moral action is converſant either with pleaſure or pain, joy or grief. Theſe being the two great motives that induce men to like or to diſlike, to act or to forbear, it is evident in which of them the defect of proper affection, and action, and the exceſs of what is improper, will commonly be found, and that the natural propenſity to pleaſure will draw too powerfully to its extreme, to allow virtuous motives to operate, and worthy actions, conſequent to them, to be performed without reluctance, when ſome degree of trouble and hardſhip is to be endured. Of this hazard, the diſciple of virtue will be ſufficiently aware. He will, ſays the philoſopher, dread the ſide on which the exceſs lies, as if it were Calypſo's iſland of enchantment. That way the helm of the veſſel will not be ſet, or the prow turned, but both rather in the contrary direction; ſo that the averſion to labour and pain may be overcome by manly reſolution and laudable habits.

Here it may be proper to recollect what length we have proceeded in aſſigning the proper characteriſtics of moral virtue. It has been ſaid to be that energy of the mind which its counſel approves as the beſt, and that prudence conducts, and habit confirms, and which, in reſpect of the vigour, or remiſſneſs of the affections and paſſions, may be held, in general, to conſiſt in mediocrity. To this deſcription, it muſt be added, that virtue is not merely a ſpontaneous *, but a voluntary action, and ſuch as proceeds from the free choice of the mind. This properly diſtinguiſhes it from all irrational, inſtinctive, and indifferent energies, and becomes the teſt of the virtuous and vitious ones. After this explication

* Ad Nicom. lib. 3. cap. 5. 6. 7. 5 et ad Eudem. lib. 2. cap. 7. 8.

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plication of the characters of virtue, the philoſopher goes on to ſhow how much they correſpond to, and are found in, the ſeveral moral rectitudes mentioned in his table, under the title of fortitude, lenity, modeſty, juſtice, liberality, veracity, friendſhip, and others. His proofs upon theſe heads are ſpun out to a tedious length, and intermixed with ſo many minute and ſuperfluous diſtinctions, that it is no wonder that the indefatigable diſciples of the ſcholaſtic ages could only have the patience to tranſlate at large, and to comment upon them. In the view here given of the fundamental principles of his Ethics, various of theſe diſguſtful intricacies have been omitted; and there will be ſtill occaſion to throw others of them aſide.

To the more eſſential properties of virtue that have been deſcribed, Ariſtotle adds, as ſecondary qualities, thoſe of its pleaſure and utility. This part of his ſubject, although an inſtructive one in morals, is treated only in a curſory manner, while much attention is paid to categorical explications of the virtues more eſpecially productive of pleaſure and benefit. That delight and utility ariſe from the performance of moral offices, appears to be a principle rather aſſumed than proved in his theory. His argument is an abrupt, and general one, that the functions of virtue can never be executed but by thoſe who have a reliſh for them; and that, being agreeable in themſelves, and conſiſtent with one another, which common pleaſures are not, the ſatisfaction and comfort attending them muſt be conſtantly felt in their practice *. He then haſtens to an inference from all his premiſſes with reſpect to virtue; that, ſince it has been proved to be the good of the mind, which is the preeminent one, and attainable by a proper exertion of the human faculties, it follows, that a virtuous life is that ſtate which is moſt natural, ſuitable, and eligible to man; and that, if, in this condition, it be aſked, Is he happy? the anſwer muſt be, that he cannot be otherwiſe; ſince the means of happineſs he is poſſeſſed of are effective of their end, and do ſo entirely coincide with it, that it is only in conception that they are diſtinguiſhed from each other.

Yet,

* Ad Nicomach. lib. 10. cap. 7.—8. pag. 102.

Yet, if our inquiry be directed to that beatitude, which may be called the *ſupreme* one in human life, it muſt be acknowledged to be of a complex nature, and to include in it three ſeveral ſpecies of good; that of virtue, of bodily good, and of external circumſtances. To the two laſt belong perſonal health, ſtrength, and beauty, with a meaſure of longevity, and, beſide theſe, a competency of wealth, noble birth, and fame. The happineſs of life, although chiefly ſupported upon virtue, ſtands in need of theſe acceſſories *. Nay, the virtuous man, when altogether deſtitute of them, may be more properly called worthy and good than happy. Notwithſtanding his fortitude may enable him to endure pain and want with compoſure, he muſt ſtill be a ſufferer, although not in miſery. To pain, and perturbation of mind, he is not inſenſible, yet he will feel the former more than he is affected by the latter, as his habitual virtue will repreſs in him whatever is beyond a mediocrity of paſſion. In ſubſerviency to virtue, the goods of the body, and of fortune, will alſo be employed, and improved by him to their proper uſe, and, by this means, be rendered the ornaments of his life. The ſphere of moral offices will receive an enlargement, and virtue and beatitude be together illuſtrated and increaſed.

If, then, the proper aim and conduct of human action be conſiſtent with the rational deſire of every attainable good, the felicity of man may be pronounced to be the uſe of life †, in the maturity of age, perfected by the beſt habits of virtue. To perceive the propriety of this definition, we are called to obſerve, that, as all actions, in order to their completion, require ſome meaſure of time, ſo thoſe of human life ought to have ſuch an extent of it, as the gods, at the longeſt, have aſſigned to the condition of mortals, otherwiſe they muſt be deficient. The immature in years are, therefore, unripe in virtue and happineſs. Of a few verſes a poem is not compoſed, or of ſome ſingle ſteps a dance. A like rule holds with reſpect to beatitude in the life of man; and it is neceſſary to ſay, that virtue is not perfected but in complete time.

Notwithſtanding,

* Ad Nicomach. lib. 1. cap. 9.—11.

† Ibid. cap. 6.; et ad Eudem. lib. 2. cap. 1.

Notwithſtanding, in the eſtimate of virtue, it cannot be accounted, ſingly, and alone, productive of all the happineſs competent to human condition, yet vice is to be deemed a ſelf-ſufficient cauſe of evil and infelicity, and to tend always directly to that end. It has been doubted whether Ariſtotle holds the moral virtues to be connected together, or to be ſeparable, ſince he aſſerts, that a man may be wiſe, and yet not juſt, generous, and not temperate. The queſtion is reſolved by conſidering, that he diſtinguiſhes the natural propenſities of the ſoul to certain virtues from its moral functions, which are conſtituted by habits. The former he allows to be accidental and vague, and often found diſjoined from each other, while the latter, being dictated by the prudent counſel of the mind *, and maintained by like energies, have a tendency to combination; and, where the practice of one is thoroughly learned, the reſt will be ready to follow in an amicable train.

Beſide holding forth, in this manner, a ſyſtem of Ethics, unconnected with any principles in Theology, which chiefly conſtitute moral obligations, there is another material omiſſion made by the philoſopher. No eſtimate is formed by him of the tendency and force of the primary inſtincts and affections found in human nature, whether ſelfiſh or ſocial, rude or gentle, ungenerous or benevolent, and how they may be ſuppoſed to operate in man, and naturally diſpoſe him, leſs or more, to the approbation and practice of virtue. They are, indeed, in his theory, of little account, as being the offspring of the irrational part of the ſoul, and no more entitled to the name of virtues than the blindeſt motions of the paſſions, until they be rectified, and moulded by reaſon, and the prudence of the mind. After ſuch apparent diſregard of the inſtinctive affections, it might be ſuppoſed that they would hardly be inſiſted on by him in the account of any of the particular virtues, or elſe repreſented as weak, ſelfiſh, and rather adverſe to virtue. But this is not the caſe; and he makes no heſitation to expreſs himſelf in a different ſtrain, when he comes to treat of friendſhip as a virtue, or what is conjoined with it †. He alſo recites, as inherent in human nature, the tender affection of

* Ad Eudem. lib. 5. cap. 13. pag. 188. cap. 1. pag. 75. Ibid. cap. 14. pag. 83.

† Ad Nicomach. lib. 8.

of the parent to the progeny, and conſiders the ſenſations of it, reflected from the latter with cordial warmth; which, if abated by increaſing years, or, in ſome meaſure, diſſipated by other regards, is renewed in a more ſteady form; and the enlightened conception of a parent's relation, of a parent's care, of a parent's part done, is cheriſhed as a tye of love and duty ſuperior to all others. To this ſource of affection, although a fertile one of kindneſs to brethren, kindred, friends, acquaintance, countrymen, he confines not the ſocial bond, but, adverting to other emotions of the human heart, he diſcovers in them indubitable proofs of that pure benevolence, that love of the kind, to which the Greeks aſſigned the peculiar name of *Philanthropy* *.

If ſelf-love be natural to men, ſo alſo is affection to their ſpecies, as the likeneſs of themſelves †; appearing in qualities of body and mind ſimilar to their own, and in thoſe ſenſations of pleaſure and pain, which are communicated in a manner as lively, from the expreſſions of them in others, as when they ariſe in the breaſt of the individual. Friendſhip is, generally, contracted upon the intercourſe and cordiality of two perſons, cemented by time, and habits mutually agreeable. But, who has not, on ſome occaſion, experienced its birth, or the tendency to it, almoſt inſtantaneouſly, and upon no previous knowledge of the perſon, or his character, who is the object of it? There is, in this inſtance, a direct evidence of the prevalence of the ſocial and benevolent affection in the human heart. Without it, indeed, friendſhip cannot be properly conſtituted; although reciprocal benevolence may take place where there is no ſuch intimate connection, which, in general, may be defined *an equality of benevolence, mutually felt, and not concealed.* Its kinds may be reduced to four, that of the propinquity of blood, of particular affection, of fellowſhip and hoſpitality; the ſecond of them comprehending a philoſophic love, as well as one of natural paſſion ‡. Sought after it may be for three ends; thoſe of virtue, pleaſure, and utility. True and ſtable friendſhip can only ſubſiſt between the virtuous and good; and, ſo far as it has not virtue for its principle, it muſt be, in proportion, leſs

* Ad Nicomach. lib. 8. cap. 6. Ad Nicomach. lib. 9. cap. 5.

† Ad Eudem. lib. 7. cap. 5. pag. 206.

‡ Ibid. ad Eudem. cap. 2.

leſs perfect and changeable. Having vice, which is inconſiſtent with itſelf, for its motive, it can never be genuinely formed; and two perſons, ſwayed by their irregular paſſions, can only, by accident, agree, or be found in equality with each other.

In general, with reſpect to the oppoſite nature, and efficacy, of virtue and vice, Ariſtotle holds, according to the doctrine of Plato, that the former was the orderly ſtate of the human ſoul, or the harmony of its three conſtituent faculties, the deliberative, the vehement, and the immoderately ſenſual. If the piece adjected to the Ethics *, addreſſed to Eudemus, be not ſpurious, which may be alledged, he copies the ſentences of his maſter ſo exactly, that they need hardly be repeated. Comparing the faculties mentioned to the three orders of a republic, he repreſents the virtues of prudence, fortitude, and ſobriety, as forming the harmony, and proper vigour of the mind, in like manner as the juſt arrangement and exerciſe of the political functions in the ſtate conſtitute its ſtrength and well being. On the contrary, the ſoul's confuſion and weakneſs is beheld in the vices, which being the natural offspring of folly, and taking the looſe and incoherent forms of their original, blend timidity with fierceneſs, and inſatiable deſire with the ſenſual gratifications.

Such, then, is Ariſtotle's ſcheme of Ethics, taken in a general view, and in reſpect of its fundamental and diſtinguiſhing principles. It is that part of his philoſophy in which he is reckoned, by ſome critics, to diſcover little or no invention, and to have ſupplied the defect of it only by a profuſion of his logical diſtinctions; the more improperly thrown out in the ſubject of morals than in any other. Hence it is alledged, that his treatiſes of them, delivered in three ſeparate diſſertations, have, on account of their prolixity, and ſince the taſte of the ſcholaſtic literature has abated, found few readers, and ſtill fewer admirers. This criticiſm, however, if not quite unjuſt, is certainly not to be admitted in all its latitude. The latter part of it, indeed, may be owned a general fault that runs through all his philoſophic works. As to the want of originality, it would be wonderful if any remarkable ſpecimen of it had been

* Libellus adject. ad Ethic. ad Eudem. pag. 218.

been afforded. The ground was pre-occupied, and, howſoever fruitful, it had been cultivated by able and ſkillful hands; and to them had fallen its prime and moſt ſubſtantial produce. Invention had not here the ſame wide range as in phyſics. The great principles were to be found within ſome known tracts, which might be enlarged, but could not be varied. Yet, it appears that Ariſtotle made a bold effort, in the choice of his tract, and the diſplay of his ingenuity in it, to give his moral ſcheme, as much as he could, the face of an original one. For the ſake of having this reputation, ſome principles held, by preceding philoſophers, to be eſſential and indiſpenſible ingredients in every complete ſyſtem of Ethics, were ſlighted by him, and upon others of ſimilar moment, although not excluded, no ſtreſs was laid. The ground of theſe objections requires to be more particularly conſidered; but, even with the allowance of there being ſome truth in them, his books of Ethics may be pronounced to contain a large fund of uſeful knowledge and inſtruction, eſpecially with reſpect to the exerciſe of the particular virtues, and the reſtrictions and modifications of which they are ſuſceptible. In what relates to the dividing and diſtinguiſhing material queſtions, and caſes of morality, he is not excelled, and perhaps not equalled, by any ancient or modern philoſopher.

The moſt important and admiſſible objection to his theory of Ethics is, that it detaches moral virtue from all views of man's connection with any higher ſphere of being, and propoſes not that of the ſoul's immortality, even in the way of a probable argument. Diſpoſed to contradict Plato's ſyſtem, and to point out his error in repreſenting human virtue in a light too abſtracted, and depending on theological contemplations, he choſe to conſider it as proper to man, taken ſeparately, and with no other relation, or tye, but that to his kind. Upon this hypotheſis, the ſcheme advanced by him appears to be rather a political than a moral one, in which little or nothing is aſcribed to rational theory, and its influence upon the mind, but all morality reſolved into rules of prudence, and its duties into habits; conſtituted more by outward diſcipline, the conſtraints of civil inſtitution and penal laws, than by internal ſentiments, or the dictates of reaſon and philoſophy. Thus, treating morals, not as a ſcience, but only as a certain right ſtate of the hu-

man mind, and placing virtue in the prudent diſpoſition of its affections and paſſions, he will not permit its name to belong to any perception or ſenſe of its intrinſic excellence, or to the quality of actions, alone, and ſeparate from their actual and habitual performance. He does not, indeed, exclude the mental perception of the difference of moral and immoral action, but aſſigns to the former the titles of honeſt, fair, and beneficial, and, to the latter, the oppoſite ones, of diſgraceful, odious, and hurtful. But this is done in a feeble manner, and with the fainteſt ſtrokes, as if it was ſufficient, in a moral ſcheme, to ſhow how virtue might be conſtituted in man, without the conception of it as an intelligible principle, recogniſed and approved as a rule of action by rational beings ſuch as the human, or without making any diſtinction between the motives to its practice.

While he diſapproves and cenſures thoſe ſyſtems which trace the foundation of morals in ſpeculative ideas of the eternal relations of things, and of their differences, which cannot bring home to man the ſenſe of virtue, either as a duty or as a deſireable good, he runs, himſelf, into a ſimilar error, by declaring virtue to be neither natural, nor contrary to nature, and that the inſtinctive affections being irrational, deſerve no attention in the proper eſtimate of a moral principle, which always implies the judgment of reaſon, and a choice of action proceeding upon it. But, from what motives, it may be aſked, is man induced to prefer one object to another, if he finds in himſelf an equal indifference to both? Is reaſon, or prudence, ſufficient to teach him the love of himſelf, or of his ſpecies, or of ſympathy with others, when no natural inclination diſpoſes him to be ſo affected? The philoſopher admits the prevalence of the ſocial and benevolent affections, and delineates their extenſive and happy energies, and yet allows them not to ſtand in the catalogue of virtues, but under certain conditions. In the ſame ſtrain of doctrine, the perſon who aſpires to do good, and whoſe ſoul is alive to every ſentiment of friendſhip and generoſity, being deprived of the means, or opportunity of practically exerciſing, to the extent of his wiſhes, theſe affections, is not entitled to the denomination of a virtuous character. He muſt have, likewiſe, along with external advantages, a length of life, in order to be ſufficiently virtuous and happy. Embar-

raſſed

raſſed in this manner, and inconſiſtent in his moral theory, Ariſtotle, notwithſtanding his elaborate performance, marked as it is with many lines of knowledge and penetration, is not the author to whom the ableſt modern writers on the ſubject have applied for inſtruction. The two, moſt diſtinguiſhed with us, have borrowed their illuſtrations of moral virtue from Plato *, as a more eminent, and purer fountain; and the ſignal approbation given to the perſpicuity and truth of their general principles, abundantly proves that they were not miſtaken in their choice.—But we now reſume the hiſtory of the Academy in its ſecond ſtage.

* Lord Shaftſbury and Mr Hutchiſon.

PART VII.

SECTION I.

Of Arceſilas, and the Middle Academy.—Of Pyrrho, and the Scepticiſm of the Pyrrhoniſts.—Of Carneades, the Founder of the New Academy, and the difference of his Scepticiſm from that of Arceſilas.—Two other Academies, called the Fourth and Fifth.

IT has been obſerved, that *Arceſilas*, being introduced to the regency of the Platonic Academy, innovated ſo much upon the doctrine of its founder, that it came to be called by a new name, that of the *ſecond*, or *middle* Academy. He was a native of Pitane, in the territory of Æolia, where a patrimonial eſtate enabled him to live in more affluence than was common amongſt philoſophers. His firſt maſter was Autolychus, a mathematician, and his countryman *. He was next inſtructed in muſic by Xanthus, an Athenian, and then, becoming a ſtudent of philoſophy, under Theophraſtus, in the Lycaeum, he was engaged, from his intimacy with Crantor, to quit the Peripatetic diſcipline for that of the Academy. "I have loſt in him," ſaid Theophraſtus, "a youth remarkable both for ingenuity and a ready wit." He had early made Rhetoric his ſtudy; and his brother Maereas would have perſuaded him to chuſe it as a profeſſion; but poetry firſt, and eſpecially the charms of Homer,

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 4. pag. 244.

Homer, and next his attachment to philoſophy, diverted him from that courſe. He was now wrapt up in the ſtudy of Plato's writings; and when, upon the death of Crates, he obtained the government of the ſchool, was believed to be a votary to the philoſophy of its founder, until a method of exerciſing the ſtudents, different from that in uſe, diſcovered his affectation of novelty. Inſtead of delivering his own ſentiment upon any point or head of doctrine, and, in caſe of a queſtion being put by a diſciple *, returning an anſwer that was generally acquieſced in as ſatisfactory, he called upon the ſtudents, in their turns, to declare what was their opinion on any particular theſis, and then allowed them to maintain and defend it, in oppoſition to him, or to one another, by all the arguments they could advance. Cicero, himſelf an Academician profeſt, according to Carneades's *new* form of philoſophiſing in the Academy, alledges, that Arceſilas did no more than revive the original practice uſed by Socrates and Plato; a poſition which can only be underſtood of occaſional diſplays of the Dialectic art by theſe philoſophers, who employed it not in the latitude, and never to the ſceptical purpoſe, to which Arceſilas turned the diſputation of his ſchool.

But, whatever might be Arceſilas's meaning or motive for thus encouraging and promoting the ſpirit of diſputation, and unlimited debate, amongſt the ſtudents of the Academy, he ſoon found particular occaſion for the utmoſt exertion of his own genius and taſte for philoſophic controverſy. An antagoniſt appeared in the field, who, having been his fellow diſciple under Polemo, and, from his more advanced years, acquainted with all the principles and tenets held by Plato, and his ſucceſſors, was alſo diſtinguiſhed by the ſubtility of his definitions and axioms. Many of theſe, as framed by him, were new, or had the appearance of novelty. Stated, ſeveral of them were, in direct contradiction to fundamental points of the Academic doctrine. This opponent was Zeno, who now ſketched out, in his theſes, the principles of the

* Is enim (Socrates) percontando, atque interrogando, elicere ſolebat eorum opiniones, quibus diſſerebat.—Qui mos, cum a poſterioribus non eſſet retentus, Arceſilas revocavit; inſtituitque, ut ii qui ſe audire vellent non de ſe quaererent, ſed ipſi dicerent quid ſentirent. Quod cum dixiſſent; ille contra; ſed qui audiebant, quoad poterant, defendebant ſententiam ſuam. Cicero de Finibus, lib. 2. initio.

the Stoical Philoſophy, which he founded, and rendered ſo famous. It proceeded, altogether, upon a corporeal theory, and admitted the being of nothing that was not body; or, at leaſt, that nothing could be made out of that, which, having no parts, was not a tractable ſubſtance. It was apparent that this poſition was ſubverſive of Plato's triple world, and that the ſenſible one was only recogniſed. Arceſilas, engaging in the conteſt with his adverſary, made uſe of thoſe arguments by which Plato's followers proved, that ſenſible perceptions afforded no foundation for real knowledge, and that they went no farther than to beget an opinion of the qualities of external objects. As the controverſy came to hinge, in a great meaſure, upon the credit due to the ſenſes, he advanced a bolder aſſertion, and affirmed, that their teſtimony being variable and contradictory, could never be relied upon, and that opinion, formed upon its ſuppoſed veracity, muſt be only a preſumptive one, and void of all certainty. Here he ſupported his argument by all thoſe proofs of the fallacy, and errors of the ſenſes, which had been adduced by Protagoras, Ariſtippus, and other ſceptical philoſophers; the mutable tone of the organs of ſenſe, their difference in different men, the various aſpects of objects according to their poſition, the oar ſeen bowed, or partly double in the water, and the dove's neck, when turned round in the ſun's rays, changeable into a multiplicity of colours and ſhades.

There are, ſaid he, but two ſources of our knowledge of external objects, the thing which affects the ſenſes, and the opinion formed with reſpect to it; and both of them are alike fallible *. By the ſame object, the ſenſes are variouſly impreſſed; they judge not what is true, and can only tranſmit to the imagination an ambiguous report. What, then, can the opinion of it be but a conjecture, partaking of the ſame uncertainty? All our judgments muſt be reckoned of a ſimilar ſtamp. Nature has thrown nothing but obſcurity around us, without affording the means, or time in life, for diſpelling the cloud. We have only the capacity of with-holding our aſſent; and it is the part of a philoſopher to

* Quod ſi omnia *viſa* ejuſmodi eſſent, qualia iſti dicunt, ut ea vel falſa eſſe poſſent, neque ea poſſet ulla notio diſcernere; quo modo aliquem aut concluſiſſe aliquid aut inveniſſe diceremus. Cicer. Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 4. et lib. 1. ad fin.

to do ſo, as well with reſpect to what is unknown to him, as what he finds to be falſe. To ſay, with Socrates, that we *know that we know nothing*, is aſſerting too much. In every propoſition, it is fit to interpoſe an *epoche*, or retention of aſſent; and we may ſoon find reaſons for remaining undetermined as to its truth. He ſpent whole days in ſhowing that various arguments might be adduced, of equal weight, to prove the truth or the falſhood of the moſt approved axiom. He was conſidered as the reviver of Xenophanes's doctrine of the incomprehenſibility of all things; and Sextus Empiricus * pronounces him to have ſtood in an almoſt perfect correſpondence with the Pyrrhonic diſcipline. He had, however, a hard ſtruggle for reputation, in the ſubtilities of the Dialectic, with Zeno †, to whom the queſtion being put, What was the diſtinction or definition of a true and of a falſe *viſum*, or of the perception of either? the reply given him was, that there could be no definition of a true viſum, but that it was otherwiſe perceived than a falſe one could be. But could not the one and the other appear under the ſame idea? That *viſum*, anſwered Zeno, muſt be nothing, or an inconceivable, which is ſuppoſed to repreſent that which is not, in the ſame form, with that which is, and render its perception, at once, both falſe and true. Evident it was, that, if Arceſilas inſiſted upon the force of his argument, he could not pretend to prove, or diſprove, any thing; whereas he only meant to declare, that, generally, in reſpect of the objects of ſenſe, and the perceptions and opinions formed of them, there were ſuch equal reaſons for affirmation and negation, that aſſent, either way, was always to be reſtrained.

Cicero declares it to be his opinion ‡, that not rivalſhip of Zeno, which might be ſuſpected, or obſtinacy in argument, or the deſire of victory in a conteſt which became ſo remarkable, that was Arceſilas's motive for engaging in it, but that his inducement was, to make the diſcovery of truth, which ſo many of the philoſophers before him

* Sext. Empiric. Pyrrh. Hypot. lib. 1. cap. 33.

† Hic Zenonem vidiſſe acute, nullum eſſe viſum, quod percipi poſſet, ſi id tale eſſet ab eo quod eſt, ut ejuſmodi ab eo, quod non eſt, eſſe poſſet. Cicer. ibid. lib. 4.

‡ Ibid. lib. 1.

him had in vain attempted, and whoſe failure might well excuſe his being involved in the doubts found by them inſeparable from every ſearch after it. This may rather be conſidered as the apology of a friend, than a juſt repreſentation of the procedure of the firſt diſturber of the peace of the Academy *; eſpecially as the Roman Orator, and Academic, takes no notice of the known allegation againſt him, that, in his philoſophic capacity, he acted ſuch a part as gave occaſion to Ariſto's ſatyrical verſe, implying, that he imitated three very different maſters; having before him Plato, behind him Pyrrho, and Diodorus Cronus in the middle. Sextus Empiricus repeats the anecdote, with an explanation, which, taken together with St Auguſtine's account of the New Academy, forms the chief ground and authority of a note by Aldobrandinus, upon Diogenes Laertius's life of Arceſilas †; the import of which is

* Cicer. ibid. lib. 4. Diogen. Laert. lib. 4. Sextus Empiric. ibid.

† The very learned annotator, and critic, ſupporting his conjecture upon the authorities mentioned, alledges that Arceſilas had no thought, or diſpoſition, to puſh his arguments, about the inſtability and fluctuation of the objects of ſenſe, beyond Plato's doctrine, and that of his ſucceſſors in the Academy, with reſpect to them, until he was animated in the courſe of his diſpute with Zeno. He, then, not only contended with eagerneſs for ſuperiority over his antagoniſt, in the uſe of the Dialectic weapons, but, finding that Zeno roſe in reputation, while he contradicted, or diſſented, from many of the tenets of the Academicians, he thought it expedient to throw around himſelf, and them, for defence, all the extravagancies of the moſt ſceptical and ſophiſtical diſputation; whence he was held the inſtitutor of a ſecond Academy, that varied much from the doctrine of Plato, although this difference was only fictitious, in order to cover the former principles, ſtill kept up, and taught amongſt the friends of the Academy, from the aſſaults of Zeno and his followers. In this way, it is reckoned, that the debate about the fallacy or the certainty of human perceptions was tranſmitted down to Carneades's time, and, even then, for the credit of the Academicians, it was not let fall. The whole appears a moſt ſtrained and improbable conjecture, reſting mainly upon St Auguſtine's account. The device imputed to Arceſilas, may, indeed, be compared to the natural artifice of the *ink fiſh*, which, by emitting its dark fluid, interrupts the purſuit of its enemies. A practice ſimilar to it has been, without doubt, often uſed by particular men, who wiſhed to perplex, when they could not confute, their opponents in argument; but how it could be made the reſource of a learned college, and be adhered to in the

is recited in the margin. But, without determining what credit it may obtain, we may here obſerve, that, upon comparing what is ſaid by the authors referred to, there is reaſon to believe Arceſilas *prevaricated* in philoſophy, and, by the contrariety of his manner of treating it, often rendered it doubtful, as Sextus Empiricus ſeems to admit, whether he dogmatiſed, or was really a ſceptic. This duplicity, however, by no means appeared to be a trait in his general character, which was marked with many of the eminent qualities of virtue. Generoſity, compaſſion for the unfortunate *, choice in his friendſhips, ſcorn of adulation to the great, ſet his diſpoſitions to it in a fair and unſuſpicious light. His maſter in geometry, Hipponicus, becoming deranged in his faculties, was taken by him into his houſe, and carefully attended to, until his recovery. He had, even when in health, the greateſt aſpect of dulneſs; and Arceſilas could not help ſaying, that geometry had flown into his *ever gaping mouth*. Various inſtances of the philoſopher's liberality, and his indifference about wealth, are recorded; and his endeavours to conceal his munificence teſtified his diſtaſte of all parade and oſtentation of it. Entering the houſe of Cteſibius, or, as Plutarch relates it, of the famous Appelles, then in ſickneſs, he was touched with the ſigns he beheld of poverty added to it. "I ſee nothing here," ſaid he, "in a ſuppreſſed voice, but Empedocles's four elements, fire and water, earth and aether, in conjunction." He departed; but, returning ſoon, he pretended to adjuſt the bolſter of the couch, and conveyed underneath it a purſe of drachmas. The old woman in attendance found it with wonder.

Apelles,

changes of its conſtituents, is difficult to be conceived. One example of it, afforded by an individual, is here to be recollected. Dr Berkley, in order to confound the votaries of that philoſophy which had only *quantity* for its object, denied, and, with ingenious and plauſible arguments, endeavoured to confute every proof that could be given of the exiſtence of matter, and left the Corporealiſts to ſeek, in his ideal world, the commenſurations and proportions of body. The argument held by the Academicians, againſt Zeno, was of the ſame import with that maintained by the modern Metaphyſician againſt the Materialiſts. Both of them, ſhowing their acuteneſs in diſproving, by ratiocination, what they could not but believe, expoſed the perplexities of reaſon itſelf.

* Diogen. Laert. ibid. pag. 240.

Apelles, upon its being ſhown to him, ſmiled, and ſaid, *this is one of Arceſilas's theſts.* On account of the many preſents made by him, he was thought to affect popularity, although he intermeddled not with public affairs. He accepted, himſelf, the gifts of Eumenes, King of Pergamus, with whom he held ſome literary correſpondence, but could hardly be prevailed upon to go to any of Antigonus's feaſts. His manners, in private life, had more of Ariſtippus's freedom than of philoſophic rigidity: Yet he was ſtrict in the diſcipline of his ſchool, and ſharply animadverted upon any delinquency of the ſtudents. A pleaſantry, however, in his expreſſions, often ſoftened to them the acrimony of the rebuke. It alſo accompanied the general ſtrain of his eloquence, which, without being diffuſe, was perſuaſive. He teſtified, by ſeveral of his ſentences, that he had the ready and apt conception requiſite in them. Being aſked, How it happened that various diſciples paſſed from other ſects to that of Epicurus, but none from the Epicureans to them? "We know," ſaid he, "that of men eunuchs may be made, but not men of eunuchs." He is reckoned to have wrote no books, becauſe he held no certain opinions. Inſtead of ſetting any value upon the Dialectic, his advice was, that it ſhould be ſhunned *, as throwing all things into confuſion. Logicians he compared to gameſters at dice, who are moſt delighted when they can trick one another. His ſaying, with reſpect to death, was more quaint than ſentimental. "Of all evils," ſaid he, "it is the only one, which, being preſent, gives us no trouble; and all our concern about it ariſes from its abſence." He may be ſaid to have outwitted his own adage; for, although death was not preſent, he exempted himſelf from the apprehenſions of it. Having drank too much, he became delirious, and, in a ſhort time, expired. He flouriſhed, according to Apollodorus, about the 120th Olympiad, and died in the 134th, at the age of ſeventy-five.

The ſuperintendence of the Academy was now aſſumed by Lacydes, the diſciple of Arceſilas; and to him Diogenes Laertius inattentively aſcribes the inſtitution of the third, or *new* Academy; which, according to indubitable authorities, did not commence till the appearance of

* Stobæi Sent. Sermo 81. pag. 472.

Carneades *, between whom, and Arceſilas, there was a ſucceſſion of three Regents in the middle Academy. But, of theſe ſucceſſors, Lacydes, Evander, and Hegeſinus, ſo little either important or curious is to be narrated, that they may be paſſed over without any detail of their manners or tenets. In their place we have a character to introduce, that cannot be omitted, when now we are entered upon the ground of the ſceptical philoſophy, and have to conſider, beſide the progreſs it made in the academies of Athens, other particular ſources of its growth; and, as it may be accounted to have had, although not its original, yet a moſt noted exhibition in Pyrrho, a native of Elis. From him a name was derived to the ſect, which, properly, could be denominated from no leader, or by any principle of reaſon, or tenet in philoſophy that was maintained. A *Sect* was, indeed, a deſignation as little applicable to this tribe of men, who, therefore, were called, variouſly, *Zetetics*, *Sceptics*, *Ephectics*, *Aporetics*; epithets denoting their inquiry after truth, their perſpectives of it, their ſuſpenſe of judgment, and, finally, their remaining doubtful of all opinions. Pyrrho's parentage, and condition in life, were too mean to afford him the advantage of education, although he is reported to have attended ſome maſters in the liberal arts, and particularly in that of painting. He found his way, however, and became attached to Anaxarchus, a philoſopher of Abdera, who attended Alexander the Great in his Aſiatic expeditions †. The leading feature of Anaxarchus's philoſophy was *apathy*, or the repreſſion of all the paſſions, which is connected with moderation, or indifference, in opinion. Theſe inſtitutes he is reckoned to have learned from Metrodorus of Chios, who, no more than Arceſilas, was contented with Socrates's maxim, that he knew nothing. He performed the office of Alexander's monitor; and, upon ſeveral occaſions, checked the eruptions of his vanity and pride. Having forgot himſelf, as it appears, in one inſtance, and expreſſed

* Cicer. Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 4. Cujus (*Arceſilae*) primo non admodum probata ratio, quanquam floruit tum acumine ingenii, tum admirabili quodam lepore dicendi.—Poſt autem confecta eſt a Carneade, qui eſt quartus ab Arceſila; audivit enim Hegeſinum, qui Evandrum audierat, Lacydis diſcipulum, cum Arceſilae Lacydes fuiſſet. Sextus Empiric. Pyrrh. Hypot. lib. 1. cap. 33.

† Diogen. Laert. lib. 9. Cicer. de Natura Deor. lib. 3. pag. 252.

expreſſed an opinion that reflected ſeverely againſt Nicocreon, King of Cyprus, the hoſtile ſpeech, although not followed by any prejudice, was reſented, and cruelly revenged by that tyrant. The philoſopher, thrown by a ſtorm upon the coaſt of Cyprus, was pounded to death; while he exerciſed, in torture, that conſtancy of mind, which, in a careleſs hour, had eſcaped him.

Pyrrho ſoon ſhowed himſelf to be of a temper fitted to perſonify ſcepticiſm in its moſt glaring ſhapes. Diſcrediting alike the teſtimony of the ſenſes, the impulſe of affection, and the plaineſt dictates of reaſon, he ſtrove to act, even in the common affairs of life, like one who had a controverſy with them all. It was not his part, who believed not the reality of motion in bodies, or of their action upon one another, and to whom every biaſs he found in himſelf was equal to another, to turn aſide from a precipice, or avoid the ſhock of a waggon or chariot that came in his way. His friends *, and others, in pity to him, were often obliged to perform thoſe ſervices which he could find no reaſon, in theory, for doing perſonally. He carried this behaviour, at leaſt, for ſome time, and when he was not liable to be much diſturbed, as far as could conſiſt with any regard to his preſervation, and not to be accounted a perſon altogether delirious. His anſwers, to ſuch as thought he might be eaſily foiled in argument, proved his faculty to be but weakly combated by their own. "You," ſaid one † to him, "who hold life to be a matter of indifference, why do you not die?" "It is," replied he, "for that very reaſon, and becauſe it is indifferent to me to live or to die." In caſes where all men teſtify their liking or diſliking, their approbation or diſapprobation, their praiſe or their blame, he appeared to be unaffected and inſenſible. When he began a diſcourſe before auditors, he continued it, without the leaſt regard to their attention or their ſtay. He ſeemed to have to do with nobody but himſelf; and to reſolve all the efforts of his mind into that of maintaining an indeciſion and indifference in all human opinions and ſentiments. Sextus Empiricus thought it neceſſary to aſſign ſome reaſon or motive for his conſtant reading of Homer, independently of his aſſenting to the grammar, or

* Diogen. Laert. ibid. † Stobaei Sentent Serm. 120. pag. 609.

or the truth of the ſentiments found in the poet *. He is not ſure, whether it might not be a feeling of pleaſure, ſuch as is produced from the rehearſals of Comedians, or from a delight in the poetical tropes and figures: For, Pyrrho himſelf was reported to have exerciſed his genius in ſuch compoſitions, and, when the companion of Anaxarchus in India, to have addreſſed a poem to Alexander, for which he was rewarded by the monarch with ten thouſand crowns. It was a queſtion more worthy of attention to have inquired, upon what motive or ground it was that Pyrrho, who conſidered the life of man to be, in any ſhape, a maſs of contradictory opinions and affections, intermixed with vain hopes, and ineffectual deſires, choſe, as far as he could, to abſtract himſelf from its ordinary courſe, and follow a line of his own, without having an opinion of it. It muſt have been abhorrence of error in ſpeculation, or the apprehended evil of deceitful affections, or both, that diſpoſed him to aſſume a deportment altogether ſingular in life, and in which, although expoſed to outward perils, he would not, for the ſhame of his philoſophy, confeſs, that common experience could teach him diſtinctly what conſiſted with his perſonal ſafety, and what not; when all the concluſions of reaſon itſelf, in matters of ſcience, appeared to him lame, and to terminate only in doubt and uncertainty.

Pyrrho, nor no man that acted or moved his body in the leaſt, could, conſiſtently, exhibit his heſitation and indifference in the degree he is ſaid to have held them forth in theory. He could no more give a reaſon why he made any uſe of his limbs, or how he came to rely on their ſupport, than why he diſtruſted his eye-ſight of a perpendicular rock before him, or the effect of a heavy body moving near him, and in a direction oppoſite to his own. Appearances of ſuch renunciation of the teſtimony of his ſenſes, if at all aſſumed by him, can be underſtood only as ſome popular proofs he thought fit to give of his conforming his actions to his theory, which with-held him from entertaining any certain opinion with reſpect to any thing. Upon what ſpecial arguments, he grafted his univerſal ſcepticiſm, we are not diſtinctly informed †. He either

* Adverſ. Mathemat. lib. 1. cap. 13. pag. 54.—56. † Diogen. Laert. in Vita, ad fin.

either compoſed no books, or left nothing behind him in writing. Therefore, Diogenes Laertius only gives ſome hints of the topics he inſiſted upon; but ſubjoins to the account of his life a ſtate of the Pyrrhonic diſputations with the Dogmatiſts of every ſect, collected from the writings of Hecataeus, Timon, Æneſidemus, Numenius, Nauſiphanes, and others, who followed what was called the *Courſe* of Pyrrho. But theſe diſputations are, by Sextus Empiricus, more formally arranged, and enlarged upon, in his firſt three books, under the title of Pyrrhonic Suppoſitions. If we may form a conjecture, what ſpecial arguments Pyrrho himſelf uſed, and how far they partook of the Dialectic art and ſubtlety, it ſeems probable, that, although he is ſaid to have been uncommonly pointed in his replies, and in ſpeaking to the queſtion, that he dwelt chiefly upon thoſe of the more obvious and vulgar kind, and that his objections to the veracity of the ſenſes were thoſe ſuperficial ones obſerved before, and, weak as they were, ſtill repeated. According to ſome fragments of his reaſoning, his profoundeſt argument for the uncertainty of human knowledge was drawn from the ſhort length it could go, and that the interior nature of things was for ever hidden from our view. How abſurd and extravagant is it, ſaid he, for us to decide upon any thing, who have only the ſurface of *what it is* preſented before us? Does the ſight of a few ſtones of a building enable us to judge of its architecture; or ſome words make us underſtand the value and merit of a lengthened piece of eloquence? This argument has been a capital one amongſt the ſceptics of every age; who, touched with ſome philoſophic ſpleen, have always endeavoured to form this concluſion, that, as we know not many things, or all things, therefore we know nothing with certainty. All ſentiments of what is honeſt or diſhoneſt, virtuous or vicious, are ſaid to have been reſolved by him into poſitive inſtitutions *; yet Cicero alledges, that he admitted virtue to be a neceſſary rule in life, but denied that there was any natural deſire, or motive

* Sed alius alio magis, Pyrrho, ſcilicet, maxime; qui, virtute conſtituta, nihil omnino quod appetendum ſit, relinquat. De fin. Bon. et Mal. lib. 4. This accords with his reply to one who aſked, Why he talked with himſelf? "I am thinking *how* I can be good."

motive to embrace it. According to Aſcanius, the Pyrrhonic way of philoſophiſing, by a general doubt, was much admired; yet this approbation, having its main ſource in novelty, appears to have been of no long continuance, or elſe to have produced no conſiderable effect *; ſince, whatever Eurylochus, and Hecataeus, and even Ariſto and Herillus, who introduced a limitation of the Pyrrhonic doubt, could advance in its favour, availed not to engage any number of followers. Nothing leſs than forming no opinion about any thing made a complete Pyrrhoniſt. This men muſt ever have found to be an impoſſibility; and, therefore, the ancient ſceptics, generally, relinquiſhed a topic revolted againſt by human nature; and the modern have not ventured to revive it. Arceſilas's argument, which approached the neareſt to it, by denying a criterion of truth and falſhood, alſo underwent a qualification by Carneades, before his Academic ſcepticiſm, of the new caſt, attained the prevalence and fame afforded to it by the aſſent of ſeveral of the Grecian wits, and ſome of the eminent and literary men of Rome.

Yet, as the Pyrrhonian argumentation found a patron in Sextus Empiricus, whoſe illuſive ſophiſtry has ſtill ſome admirers, we ſhall enter ſo far into the detail of it, as may enable us to obſerve what ſimilarity it has with the modern productions in the ſceptical ſtrain. The Pyrrhoniſts, abating ſomething of their founder's extravagance, did not pretend to be unmoved with ſenſible phenomena, or to be deſtitute of affections, and opinions with reſpect to them. We yield, ſaid they, as other men do, to the influence of deſire and averſion, of cuſtom and novelty, and the like impreſſions, at leaſt in certain degrees. Theſe *phantaſms* are, in the ordinary courſe of life, obtruded upon us, and meet with our compliance from neceſſity, and a ſubmiſſion to the laws of our country, which teach us, that virtuous action is a real good, and vicious behaviour an evil †. But this conformity is a ſimple act, in conſequence of the coercive power of the *phantaſmata*, as they happen to occupy the imagination, without the queſtion being ſtated, Whether or not they are; what they appear to be;

* Jam exploſae ejectaeque ſententiae Pyrrhonis, Ariſtonis, Herilli—qui in rebus iis, in quibus nihil, quod non aut honeſtum aut turpe ſit, negant eſſe ullam cauſam, cur aliud alii anteponatur. † Sext. Empiric. Hypotyp. lib. 1. cap. 11.

be; or any opinion or judgment being formed with reſpect to them. That there are ſuch, and ſuch phenomena, we allow; but all aſſertions relative to them, in which reaſoning is concerned, are rejected by us as totally uncertain, or ſo problematical, that the arguments for them may be always ſubverted by others of equal force. Here, beſide taking notice of the abſurdity of complying with impreſſions without any judgment about them, it is to be aſked, Whether the human mind is not naturally, and as cogently, induced to aſſent to the truth of certain propoſitions, as the imagination can be to yield to the appearances of things? and, farther, Why the mind ſhould heſitate more in forming a ſpeculative opinion, that, in its nature, may be neither good or ill, than in ſubmitting to the conſtraint of objects, that preſent the one, or the other, or both? It is not, ſurely, of more importance in life, what abſtract notions men conceive, than in what manner, and from what motives, they are to act; and, therefore, it muſt be mere obſtinacy to pretend, that the former require from them heſitation, ſcrutiny, and diſcuſſion, which may be diſpenſed with in the latter.

It was a preliminary queſtion, juſtly put to the Pyrrhoniſts by their adverſaries, How do you, who deny that any thing can be comprehended as true, pretend to urge a true objection to our aſſertions? In anſwer to this, it was ſaid, that the Dogmatiſts ought to explain what they meant by comprehenſion; ſince it might be taken either ſimply, for underſtanding any poſition in diſcourſe, without affirming the *being*, or *not being*, of the things referred to; or it may mean, beſide barely conceiving what the aſſertion implies, the admitting the exiſtence of the things in queſtion. In the former ſenſe, the Sceptics hold themſelves not excluded from comprehenſion; but the other meaning of it they left to be aſcertained by the Dogmatiſts, who, as they preſumed to have ſuch knowledge of the being and nature of things, that they could immediately advance aſſertions with reſpect to them, might be reckoned to have finiſhed their inquiries; which, yet, may be found ſo looſe and inaccurate, that the Sceptics choſe to begin their doubts with what are called their moſt evident poſitions. But this anſwer of the Sceptics was evidently an inſufficient and evaſive one. For, although they ſaid that they oppoſed no affirmations, but only their doubts, to the *theſes* of the Dog-

matiſts, yet theſe doubts muſt have reſpected ſome object of ſenſe or reaſon, capable of being proved to exiſt, or not to exiſt, to be true, or to be falſe; otherwiſe they muſt have entertained doubts and difficulties about nothing.

The Pyrrhoniſts, however, were not aſhamed to incur this palpable futility, and to declare both ſenſible and intelligible things to be alike incomprehenſible. To ſubvert the credibility of the ſenſes, *ten* common places, or reaſons of ſuſpending aſſent, were delivered by them; the whole a huddle of arguments; ſome inſignificant, ſome ſpecious, ſome grounded on appearances, ſome fictitious, and ſome conſiſtent together, and others not; and the whole of them intended to prove, in contradiction to the inſtinctive diſpoſitions of mankind, that the information of the ſenſes, liable as they were to ſome deceptions, was to be credited in nothing; for, by a ſhort and deſultory argument, ſaid they, the phenomena perceived by them are either all true, or all falſe; but ſome of them are found to be falſe; therefore, none of them can be proved to be true: And, why not as well conclude, that, if ſome of them be found to be true, none of them can be held to be falſe?

As the object perceived is one thing, the perception of it another, and what is intelligible about it a third, it was contended by them, that theſe three things could not be brought into connection, or joined together in the proof of any truth. And, what was more evident than, ſuppoſing the faculties of perception, judgment, and reaſon, found in the human conſtitution, to be incoherent, or taken ſeparately, that man could not be the rational creature he is? yet, upon this moſt deplorable argument, which tears aſunder all nature, viſible and inviſible, the line of the Dialectic is lengthened out, to prove that the ſenſible perception aſſumed ſingly, and the image in the phantaſia, by itſelf, and the rational faculty, without having reference to either of them, nothing can be concluded. How wonderful, indeed, would it be if any concluſion could follow? When the Pyrrhoniſts alledged that our perceptions could be accounted nothing more than certain affections of the phantaſia, which, for ought we knew to the contrary, might be chimerical, vain, and relative to nothing external; they may be reckoned to have led the way to the ratiocination uſed by the author of the *ſcheme of the ideal world*, whoſe capital argument

argument is, that we perceive, and can be conſcious of nothing but our own ſenſations, which have exiſtence by their being perceived; and, therefore, all objects muſt be ideal, and only found in the mind. Between the two arguments there was this difference: As the followers of Pyrrho aſſerted nothing, the poſſible exiſtence of external objects was not denied by them; although they impugned every evidence of it: But Dr Berkley puſhed his argument ſo far as to aſſert, that the exiſtence of the material world was an impoſſibility. How he held that to be impoſſible which implies no inconſiſtency in the conception, and, whether illuſive or not, is thought, by us, to be perceived, is a point in his metaphyſical reaſoning that remains to be explained by the admirers of his invention, and acuteneſs in argumentation.

There is, likewiſe, a ſimilarity in the arguments employed by the ancient and modern ſceptics *, to diſprove any proper or intelligible conception of cauſes of things, whether corporeal or incorporeal; and, by diſputations upon this head, to throw into perplexity not only phyſical principles, but all adequate grounds of moral reaſoning. By the former, the ambiguity of the queſtion is ſtated in the following manner: It may be alledged, firſt, that there is a cauſe; otherwiſe, no account can be given whence come augmentations, and diminutions, generations, and corruptions, or the effects of motion, as they are ſeen both in corporeal and mental agency; and, together with them, the orderly arrangement of the world. All theſe phenomena muſt be unintelligible, without the ſuppoſition of ſome cauſe: For, if none of them be in their nature what they appear, we muſt ſay, at leaſt, that, from ſome cauſe or other, they ſeem, plainly, to us, to be what in reality they are not. Beſides, if no cauſe intervened, all generations of things would be accidental and promiſcuous, and a ſtrange confuſion of them, ſuch as may be eaſily imagined, would take place in nature. But, in oppoſition to theſe probable reaſons for the exiſtence of a cauſe, others may be alledged of equal force; and an obvious one ariſes from this conſideration, that, every cauſe being a relative, and having a reference to a particular effect, it can never be underſtood ſeparately, but always in con-

* Sext. Empiric. Pyrrh. Hypot. lib. 3. cap. 3. pag. 112.

junction with the event produced by it. The effect muſt alſo be comprehended by us, before we can affirm that it has had this, or that, ſpecial cauſe, and not another; but, ſince the two, in order to be underſtood, muſt be taken together, the knowledge of both comes to fall under the falſe reaſoning of the *alternate common place;* and we may as well prove the exiſtence of the cauſe by the effect, as that of the effect by the cauſe. But, notwithſtanding a father be a relative idea, and conjoined with another, we do not, therefore, conceive, or ſay, according to this dialectic inference, that the two ideas of a father, and a ſon, may be reciprocated, and the one ſubſtituted in place of the other. Their connection does not render them indiſtinguiſhable, nor is the peculiar property of the one miſtaken, or confounded with the other. No more does any one, who underſtands the terms of cauſe and effect, aſk which of them has the priority, or imagines, on account of their having a connected exiſtence, that the order of that exiſtence may be tranſpoſed. If a metaphyſician, diving deep into the abyſs of his admired ſcience, ſhould doubt, whether they may not co-exiſt, he muſt be left to explore, in his perplexed conception, how a thing may begin to be, and become, at once, cauſe and effect. In the reaſoning of the modern ſceptics, the Pyrrhonian argument is adopted; but has been caſt, as it is thought, into a more advantageous form. It is contended, that we have no idea of power, or of *neceſſary connection* betwixt what we call a cauſe and its effect; and that this ignorance, only covered with a ſlight deception, hangs upon all our reaſonings, both of the phyſical and moral kind. Thus, while we ſee nothing more in the operations of nature, but that one thing follows another, we pronounce, without knowing *how* or *why*, that *this* is the cauſe, and *that* the effect. In like manner, when we reaſon about human actions, we infer, that a certain meaſure of conſtancy obtains in men's diſpoſitions and affections, and alſo in their tendency, when exerciſed, to accompliſh ſpecial purpoſes; and this connection is formed in conſequence of particular appearances of ſuch conſiſtency, obſerved by us in the actions and events of human life: Yet, ſay they, a ſingle inſtance, or another added to it, is not ſufficient to lead us to this inference. It is requiſite, in order to it, that we have the experience of a number of them. But what do we diſcern in many inſtances, more than in one, to make

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us conclude, that ſuch an event will be neceſſarily productive of another of a ſpecial kind? We ſee not, and know not, what power or influence is generated in the one caſe, which is not found in the other; and, therefore, what, in phyſical and moral objects, is reckoned to be a neceſſary connection of two events, and ſuch as that of the one producing the other, ought to be reſolved into a feeling of the imagination, ariſing from habit, or the mind's aptitude to paſs from one idea to a ſecond, not neceſſarily connected, but uſually conjoined with it.

The Pyrrhoniſts ſaid, that the ſenſes, not diſcovering to us the nature of objects, make nothing known; and the modern argument reſts upon the ſame foundation. Our ignorance of the conſtitution of ſubſtances, and our acquiring moral knowledge by gradual experience, is inſiſted upon as a ſufficient reaſon why we cannot diſtinguiſh cauſes and effects. But, ſenſible as we are that we *know that we do not know many things*, is our ignorance to be held as a proof that cauſes and effects do not exiſt in the world? This would be the ſtrangeſt of all logical concluſions; and yet it is that to which the ſceptical argument plainly tends. Not having omniſcience, we know nothing, is its manifeſt reſult. Its improved form, although ſuggeſted by a diſtinguiſhed metaphyſical reaſoner, does not diſcover much of the author's ingenuity *. The argument, more ſtrained than ſpecious, cannot obtain credit; ſupported as it is by the arbitrary aſſertion, that we have no *idea of power*, or neceſſary connection of cauſe and effect; when a clear and diſtinct ſource of it appears in the ability men find in themſelves of moving their bodies at pleaſure, and alſo from the faculty of exciting new and different conceptions in their minds. There is, perhaps, no idea ſo early, and conſtantly impreſſed upon us, than that we are, ourſelves, the cauſes of events; and it ſeems to be, from a conſciouſneſs of this power, that, upon beholding a change made in the appearances of bodies around us, as of ſnow melted by the ſun's rays, or of metal by the fire, we naturally, and with a kind of aſſurance, conſider the body, which, acceding to another, is not changed, while an apparent alteration takes place in the latter, to be the cauſe of a new phenomenon, or of a viſible effect. Hence the human mind acquires the idea of a power in ſome ſubſtances to operate upon others, although, for

* Vide Mr Hume's Philoſophical Eſſays, ſect. 7. *Of the Idea of Neceſſary Connections.*

for a time, it no more thinks by what means this is done, than how, in conſequence of its *will*, motions are effectuated in its own, and other bodies. The notion, however, of a certain and neceſſary connection is entertained, until, excited by more mature reflections upon the phenomena obſerved by it, the mind, curious of knowledge, is induced to conſider what that power, of which it has a general idea, may be, in particular inſtances, and how it can be conceived to carry its influence to the effect produced. Foiled, often, in making the deſired diſcovery, it does not, therefore, quit its original conception, that there is an *energy* derived from the conceived power; and, inſtead of imagining it not to exiſt, becauſe, in many caſes, it cannot be traced, the mind eagerly purſues the inveſtigation; and not only endeavours to diſtinguiſh, in the phenomena of nature, cauſes and effects, but to form probable hypotheſes with reſpect to the different powers of cauſes, and how they may be reckoned to operate, both in the natural and moral world. In the looſe tranſition of their ideas from one object to another, even the moſt vulgar minds do not reſt, without diſtinguiſhing ſuch of them as are relatives, and which they conceive to be, in a certain manner, inſeparably connected; while, to the more enlightened views of reaſon and reflection, ſuch a ſeries of cauſes and effects is apparent, as teſtifies a regular and fixed conſtitution of them in nature; and, conſequently, demonſtrates the exiſtence of an original and ſupreme cauſe, the ordainer and diſpoſer of ſubordinate cauſes and effects, according to a general and intelligible ſyſtem of them.

Here ſome notice might be taken of the ſatirical performance called the *Silli*, which the Sceptics extolled as a capital chaſtiſement of the Dogmatiſts. It had, however, too much of the groſs invective to deſerve commendation *. Timon, a Phliaſian, who, beſide ſatires, wrote a number of tragic and comic pieces, was its author. His character, like that of his *Silli*, was an irregular one, but not deſpicable, or deſtitute of ſome philoſophical merit. But, without further inſiſting upon the value of the work, often quoted by Diogenes Laertius †, we ſhall conclude the argumentation of the Pyrrhoniſts, with obſerving, from that author, that its whole effect was underſtood to be like that of *cathartics*.

* Sextus Empiric. lib. 8. pag. 319. † In Vita, lib. 9.

thartics in medicine; which, having removed all redundant humours of the body, at laſt throw off themſelves. This is alſo confeſſed by their modern followers; and what elſe, but ſuch contradiction, can be ſuppoſed the conſequence of endeavouring to ſubvert reaſon by rational arguments?

Pyrrho may be reckoned to have preceded Arceſilas by almoſt forty years; and, before the *middle* Academy was changed into the *new*, by Carneades's acceſſion to the regency, it may be computed that near a century intervened. About the laſt of theſe periods, however, there is a great conteſt amongſt the Chronologiſts; and a palpable error is ſuppoſed to have crept into Diogenes Laertius's text *; where, upon Apollodorus's authority, the 162d Olympiad is aſſigned for the time of Carneades's death, which ought to be accounted that of his birth †. That ſuch a chronological difficulty ſhould occur, is the more ſurpriſing, upon conſidering, that the time of his flouriſhing is marked by the known event of his coming from Athens to Rome, in the quality of an ambaſſador ‡. But the diſagreement of the Roman authors about the time of this embaſſy has rendered it a controvertible point; while, by ſome of them, the event is placed ſoon after the ſecond Punic war, and by others at the end of the third; which makes a difference of at leaſt fifty years, according to the Roman Calendar §. Cicero's date of the embaſſy, which nearly agrees with that of Pauſanias, appears the moſt probable. He fixes it in the Conſulſhip of Publius Scipio, and Marcus Marcellus; the former being underſtood to be that Scipio who deſtroyed Carthage in the 599th, or the 603d, year of the building of Rome.

Carneades was a native of Cyrene in Africa; but being educated at Athens, and affording various proofs of his progreſs in philoſophic ſtudy, he was choſen to ſucceed Hegeſinus in the Academic School. The diſputes amongſt the different ſects of philoſophers, eſpecially the more eminent ones, of the Lyceum, of the Porch, and of the Garden, were now

* In Vita Carnead. † Cicer. de Oratore, lib. 2. p. 154; et lib. 3. pag. 187. ‡ Aulus Gellius, lib. 7. cap. 14. § De Claris Orator. pag. 221. Pauſan. Achaicis, lib. 7. pag. 418.

now carried on to the greateſt height, which proved an encouragement to the diſciples of the *middle* Academy to inſiſt upon the uncertainty of all human knowledge. After its utmoſt efforts are tried, ſaid they, what is the ſucceſs of them? Oppoſite tenets, and controverted opinions, are their only conſequence. Why, then, not hold all pretenſions to ſcientific knowledge a fallacy, or deluſion of the mind? Carneades, diſtinguiſhed as he was for eloquence, ſaw, that a ſuperior fame might be acquired by excellence in controverſial reaſoning. To be ready and alert in this faculty *, he abſtained from all feaſts, and even neglected his common meals; and, when he was to diſpute with an opponent ſo able as Chryſippus, he ſometimes prepared himſelf by phyſical evacuations †. Cicero highly extols his powers of elocution; and repreſents his voluble, and copious expreſſion, as alike efficacious to command aſſent, or to overthrow objections, to whatever he propoſed. His voice was ſonorous, and he extended it with freedom. One day the *Gymnaſiarch* thought proper to requeſt him to lower his tone ‡. "Give me then," ſaid he, "a meaſure for my voice." "That," replied the other, "you have already in thoſe who hear you." Although not unfertile in ſharp replies, he often choſe to uſe the pleaſantry of his wit againſt the Stoics. He conſidered them to be acceſſories to his reputation; as he believed he could vanquiſh them in many dialectical arguments. "Without Chryſippus, and other diſciples of the Porch, my fame," ſaid he, "would have been nothing." Yet, as Arceſilas had done before him, he is reported to have ſpoke ſcornfully of the Dialectic art §. "The fiſh called Polypus, when its claws are too much lengthened out, bites them off. So," he ſaid, "Logicians, exceeding in ſubtleties, confuted their own arguments." Thus, while the *Academics* arrogated credit to themſelves on account of their faculty in argument, they were not aſhamed to turn it into ridicule.

It was when this abuſe of reaſon, and redundance of wit, prevailed in Athens, that, to implore the releaſe from a fine of five hundred talents, incurred by her citizens, for pillaging the town of Oropus, a deputation of

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 4. pag. 264. † De Oratore, lib. 2. pag. 154.; ibid. lib. 3. pag. 187. ‡ Valerius Maxim. lib. 8. cap. 7. § Stobaei; Sermo 81. fol. edit. pag. 473.

of three of her eminent philoſophers, Diogenes the Stoic, Critolaus the Peripatetic, and Carneades the Academic, was ſent to Rome *. Cicero makes it an argument that ſome taſte of literature muſt have then obtained among his countrymen; becauſe ſuch learned ſolicitors were put upon this commiſſion to the Senate. But the Romans of that age, except perhaps a few of the younger ſenators, moſt probably underſtood not what was the meaning of the name or profeſſion of a philoſopher. The Athenian deputies, however, wanted no more than to be heard, and underſtood in their own language, in order to excite admiration of their oratorial talents. Upon being admitted to ſpeak in the Senate-houſe, the impreſſion their elocution made was viſible. The young nobility flocked after them, to be repeatedly entertained with what was no leſs ſurpriſing than agreeable. Carneades, whoſe oratory was moſt attractive †, choſe one day to make the principle of juſtice his ſubject, and ſupported it by a train of ſolid reaſoning; but, what aſtoniſhed all his hearers, upon the next, he, with equal ability, as it ſeemed, diſproved the whole of the arguments he had uſed. This refinement in reaſoning was a novelty to the ſimple Romans; and Cato, the Cenſor, thought one ſpecimen of it more than enough to be heard by them. "It is time," ſaid he, "for us to ſend home thoſe Greeks, with their verſatile eloquence. Let them teach it in their ſchools; but the youth of Rome are not to be expoſed to its ſeduction." The objects of the commonwealth required, indeed, a very different diſcipline.

In the *Academy* inſtituted by Carneades, the ſcepticiſm which Arceſilas had introduced, received ſome mitigation. Slight, indeed, it was, and but inconſiderable, in reſpect of the Dialectic argumentation, or the aſſent to be given to ſpeculative propoſitions; which Carneades reſtrained almoſt in the ſame degree which Arceſilas had done, and upon reaſons ſimilar to thoſe uſed by him ‡. According to Sextus Empiricus's account of Carneades's ratiocination, he found not, either in the ſenſes, or the phantaſia, or the rational faculty, or in their combination, an ability equal to the diſcernment of truth. Our perceptions, ſaid he, conſtitute

* Pauſanias, ibid. † Aulus Gellius. Plutarch. in Vita Catonis Majoris. ‡ Adverſus Mathem. lib. 7. pag. 167.

not a diſtinct judgment, but only a common *phantaſia* of things; which, although it be the guide of all animals in the knowledge they have, and may be called their *light*, enables them not to make the proper diſcovery of objects. From its deficiency, and unſteadineſs, the ſame things appear to us in different ſhapes, and thoſe that are different to have ſimilarity. Such vague perception cannot be deemed a true one; nor can the wiſe man aſſent to it as ſuch. Does he then form an opinion about any thing *, without having an adequate perception of it? He may; becauſe he will be ſenſible that he does no more than barely *opiniate;* and that things falſe ſo nearly reſemble thoſe that are true, that no *criterion* ſufficient to diſcriminate them can be found. The only credit, then, which the ſenſes, or the phantaſia, can claim, muſt be of an imperfect and doubtful kind; and whatever they repreſent to us can be aſſented to no further than as being *probable*, or *improbable* †. To admit nothing, in ſpeculation, to be probable, ſeems to be repugnant to the affections of nature itſelf; and not to comply with veriſimilitudes, as they may be diſcovered in matters concerning common life, would be a revolt from the human ſtate ‡. The wiſe man, therefore, is, in a manner, diſpoſed to allow them a meaſure of credibility. In this conceſſion of a probable opinion that might be entertained and followed, about a true or falſe perception, the difference of the *new* Academy from the middle one chiefly conſiſted; but it was not underſtood to be the conceſſion of ſuch a judgment of what was true, in the objects of ſenſe, or imagination, as would afford ground for poſitive and inconteſtible aſſertions with reſpect to them. It was even confeſſed by Clitomachus, the friend and aſſociate of Carneades, that he never could underſtand what opinion that philoſopher held, as a probable one, about any

* Sed ut illa habet (Carneades) probabilia, non percepta, ſic hoc ipſum, *nihil poſſe percipi*. Nam, ſi in hoc haberet cognitionis notam, eadem uteretur in caeteris; Cic. Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 4. pag. 31. Ibid. pag. 25. Licebat enim nihil percipere, et tamen opinari; quod a Carneade dicitur probatum.

† Etenim is quoque, qui a vobis ſapiens inducitur, multa ſequitur probabilia, non comprehenſa, neque percepta, neque aſſenſa, ſed probabilia veri; quae, niſi probet, omnis vita tollatur; ibid.

‡ Etenim contra naturam eſſet, ſi probabile nihil eſſet; ibid.

any thing; and it is apparent, that, in his argumentations with the Stoics, and other adverſaries, he maintained, that nothing could be truly perceived, or, in reaſon, comprehended. Yet, to authoriſe the direction of human life, according to ſome rules of reaſon and morality, he diſtinguiſhed what he called an *emphatic*, or probable *phantaſia* of things, from an *apemphatic* or improbable one. What was underſtood by theſe two conditions of the human mind *, Sextus Empiricus has minutely ſtated; and how the phantaſia may be *diſtracted*, or *undiſtracted*, leſs or more attentive to its objects, active in the ſurvey of them as particulars, and collective of the cleareſt judgment of them, by a *circumcurrency* over their whole evidence. But, in place of this abſurd and unintelligible account of the imagination performing the work of reaſon, and, after all it is ſuppoſed to do, acquitting itſelf in the lameſt manner; we ſhall here bring into view what has a more ſplendid appearance, the diſtinguiſhed *eſſay* of the Roman Orator, and Academician, to maintain the reputation of Carneades's ſchool, or diſplay that ſpecies of ſcepticiſm which was profeſſed in the New Academy.

In no part of Cicero's Philoſophical Dialogues do we find ſuch an introduction to what he, as a diſputant, was to deliver, than in the middle of the fourth book of his Academic Queſtions. He there declares that he felt himſelf under an emotion of anxiety, almoſt equal to what he had experienced in riſing up to ſome of his greater Forenſic pleadings. Suſpected, as he might be by ſome, of engaging in the controverſy from improper motives, he thought it requiſite to ſignify that he was free, and ready to emit a ſolemn proteſtation to the contrary; and that, uninduced by a propenſity to diſputation, or the vain hope of ſhining in it, he was only conſcious of an honeſt deſire of finding out the truth. He was called upon to make the reply to Lucullus's vindication of Antiochus; who, from being a ſtrenuous Academic, and ſupporting, with his own ingenuity, Carneades's ſceptical arguments, had at laſt found reaſons for abandoning them, and adopting, in many things, the principles of the Stoics, which he thought not inconſiſtent with thoſe of Plato, and the Old Academy. As Lucullus had not only ſtated

* Ibid.

Antiochus's objections to the ſceptical ratiocination, but added, from his own fund of knowledge, others tending to reprobate it upon the whole, it was Cicero's part to undertake the general defence of the ſchool he followed; a taſk that required acuteneſs and ſkill in the art of reaſoning, and a thorough acquaintance with the tenets of all the different ſects of philoſophers. In theſe reſpects, the two books that remain, of four he is reckoned to have compoſed on this extenſive ſubject, are a ſignal teſtimony both of his genius and erudition. They have, however, in many paſſages, the mark of that ſtudied artifice, and captious ſubtlety in diſquiſition, which was thought allowable in the Dialectic, while the practice of it turned chiefly to the advantage of the Academics; Lucullus complains of their availing themſelves of the *Sorites*, and other ſophiſtical fallacies, by means of which all argumentation might be twiſted, and untwiſted, without end, like the *web* of Penelope *; and Cicero's reply is, that it was not the fault of the Academics if they found the Dialectic ſo lamely contrived, or ſo ill underſtood, as to admit of theſe verſatilities. His controverſial reaſoning, therefore, againſt any certain perceptions of truth by the human mind, is not, or but little, of the general kind. It is almoſt wholly a diſputation upon the dialectical concluſions of the ſeveral ſects of philoſophers, and eſpecially thoſe of the Stoics; which, as they were not conſonant with one another, and often unaſcertained in their meaning, could be the more eaſily confuted. Having the ſame argument to plead, of the diſagreement of the other philoſophers in their phyſical and moral principles, he expatiates upon it; and concludes, as with a complete apology for the Academic ſcepticiſm, and what even gave it an undeniable triumph, that, ſince a conſiſtency, either in ratiocination, or in tenets, could not be found amongſt them, down from Thales to Epicurus, or from Socrates to Philo, or Antiochus, that the diſcovery of truth, or of certain principles in philoſophy, was no further attainable than with the heſitation and ſuſpenſe adopted in the New Academy. Did he expect to find a perfect or unexceptionable dialectic, or an inconteſtible ſyſtem of phyſics,

* Quid quod eadem illa ars, quaſi Penelope telam retexens, tollit ad extremum ſuperiora? Utrum ea veſtra, an noſtra culpa eſt?

phyſics, or of morals, in the writings of one of them, or of ſome of them, or of all of them taken together? The firſt ſuppoſition could hardly be made. The ſecond, conſidered as reſpecting the dialectic, and moral principles, might have been verified; at leaſt ſo far, that it would not have been diſputed, whether, by the one, a true propoſition could be known from a falſe, and, at leaſt, ſome general rules of right reaſoning eſtabliſhed; and whether, in the other, its fundamental and moſt important tenets were recogniſeable, and admitted of a rational and juſt proof; if obſtacles well known, and not eaſily to be avoided amongſt men, had not ſtood in the way of ſuch agreement. The Roman Academic himſelf appears to have been not inſenſible to their influence, and even, in ſome reſpect, to conſider the yielding to them as laudable, when he makes it the encomium of his ſect *, that, by reſerving to themſelves the entire freedom of judging in all things that were the objects of knowledge, they were the more diſengaged from every prepoſſeſſion, and obliged to regard no poſition, or precept, which, obliquely, challenged aſſent, on account of the name and reputation of its author. To renounce authority, to impugn and ſubvert what had been advanced by others before them, and to hold themſelves forth as inventors in ſcience, has been leſs or more the diſpoſition of the men of genius in all ages and nations, and was too much the characteriſtic of the Grecian wits and philoſophers, to produce evidence of that agreement in their theories and reaſonings, which might have taken place, at leaſt amongſt the few, upon the ſuppoſition of an unbiaſſed exertion of their rational faculties. But, having the vanity of men, they often affected, and made the ſhew of diſagreement with others, where there was no difference, in their tenets; and if, with ſome, there was moderation or reſerve in this reſpect, their expounders, in caſe of any dubiety in their expreſſions, were more apt to underſtand them in the ſenſe of diſſenting than of concurring. What, amongſt the ſmaller number, was thus, in a great meaſure, repreſſed, could have yet leſs ſucceſs among the all, or the many.

To

* Hoc autem liberiores, et ſolutiores ſumus; quod integra nobis eſt judicandi poteſtas; neque ut omnia, quae praeſcripta, et quaſi imperata ſint, defendamus, neceſſitate ulla cogimur; Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 4. initio.

To impute diſſimulation to Cicero, and, notwithſtanding his ſolemn declaration of candour and ſincerity in the general argument to be ſuſtained by him, and to alledge that he feigned a conviction, which then he had not, would be unfair, and unjuſtifiable, and what his character for veracity might well confute. Yet, it may be ſaid, that the honeſteſt and ableſt men may, at different periods, think differently, eſpecially with reſpect to the validity of arguments, by themſelves acknowledged to be of a perplexing and doubtful kind; and, further, that the peruſal of the Roman Orator's other philoſophical works will hardly ſuffer any one to believe, that, upon the whole, and in his general ſentiments, he was inclined to maintain the ſcepticiſm of the New Academy. That he profeſſed himſelf a diſciple of that ſchool, and preferred the unreſtricted freedom of inquiry and diſputation exerciſed in it, to a partial attachment to any ſect, is unqueſtionable. But how far he carried his academic retention of aſſent, and, whether it equalled the degree of it aſſigned to Carneades, is a point not to be determined. The queſtion, indeed, is of that nice kind, that no man profeſſing to ſcepticiſe could eaſily anſwer it to himſelf, or ſay, with preciſion, to what length his *doubt* was extended *. We know, from his own teſtimony, that he diſavowed that arrant and boundleſs ſcepticiſm, which alledged, that nothing was diſcoverable, by reaſon, as a truth, nor any rule to be owned as a certain one in the actions of life; and beſides, that he conſidered the difference between the Academics, and thoſe called the Dogmatical Philoſophers, to be no more than this, that the latter held their tenets to be indubitable, and true, while the former admitted many things to be probable, and what they could eaſily follow in life, but found difficult to be advanced as true aſſertions. They, ſays he, acknowledge certainties and uncertainties; we, probabilities and improbabilities; yet againſt

* Occurritur autem a nobis, et quidem a doctis, et eruditis, quaerentibus; ſatiſne conſtanter facere videamur, qui, cum percipi nihil poſſe, dicamus, tamen et aliis de rebus diſſerere ſoleamus, et hoc ipſo tempore praecepta officii perſequamur. Quibus vellem ſatis cognita eſſet noſtra ſententia: *Non enim ſumus a quorum vagetur animus errore, nec habeat unquam quid ſequatur.* Quae enim eſt iſta mens, vel quae vita potius, non ſolum diſputandi, ſed etiam vivendi, ratione ſublata?

againſt all things we diſpute *; becauſe probabilities themſelves cannot be evinced, without every queſtion and argument, for and againſt them, being fully diſcuſſed. We aſk then what is to be underſtood by the conceſſion firſt made, that the Academics did not ſcepticiſe in the boundleſs latitude of thoſe who held no certain rule of reaſon, or maxim in life? If any probability could be no otherwiſe made apparent, than by ſubjecting it to the dialectical ſcrutiny, it is plain, that its diſcovery would be rendered as vague and problematical, as the moſt extravagant ſceptics held any certainty or truth to be. They could not, and did not, decline the examination of every poſition by the dialectic; which, they had judgment enough to ſee, could never be made a complete directory in reaſoning; but rather, in the manner in which it was eked out, with variations, amongſt the different ſects, that it would ſerve, as they wiſhed, to engender and multiply contradictions and fallacies. Either, therefore, we muſt ſuppoſe, when the Roman Orator declared he had no other motive for taking the broad ground of the ſceptical argument, but that of the juſt inveſtigation of truth, he over-rated the efficiency of the dialectic, and believed the diſplay of it ſufficient to accompliſh his aim; or that, notwithſtanding he knew it led to perplexities, and the embarraſſment of reaſon, he yet thought it not unfair, or prejudicial to the diſcovery of truth, to ſtate theſe ambiguities in all their extent; ſuppoſing, according to the common ſaying, that great was the force of truth, and although it might be ſomewhat obſcured by its adverſaries, it would finally ſhine forth, and prevail.

But, in whatever way Cicero thought his ſupporting the argument for general ſcepticiſm allowable, and conſiſtent with the declaration of his own Academic doubt being, in ſome degree, qualified, it is to be remarked, as a conſideration obvious to the plaineſt underſtanding, that, if he took up the diſpute upon the footing that nothing was comprehenſible, either by the ſenſes, or the perceptive faculty, or by reaſon, it was an illuſive one, and could not pretend to the diſcovery or proof of any thing.

* Contra autem omnia diſputantur a noſtris, quod hoc *ipſum probabile* elucere non poſſet, niſi, ex utraque parte, cauſarum eſſet facta contentio; De Officiis, lib. 2. pag. 374.

thing. You may, ſays Lucullus, as well, after depriving a man of his eye-ſight, alledge that external objects might ſtill be diſcerned and diſtinguiſhed by him; for, *you had taken away none of the things that ſtood before him.* He obſerves, juſtly, that he had conſented to do what, in the judgment of ſeveral eminent philoſophers, ought not to be done; when he was about to prove what was true to the conviction of thoſe who aſſerted that nothing could be proved. Antipater, the Stoic, therefore, was reprehenſible, who gave way to this fallacious practice, which furniſhed occaſion to require definitions of things that were by no means neceſſary for underſtanding them, and the framing of which tended only to perplex what was in itſelf ſufficiently clear and manifeſt. Such were thoſe required of the meaning of the perception, of the knowledge, and comprehenſion of any thing. For, what other words, were Cicero himſelf to invent them in the Roman language, could better ſignify what all men underſtand by the common ones, when they ſay, they perceive, they know, or comprehend this or that object? With reſpect to the certainty of what is perceived, the evidence of it muſt be found in every man's mind; and, unleſs it be apparent there, it can never be demonſtrated to him. Things, therefore, there are, which carry to the mind their own evidence alongſt with them; or the mind is the *meaſure* to itſelf of their perſpicuity. Hence no deſcription or definition of a true *viſum* was given by Zeno; but that it was otherwiſe perceived by the mind than a falſe one could be; and, unleſs the rational faculty be admitted to make the diſtinction in ſome competent way or other, an end muſt be put to all inquiry, or diſcourſe, about any object, either of the ſenſes or of the mind.

Lucullus ſtates the four great heads of argument, by which the Academics proved that nothing could be perceived. The firſt is, that, of things ſeen, ſome are true and ſome falſe. The ſecond, that a falſe viſum cannot be perceived; and that which is true is ſtill ſuch as to be under the predicament that it may be falſe. The third is a concluſion, that, where there is no difference betwixt the viſa, it cannot be that ſome of them ſhould be perceived and ſome not. A ſet of arguments, more disjointed than theſe, he obſerves, could hardly be found put together in the proof of any thing. For, granting the firſt half of the ſecond

poſition,

poſition, and the whole of the laſt, which is the utmoſt that can be allowed, How is it poſſible, by any ſubtlety in diſpute, to connect the remainder of the ſecond propoſition with the firſt *? How is it to be aſſerted, without the moſt abſurd contradiction, that ſome perceptions are true, and others falſe, and yet that there is no perceptible difference betwixt them? Can there be a falſe viſum known, and no true one? or, are we to ſay, that we have a faculty of knowing error, without any ſenſe or perception of truth?

To theſe ſketches of Lucullus's confutation of the ſceptical ratiocination, we ſhall ſubjoin ſome ſpecimens of Cicero's manner of replying to ſuch arguments, that we may judge whether he who compoſed them in Lucullus's name, does not, in his anſwer to them, appear to play the part of a wrangling diſputer, and to forget altogether that of a candid inquirer after truth. The introduction to his reply may be quoted as a teſtimony againſt him. In it, inſtead of objecting to, or acquieſcing in, any of Lucullus's general arguments, he takes up the extraneous, and ridiculous queſtion, Whether the *wiſe* man could *opiniate*, or hold a ſentiment that was doubtful, and not fully comprehended by him. Lucullus had ſaid, without pretending to determine the point, that it appeared to him a certainty that the wiſe man would not *opiniate*; if it was taken in the ſenſe of his aſſenting to any thing falſe, or beyond his comprehenſion. It is, then, ſays the Academic, your conceſſion, that the wiſe man does not opiniate. May I not, therefore, aſſume this argument againſt you? If, at any time, he aſſents, he will neceſſarily opiniate; but it is granted that he never opiniates; and, therefore, he cannot give his aſſent to any propoſition. To give ſome cover to the glaring futility of this ratiocination, he puts Lucullus in mind, that the Stoics maintained that their wiſe man never opiniated. He then adds, that, allowing there may be, as theſe philoſophers ſaid, a comprehenſion of ſomething, yet, to the Academics, this was not ſatisfactory, when they conſidered how ſlippery

* Maxime autem conveniuntur, cum haec duo, pro congruentibus ſumunt, tam vehementer repugnantia; primum, eſſe quaedam falſa viſa; quod cum volunt, declarant *quaedam* eſſe vera; deinde, ibidem, inter falſa viſa, et vera nihil intereſſe. At primum ſumpſeras, tanquam intereſſet. Ita priori poſteriora, poſteriori ſuperiora non jungitur. Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 4. pag. 19.

and dangerous the very cuſtom of aſſenting proved. Leſt we do it raſhly, and agree to what is falſe, or unknown, let us rather altogether with-hold it. My aſſumption is, that there is no true perception; and it is your conceſſion, that no wiſe man opiniates. Theſe being taken together, it will follow, that all aſſent is to be reſtrained. But think whether you would not rather chooſe to ſay, that, in ſome things, the wiſe man may entertain an opinion. You declare neither way. The controverſy, therefore, muſt proceed againſt my general aſſertion, that nothing is to be truly perceived. Hardly could the Roman Orator, in ſo few ſentences, have ſhown more of the ſubtle Dialectician's addreſs and evaſion.

It requires attention to his cloſe and abbreviated ſtyle, but no great penetration, to be ſenſible that he enters but ſuperficially into the main arguments advanced by Lucullus, and often ſlights, or turns them aſide, by ſome logical ſubterfuge, without taking off their force. As, beſide the common topics uſed to diſprove the teſtimony of the ſenſes, the Academics alledged that of the ſimilarity of objects to be a main cauſe of deception, Lucullus, anticipating this objection, had admitted that many things were undoubtedly like to others; as eggs to eggs, bees to bees, wolves to dogs, and ſeveral impreſſions of the ſame ſeals to one another, but that theſe ſimilitudes were to be reckoned of no conſequence in themſelves, and could be of as little ſignificance to the Academic argument, ſince, although they were like, they might be known not to be the ſame; and, if not always individually diſtinguiſhed, yet they were ſo according to their kinds and claſſes. Even in the likeneſs of twin brothers, ſuch as the two Servilii, who were ſaid to be often miſtaken for one another by Cato, twice Conſul with one of them, a difference was ſurely perceptible; for at home, and amongſt their domeſtics, it is not alledged that they were undiſtinguiſhable. Attentive and cloſe obſervation makes us perceive diſparities in things which were long thought to have an entire reſemblance. And, indeed, when the infinite variety of nature, diſcoverable to the eye, is conſidered, it may be denied, according to the doctrine of ſome philoſophers, that, upon a narrow ſcrutiny, one hair, one pile of graſs, or grain of ſand, could be found perfectly like to another. Deſcanting upon this argument,

Cicero

Cicero ſays, It is a poſition of the Stoics, and not very credible, and which may be confuted, that there are in nature no perfect ſimilitudes of things. But I ſhall not contend the point. It is enough for my argument, that, in many inſtances, objects appear to us to be ſuch; and that we have no mark, no rule, to direct us in the knowledge of their differences. Nature, wiſe as ſhe is reckoned to be in the fabrication of man, has not given us organs of ſenſe fitted to ſuch accurate perceptions of them. But there is, plainly, a want of a *criterion* of truth in all things, and no leſs in the judgment of the mind about our perceptions, and in all our dialectic reaſonings, than in reſpect of the outward appearances of objects. Notwithſtanding the Academics inſiſted ſo much upon the want of a criterion of truth, it may be affirmed that they neither could explain, or conceive what they meant by it, further than what may be underſtood by a want of the enlargement or greater perfection of the human faculties. A *criterion of truth* is a ſoleciſm in ſpeech, founded on an abſurd conception; as if truth could have any other *teſt* but that of its own perſpicuity to a rational mind, and that every ſpecies of truth, phyſical and abſtract, moral and divine, ſhould be equally perſpicuous, by means of an imaginary *criterion*. In the perception of external objects, the fiction of it would ſuppoſe a kind of evidence attainable, beyond what the human organs of ſenſe, aided by reaſon, can admit. In abſtract, or dialectic reaſoning, it would adduce a proof of *truth being true;* and ſo, as the Sceptics argued, another proof might be wanted of the one adduced, and of that another, without end. In truths of a moral kind, it would either confound certainties with probabilities, or elſe divide itſelf into a variety of criteria, for diſtinguiſhing and marking the ſeveral degrees of rational evidence. It would appear, then, that *the Philoſophers ſtone*, ſought after by the Chemiſts, is not a greater *chimaera* than ſuch a criterion of truth, as the ancient Dialecticians and Sceptics inſiſted upon as a *deſideratum* in nature. But, as the one is not to be found in the corporeal world, ſo neither is the other in the intelligent one; the latter being yet more inconceivable than the former, and, ſuppoſing its poſſibility, demonſtrable from reaſon, to be altogether inconſiſtent with the human conſtitution, and that of the ſublunary ſyſtem to which it belongs.

How hard a condition is it, ſays the Academic again, that a wiſe man going a ſhipboard, to ſail from hence to Puteoli, diſtant only thirty furlongs, can have no comprehenſion of his accompliſhing the navigation according to his wiſhes! Even with a good veſſel, an able pilot, and in the preſent calmneſs of the ſea, it can appear no more than probable to him that he will arrive in ſafety. Here the Dialectic argument ſeems to be contradictory; when the wiſe man is ſaid to have no comprehenſion of his making a ſafe voyage, and yet to perceive, or comprehend the probability of it. Lucullus had obſerved, that it was an abſurdity in the Academics to ſay they followed probabilities, when they *found no impediments to it*. How, ſays he, can you not find impediments, aſſerting, as you do, that truths vary ſo little from falſehoods, that there is no proper perception of their difference? In this reſpect, Arceſilas was more conſiſtent than Carneades, if the latter held the ſame poſition with him, that nothing was truly perceived, and yet declined the natural inference, that no aſſent or approbation was to be given to any propoſition. For why, indeed, ſhould it be yielded to what men ſay they do not comprehend? The mind, it is added by Lucullus, does not aſſent but upon ſome apparent ground of truth; no more than the natural appetites and affections are moved with the deſire of objects ſtrange, or unaccommodated to them. How the firſt, or early impreſſions made on the ſenſes, are, ſome of them, affected, and others repelled, it may be difficult, perhaps impoſſible, phyſically, to explain, or to underſtand. But evident it is, that there is a memory preſerved of the one kind and the other; and that the mind's diſcernment, gradually unfolding itſelf, acknowledges the juſt experiences of the animal nature, and by more extenſive obſervations of objects, and their effects, confirms theſe experiences, where doubtful, and enlarges them, where defective, in ſuch a manner as to reſt aſſured, not only of the truth of its perceptions, but, in the buſineſs of human life and manners, to form upon them thoſe rational concluſions called *knowledge*, or *the wiſdom of man*, which exhibits a determined approbation of one kind of action in preference to every other, and a perſeverance in it, ſo ſignal in the virtuous man, that no hardſhips, no outward diſtreſſes, have power to abate his ſenſe of duty, or alter his conduct. Yet, in contradiction to nature, reaſon, and experience, the Academic ſays, there is nothing

nothing truly perceived, nothing comprehended, or known by him. But enough has been ſaid, to prove that Cicero, no more than any other eſpouſer of the ſceptical arguments of the New Academy, could ſupport them with any ſhew of reaſon, without incurring contradictions, and contending, not for the diſcovery of truth, but for an apparent victory, by help of the perplexities of the Dialectic.

Clitomachus, by birth a Carthaginian, but trained up at Athens under the diſcipline of Carneades, ſucceeded him in the regency of the Academic ſchool. He joined induſtry to natural genius, and was converſant in the tenets of the Peripatetics, Stoics, and other philoſophers, while his wit, no leſs remarkable, according to Cicero *, than his maſter's eloquence, or Melanthius the Rhodian's ſweetneſs in diſcourſe, was chiefly directed to maintain the credit of his own ſect, by the explanations he publiſhed of Carneades's ratiocination. The ſubſtance of them is given us by the Roman author, from a book addreſſed by Clitomachus to the Latin poet Lucilius, and upon the ſubject of which he had alſo wrote to Cenſorinus the Conſul. They are a ſummary of the Academic reaſons for with-holding aſſent, but not in the leaſt clearer than thoſe that have been mentioned. We do not, ſays he, as is alledged, take away the ſenſe of colour, taſte, or ſound, but only aſſert that there is no invariable mark of what is true or falſe in them. By what other mark could they be known, but from that ſet upon them by the ſenſes, unleſs they were to be perceived otherwiſe than by the intervention of the ſenſes? But, *having explained his meaning upon this*, ſays Cicero, he proceeds to ſhow how the wiſe man had a *double* way of reſtraining his aſſent; one was, to yield it in no reſpect, and to nothing whatſoever; another, by which he ſuſtained himſelf in a diſpoſition to anſwer to no queſtion, ſo as to affirm or deny. By the firſt, he excluded all approbation of any thing; by the other, following probability, as he found reaſon for it, he might anſwer *yes*, or *no*. For one, who univerſally with-holds his aſſent, is ſtill moved, and acts ſomething; and ſo the *viſa* exciting him to action are maintained, and thus, alſo, are thoſe, about which, being interrogated, he may make his reſponſe either

* Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 4. pag. 14. Diogen. Laert. lib. 4.

either way, yet without aſſent, and only as to a thing *ſeeming* to him to be ſo: Nor were all *ſeemingly* probable phantaſia to be admitted, but thoſe only againſt which there lay no *impediment*. Such is the corrected and illuſtrated account given of the wiſe man's management of himſelf, as to aſſent, or diſſent; ſo artfully is he made to deal with his *viſa*, and to prove, evidently, by his proceeding, that there was nothing perſpicuous. It was no wonder that Clitomachus, according to Stobaeus, compared the Dialectic to the moon *, which never ceaſed to increaſe, or decreaſe; although the decline of the Academy, from Arceſilas's time, and its revival under Carneades, had not been alluded to by him in the compariſon. Rhetoric, he is ſaid to have rejected as a pernicious art †, and to have joined in opinion with Critolaus, the Peripatetic, for excluding it from the cities. He muſt, ſurely, have found its uſe, or employed other arguments than his ſceptical ones, in compoſing his book on *Conſolation* to his countrymen, when totally ſubjected to the Roman power ‡. His death, which enſued thirty years after his admiſſion to the regency, was, in the manner of it, as reported, a contraſt to Carneades's behaviour in the proſpect of the fatal hour ‖. Having fallen into a lethargic fit, and recovered from it, he ſaid abruptly, "I will be no longer flattered with the love of life;" and ſoon put an end to himſelf §. The other philoſopher, diſcovering rather a dread of death, was often heard to ſay, "Nature, that has tied the bond of our conſtitution, will looſe it." But, hearing that Antipater, the Stoic, had voluntarily taken poiſon, he appeared to be animated to a like reſolution, and ſaid to his ſervants, "*Give me too.*" When aſked what he would have, he replied, *a mixture of wine.*

The annunciation of Philo as a ſucceſſor to Clitomachus, whom he had heard for ſeveral years, is underſtood by ſome to imply that of the erection of a fourth Academy **, although he himſelf is ſaid not to have admitted the grounds of the diviſion of the Middle, or the New, from the

* Sermo 80. pag. 473. † Sextus Empiric. Adverſ. Mathem. lib. 2. cap. 1. ‡ Cicer. Tuſcul. Quaeſt. lib. 3. ‖ Stobaei Sermo 7. pag. 90. § Diogen. Laert. lib. 4. ** Cicer. Academ. Quaeſt. lib. 1. Ibid. lib. 4. Et Tuſculan. Quaeſt. lib. 2.

the Old, and to have wrote ſome treatiſes in ſupport of his ſentiment. It appears from Cicero's account, that, in the diſpute of the Academics with Zeno, he refuſed obſtinately to make the conceſſion in favour of that Philoſopher's definition of a true *Viſum*, to which others of Carneades's School had acceded, and, on that account, to have incurred both diſadvantage in argument, and reproach. Amidſt the public confuſions that ſpread over Greece during the Mithridatic war, he choſe, with ſome principal men of the Athenian ſtate, to make his retreat to Rome. There, not reprobating the Faculty of Rhetoric, as Clitomachus had done, he only made it his inſtitution to teach its precepts at one time, and thoſe of philoſophy at another †. His lectures were heard by the Roman nobility with applauſe; and Cicero, diligently attending his philoſophic ones, ſeems then firſt to have contracted a taſte for the Academic ambiguity in diſputation ‡. By Sextus Empiricus we are only told, that, as to any judgment of truth, by means of a *comprehenſive phantaſy*, ſuch as the Stoics maintained, he thought all things might be held incomprehenſible; but not ſo, if the nature of things themſelves was conſidered. In what manner, then, were they to be rendered comprehenſible? We are not informed, further than what Stobaeus delivers as the ſum of his philoſophy, in the Ethical part; which he conceived to admit of the moſt exact diviſion, and beſt illuſtration, by comparing it to the office of a phyſician. With reſpect to ſuch theory, it need only be obſerved, that, allowing there were ſome proprieties in the compariſon, yet, in philoſophy, more than in rhetoric, the common adage was to be remembered as a juſt one, *Omne ſimile claudicat.*

The fifth Academy, if it can be ſo called, was inſtituted by Antiochus, a native of Aſcalon, and Philo's diſciple: But his revolt from the Academic School gave him more fame than otherwiſe he would have acquired, and likewiſe expoſed him to more obloquy. This apoſtaſy was much arraigned, and, in a manner, reſented by Cicero ‖, who aſſigns, not upon ſufficient evidence, ſelfiſh or diſhonourable motives to it **:

Yet

* Ibid. in Bruto. ſeu de Clariſ. Orat. p. 242. † Pyrrh. Hypot. lib. 1. cap. 33. ‡ Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 4. p. 24. ‖ Ibid. in init.
** Cicer. de Legibus, lib. 1. p. 318.

Yet Lucullus choſe him for his Quaeſtor in Aſia, and held him in great eſteem; Atticus accounted him worthy of his friendſhip; and Cicero* himſelf acknowledged him to have been the moſt acute and beſt bred philoſopher of his time. But the new profeſſion he made in philoſophy, appeared to the latter an objection to his character not to be removed; and, from its being ſo keenly urged as we ſee it in the Academic Queſtions, it is not preſuming too much to ſay, that, if the Roman Orator was inſtigated by any particular motive, in framing theſe dialogues, beſide the general one of the defence of his ſect, it appears to have been that of indignation at Antiochus's behaviour, and a deſire of combating thoſe arguments he was known to have explained to Lucullus, and other learned Romans, in accounting for the change of his ſentiments. Notwithſtanding all his faculty in diſputation, adds the Roman author, and the efforts made by him to prove, that the Stoics and Peripatetics did not diſagree with the Old Academy, he appears to have had other inducements than thoſe of reaſon, for acting the part he did; and, at any rate, it muſt be concluded, according to the received maxim, *that inconſtancy depreciates authority*; ſuch inconſtancy, eſpecially, as was manifeſt in him, who, in his advanced years, departed from what he had before ſo long maintained. But it is in Antiochus's favour, that he was a man†, as Lucullus atteſts, naturally of the mildeſt diſpoſition; ſo that he was never ſeen by the Roman General to be once angry, or under the influence of paſſion, unleſs upon the occaſion of Philo's two books being preſented to him; in which he conceived himſelf to be moſt injuriouſly treated, and replied to the invectives in a piece, under the title of *Soſus*. Until then, it is acknowledged, that he had conducted the diſputation with uncommon temper and moderation. How arbitrary and partial, then, may the conſtruction be deemed, which imputes his renunciation of Carneades or Philo's School, that, rather *equivocally* than *directly*, admitted ſome probability of truth, and his eſpouſing a philoſophy that evinced the certainty of the principles of

* Acad. Quaeſt. ibid. p. 32. † Homo natura leniſſimus (nihil enim poterat illo fieri mitius); Acad. Quaeſt. ibid. p. 13.

of reaſon, not to rational perſuaſion, but to inconſtancy of mind, or ſome other ſiniſter and unjuſtifiable motives?

In ſupport of the charge, the Roman Orator ſtates it as an argument, that Antiochus was late in life before he found out any pretences in reaſon for ſuch a retraction of his ſentiments. But, ſurely, many inſtances there are, of men remaining long under the influence of an erroneous judgment without perceiving it; and, in Antiochus's caſe, the *faſcination* of the dialectic arguments might long miſlead his underſtanding. Trained up in the admiration of them, and obtaining applauſe for his own dexterity in their application, he might well be prevented from conſidering their fallacy; and, for a courſe of time, as little deſire to renounce them, as apprehend how juſtly it might be done. But, at an age of more cool and unbiaſſed reflection, it would require no great effort of his judgment to be convinced of what Lucullus aſſumed as a principle in all human ſcience, that ſome truths were to be held forth as ſelf-evident; and, from theſe, the rational faculty made a progreſs to others unknown. If none *, ſuch as the former, were acknowledged, neither would any of the other denomination be evinced, ſo as not to be liable to the objection of being doubtful and uncertain. Unleſs a conceſſion was made, that there were axioms intuitively perſpicuous, all *diſcurſive* or logical ratiocination could be no more than a *periphery* of ſyllogiſms, that reſted on no recogniſed foundation of truth: And this may be ſaid not only of any chain of moral arguments, but of the abſtract theorems of geometry and mathematics. Although ſome of the moderate Academies were diſpoſed to admit the perſpicuity of the *poſtulata* of the latter ſciences, yet the profeſſed dialecticians and ſceptics, like Sextus Empiricus, made no ſuch exception, but conſidered them to be points diſputable, and deſerving as little credit as the maxims of the former. The diſputations of the ancient Sceptic, upon this ground, have partly been gleaned by ſome of his modern imitators. But here we conclude the account of the Academies in affinity to Pyrrho.

The next ſubject to be taken up, in order of time, ſhould be that of the Stoical Philoſophy: But, as the difference between the period of

* Acad. Quaeſt. ibid.

Zeno's flouriſhing and that of Epicurus, is inconſiderable, and the phyſical philoſophy of the latter has been, in a great meaſure, anticipated in the expoſition of Democritus's atomical ſyſtem, adherence to the chronology may be ſo far diſpenſed with, and that philoſophy firſt introduced, which has already had a large diſcuſſion.

PART

PART VIII.

SECTION I.

Of Epicurus's Education, and manner of Life.—His inſtitution of a Sect.—The offence he gave to other Philoſophers.—Fame of his School.—The Unanimity and Celebrity of the Succeſſors in it.

A SMALL town in Attica, called Gargetium, gave birth to Epicurus. The family of his father, named Neocles, being connected with that of the *Philaidae*, was ancient and noble, but in depreſſed circumſtances *. The lot aſſigned to it, in the diviſion of land in the iſle of Samos, amongſt two thouſand citizens, was an inſufficient ſupport for a father and mother, with four ſons that had not attained the age of puberty. Neocles, to obtain a ſubſiſtence for them, taught a ſchool, while the mother, Chaereſtrata, exerciſed her ingenuity upon the ſame account, in another way. Attended by her ſon Epicurus, in puerility, ſhe went about chanting prayers in verſe, for expelling ſpectres, or expiatory purpoſes, according to the vulgar credulity. Neocles, Chaeredemus, and Ariſtobulus, were Epicurus's three brothers, to whom, as Plutarch relates it †, the philoſopher's affectionate care and benevolence were extended in a remarkable manner, and with ſo much efficacy, that

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 10. † De Amore Fraterna.

their mutual concord and unanimity might well be quoted among the ſignal examples of fraternal love.

The education Epicurus received, either at Samos or at Teos, was domeſtic, and under his father, until, at leaſt, the eighteenth year of his age. He then appears to have viſited Athens *, in the time of Xenocrates's regency of the Platonic Academy, and that of Theophraſtus in the Lyceum. His ſtay, however, ſeems not to have exceeded four or five years, and to have been ſhortened, from the incident of Perdiccas's uſurpation of the Athenian government, and the turbulence attending it after Alexander's death. He withdrew to Colophon, where his father now reſided; and betaking himſelf, by turns, and as it was convenient, to a courſe of ſtudy, or to teaching a ſchool, he ſpent ſome years in the latter occupation at Mitylene and Lampſacum. Authors agree that he came not to ſettle at Athens ſooner than the thirty-ſixth year of his age; which, as his birth enſued in the 109th Olympiad, correſponds to the 118th of that æra.

Amidſt the number and celebrity of the Athenian ſchools, the appearance of a perſon in no repute, and rather in indigent circumſtances, could not attract the public attention; and we have a teſtimony †, which may be reckoned unqueſtionable, that Epicurus lived at Athens with Metrodorus, Polyænus, and Hermachus, for a conſiderable time unknown in the city, and almoſt unheard of in Greece. Diogenes Laertius, indeed, ſays, that he converſed publicly for a while with other philoſophers, and then, privately, inſtituted a ſect called by his own name. At firſt, according to Plutarch ‡, he only profeſſed himſelf a follower of Democritus in philoſophy: But, whether known in public, or unknown for a ſpace of time, or whatever diſtinctive title he took as a philoſopher, it appears evident that his ſchool, in its firſt inſtitution, and even after he purchaſed, for eighty minæ, his famous *garden*, repreſented more a company of aſſociates, who choſe to live together as friends, and to hold diſcourſes on philoſophical ſubjects, and chiefly on that of turning life to the beſt account, in reſpect of its pleaſures, than

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* Strabo, lib. 14.

† It is a citation, by Seneca, from one of Epicurus's Epiſtles to Polyænus.

‡ Adverſus Colotem.

a college for literary ſtudy, and the inſtruction of diſciples under a learned maſter of the ſciences. To emerge from obſcurity, and to collect diſciples, the Inſtitutor of the new fraternity took all requiſite pains. The inſcription on the door of his garden gave a welcome to ſtrangers *. He received the youth that came from Mitylene, and other parts of Aſia, where he was known, with the kindneſs and facility of a friend, who wiſhed to guide their early ſtudies. He diſperſed, amongſt foreigners from all countries, treatiſes compoſed by him, on ſuch topics of philoſophy, as, beſide being intereſting in themſelves, ſignified how much he differed from its other profeſſors, both in ſtating the proper objects of it, and in his manner of treating them. The report of the concord and unanimity that reigned in the ſociety being ſpread over Greece, numbers of ſtudents, under other maſters, joined themſelves to it; and Athens ſaw, in a courſe of time, a ſeminary of learning eſtabliſhed, which had all the appearances of a well regulated and harmonious commonwealth.

The unexpected advancement of Epicurus's ſchool into fame was the more offenſive to the ſects that prevailed in reputation, as a rival ſeemed to ariſe to them, who himſelf had no name in the fields of literature; who puſhed not before him that of any celebrated inſtructor, and appeared rather to diſdain the credit that might reſult to him from the claim of erudition †. Their indignation was excited againſt him as a deſpiſer of learning; becauſe, as they ſaid, he had it not. His ſyſtem of philoſophy was arraigned as impious, and ſubverſive of all morals; and aſperſions of the groſſeſt kind, upon the life he led, and the manners of his pupils, were retailed without proof, or any proper inquiry. Diogenes Laertius has given the catalogue, and the confutation, of theſe invectives, with the pen of a friend, and in the warmth of one who felt for the injuſtice done to the character of the philoſpher he moſt admired. Certain, indeed, it appears to be, that Epicurus, neither from his conſtitution,

* Plutarch de Occulte Viventibus. Cicero de Finibus, lib. 2. pag. 64. Rumenius apud Euſebium, Praepar. Evangel. lib. 14. cap. 5. † De Natura Deorum, Cicero, lib. 1. pag. 205. Sextus Empiricus Adverſus Mathem. lib. 1. initio.

ſtitution, habit, or affectation of licentiouſneſs, in diet, or the gratification of the ſenſes, was addicted to the leaſt exceſs; and that, on the contrary, he practiſed that temperance and ſobriety, in his daily fare, recommended to his eleves, in a degree which few could imitate. While he drank only water, their allowance in wine was a ſpare one; and which it was a praiſe amongſt them not to require. His temper, naturally placid, his humanity remarkable, and his converſation eaſy and agreeable, the influence of theſe qualities was apparently diffuſed through the ſociety, in which the noiſe of diſputation was not heard *, or petulance diſcovered; but, undivided in opinion, all its conſtituents adopted, and reliſhed, the maxims of their philoſophical guide. Their fortunes were not made, as amongſt the Pythagoreans, a common ſtock for ſupporting the general expence; but, inſtead of diſtruſting the generoſity of friends, it was deemed more decent to leave it free to every one to contribute in the proportion he thought fit.

Notwithſtanding Epicurus ſhowed himſelf prudent and mild in the management of his diſciples, and had no diſpoſition to take a part in the controverſies of the different ſchools, yet, as he found himſelf obnoxious to moſt of them, and apprehended that the credit of his philoſophy might ſuffer by their aſperſions, he became moroſe and ſplenetic with reſpect to them, and expreſſed his cenſures of what he thought their defects, with aſperity or deriſion. When they aſſigned him inſtructors in philoſophy, at a conjecture, or according to their fancy, he was not contented with denying their aſſertions, but ſpoke ſcornfully of ſeveral of thoſe that were named by them; and, if he uſed this freedom, as we are aſſured he did, with reſpect to various of them, his adverſaries ſcrupled not to report his contumely to be directed againſt them all. In this way, at leaſt, we may, moſt favourably for him, underſtand the amount of the charge, as it ſtands againſt him in various paſſages in Cicero †, and

* Themiſtius in Epiſt. 38.

† Cum Epicurus contumelioſe Ariſtotelem vexarit; Phaedoni Socratico turpiſſime maledixerit; Metrodori ſui fratrem Timocratem, quia neſcio quid in philoſophia diſſentiret, totis voluminibus concideret; in Democritum ipſum, quem ſecutus eſt, fuerit ingratus, &c. De Natur. Deor. lib 1. pag. 209.

and other authors, for affected, and often announced contempt of the philoſophers of his time, and of many of thoſe who preceded him. The accuſation is not removed by Diogenes Laertius, but rather enforced, when he carries back Epicurus's ſcanty commendation of the philoſophers to Anaxagoras and Archelaus of the Ionic ſchool, and his ſtudying the books of Democritus, and Metrodorus of Chios: For, although he might account their phyſical theories alone worthy of his approbation, he contradicted one of his firſt maxims, if he did not reckon the regulation of the human ſentiments, upon a moral ſcheme, a more intereſting object of ſcience, and to which that of phyſics was conſidered by him as ſubſervient. But, as theſe philoſophers, whom he valued, had treated morals with little attention or accuracy, he muſt have been ill verſed in the books of the eminent inſtructors in that branch of diſcipline, not to confeſs their excellence, or elſe averſe to commend where much praiſe was certainly due.

Beſide what may be aſcribed to confidence in himſelf, Epicurus had grounds to preſume that his attempt to raiſe a ſect, connected with no other, and that pretended to borrow nothing from any known one, might be ſucceſsful. The diſſenſions amongſt the ſects was a circumſtance favourable to his hope. The marked deformity of ſome of them, ſuch as the Cynics; the formal gravity and auſterity of others, ſuch as the Platoniſts and Stoics; the hard ſtudy generally preſcribed by the diſtinguiſhed ones; and the intricate points of the dialectic to be learned by them all, while the Sceptics urged their arguments for endleſs doubt and debate; were advantages which he had to reckon upon, when he entertained the thought of exalting the reputation of his philoſophy above that of the moſt applauded among them. Sequeſtered for ſome time in his garden, and looked upon only as a philoſopher who, with a company of friends, choſe privacy and retirement, his frequent publications conveyed, at length, to the remoteſt corners of Greece, intelligence both of the novelty of his ſyſtem, and the little difficulty there was in comprehending clearly all its principles. The report ſeemed to come forth with all the charm of a *Syren* ſong, from a quarter whence it was leaſt expected to be heard. Philoſophy was ſaid there to ſmooth her contracted brow, to lay aſide her cumberſome and uſeleſs attire,

and

and to engage men to follow her precepts, as nature herſelf had dictated them; and, without conſtraint upon her deſires, and without notions, impoſed under the name of wiſdom, to lead them on to the knowledge of phyſical and moral truths, in ſuch a manner that pleaſure, the only ultimate good, would be found the reſult of the perception of both. A philoſophy of eaſy diſcuſſion was not, indeed, much in the taſte of the Greeks: They were naturally inclined to loquacity, and the love of diſputation; and, as we may well underſtand, from the variations and multiplicity of their theories that have been traced, they choſe more the exerciſe and ſtraining of their invention, than any pauſe or check of their diſquiſitive faculties: Yet this ardour of their genius, long exerted, had began to abate. The times, too, conſpired to relax their tone in philoſophiſing, as well as in other exertions; and, when a diſcovery was alledged to be made, of an eaſier and more direct way to the attainment of all requiſite knowledge, men readily believed what they wiſhed. The dry and diſguſting ſtudy of the dialectic, the unbounded ſtretches of reaſon and imagination, the theoretical views and practical purſuits of a perfection in virtue, which ſurpaſſed the human conceptions and powers, were accounted unneceſſary or chimerical. Rejecting all theſe courſes, it was viſible, and proved, by the contentment, the unanimity, and cordiality that prevailed among the diſciples of the Garden, that men of contemplation might be ſufficiently intelligent and happy. Such were the motives that determined many diſciples of the other ſects to become converts to Epicurus; and, what was yet a more remarkable circumſtance, the change was accompanied with the moſt entire ſubmiſſion of their opinions to the dictates of their new maſter. In the other Schools, there was commonly ſome point that was controverted, and which occaſioned diſſenſion among the diſciples; but, in that of Epicurus, all conteſt ſeemed to be excluded. In the principles of his ſyſtem, the Platoniſt, the Peripatetic, the Stoic, and even the diſputatious and diſcontented Academic found each his *quietus*: So much was it verified, that, to operate conviction, there goes often ſomething more than ſheer argument. From the days of Pythagoras, no philoſopher had obtained from his followers an equal acquieſcence in his tenets; the

the ethical parts * of which were, therefore, compriſed by him a book of *ſhort ſentences*, or *maxims moſt approved*, and that were learned by them, and committed to memory, like ſo many oracles. Not only while Epicurus lived, but long after his death, it was the boaſt of his ſect, that there was no diſagreement or altercation known amongſt them.

If it be the excellence and recommendation of philoſophy, that it holds forth doctrines, not only rational and juſt in contemplation, but ſuch as are ſalutary and beneficial to particular men, and to ſocieties; the ſyſtems of it that have moſt a tendency to thoſe ends, and are the leaſt liable to be perverted, appear to challenge, and to merit a preference: But that of Epicurus was, in this eſtimate, exceptionable, not to ſay unintelligible, and faulty, as it announced *pleaſure* to be the ſupreme, and the higheſt of all *expetible goods*. Hardly any word, from its ambiguity, required more to be defined, and to have its meaning guarded againſt miſconſtruction, than the term *pleaſure*; eſpecially when it was uſed, in a moſt important ſenſe, by a philoſopher, who meant to expreſs by it the ground and foundation of a moral ſcheme; or to point out what that ſpecial movement was, which, in the corporeal and mental affections of man, was to be regarded not only as the moſt predominant one, but alſo as the great principle by which the action or inaction of all the others was to be determined †. Epicurus avoided definitions, and pronounced them, generally, to be unneceſſary. We ſhall, afterwards, ſee how indifferently he acquitted himſelf in explaining his conception of pleaſure, and diſtinguiſhing it from that of the Cyrenaic philoſophers.

It was not, therefore, without ground, that the Stoics, and other ſects, took the alarm, and exclaimed againſt Epicurus's philoſophy, as equally

* In alio, vero, libro, ubi, breviter comprehenſis graviſſimis ſententiis, quaſi *oracula* edidiſſe ſapientiae dicitur, ſcribit his verbis; quae nota tibi profecto, Torquate, ſunt; quis enim veſtrum, non edidicit Epecuri κυριας δοξας, id eſt, maximeratas?—*Cicer. de Finib. lib. 2. p. 54.*

† Jam in altera philoſophiae parte, quae eſt quaerendi et diſſerendi; iſte veſter, plane, ut mihi videtur, inormis et nudus eſt; tollit definitiones, nihil de dividendo, ac partiendo docet, &c.—*Cic. de Fin. lib. 1. p. 42.*

corrupt with that of Ariſtippus, or of a ſimilar tendency. However it might be explained and qualified by gloſſes, the abuſe of his theory was moſt likely to prevail, and might pave the way to the total depravation of the Grecian manners. The leſſons learned in the ſchools of Greece, with reſpect to virtue, and the motives to it, were not, as in other countries, a matter chiefly of private concern: They were preparatory to, or went alongſt with, the diſcipline of a more public kind; which was that of the *gymnaſtic* exerciſes; inſtituted in the ſeveral republics, and enjoined to all their free citizens, at a certain age, to qualify them for military ſervice. The youth were early trained, and incited to excel in theſe exertions of their manly vigour, and to court the toil and labour attending them, from the proſpect of honour and fame reſulting to themſelves, together with an increaſed power of defence to the ſtate. With this diſcipline, the recommendation of eaſe and indolence, and the ſtudy to attain the moſt pleaſant ſenſations of body and mind, according to Epicurus's principles, were incompatible, and deſerved, in any ſhape, to be diſcredited, rather than approved.

To reſpect the inſtitutions or policy of his own, or any other country, is not, it may be ſaid, the buſineſs of a ſpeculative philoſopher; who acknowledges no other guides, in his theories, but nature and reaſon; and Epicurus's purpoſe was to ſhow what might be reckoned the end of human life, in general; to which, as their main object, men's actions were to have a conſtant reference. But, if the ſupreme good, held forth by him, was of a complex kind, participating as much of the bodily, as of the mental pleaſures, and virtue, inſtead of being regarded as, in itſelf, a ſufficient cauſe of happineſs, was ſuppoſed only to co-operate to it in a certain degree; it would appear that his ſcheme of man's life would be an ambiguous one, and leave looſe, and undetermined, which of two objects ſhould be preferred, and upon what motives its actions were principally to proceed. How far Epicurus's reaſoning removed this apparent ambiguity in his moral principles, and reduced them to conſiſtency, may be apprehended from the expoſition of them, ſubſequently to be given.

It is Seneca's remark, who, although a Stoic, makes many encomiums on Epicurus's virtues, that, if the ſchool of the latter produced great

great men *, it was to be aſcribed to the imitation of his ſober and temperate life, by his diſciples, more than to his doctrine. He obſerves, how pervertible into a vitious meaning his general principles were; notwithſtanding it was his avowed maxim, that *pleaſure was inſeparable from virtue* †. In regard to Epicurus's manners, and what was to be learned from them, his followers were left in no dubiety. The life he led, as to the gratification of the ſenſes, was not only abſtemious, but what any other perſon, except a philoſopher, who placed his pleaſure in his ſtudies, and the fame that might thence redound to him, would have accounted a painful one ‡. "Truly," ſays Seneca, "I cannot think otherwiſe of his ſupreme pleaſure, than as being ſomething too ſober and dry." He means, his reſolving felicity into the abſence of pain, and the poſſeſſion of tranquility. Yet this might be the higheſt enjoyment to one who had an infirm conſtitution, and ſuffered often acute pains, from the fixed diſtemper of the ſtone; under the violence of which he ended his life. While in the ſevereſt diſtreſs, for fourteen days ‖, he ſpoke and wrote of the counterpoiſe to it, which the recollection of his performances in philoſophy afforded. The appointments in his *Will*, which Diogenes Laertius has recorded at large §, teſtified with what hope, and even a degree of aſſurance, he looked forward to the continuance and enlargement of the renown he had acquired. His Garden was aſſigned over to Hermachus, deſtined his immediate ſucceſſor in teaching philoſophy, and to ſuch as he ſhould nominate to the ſame charge; and, after theſe, to the profeſſors of his doctrine in perpetuity. His birth day, as ſolemniſed in his life time, was to have, always an annual celebration; and, every month, a day of feſtivity was

* Epicuri non ſchola, ſed contubernium magnos homines fecit; Sen. oct. edit. tom. 1. pag. 212.

† Audit, enim, voluptatem a virtute ſeparari non poſſe; deinde, vitiis ſuis ſapientiam inſcribit, et abſcondenda profitetur. Ita non ab Epicuro impulſi luxuriantur, ſed vitiis dediti, &c.

‡ Nec aeſtimatur voluntas illa Epicuri (ita enim, Mehercules ſentio) quam ſobria et ſicca ſit; ibid. tom. 2. pag. 270.

‖ Cicer. Tuſcul. Quaeſt. lib. 5. pag. 190. § In Vita, ibid.

to be held to his and Metrodorus's memory, another to that of his brethren, and a third to Polyaenus.

The frequency of theſe feſtivals, without ſaying any thing of the vanity of them, rather ſupererrogated upon the cuſtoms of the Greeks *; and, if they ſerved the end of their deſtination, to promote, together with a veneration for Epicurus, the fellowſhip and harmony of his ſect, they alſo contributed to the abuſes committed by its *voluptuaries;* ſome of whom were baniſhed from Rome †, and others noted by Cicero as worthy of like puniſhment. Epicurus's death coincided with the ſecond year of the 127th Olympiad, and in the completion of the ſeventy-firſt of his age; a period which Zeno, the founder of the Stoic ſect, is reckoned to have ſurvived, from his longevity. He obtained a punctual conformity to his teſtamentary requeſts, by his friends and diſciples; and, alongſt with public honours to his memory, the houſes of his followers were generally adorned with his picture ‡; which they alſo engraved upon their cups and rings. The ſucceſſion of his ſchool is ſaid to have been continued, without interruption, under fourteen maſters, till near the Auguſtan age; and, for a courſe of time after that aera, to have had celebrity. How conſtant his application to ſtudy and compoſition was, may be eſtimated from the numerous treatiſes he publiſhed, amounting, according to Laertius, to three hundred volumes; when thoſe only were reckoned, in which no citation from any author was to be found. Of all his voluminous works, there remain no more than three epiſtles; one to Herodotus, of *Natural Things;* a ſecond to Pythocles, of *Meteors*, or things celeſtial; and another to Menaeceus, of *Morals;* and a few lines ſent by him, when dying, to his friends Idomeneus and Hermachus. The ſtile is plain and ſimple, and ſuch as he thought ſhould ever be adopted in philoſophical ſubjects, for the ſake of perſpicuity, and to avoid all obſcure expreſſions. It was much cenſured, however ‖; and, by Ariſtophanes, the grammarian, pronounced not inelegant

* Cicero animadverts upon their inſtitution as unbecoming a philoſopher.

† Ælian, lib. 9. Cicero in Orat. pro Mar. Caelia; et in Orat. poſt redit in Senatum. ‡ Cicero de Finib. lib. 5. p. 98. ‖ Sextus Empir. Adverſ. Mathem. lib. 1. init.

elegant only, but too mean and vulgar to be uſed in any work of erudition.

Particular mention ſhould now be made of Epicurus's chief aſſociates in philoſophy; of whom Metrodorus, a Lampſacene, is held to be firſt in reputation for ingenuity, and called by Cicero almoſt a ſecond Epicurus, and, at leaſt, his colleague in wiſdom. The titles of ſeveral of his works are mentioned by Laertius; and the value Epicurus ſet upon his character, marked as it was with ſingular magnanimity, under much bodily indiſpoſition. "I know all the avenues *," ſaid he, "of Fortune, by which ſhe can aſſault me; I have ſhut them up; and ſhe is unable to reach me with her noxious breath." We omit rehearſing the ſtory of his brother, Timocrates, who quitted Epicurus's ſchool, with reflections on its diſcipline; and which raiſed a duſt of ſcandal, that, in the authors who retail it, makes no more than a piece of obſcure, and unprofitable reading. Metrodorus would have undoubtedly been named ſucceſſor to the ſchool, by Epicurus's ſuffrage, had he not died before him. Hermachus, therefore, attained the appointment, who diſtinguiſhed himſelf by ſeveral publications. Polyaenus may be reckoned the next in reputation; who joined to his other knowledge that of Mathematics. Epicurus's ſervant, Mus, whom he liberated, had alſo ſuch a ſhare of genius as to be ranked amongſt the philoſophers, who roſe into fame from a ſervile condition. But thoſe who lived under Epicurus, and others of his ſect, attempted no more in philoſophy, than to copy ſtrictly the tenets preſcribed to them. It was, as Numenius obſerved †, even accounted, amongſt them, an impiety to do otherwiſe. Whatever any of them wrote was conſidered to be learned from him ‡, either directly, or by the help of his *auſpicious* principles of ſcience. So inclined to admire, and be delighted with his compoſitions, were the generality of his followers, that it is probable, no Grecian author tried, in proſe or verſe, ſuch

* Cicero. Tuſcul. Quaeſt. lib. 5. pag. 181. † Apud Euſeb. Praepar. Evan. lib. 14.

‡ Apud eos, quicquid diceret Hermachus, quicquid Metrodorus, ad *unum* referretur; omnia quae quiſquam in illo contubernio locutus eſſet, unius ductu, et auſpiciis dicta viderentur. Seneca in Epiſt. 33.

ſuch an illuſtration of his ſyſtem as Lucretius produced, in his ingenious and elaborate poem. Epicurus may, perhaps, be reckoned as much indebted to Gaſſendi for the vindication of his character *, and the revival of his fame, in modern times, as to any one who anciently undertook the taſk; when the facts to be proved were recent, and the teſtimonies to them leſs liable to be controverted. But we come, in the next ſection, to the introductory part of Epicurus's philoſophy.

SECT.

* Gaſſendus, de Vita et Moribus Epicuri.

SECTION II.

Introduction to Epicurus's Dialectic.—His Cononics, or Short Rules of Logic.—Examples of his Argumentation.—Eſtimate of his Reduced form of the Dialectic.

THE *end* of human life is, to live happily; and philoſophy is that exerciſe of the ſpeculative mind which enables us, without erring, to diſcover, attain, and enjoy *, the greateſt felicity in body and mind. Other ſtudies, that are foreign to this true wiſdom of life, may be left to idle men to purſue; but nature and reaſon equally engage, and perſuade us to turn our thoughts to it, as our chief object. Laudable and beneficial, alike, it may be accounted, in every age and condition of humanity †; to the young and the old, to the wealthy and the indigent. As it conſtitutes the well being of each of theſe ſituations of life, it becomes youth to learn early its precepts, and mature years not to forget them.

* Diogen. Laert. in Epiſt. ad Menaeceum. Sextus Empiric. Adverſus Mathem. lib. 10. pag. 466.

† The ſentiment of Horace, in the following verſes, may be thought to be borrowed from the Ethics of a founder philoſophy than that of Epicurus; yet, it muſt be owned to be exactly copied from his doctrine, expreſſed in the text:

Sic mihi tarda fluunt, ingrataque tempora, quae ſpem,
Conſiliumque morantur agendi gnaviter, id, quod
Æque pauperibus prodeſt, locupletibus aeque;
Æque neglectum pueris, ſenibuſque nocebit.—Hor. Epiſt. 1: lib. 1.

them. No one can be inſtructed too ſoon in what pertains to the rectification of his mind; or pretend, that the ſeaſon for it is either not yet arrived, or is paſt; unleſs he be of opinion, that the convenient time of his doing well, and being happy, falls alſo under one or other of theſe predicaments. But, to that philoſophy which is the proper ſtudy of man, he who is young will be eaſily encouraged, by the ſenſible good it procures him, and alſo, to perſiſt in that courſe of life proved to be advantageous; and the perſon in age will find his wonted ideas, on the moſt intereſting ſubjects, recur, with an influence ſtrongly felt, from their early and continued impreſſions: For, it is the peculiar excellence of philoſophy to communicate principles that cure the mind of anxiety, and baniſh the vain apprehenſions of futurity, which otherwiſe, in declining years, are apt to invade it. Happy, then, are thoſe to be accounted, who, from a fortunate temperature of body and mind, are diſpoſed, of themſelves, to cultivate the ſtudy of philoſophy; or, being the natives of a country where proper inſtructions in it may be found, are induced to learn its important leſſons; which, along with the wiſdom of them, render men the maſters of their ſentiments and affections.

In entering upon the ſtudy of philoſophy, or treating, ſcientifically, any of its parts, nothing ought to be more avoided, than either the admiſſion of any tenet upon frivolous grounds *, or ſupporting an opinion by fables; ſuch as are invented by the poets. A philoſopher ſhould himſelf feign nothing, nor retail, in his works, the fictions of others. As he profeſſes to ſearch after truth, his inveſtigation of it ſhould be carried on in a plain manner, without deviating into the fields of fancy, and placing what are only his own imaginations, or thoſe of others, on a level with the diſcoveries of truth †. In this reſpect, that philoſopher is not to be excuſed, who introduces into his account of the celeſtial ſpheres,

* Plutarch. de Audiendis Poetis.

† Epicurus here cenſures Plato, who, in the tenth book of his Republic, a work not ſtrictly philoſophical, but confeſſedly of a mixed kind, and decorated with ſome *allegories*, and traditional narratives, inſerts the ſtory, and the viſionary ſcenes, alluded to in the text. We find, in other parts of his works, a reſerve uſed, and even a diſcredit given to ſuch poetical or traditional fictions.

ſpheres, and the different fates ordained for ſouls, either firſt entering into bodies, or here departing from them, the fabulous ſtory of *Herus Armenius's* reſurrection from the dead, and the report of his *viſions* in theſe inexplorable regions; neither is Socrates's ironical manner of argumentation to be approved, and ſuch pretended ignorance made uſe of by philoſophers, as he thought allowable in his reaſonings with the Sophiſts *. In a proper judgment, rhetoric, and even grammar, as arts that may be abuſed, are not to attain, in philoſophical diſcourſes, more eſtimation than is due to perſpicuity of expreſſion in the one, and the concordance of words in the other. Inſtead of giving indulgence to *hyperboles* in any panegyrical work, or poetical ornaments in plain doctrine or narrative, the man of wiſdom knows what reſtrictions are to be preſcribed to theſe compoſitions that too readily and improperly take the poet's ſtrain, or the rhetorician's extravagant flouriſhes.

All philoſophy is reducible to two parts, Phyſics and Ethics; of which the latter has ſo much univerſality †, that it may be reckoned, in a certain ſenſe, comprehenſive of the other; ſince, its object being the attainment of a happy life, the ſtudy of *phyſiology* is rendered conſiderable, only as what may be found conducive to that end. Were we not diſturbed with apprehenſions about the natural phenomena around us; and eſpecially by the ſight of thoſe objects which appear to us to have an awful ſublimity; had we not our fears of death, as ſomething of the moſt intereſting conſequence; or, did we not form conjectures about the unknown ends of our deſires, and by what means the griefs reſulting from them may be mitigated; there would be little or no occaſion to make phyſics, or the explanations of natural things, a ſpecial ſtudy: But, apt to be impreſſed, as we are, with ſuch fears, and which, altho' unreal and vain, like thoſe conceived by children in the dark, yet, upon uncultivated minds, produce their diſagreeable effects, it becomes neceſ-

 ſary

* The ſtricture upon Socrates is not approved, but the propriety of his *irony* acknowledged, by Atticus, although an Epicurean, in the Dialogue of Cicero, de Claris Oratoribus, in the following terms: "Decet hoc, neſcio quomodo, illum *Socratem*, nec Epicuro, qui id reprehendit, affentior."

† Diogenes Laert. ibid.

ſary to turn our attention to the *nature of things*, ſo cloſely, that reflection and reaſon may enable us to emancipate ourſelves from them.

A third part of philoſophy, called the *dialectic*, notwithſtanding the oſtentation made of it in the ſchools *, is not to be aſſumed into uſe; ſince it has been found, in its pretenſions to cruſh the *briars* of ratiocination, to have cheriſhed the growth of a new ſpecies, and interlarded argument with cavils, or the empty ſounds of loquacity. It is ſufficient, for the purpoſes of reaſoning, to know and to follow, as the *phyſiologiſts* generally do, the uſage of clear and cuſtomary expreſſions. In forming a *canonic*, or general directory of reaſoning, it is neceſſary to conſider *truth* in two views; either as it is ſo *in fact*, or in the nature of things, or elſe, as the conceptions and notions of our minds are correſpondent to this *actual* ſtate of them. The former may be called the truth of *exiſtence*; and the latter that of *judgment*. Into theſe two are reſolvable all the objects of our knowledge; and the criterion of its truth is no otherwiſe to be diſcovered, than by attending to the ſeveral inſtruments and modes of our perceptions of objects. In perceiving things external, there is, firſt, to be conſidered the organ of ſenſe, which preſents the object to the mind; and, ſecondly, the internal ſenſation, or affection produced by it. Both theſe come under one denomination, that of a particular ſpecies of *ſenſe*. Whether the perception be of an object immediately preſent, or of one recollected, and out of the reach of the ſenſes, the mind does no more than contemplate a corporeal impreſſion; which, in the ſecond caſe, is diſtinguiſhed by the name of the *phantaſia*, or imagination. But the mental faculty goes further; even to the act of reaſoning; ſo that a perception being again and again ſurveyed by it, a diſtinctive notion of the thing perceived is formed in the mind, and adopted, by way of *anticipation*, for a rule of judgment, or general *idea* of that *claſs*, or ſpecial kind of our perceptions. With reſpect, however, to the appetites of ſenſe, or the affections and paſſions of the mind, no ſuch judgment of reaſon intervenes. That which is attractive to us, as pleaſure, and that which cauſes averſion, as pain, is ſubjected to

* Sextus Empiricus Adverſ. Logicos, lib. 7. pag. 139. et ſequent. Some reckoned, that Epicurus only rejected the verbal logic of the Stoics.

to no rational examination. The one and the other is felt, without the exerciſe of judgment; neither can the mind, by any operation or diſcuſſion, vary, in the leaſt, the contrary, and inconvertible impreſſions made by them. The *criteria*, upon which our faculty of judgment proceeds, may therefore, according to this account of the modes of our perception, be reckoned three. The organ of ſenſe, or the ſenſation ariſing from it, conſidered as one; the *anticipated* notion, or *idea* of the thing perceived; and the affection, or paſſion communicated from the object, to the mind.

Againſt thoſe who maintain, that, in the ſenſes, or the ſenſations produced by them, there is no evidence of truth, ſeveral obvious and juſt arguments may be uſed *. All ſenſe, barely, apprehends and receives impreſſions of objects, without being capable of altering their appearances, or reaſoning with reſpect to them. In the function of the ſenſes, there is no exertion of the judgment, or rational faculty. They only announce what exiſts; and leave to the mind the notion or conception of *what it is*. Whatever it be, its exiſtence, as an object, is inconteſtible; and againſt its reality there can be no appeal, either from one of the ſenſes to another, when each of them is of equal credit, or to reaſon, the operation of which muſt have its ground in the perceptions of ſenſe; and theſe muſt be held to be true; or all ratiocination with reſpect to them muſt be fallacious. The ſenſes, therefore, and the imagination, muſt be reckoned to afford the ſame evidence of truth, in whatever they repreſent to the mind, as is univerſally allowed to the primary affections of pleaſure and pain. If, in theſe, there be no deception, ſo neither is there any in the other, but what is corrigible, and can be rectified by the ſenſes themſelves, when adjuſted, and duly placed to obſerve their objects †. How there ſhould be a difference in

* Diogen. Laert. ibid. Sextus Empir. Adverſ. Mathem. lib. 7. p. 176.

† The doctrine of the credit due to the external ſenſes, here maintained, is no more than what was aſſerted by the Peripatetics and Stoics; and the arguments of the latter, in ſupporting it, are almoſt the ſame with thoſe uſed by Epicurus. Non enim is ſum (ſays Lucullus) qui quicquid videtur, tale dicam eſſe, quale videatur. —Meo autem judicio ita eſt maxima in ſenſibus veritas, ſi et ſani ſunt et valentes, et omnia removentur quae obſtant et impediunt. Cic. Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 4.

the appearance of the bulks, figures, and colours, of the ſame objects, when ſeen near, or at a greater diſtance, or in varied poſitions, and that ſounds, in like manner, ſhould be differently perceived, is, from obvious reaſons, intelligible, and can occaſion only a temporary error: But in neither caſe, is the report of the ſenſes a falſe one. He who, at a diſtant view, ſees a tower to be ſmall and round, which, as he draws nearer to it, appears large and ſquare, has not an erroneous viſion, but a true one, and ſuch as it ought to be, from the different impreſſion made on the organ of ſight; which, juſtly, receives the one preſented to it, and not another, that, upon a change of place, it may as properly admit. All the impreſſions of the ſenſes, and the phantaſia, are, therefore, realities, as much as our feelings of pleaſure and pain; and, as the former cannot be moved by nothing, they muſt be deemed, no leſs than the latter, to have their cauſes in nature, and ſuch efficients of their exiſtence, that their forms and appearances cannot be any other, or different from thoſe which they are actually, and at the time, perceived to be.

Yet, notwithſtanding all affections of the imagination may be thus evinced to be true, the opinions we form of them may make ſuch a difference, that ſome of them muſt be falſe, and others true. Opinion is ſomething ſuperadded to ſenſe. It is a judgment which obſervation, or experience enables us to make about what is exhibited by the ſenſes; and, being fallible, it may either be juſt or defective, founded in truth, or erroneous. We ought, therefore, to diſſent alike from two claſſes of philoſophers, thoſe who would perſuade us to doubt of all things, and others, who preſume that every thing may be certainly known by us. There are, ſurely, ſeveral phenomena in nature that may be accompliſhed various ways; as in the caſes of the riſing and ſetting of the ſtars, the eclipſes of the celeſtial bodies, and other meteors. To aſſert that they can be performed in no way but in one, is an abſurdity. Yet there are ſome maxims in phyſics which a wiſe man will not heſitate to adopt as invariably true; ſuch as that *out of nothing, nothing is made; the univerſe conſiſts of body and vacuum*; the principles of things are indiviſible; and

* Sext. Empir. ibid.

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Anticipation, or preconception, is ſuch a notion of an object which the ſenſes have preſented ‡, and the mind has attentively conſidered, as affords a fixed conception of it; ſo that, whether again beheld, or recalled to memory, we apprehend it to be that identical thing, and not another, and to have a form and appearance that diſtinguiſhes it from any other. Thus, after obſerving the figure and aſpect of a particular man, the mind ſets apart, as it were, that marked perception, and anticipates

* Judicio rerum in ſenſibus ponit (Epicurus) quibus, ſi ſemel aliquid falſi pro vero probatum ſit, ſublatum eſſe omne judicium veri et falſi putat. Cicer. de finibus, lib. 1.

† Sextus Empiricus, ibid. lib. 7. p. 177. ‡ Diogen. Laert. ibid.

the appearance of the bulks, figures, and colours, of the ſame objects, when ſeen near, or at a greater diſtance, or in varied poſitions, and that ſounds, in like manner, ſhould be differently perceived, is, from obvious reaſons, intelligible, and can occaſion only a temporary error: But in neither caſe, is the report of the ſenſes a falſe one. He who, at a diſtant view, ſees a tower to be ſmall and round, which, as he draws nearer to it, appears large and ſquare, has not an erroneous viſion, but a true one, and ſuch as it ought to be, from the different impreſſion made on the organ of ſight; which, juſtly, receives the one preſented to it, and not another, that, upon a change of place, it may as properly admit. All the impreſſions of the ſenſes, and the phantaſia, are, therefore, realities, as much as our feelings of pleaſure and pain; and, as the former cannot be moved by nothing, they muſt be deemed, no leſs than the latter, to have their cauſes in nature, and ſuch efficients of their exiſtence, that their forms and appearances cannot be any other, or different from thoſe which they are actually, and at the time, perceived to be.

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† Sextus Empiricus, ibid. lib. 7. p. 177. ‡ Diogen. Laert. ibid.

cipates as a thing known and comprehended by it, any ſubſequent exhibition of his image to the ſenſes or imagination; and not only does this internal pre-conception communicate the intelligence of the diſtinction of ſingular objects, but, by the mind's notice of a difference common to many of them, univerſal conception, including ſeveral ſpecies under one idea, is derived; and we as readily underſtand and pronounce ſuch an animated form to be human, or that of *man*, generally conceived, as we recogniſe *this* object of the ſenſes, to be Socrates, and *that* *, Plato. Without an anticipated notion in the mind, by means of which ſome inference may be made, we could not inquire, doubt, or reaſon about any thing. We could not even give a name to any perception of the ſenſes, or underſtand the meaning of its picture in the imagination. Anticipation, therefore, is, in a manner, the *defining* of a thing to us, and the *exordium* and principle of all rational diſcourſe. It preſents to the mind ſomething *firſt* evident, before, in annunciation, or reaſoning, any concluſion can follow. To prove that a man, and not another object, is beheld by us, we muſt antecedently have a certain conception of his form; otherwiſe we cannot pronounce what it is we ſee; and ſo every proof and demonſtration muſt have for its baſis a conception that is manifeſt, and about which we do not reaſon, but uſe it as the neceſſary ſtep to ratiocination, or the unfolding of ſomething not perſpicuous. In this proceſs, the ſcrupulous forms inſiſted on by the Dialecticians, are not requiſite to be obſerved; nor need we ſtudy, as they do, artificial modes of reaſoning and argument, as if all things were to be demonſtrated by them. If the anticipations, or what, in argumentation, are called the premiſes, be diſtinct and clear, as they ought to be, the concluſions of reaſon will be ſufficiently evident, although not ſcanned by their elaborate rules.

That demonſtration conſiſts in evincing, or bringing to light that which is unmanifeſt, from the aſſumption of a thing manifeſt, may be exemplified in the proof that there is a vacuum in nature. The exiſtence of a thing not evident is here to be proved †. We aſſume, for the deſiderated

* Sextus Empiric. lib. 10. p. 442.

† Ibid. Sextus, adverſ. Logicos, lib. 7. p. 176. et ibid. p. 280.

deſiderated evidence, a thing atteſted by the ſenſes, which is motion; and ſay, if there be motion, there is a vacuum, but there is motion; therefore there is a vacuum: Or the argument may be more explicitly thus ſtated: If there be not a vacuum, neither is there motion; for motion is inconſiſtent with an univerſal plenum; but it conſiſts with, and requires a vacuum; therefore the latter muſt exiſt. Here it is to be obſerved, that in the firſt form of the argument, the atteſtation, and *non-contradiction* of the evidence of ſenſe are the criteria, upon which we infer the exiſtence of a thing called in queſtion. The ſenſes teſtify that there is motion, and they do not contradict the ſuppoſition of a vacuum. Clear and unambiguous premiſes are therefore held forth; and one of them, which is a ſenſible perception, is aſſumed as the *medium*, or probable reaſon of the concluſion, or that the exiſtence of a vacuum is true. In the other form, the contradiction of the ſenſes, and the want of their evidence are made the rules of judging and determining the exiſtence of a thing to be falſe. It is not teſtified by the ſenſes, that there is no vacuum; and what is more, the oppoſite ſuppoſition of a plenum contradicts their perception of motion, which conſiſts not with it; and ſo, to prove a plenum we muſt remove, or hold as a non entity a thing only not manifeſt, and alſo ſubvert that which has the cleareſt evidence of its truth: Any opinion ſupported by ſuch argumentation carries along with it, a ſufficient proof of its falſehood. In reaſoning, the *medium* uſed ought properly to be a thing perceived by the ſenſes; but, in many caſes, it may not have any neceſſary connection with what is inferred. When the vaſt infinity of nature is conſidered, we muſt underſtand what is called the rule * of *equivalence* to hold, that is, if of two contraries, one exiſt, the other muſt be allowed to *be*. Hence is framed this argument, If the multitude of mortals be ſo great, that of immortals can be reckoned no leſs ſuch; and if things that deſtroy be numberleſs, thoſe which preſerve muſt alſo be infinite. We mention not here the ſeveral ways the conceived idea of a thing may be excited, and converted in the

* Summa, vero, vis infinitatis, ac diligenti contemplatione digniſſima eſt; eam eſſe naturam, ut omnia omnibus, paribus paria reſpondeant. Velleius Epicureus in Cicerone, De Natura Deorum, lib. 1. p. 203.

the imagination; as the account to be given in the Stoical Philoſophy of this proceſs is quite ſimilar to that of Epicurus; and we ſhall find ſome other of Zeno's ſpeculations upon the ſubject of ideas to correſpond with it. In concluding the article of anticipation, as it relates to reaſoning, it deſerves notice in what manner Epicurus, to the * ſurpriſe of the Dialecticians, foiled their moſt approved and fundamental maxim in argumentation; that, in a disjunctive propoſition, the ſubject of which is a future contingency, one of its contraries, either its affirmation or negation muſt be neceſſarily true; as when it is pronounced that Hermachus will either live, or he will die to-morrow. It is, ſaid Epicurus, not an inconteſtible propoſition; for, if either of its disjoined parts be taken ſeparately, it contains no certainty of what is to be; and, taken together, they can never prove that there is a neceſſity in nature, that Hermachus ſhall live, or ſhall die on any aſſigned day. Cicero, touching upon this argument, alledges, as an academic diſputant, in one paſſage †, that it appears to ſubvert all the dialectical reaſoning of the Stoics; and, in another ‡, he quotes it as an inſtance of the ignorance or impudence of the Epicureans; who were not aſhamed to aſſert, that an announced propoſition might be neither true nor falſe. In an aſſertion about the actual *being* or not *being* of a thing, the one, or the other, of theſe contrary predicaments muſt be applied, unleſs entity and non-entity be confounded. But with reſpect to the future and contingent exiſtence of an event, the mind can only conceive its poſſibility or impoſſibility, without being capable of judging certainly, whether it will enſue or not; and, therefore, the aſſertion can neither be affirmative or negative. Yet, in Logics, it may be properly aſked, How that can be called an aſſertion, which does not affirm or deny any thing?

To the affection, or paſſion, communicated from the object to the mind, no other criterion of judgment is competent, but that which is taken

* Vide, ſays Cicero, quam ſit cautus is, (Epicurus) quem iſti tardum putant. Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 4. p. 29.

† Ibid. ‡ O admirabilem licentiam, et miſerabilem inſcitiam diſſerendi! ſi enim aliquid in eloquendo, nec verum, nec falſum eſt; certe id verum non eſt. Quod autem verum non eſt, qui poteſt non falſum eſſe; aut quod falſum non eſt, qui poteſt non verum eſſe. Cic. de Fato, p. 307.

taken from the affection, or paſſion itſelf, indicating a ſenſe of pleaſure or pain *; and of the one, a deſire, and towards the other, an averſion. It is, becauſe pleaſure is pleaſure, and pain is pain, that theſe two affections are to be regarded as, in themſelves, the abſolute motives to all liking or diſliking of objects, either of ſenſe, or the imagination. This will be explained more particularly in the *Ethics*. Here it may only be premiſed, that, ſince in life, pain as well as pleaſure muſt be encountered, a wiſe man, in any voluntary admiſſion of the former, or reſignation of the latter, will look for, and endeavour to procure, a compenſation to himſelf. How this will be beſt obtained, the following canons may be taken as a general directory. *He will embrace all pleaſure, to which no pain is annexed: He will ſhun all pain connected with no pleaſure: Where pleaſure hinders the acceſs of a greater degree of it, or produces that of a greater pain, it will be avoided by him: In caſe a heavier pain can be removed, or an enlargement of pleaſure be procured, by means of the former, it will be embraced by him.* The canons Epicurus added, reſpecting the uſe of words in diſcourſe, being comprehended in what has been ſaid of his recommendation of plain and unambiguous diction, require no particular rehearſal.

Such, then, was Epicurus's model of the dialectic; ſo contracted, indeed, and ſtripped of what he accounted its vain parade, and frivolous rules, that it was thought, in the ſchools, undeſerving of the name of a theory of the art of ratiocination. It had, however, conſiderable merit; and was a well aimed and hardy blow at the ſcepticiſm of Pyrrho, and the Academics, and alſo a juſt reprobation of the dialectical perplexities. It was not a ſyſtem of Logics; it was not a ſet of rules for confining argumentation to one tract; it did not pretend to give a demonſtrative proof to thoſe, who ſaid they had not a notion of demonſtration. While, without the books of Ariſtotle being publiſhed, his diſciples endeavoured to bring all ratiocination to the ſyllogiſtic form †; and, while the Stoics, adverſe to ſcepticiſm, in fact, promoted it, by daſhing their logics with the moſt futile diſtinctions of ideas and words; Epicurus took

* Diogen. Laert. ibid. pag. 281.

† Sextus Empiricus, ibid. de Dæmon.

the opportunity of condemning, and, in a great meaſure, ſhaking off theſe ſtudied fetters of knowledge, and preſcribed the criteria of true and falſe opinion, and, conſequently, of juſt argument, that have been mentioned, and beyond which he thought it unneceſſary to ſtretch the proceſs of the Dialectic. It appears from Sextus Empiricus *, and other authors, that Democritus had his *Canons*, or rules of judging, betwixt a clear and obſcure knowledge of things; which, from the hints of them given, nearly coincide with thoſe of Epicurus. Originality, therefore, either in the name, or the import of what he called his *Canonics*, cannot be aſcribed to the latter. Their narrow compaſs and ſimplicity, without conſidering their evidence, reproached, or ridiculed the accumulated labours and controverſies of the other ſchools in the theory of logics. Appendages, as they were, of his phyſical ſyſtem, and helps to his moral one, their truth was liable to be ſcrutiniſed upon the principles of theſe ſciences. Taken in connection with the one or the other, the *Canonics* might gain, or loſe credit, according as the theory of each appeared to be valid, or otherwiſe. Epicurus found not in them that releaſe from diſputation they were calculated to procure. Notwithſtanding their barrier, he was dragged into controverſy, about ſeveral of his tenets, or their conſequences, upon the dialectical ground, embarraſſed and fallacious as it was rendered by Zeno's ſubtile arguments, refined upon and improved by Chryſippus. His Atomical Syſtem, now to be brought forward, was not ſo much the ſubject of contention, as ſome principles of theology and morals involved in it, which led to other points of obſcure and metaphyſical diſcuſſion.

SECT.

* Ibid. page 164.

SECTION III.

Heads, or Summary of what is comprehended in the Science of Phyſics.—Illuſive argumentation about the All or Whole of things.—Variations of Epicurus's Atomical Theory from that of Democritus.—Imitations of his Stamina of Bodies, adopted by Modern Corporealiſts.—Phyſical Analyſis of the Human Soul.—The Epicurean Divinities.—Apologies for his Theology by Modern Authors.—State of their arguments in his defence.—The queſtion about the Origin of Natural and Moral Evil treated by them.

THE ſcience of *Phyſics*, which may rather be denominated *Phyſiology*, has for its object the things of nature, and is explicable, by rational diſquiſitions, and diſcourſe with reſpect to them *. For inſtruction to the minds, and aid to the memories, of thoſe who would apply themſelves to this ſpeculation, without having intention, or leiſure, to deſcend into all its particulars, it may be proper and uſeful to ſet before them a *compendium* of it, under ſeveral heads; whence may be underſtood its great extent, and the variety of diſcuſſions it includes. Theſe heads are reducible to four; the *univerſe*, called alſo the *whole*, the *all*, or the *ſum* of things; the *world*, or that portion of the univerſe viſible to men; of which, as comprehending the circumference of the heavens, and the ſtars, there may be, in the nature of things, numberleſs other patterns. Next is to be reckoned the *earth*, and whatever it contains, placed in the middle or lower part of the world; and, laſtly, thoſe parts

* Diogen. Laert.

of nature, which, in reſpect of the earth, have inferiority and ſublimity, ſuch as the air or atmoſphere contiguous to it, and the ſuperior region of *aether*, or fire.

Notwithſtanding what Epicurus had ſo ſpeciouſly premiſed, about the unbiaſſed ſtudy of philoſophy, and aſſuming no hypotheſis upon frivolous or traditional grounds, he could not, it ſeems, avoid advancing the old equivocal argument of the philoſophers, that the univerſe was infinite and immoveable. He ſupported the firſt poſition, by alledging that its extremity cannot be determined. Why? Becauſe it comprehends within it all place of body, or ſpace, which renders it infinite. But how is it proved to be under that predicamentt? It is neceſſarily ſo, and cannot be otherwiſe, *becauſe* it is the *univerſe*. This was the illuſive and puerile argument, which many of the ancient philoſophers, both metaphyſical and phyſical, uſed in maintaining the infinity of what they called the Univerſe; when conſidered abſtractly, and without reference to any ſpecial conception of its nature, or ſubſtance. But exiſtence, in the abſtract, can have no one attribute applicable to it, more than another; and the univerſe, or world of being, muſt be imagined to be of a certain nature, before any thing can be affirmed or denied with reſpect to it. Yet the philoſophers, who found it eaſieſt to compile their ſyſtems metaphyſically, and by help of words reducible to no determined meaning or definition, avoided ſaying what they conceived the ſubſtance of the univerſe to be; and, therefore, readily inveſted it with whatever attributes they pleaſed. They pronounced it infinite, although human language could hardly find any name or appellative for it, but what was of a definite ſignification, and held forth a circumſcribed idea: For ſuch, notwithſtanding their generality, are the terms the *univerſe*, the *all*, the *whole*, or the *ſum* of things. They ſignify no more than a conception of ſomething ſo extended or immenſe, that, to it, no addition is to be made. The *infinity of things*, that neither denotes, in a phyſical or metaphyſical ſenſe, genus or ſpecies, or difference of condition, appears to be the only epithet expreſſive of the world's being infinite.

When the emphatic term, *whatever is*, came to be uſed, by the diſciples of the Pythagorean and Platonic ſchools, to ſignify the univerſe,

or

or *all* of things, it appeared grofsly abfurd to fay, *whatever is, is infinite;* and, when the fubftance of the world was declared to be body, the application of the epithet was evidently incompetent; as a quantity infinite was inconceivable, and body could never be imagined of fuch extenfion, as to leave no room, or place beyond it. Empty fpace was therefore to be brought forward; or elfe the world could not, even in idea, have infinity afcribed to it. While fome philofophers pronounced it to be nothing, or only an idea of the mind, it was admitted, in the theories of Democritus and Epicurus, to be not merely an *adjunct*, or accident to body, but an *ens* that fubfifted by itfelf, of a fpecies different from *corporiety*, and conceivable without any connection with magnitude. And thus, the two moft diftinguifhed materialifts of antiquity could not hold forth their theory without affigning a real exiftence to fpace, abfolutely requifite as it feemed to be, not for place of body only, but for its local motion. Being unfolid and penetrable, it had not the eflential properties of body, which was defined by Epicurus to be, that which was tangible, and made refiftance to any impreffion. Contemplated by itfelf, they were forced to reckon it a fort of *incorporeal;* a conception quite inconfiftent with their fcheme of the world. As thofe philofophers, who held the univerfe to be *a plenum*, were much perplexed about the movement of bodies in it; fo it proved difficult to fuch of them as fcepticifed about *incorporeal* being, to difpofe decently of fpace. They, generally, held it to be nothing more than an idea; upon the argument as old as Zeno Eleates; and of which, indeed, as has been mentioned, he was accounted the inventor. But, fpecious as it is, it muft feem ftrange, if that, without which none of the great bodies in the univerfe could move, in the manner we now know many of them certainly do, is only to be reckoned a *non-entity*. But, in Epicurus's philofophy, it was aflumed as a principle no lefs real than body itfelf; for, as has been obferved in the dialectical part, if the one had the teftimony of the fenfes for its exiftence; the other, although unmanifeft to them, was proved by motion taking place; a thing equally perceptible to them. Of the two principles, *body*, and a *vacuum*, he maintained the univerfe to confift; and, between them, he afferted there was no other in the nature of things.

As,

As, according to the maxim commonly received among the philoſophers, that, *out of nothing, there could come nothing;* the *all* of things could have no beginning; ſo, neither could mutability, or terminable exiſtence, be aſſigned to it. The parts of which it was conſtituted being moveable, might undergo changes; but theſe, bearing no proportion to the immenſity of the *whole*, could not affect its conſtant and perpetual duration. Yet, if all the parts, or any given diviſions of them, were changeable, what power or virtue could be imagined in the whole to exempt it, in endleſs time, from mutation? To this it was replied, that matter was not infinitely diviſible, as ſome philoſophers alledged, who abſurdly conceived that there could be infinite parts in a finite body. How much more reaſonable was it to ſuppoſe, that its diviſion terminated in its ſmalleſt imaginable particles; which, being the utmoſt ſections of magnitude, may be called *atoms*. Their minute parts being incapable of ſeparation, they might be reckoned infrangible. If, then, allowing a ſmall difference in their magnitude, they ſhould be accounted, although not infinite in their figures, yet, beyond comprehenſion, divers, as round, oval, ſtraight, crooked, plain, cornered, angular, hooked, and of other ſhapes that have no name; they may, being infinite in number, and nearly ſo in their various kinds, be held the original ſtamina of bodies; and, by means of their motions in empty ſpace, ſufficient for the formation and contexture of all corporeal ſubſtances in the earth and in the heavens. After the full expoſition given of the Atomical hypotheſis, in the Phyſics of Democritus, we ſhall not now again inſiſt upon the improprieties of the *poſtulata*, and its theoretical abſurdities, further than bringing into view ſome of them, not particulariſed, and others of moral importance. Here it may be obſerved, in general, upon the hypotheſis of the atoms exiſting eternally, that, ſince it was neceſſary to ſuppoſe that ſomething always was, to avoid the inconceivable production of any thing from nothing, the obvious dictate of reaſon, in the contemplation of ſuch an eternal principle, the cauſe of all other things, is that, to it, appertains abſolute perfection. Neceſſary exiſtence muſt involve this idea; for, ſo far as perfection is an intelligible attribute of being, it can be aſcribed alone to that which ever was, of itſelf, one and the ſame being; and not to any thing contingent,

generated

generated in time, and, therefore, imperfect and mutable. That the generality of the ancient philoſophers, with few exceptions, deviated from this rational idea, or never at all entertained it, is too apparent from the hiſtory of their theories of the world's generation; in which they introduced, as eternal principles, *chaos*, the confuſion of all the elements, or ſuch partitions of them as they pleaſed. The theoriſts, properly called Phyſical, thought themſelves as well entitled to this liberty; and, therefore, conſidered it as the proper diſplay of their ingenuity, to ſhow how certain quantities of matter or body, ſuch as Epicurus's atoms, deſcribed to be infrangible, and diverſely figured, but deſtitute of all other properties, and having no connection of exiſtence with one another, might both be, and act, as eternal principles, and generate worlds after worlds, fortuitouſly, and, often, in the regular and orderly forms of the heavens and the earth; ever beheld, by rational creatures, with admiration, and which aſſiſt, at leaſt, if they do not excite, what Epicurus reckoned men's natural anticipations of deities, or divine powers, in the univerſe.

Having ſtated, arbitrarily, that the principles of bodies might be found in the ſections of bodies, as if their diviſion could be reduced to a fixed point, Epicurus's next ſpeculation reſpected the motion of his atoms. Leucippus and Democritus had aſſigned to them a kind of inherent animation; but he, with the ſhew of more phyſical knowledge, repreſented them as having a tendency to motion, and actually moved, from their *gravity*. But how could this principle take place; when, according to what was admitted in his hypotheſis, there was no *upwards* or *downwards* in the infinite void, or any conceivable point in the univerſe, to which they could gravitate? Inſtead, therefore, of any proof of their having weight, he ſubſtituted another *poſtulatum*; equivalent to begging the whole queſtion about their motive power. It was neceſſary, he ſaid, for the ſake of the theory, to ſuppoſe an *upper* region, from which the atoms had been eternally deſcending, like drops of rain, in a perpendicular direction, and that with ſo much velocity, and uniformity of their motion, as to ſweep down, in an inſtant of time, over any the greateſt aſſignable ſpace, when, in the *vacuum*, nothing obſtructed

their

their courſe *. But alledged to move thus, in parallel lines, the material point, of their coming into colliſion or contact with one another, was rendered impoſſible. To correct this error, he was obliged to feign the *clinamen* of the atoms, or their leaſt poſſible declination from the ſtraight line, without ſaying how they came by it, in direct contradiction to his aſſumed phyſical principle: Still, however, the forced ſuppoſition availed not to effectuate the concourſe of the atoms; for, if the declination was general, and equal amongſt them all, they could as little attain it in any bent direction as in a perpendicular one; and, if ſome of them took the one, and ſome the other, there was then a ſort of different *office* doing among them; an abſurdity ſufficient to reprobate the whole theory. When joined, as it was, with the groſs imagination, that the liberty of human actions depended upon the deflection of the atoms from the ſtraight line, it muſt be owned, that no fiction of the poets could exceed it †. That an hypotheſis, ſo replete with errors, underwent ridicule, as well as ſerious confutation, need not be ſurpriſing. Its credit, however, was ſtill ſupported, in a conſiderable degree, by the inveſtigators of the principles of bodies, in oppoſition to the doctrine of *occult* qualities; which taking its riſe, chiefly, from the Ariſtotelian philoſophy, appeared to throw an impenetrable cloud over phyſiology in the ſchools.

Hence the modern Atomiſts, in imitation of Democritus and Epicurus, continued to invent various theories, for proving the world a ſelf-moving machine. By Deſcartes, the atoms were reſolved into a *ſubtile matter*, which he ſuppoſed to be created by the Deity, with a quantum of motion impreſſed upon it, and conſtantly maintained by him ‡. Excluding

* Debent, nimirum, praecellere mobilitate
Et multo citius ferri, quam lumina ſolis,
Multiplexque loci ſpatium, tranſcurrere eodem,
Tempore; quo ſolis pervolgant fulgura coelum.—*Lucret. lib.* 2.

† ——— Ne res ipſa neceſſum,
Inteſtinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis
Et devincta, quaſi cogatur, ferre, patique
Id facit exiguum clinamen principiorum.—*Ibid.*

‡ Renat. Carteſ. Princip. Philoſophiae, Pars 3tia, Artic. 48.

cluding a vacuum in nature, he endeavoured to ſhow, that, by his particles of matter propelling one another, circularly, certain *vortices* would be formed, having ſuch action, that the ſpheres of the earth, and the heavens might be produced by them. His ſcheme of the world's conſtitution, in this manner, was applauded as ſurpaſſing, in ingenuity, every former corporeal theory. It was generally thought to be invincible by argument; when the more juſt knowledge of the laws of motion, in fluids, aſcertained by experiments, and the demonſtration of a vacuum, given in the Newtonian philoſophy, ſubverted the credit of all his laboured proofs, and left his *vortices* without a *ſtanding* in the operations of nature. There is ground for believing that Sir Iſaac Newton conjectured, that the elements of all bodies may have been corpuſcles, or atoms of matter, actually divided by the *firſt cauſe;* ſo that, from their hardneſs, the natural elements compoſed of them might be durable. This opinion of the incomparable geometrician and philoſopher, amounts to no more than what we find expreſſed by him, with reſpect to a ſimilar queſtion, in a note upon the text of his optics, where he ſignifies, with modeſty, his thought, or apprehenſion, that a ſubtile fluid might be the cauſe of the gravitation of bodies: So unpreſumptuous, and diffident, was he, in aſſigning, poſitively, the primary, although ſubordinate, cauſes of the works and operations diſcernible in the world of God. Yet ſome geniuſes there have been, and are, by whom Epicurus's theory of the origin of the world, or matter, ſome how or other, myſteriouſly agitated, is held ſatisfactory, and all that they deſire to know, in a point, of all others the moſt important, and worthy the utmoſt attention of the human mind.

The next article to be exhibited, of Epicurus's phyſiology, ſhould be that, in which he endeavours to aſſign the *ſtamina* of the human ſoul; which he reſolves into four ſpecies of corpuſcles, of exceeding tenuity; one *fiery*, another *aërial*, a third *flatuous*; and a fourth, to which no name could be given *, on account of its ſubtility, or its efficacy being no fur-

* Quarta quoque his, igitur, quaedam natura neceſſe eſt,
Attribuatur, ea eſt omnino nomine expers,
Qua neque mobilius quicquam nec tenuius extat.—*Ibid.*

ther explained, than by ſaying it cauſed the ſenſitive faculty in all animals. Its weight was computed to be no more in the bodily frame, than the ſpirit in wine; although its extenſion was equal to the whole capacity of the body. But, notwithſtanding this contexture of parts, the ſoul was not completed, without having *intellect* or *mind* conjoined with it. Diſtinguiſhed from the ſenſitive or animal ſoul by its faculty of perception, when moved by the ſenſes, it thinks, underſtands, and performs all the functions of reaſon. It was reckoned to be void of affection and paſſion; or at leaſt, to receive the impreſſion of either in a way peculiar to itſelf. It was even ſuppoſed to have more of animal life than the ſenſitive ſoul; as it ſubſiſted in the amputation of the limbs around it, when life in them departs with the extinction of the intellect. We need not farther unfold this complicated proceſs of the atoms, in patching up the compound ſubſtance of the human ſoul; which required them to be refined, and ſublimated, beyond all power of conception, before one glimpſe of thought could be ſuppoſed to ariſe from their operation.

There is, however, ſome invention allowed to Epicurus, or rather Lucretius, in accounting for the action of external objects upon the human ſenſes, and the perception of them by the ſoul compoſed of atoms; which, although no maſter-piece of ingenuity in phyſics, can hardly be omitted in the ſketch of their theory. Obſerving that certain *effluvia*, as ſmoke, or vapour, iſſued from fire, water, and compoſitions of earth; it was thought by them a probable hypotheſis to maintain, that thin images, or pellicles, (called by Lucretius *ſimulacra*, and *cortices*), were detached from all bodies, and made an incurſion upon the ſenſes, which were always ready to admit them. It was ſuppoſed that the atoms, however much combined, were ever in ſome ſtruggle to diſengage themſelves, and that they would with more facility eſcape from the exterior than the internal parts of bodies, which yet they were ſeen to do; and being only contextures of ſimple atoms, that they might ſo eſcape, as to preſerve the order and arrangement they had in the extremities of the bodies. Too aerial to be diſcerned by the eye, the *ſimulacra* were capable of ſhooting off inceſſantly, and alſo, of being conſtantly followed by others; while the medium of the air, through which they paſſed, would

would be little or no impediment to their celerity. By hard bodies, as wood, and ſtone, and others untranſparent, they might be ſhivered, or broken in pieces; but, penetrating through all porous and pellucid ones, they would have a full influx upon the human organs of ſenſe, and thoſe of all animals. Carrying the various dies of the bodies from whence they came, they would give the tincture of them to the viſual organs, and ſo cauſe the perception of colours. A nice examination of this theory may be ſpared. There is but little occaſion to put phyſical queſtions to expoſe its many fallacies. How we are to underſtand that the *effigiae*, or ſimilar ſurfaces, were to be found in ſeveral continued, and entire folds in the bodies, or elſe, in the inſtant of their flight, get into their forms, and how the bodies themſelves did not, from their conſtant fluxion, decreaſe, and vaniſh altogether, it is impoſſible to ſay. When objects are ſeen, ſounds heard, ſmells perceived, all at the ſame time, is it credible that there ſhould be no interference among the *ſimulacra*, or that their reception by the ſenſes ſhould be ſo eaſy and equal, as to produce no broken or disjointed impreſſions? The phyſical poet, after the greateſt ſtrains of his imagination upon theſe points, finds his taſk not half performed. Images were ſtill awanting to correſpond to thoſe of the mind, which had no repreſentations in nature. The viſions in ſleep, too, when the organs of ſenſe are hardly acceſſible, demanded a particular explication. For ſuch phenomena, he feigns a generation of floating images; one ſet of them ſpontaneouſly formed in the air, like the varying ſhapes of the clouds, and another engendered by the accidental rencounter of the different *ſimulacra* of real bodies; from the coheſion of which maſſes, the monſtrous forms of giants, centaurs, and other chimeras, might be conceived to be produced. The fourth book of the *De Natura Rerum* is almoſt entirely taken up with reſolving theſe appearances; while, by what means the pellicles find their way, unſhivered, into the breaſt, the reputed ſeat of the ſoul, or how their impreſſions are retained, or repelled, recalled, or baniſhed, at the will of the mind, are points either omitted, or what preſent difficulties unſurmountable by any phyſical ſolution. The figure Lucretius's genius makes in the attempt may indeed be a monitory, to the

moſt conceited of their phyſical ſcience, how diſadvantageouſly they would engage in the argument, upon ſimilar grounds.

It appears that the corporealiſts conſidered Epicurus's analyſis of the human ſoul as incautiouſly minute, and what aſcribed ſo much to the intellectual part as to give it, ſingly, all the eſſential properties of an immaterial principle; although not capable of exerting them, but by means of the body, and its organs. It was not, therefore, generally acquieſced in; but Diceearchus's treatiſe upon the ſoul, as Cicero informs us, obtained ſuperior reputation amongſt the Epicureans and Academics. His tenet was, that, being material, it had no particular poſition, either in the brain or breaſt, or any one part of the body, but was equally diffuſed through its whole frame; ſo that it became ſight in the eyes, hearing in the ears, ſmelling in the noſtrils, taſting in the palate, and ſenſation in every part. All the ingenuity of this hypothetical argument may be ſaid to conſiſt in its being, as Socrates alledged ſome of Heraclitus's poſitions were, of the unintelligible kind. It ſuppoſes a ſpecies of matter, undeſcribed, but called *ſoul*, by means only of its extenſion in a body with organs, to be ſo diverſified, as to acquire faculties utterly incompatible with any conceptions that can be formed of the action or powers of material particles, however modified or ſubtilized. It would confound the intelligent faculty with the corporeal organs; and, becauſe the eye is ſaid to ſee, the ear to hear, the body to feel, imply, that there reſides in each of them a diſtinct perceptive faculty, of which, notwithſtanding their fine organization, none of them are conſcious, no more than the ſkin of the body knows that it has ſenſation. It aſſumes, that the individuality of perception, or that unity of thought which characteriſes an idea in the human mind, may be accounted for, from a material *percipient*, extended, or divided into parts. It contradicts the experience we have, that the intelligent faculty is not diſtributed, like animal ſenſation, through the body, but confined to a particular part. It can give no account of the ſoul's command over the body in all its exterior motions; which, without mentioning its other peculiar endowments of reflection, reaſon, and judgment, makes it preſumable that the body is fitted up, organically, to be ſubſervient to the agency of this ſuperior principle; a power that is, accordingly,

cordingly, exerciſed by it, with underſtanding, will, and intention, in all its purpoſes.

Although the diſſolution of the human ſoul at the death of the body was the natural conſequence of Epicurus's theory of its compoſition, Lucretius has ſubjoined other arguments for its mortality, of the vulgar kind; which, however, may be ſuppoſed to operate more powerfully on common underſtandings, than ſuch as are ſtrictly philoſophical, or moral. The imbecillity of the mind, in the immature age of the body, its ſeeming advancement in vigour, alongſt with the corporeal frame; its various affections, from the indiſpoſition, or ſoundneſs of the bodily organs, and the gradual decline of its powers upon the accumulation of years; are urged as inconteſtible evidences of its material and diſſoluble compoſition. That the ſoul, connected with, and under fixed laws of union with the body, ſhould be affected with the ſtate of its aſſociate, and be in a conſtant degree of ſympathy with it, is ſurely nothing more than what was, in every view of ſuch a combination, to be expected; nor is it conceivable how it ſhould be otherwiſe; not only in reſpect of the changeful frame of the body, but the limited operation of the immaterial principle. Its perceptions, ſo far as they reſpect external objects, are, as we experience, confined to a particular place of recognition, from impreſſions made on a material *ſenſorium*, and therefore liable to be diſturbed by accidents to the bodily organs. There are no other avenues, by which the mind can be approached, but by the motions excited in the ſenſes; nor can any other pictures of outward things be formed by it, different from thoſe admitted by, or retained in, the paſſive ſenſory. Such as theſe are, the ſoul is obliged from the law of the human nature, to conſider them to be true; and although, in certain caſes of their confuſion, or imperfect traces, it endeavours to rectify their irregularity, or ſupply their defects, every effort may prove ineffectual; and when it is ſo, the ſoul muſt yield to deranged and falſe perceptions. In ſudden ſhocks of nature, the memory of them is loſt; and, as if we were to be taught, not to be ſurpriſed at this ſubſiding of the human faculties, the reverſion of them is made a matter of experience; when, in ſleep, the regiſter of them being obſcured, the fantaſtic imagery of dreams, and viſions of the night, are preſented to us. But, without pretending to be

preciſe

preciſe in an argument that reſpects the myſterious union of the ſoul and the body, we may juſtly obſerve, that, were the human mind a compound of atoms, or diſſoluble matter, and not of a ſubſtance indiviſible, there would enſue in the tranſports of anger and rage, a thouſand times oftener than is beheld, not only acceſſes of inſanity, but total deſtruction and death to the corporeal frame. The immaterial principle may well be reckoned the *vis abdita*, that ſecret power of conſervation, as far as it can be exerted in the mortal nature of the body; and without the ſuppoſition of which, neither Epicurus, nor his poetical diſciple, found that a phyſical explication of the human conſtitution could be given.

It may be added, that the decay of the mental faculties in old age, is, by no means, ſo verified from experience as is commonly ſtated by the objectors to the immateriality of the ſoul. There are many teſtimonies to the contrary afforded in hiſtory; and of which the enumeration by Cicero *, although a ſignal one, may be reckoned no more than equal to what may be found in every age. That the vigour or decline bears a proportion to the former habits of body and mind, may well be allowed: And that both may be undone by unſuitable and vicious uſages. This is conſiſtent with the moral ſcheme of human life. But moſt remarkable and ſtriking are the many examples of the powers of reflection and reaſon being, in the advanced years of a virtuous life, prolonged to its utmoſt ſtage. What is truly called the *man*, is ſeen ſo entire, that any diſciple of Lucretius may find it difficult † to conclude with him, that the rational ſoul, as well as the animal life, diſſolves like ſmoke in the air. The axiom, generally admitted in philoſophy, oppoſes the concluſion, that any thing having being can, without the act of omnipotent power, go to nothing. Much leſs may that principle in the univerſe, which is the ſuperior one, and has activity, and intelligence in itſelf,

* De Senectute.

† ——Ergo, diſſolvi, animae quaeque natura,
Oportet ut fumus in altas aeris auras, &c.—Lucret. lib. 5.
What was eaſier to ſay than that the ſoul being no more than a compound of atoms, would, at the death of the body, be diſſolved into them?

ſelf, ceaſe to be; but, on the contrary, as every eſſence in nature has its deſtination, it muſt be judged to have the continuation of its exiſtence in a proper and appointed place. We now proceed to the exhibition of Epicurus's theology.

It was a fundamental doctrine, in his philoſophy, that, between *atoms* and a void, the only two principles in the univerſe, there was no middle, or third nature to be found. Yet this, it appears, hindered him not from aſſerting the eternal exiſtence of beings, having certain divine, or godlike attributes. For ſuch a bold ſtride over his general principle, he advanced an argument no leſs ſingular than incongruous with his theory *. It was requiſite, he ſaid, when the infinite variety of images or perceptions of objects, fortuitous and periſhable, was conſidered to admit a ſpecies of ever permanent and indiſtructible ones; in order that, two ſuch oppoſite exiſtences being found in the univerſe, the whole might be brought to a balance. He ſupported this reaſon, foreign as it was to his phyſiology, by a more decent and intelligible one; that of the general perſuaſion and belief entertained among mankind, in all ages and nations, with reſpect to the exiſtence of Gods, or divine powers. This conſent he brought under his firſt criterion of truth, *anticipation*; but left it unperſpicuous, whether the common opinion had its ſource in the anticipated notion, or the latter its origin from the former. He alledged, however, that it could not be the obſervation of the orderly return of the ſeaſons, and the regular courſe of the heavenly bodies which excited in men the conceptions of deities; for, ſaid he, prepoſterouſly, how could they aſcribe theſe wonderful appearances to the Gods, without knowing previouſly that there were ſuch beings? Yet allowing, contrary to the known fact, that they had the notion of deities from *anticipation*, he could hardly deny, that when ſo known, men generally admitted them to be the rulers of the elements, and adored them as the cauſes of the phenomena in nature. But how were they, who had no intercourſe with the world, diſcovered to mankind? They were found by them, in moſt queſtionable ſhapes; in *apparitions* of them in ſleep and dreams. Of the human form they ſeemed, but

* Diogen. Laert. ibid. Cicero de Natura Deorum, lib. 1.

but far more majeſtic in their ſize and attitude; and although ſaid to be peaceable in their motions, they were, in the dormant ſtate of the ſenſes, apt enough to impreſs terror upon the imagination. Yet of theſe fantaſtic images, which, perhaps, were never beheld by any, even in their wildeſt dreams, Epicurus had the effrontery to affirm, that men, in their waking thoughts, made deities. In ridicule of any rational evidence of the being of the Gods, the extravagant aſſertion may be underſtood to be meant, but moſt unſuitably by him; who allowed not even the Socratic irony to paſs in philoſophic reaſoning, and gave it as a rule, that no opinion ſhould be ſupported by fictions, either our own, or thoſe of others.

The conception of the nature or ſubſtance of Epicurus's *deities*, was no leſs abſurd than his forged account of the impreſſions of their exiſtence on human minds. To expreſs their conſtitution, he had recourſe to the language and fictions of Homer, and the poets. They were ſaid to be not body, but ſomething, *as it were body*; and to have blood, not human, *but what reſembled it*. But how, ſaid the academics, came they, if eternal, to be of the human form? Was the figure of man a known one before it was caſually produced in nature? He was no leſs embarraſſed to aſſign a quiet or ſafe place for their reſidence. The infinity of ſpace could not afford it; thorough which the atoms conſtantly ſhot with an *impetus* ſurpaſſing that of the Solar beams; and where worlds after worlds, alternately generated, and diſſolving, might tumble around them. They were of too refined a contexture, he ſaid, to be annoyed by the atoms; and, at any rate, it was not neceſſary to point out their abode. It was enough to underſtand, that it could not be in any ſuch world as ours; and that a ſeat, ſerene and peaceful, like what the poets feigned of Olympus, was only ſuitable to them; who, far from being a company of ſuch reeling and turbulent divinities as thoſe of Homer, were to be conceived to have no anger, paſſion, emotion, deſire, concern, or any affection, extraneous to themſelves, and the ſenſe of their own beatitude. This was the proper idea to be formed of deities, or perfect beings; who, knowing themſelves to be happy, neither think, intend, or act any thing beyond the delight they have in ſelf-contemplation.

tion *. No part could they be ſuppoſed to take in the making of worlds; and as little to be concerned or diſturbed with ſuperintending them, and their caſualties. But, had theſe happy beings no intercourſe amongſt themſelves, nor any communication of their thoughts and feelings; and, did they underſtand nothing of what paſſed in the univerſe, in which they were included? It was to be remembered, that they were not pure intellectual beings, but of a frame that had a ſpecies of corporeiety in it; ſo that they could not be conceived to be altogether free from defects, and intermiſſions of their contemplations, or that variability in their thoughts and affections, which is inſeparable from the higheſt qualification of body. To imagine that they were equally happy, whether ſeparated from one another, or in aſſociation, or that, according to the Epicurean idea, they were, all and each of them, under the ſame conſtant intoxication of pleaſure, were ſurely very difficult conceptions; eſpecially when the mode of their felicity was no more defined, than the *genus* of their compoſition was aſcertained. Homer, and the poets, who gave a like ambiguous account of the nature of their celeſtial divinities, were not ſo inexplicit with reſpect to their enjoyments; but, more *phyſically* juſt in their notions, aſſigned them *nectar* and *ambroſia*, to ſupport their beatitude.

Still, however, they were repreſented as moral beings, wiſe, benevolent. and good; and, therefore, happy and bleſſed. But admitting, for argument's ſake, that they might be ſuch, in ſome incomprehenſible manner, the next queſtion was, how they were known to mankind under this character? From the alledged imagery of them in dreams, this diſcovery of their attributes could never be derived; for, inoffenſive and quiet as they were ſaid to be, they gave no evidence of their wiſdom, or intelligence; and only ſhowed their ſtupenduous forms with a mimickry not to be underſtood, whether it was meant for good or for ill. Demo-

 critus,

* Quod, ſi jam rerum ignorem primordia quae ſint;
Hoc tamen, ex ipſis coeli rationibus auſim
Confirmare, aliiſque ex rebus reddere multis,
Nequaquam nobis *divinitus* eſſe paratam,
Naturam rerum: Tanta ſtat praedita culpa.—*Lucret. ibid.*

critus, the father of this miſerable philoſophy, it has been obſerved, appeared to have entertained his own fears about them; and it cannot be ſaid that Epicurus's viſions of them were ſuch as to rid mens minds altogether of apprehenſions; notwithſtanding it was reckoned to be the noble aim, and boaſt of his philoſophy, to deliver them all from dread of the anger of the gods, or any effect of their interference in human affairs. To be wiſe and knowing, eſpecially in a meaſure approaching to what is divine in theſe excellencies, implies not only an underſtanding of what actually *is*, but of what may exiſt in the nature of things. Wiſdom, conjoined with benevolence, reſts not, ſimply, in the knowledge of what is good and excellent, but affects to produce every poſſible ſpecies of theſe qualities. A benevolent being, to whom the attributes of ſupreme wiſdom, goodneſs, and power, belong is not only conſervative of its own felicity, but deſires, and delights to *do good*, and to create life and enjoyment where it was not before. Hence worlds of ſenſible beings have been called into exiſtence by the univerſal parent; who, inviſible to the mortal eye, is exhibited to the contemplative mind in his works. His divine benignity, extended amongſt his creatures, is recogniſed by them, and felt as a motive to cheriſh the principle by which they live, and to exert it freely and mutually in their actions. From the ſenſe of his providential goodneſs, men form the conception of his amiable nature and perfections, and approve of virtue as the venerable and happy imitation of them.

Inſtead of this intelligible character of Deity, Epicurus ſubſtituted a ſet of chimerical beings, juſtly called his *monogrammic* gods, known, by no act, or energy in the univerſe, to exiſt; and underſtood, indeed, by his more inſtructed diſciples, to be held forth only in ſhew, that he might not be charged with Atheiſm. They exulted in what they knew to be his meaning; which, in the ſtile of Lucretius *, made them ſpurn, as duſt under their feet, all the prevailing notions of religion and the gods, and to equal his divinities in their ſuperiority over all mental perturbation. Yet what was their mighty attainment, ſays Plutarch, ſuppoſing

* Quare religio pedibus ſubjecta viciſſim,
Obteritur; nos exaequat victoria coelo.—*Lucret. lib. 6. ver. 50.*

posing it to be complete *? It could be no more than what has fallen to the lot of the brute creatures; which, having no understanding of their own natures, are excluded from any conception of those of other beings in the world.

Authors, however, there have been, and those, too, the friends of religion, who have taken Epicurus's theology in a more favourable light. It appeared to them an uncandid and harsh judgment to impute dissimulation to him, who had advanced the just maxim, that not those who rejected the vulgar notions of the gods, but such as characterised them unworthily, were to be accounted impious; and, in consequence of this sentiment, had boldly, and without fear of incurring the fate of Anaxagoras or Socrates, taught publickly, in Athens, theological principles, subversive of those commonly entertained. Amongst others inclined to this opinion, Lactantius is one; who, although none of the Christian Fathers has more impugned and confuted Epicurus's false theism, yet chose to deliver a qualified judgment with respect to its author, and to suppose that a real misapprehension of the perfections of Deity may have led him into error; and that, having made it a fundamental principle in his philosophy, that supreme beatitude consisted in absolute tranquillity †, and, measuring this tranquillity by his human and imperfect idea of it, he might conclude, not feignedly, but erroneously, that the world could not be governed by Deity, without a participation of disturbance incompatible with his supreme felicity. He might also conceive, that, although detached from all concern with the world, and mankind, adoration was due to the gods, on account of their excellent natures. Upon this, or similar ground, several authors, in the aera of the revival of letters, undertook to apologise for the most of Epicurus's theological and moral theories, notwithstanding of their being long under a species of condemnation. Amongst the moderns, beside Gassendi, du Rondel and Bayle have made the same effort; and, with them, Mr Hume has

 joined

* Adverf. Colotem.

† Quod putaret Epicurus a Deo esse alienum, malum facere, atque nocere. Sic enim Epicuri ratiocinatio processit: Si Deus mundum gubernet, impiis irascitur; ira tranquillitatem debilitat: Quicquid tranquillitatem debilitat, a Dei beatitudine alienum est.—*Lactant. de Ira Dei, cap.* 13.

joined his pen. They take up the argument, not in a general way, but that, in a conſiſtency with the received principles of the heathen theology, Epicurus's vindication might well be attempted. We ſhall, chiefly, conſider what is advanced by the two laſt.

The French critic, in advancing his arguments, has not forgot to throw in his favourite one *, reſpecting the ancient and general belief of two eternal and oppoſite principles, the one good and the other evil, according to the *Manichean* ſcheme. But, more in point to the queſtion, he alledges, that the neceſſary exiſtence and eternity of matter being aſſumed by all the ancient philoſophers, as they had no conception of any thing being created out of nothing, there was a difficulty in apprehending, even upon the ſuppoſition of a co-eternal mind, or deity, how his power of moving, or arranging a ſubſtance not generated, and uncongenial with his own, could be properly and effectually exerted. Conſidering, therefore, the intractability of matter, to which might be aſcribed the mixture of natural and moral evil found here below, it might be a queſtion, whether it would not have been better to have ſuffered it to remain in its original ſtate? At leaſt, the philoſophy which taught that the gods had not interfered with ſuch a ſubſtance, might be conſidered as doing them moſt honour, ſince it acquitted them of all objections that might be made to their wiſdom and goodneſs, on account of the many diſtreſſes experienced in a world ſuch as ours, and in the contemplation of which it might be maintained, that evil was much more prevalent than good. Hence Epicurus ſtated his argument againſt its being the work of a deity poſſeſſed of conſummate wiſdom and goodneſs †, in terms that groſsly arraigned the divine perfections. In this kind of argument, all the force of Bayle's reaſoning, and that of every eſpouſer of ſceptical impiety, in contradiction to the rational principles of theiſm, and the demonſtrative proofs of the Deity's wiſe and good

* Dictionaire Hiſt. et Critique, article Epicure, remarq. S.

† Either, ſaid Epicurus, he wills to remove the evils of human life, and cannot, and then his impotence muſt be inferred; or he can do it, and will not, which concludes his being defective in benevolence; and, if he has neither the will nor the power, he is not a divinity; or, if he has both, whence came the evils, or why not taken away?

good government of his creatures and works, will be found ultimately to terminate.

Whence comes evil, in the natural and moral world, admitted to be produced, and ſuperintended, by an all-wiſe, powerful, and beneficent being? has been the oldeſt queſtion ſtated amongſt ſuch of mankind as were addicted to the ſtudy and contemplation of ſublunary being and human life. It is urged as forcibly in *Job's* complaints, as in Epicurus's queries; but with a ſolution in the one diametrically oppoſite to the inferences of the other. In what manner, ſays the latter, was Plato's God employed before the world is ſuppoſed to have been made by him? If the work was fit and competent to him, why was it deferred for an inſtant of time, and not immediately produced? Could Epicurus tell, in what point of time, or *eternity*, any of his worlds was generated from atoms; ſo that one of them could be reckoned to have had its origin earlier, and in more ancient days, than another? The queſtion, why the divine being created a material world? is of another kind, but a ſtrange one to be put by the Epicureans, or Corporealiſts, upon the ſuppoſition of the intractability of matter, which they hold forth to have, in itſelf, the capacity of producing whatever is called great, fair, good, and admirable in the world. But, as they have never been able to define or deſcribe what it is, and, in fact, make it either an imaginary ſubſtance, or an occult quality in nature, we may preſume that it had no being of itſelf, but was a *created thing*; and then we can have no doubt, that its *maker* knew what he made. The next queſtion comes to be, Has it received all the perfection of which we can underſtand its nature to be capable? We certainly can conceive nothing, that is body, more perfect than the viſible world is in its form and conſtitution. As it is, to us, the image of perfection, in its kind, ſo it is the occaſion of our having an idea of what perfection is in ſuch an object, which, conſiſting of ſeveral parts, appears to be one *whole*, complete in itſelf. Since, then, the world bears the outward form of a perfect work, if it be affirmed, that, in another view of its conſtitution, this idea is not carried on, but contraveeened, there muſt be proved to exiſt in it, in that reſpect, a principle, of ſuch a nature and influence, as ought not, at all, to be found or permitted in a world, formed and governed by unerring wiſdom,

wiſdom, and goodneſs unbounded. But it was diſputable, whether a principle of that deſcription did take place in the world; and alledged, that, although mens partial and inadequate judgments of what are called the natural and moral evils of human life, might ſuggeſt ſuch a conception of them, yet, without pretending to determine fully with regard to their cauſe and tendency, a juſter idea might be formed of them, upon a more deliberate and mature contemplation of the qualified nature of beings, created and finite, and whoſe perfection could never be extended beyond the *law* of their ſeveral natures and ſpheres.

Hence the philoſophers of antiquity, and eſpecially thoſe of the Platonic ſchool, who conſidered the formation of the corporeal world as, from the nature of matter, involving ſomething defective, or repugnant to perfection in its elements, conceived at the ſame time, that even the incorporeal and intelligible ſyſtem of beings comprehended ſome orders of them inferior to others in perfection. They did not ſuppoſe, that the eſſential goodneſs of the Deity, which moved him to the production of creatures, ſtopt at the formation of only one claſs of them; whoſe perfection and felicity, howſoever exalted, and neareſt his own, was yet *neceſſarily* limited. No ſphere of them, unleſs carried on to infinity, could include in it ſo much felicity as a multiplication of the number of ſpheres finite; although they contained unequal and ſubordinate degrees of happineſs. There was therefore wide room left for the extended operation of the divine goodneſs, by giving being to numberleſs ranks of creatures, which, in reſpect of perfection and felicity, might bear a proportion to, but not be on a level with the higheſt, or quite equal to one another. If, in the lengthened ſeries of them, the loweſt being a compound of body and mind, or of the *diviſible* and *undivided* principle, as the viſible world was, incurred ſuch a meaſure of imperfection, as to produce apparent perturbation in its corporeal parts, and pain and evil to ſenſible beings in it; they ſtill conceived, that neither of theſe was of that magnitude, or influence, as to render the principle of evil the predominant one; and, if it ever proved ſo, it was found to be the lot of thoſe who abuſed their free agency, and vitiated their rational natures. In general, the pain or evil was conſidered by them as partial, and having always ſome mixture of good, or being convertible

convertible into it; and, therefore, correctives and remedies, both natural and moral, were applied, and had their operation, and would, finally, prove effectual to exterminate the evil; while, in the mean time, for mitigation of it, the measure of the natural pleasures of human life was much superior to its pains.

Amongst other arguments which Bayle uses to prove the predominancy of pain, it is alledged by him, that pleasure is only a *negative*, but pain a *positive* thing. This position, however, beside belying human experience, is an absurdity. For if, of two perceptions supposed to be opposite, one be turned into a negative, so likewise may the other. Pain may be as well affirmed to be no more than a negation of pleasure. According to Epicurus's doctrine, the absence of pain was held to be the highest pleasure. Why, then, said his opponents, should not the vacuity of pleasure be accounted the greatest pain? But, without regarding these quibbling arguments, it may be observed, that it appears, except in such cases as respect the conservation of life, or the satisfaction of the natural appetites, that the sense, or estimate of what is pleasant or painful, is by no means uniform among mankind, but varied, according to the difference of their age, their education, their circumstances, and habits. To the generality of the human race, simply *to be*, and have the bare necessaries of life, is happiness; in such a measure, that hardly the desire, or conception of a higher enjoyment, is entertained by any of them. In infancy, the slight and alternate touches of pleasure and pain, prepare them, insensibly, for the checquered scene of life. The vivacity natural to youth throws over it the most pleasing colours; and the advancement to manhood does not, for a considerable time, vary the prospect. Near a third part of human life is gone, before any settled thought is formed of its calamities and evils, natural and moral; declaimed upon as they are by the morose, the infirm, and the aged, or those of extravagant and disappointed hopes; but with little or no impression upon minds otherwise affected. It is the more remarkable, and an argument of the *providential* alleviation of the pains and troubles complained of in the state of humanity, that this sentiment takes place in outward circumstances unfavourable to it. Notwithstanding men, crouded together in large societies, find civil life is to be supported by the

the excitement and play of all their paſſions, good and bad, and emulation, envy, avarice, and ambition, operate with their contagious force; the bulk of them are ſeen to accommodate their deſires and affections to their conditions, and to find amidſt their daily labours and toils, regarded by thoſe in a ſuperior ſtation as the greateſt ſufferings, a contentment, and ſufficiency of good, which, in reſpect of uniformity and conſtancy, is equalled by no other experienced in a different ſituation, and would indeed fly from them, or be leſſened, in any ſuppoſed change. Their love of life, and the natural deſire of the continuance of their exiſtence, renders the doctrine of the immortality of human ſouls acceptable to them, while, without proper inſtruction, their conceptions of felicity in another ſtate riſe not much above thoſe of their preſent enjoyments.

It is their ignorance and ſtupidity, ſays the gloomy and querulous philoſopher, that makes them acquieſce in their condition; otherwiſe, the conſideration of the moral, no leſs than the natural ills of human life, would convince them that there is no ſuch order taken with reſpect to it, as announces a divine government. Why is not the life of man prolonged beyond the ſhort term of years within which it is confined; or elſe its abridgement appointed to be the lot of the vicious and wicked? But, there are no proper checks, or remedies provided, againſt the prevalence of vice, and its pernicious effects, while the good are often abruptly cut off, or expoſed to ſuffer on account of their virtues.

To ſtate it as an objection to divine and providential wiſdom, and goodneſs, being exerciſed in the world, that human life is of ſhort continuance, muſt appear a ſtrange and inconſiſtent argument, when it is alledged that man's life is over-run with evils. For, why ſhould it be complained of as ſhort, if, indeed, it be ſo fraught with miſery? But we may well underſtand, that, if it were left to men's judgments, they would never agree in fixing its proper period. The author of Life, who alone perfectly knows its ſcheme and deſtination, has therefore ſet the boundary to it, and to each man's ſteps within that general limit. It has, however, even in our partial and inadequate ſurvey, ſufficient marks of a wiſe and gracious deſign. The laws and conditions of its well being, or unhappineſs, to individuals, or communities of men,

men are as much fixed, and rendered evident, and obligatory, as if the lives of particular men were to be protracted through ages. To the ſubſiſtence of the rudeſt ſtate of human ſociety, for any period of time, a degree of humanity and virtue is made abſolutely neceſſary. The total abſence of theſe principles, if it can be ſuppoſed in the families, or aſſociated tribes of mankind, would operate as effectually to their perdition, as the confuſion of the laws of motion in bodies would do in the ſyſtem of the natural world. Beſide ſuch fatal effects of the fierce paſſions of men being prevented by the innate principle of ſelf-preſervation, unuſual appearances in nature, or unexpected accidents in life, concur to make impreſſions upon their uncultivated minds, equivalent to a moral diſcipline. Under the apprehenſion of ſupernatural powers, and the dread of their diſpleaſure, they are diſpoſed the more to combine, and ſeek ſupport from one another. The ſocial affections are extended among them. Private and public good is found to ariſe from the reſtraint of the paſſions, and a regard to equity. Laws are deviſed for the benefit of individuals, and the community; and their inſtitution is approved, and ſubmitted to, not as being only the appointment of men, but as authoriſed and ſanctioned by the will of the ſuperior and divine powers.

In the more improved condition of human ſociety, ſome become ſtudious of the world's conſtitution, and of human nature. Amidſt various and uncertain theories concerning the former, it was ſoon evinced, beyond a doubt, with reſpect to the latter, that human life, having happineſs for its end, was ſubjected to an unalterable law, for the attainment of that end; the law of reaſon operating ſo as to produce the principle of virtue in the human mind. Here we need not particulariſe thoſe illuſtrations of the moral principle which philoſophy has been ſhown to have copiouſly afforded: But it may be remarked, as a ſingularity, that thoſe philoſophers who ſet *deity* aſide, or denied a providential order in human affairs, allowed that a moral ſcheme of human life was demonſtrable, and had a foundation in nature, without being connected with theſe fundamental principles. From them, however, and it was no wonder, chiefly came the arguments and complaints, that virtue was not duly ſupported; that no divine favour was ſhown

to it; and that, upon ſuch a ſuppoſition, a better lot in life muſt have been aſſigned to the virtuous man, and a different diſtribution made of good and evil, than what obtains in the world. It may be obſerved, in general, upon this objection, that as human wiſdom, in pretending to range the celeſtial bodies in another order than that in which they are placed, is proved to have committed the groſſeſt errors, ſo its failure may well be ſuſpected in the correction of the moral oeconomy of things, and the providential diſpenſations reſpecting mankind. The wiſer, and more adequate plan, has never yet been ſhown; or elſe, the hints given for obviating or removing what are reckoned partial evils, have been ſuch as ſubverted the general laws of the human ſyſtem; and, for the ſake of immediate rewards to virtue, diminiſhed or annulled its nobleſt and worthieſt exertions, ariſing from probationary ſituations; without which, in human life, it could hardly be known.

It is therefore the part of philoſophy, before determining what is an *evil* or a good to men, as free agents, and in a ſtate of moral diſcipline, to conſider not only the propriety of a probationary courſe, for the exerciſe of virtue, but the connection it may have with a more extended and higher ſyſtem than the ſublunary one. All things viſible to us exhibit, even amidſt partial incongruities, a chain of relations and concords, in the various claſſes of beings, of which we can neither trace the beginning or the end. The only rule of judgment competent to us, and the probable one, is to advert to the importance and extent of the faculties of the beings, in any particular ſcale of them, contemplated by us; and from thence to form an opinion with reſpect to their relative nature and deſtination. Conſidered in this light, man appears evidently to be endowed with powers ſurpaſſing his preſent ſtation. His rational faculties, his conceptions of things, his motives of action, his deſires and aims, are all of a caſt far beyond that of any other being known in the corporeal world. All the tribes of terreſtrial creatures appear to be in ſubſerviency to him, yet none of them are his proper aſſociates. There is but the ſlighteſt trace of a connection betwixt his intelligence and their greateſt ſagacity. Viewed in the interminated ſcale of beings, which aſcends, as well as deſcends, he may be reckoned, as pronounced by philoſophers, that *intermediate one*, that *link* in the chain,

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that connects the visible and invisible world, but which holds principally, and most congenially, with the superior nature. His rational contemplations, and his virtuous energies, correspond to it; and he is then only in true character when they are so directed. He aspires after the enlargement of his intelligent faculties; and accounts not his labour to that end a hardship, or the exertions requisite for the improvement of his moral excellencies an evil, but a real good. Conscious of acting in conformity to the law of reason, and in imitation of the acts of sovereign wisdom that rules in the universe, he trusts that his progress is not limited to the sphere of mortality. The efficiency of virtue to present happiness, he has proved, as far as in the corporeal state it can be, but not in that measure which is conceivable in a future one. But to what pitch of felicity the virtuous soul may be raised hereafter, or to what penal sufferings the grosly vicious one may be condemned, is a point, which as divine wisdom only can determine, so supernatural revelation alone can unfold.

Here the question is taken up by Mr Hume *, in a point of view that shows how he could touch the nicest hinges of metaphysical disputation, with singular ingenuity. The reasoning he employs in apology for Epicurus's theological positions, at least according to a certain representation of them, is such as we may well believe hardly entered into the conception of that philosopher, or any of his disciples; although an argument similar to it may be traced amongst Aristotle's metaphysical subtilities †, refined upon by his commentators and the schoolmen.

* Vide Essay XI. Philosophical Essays.

† It appears that Aristotle's principle of the *Deity's immobility*, and his abstruse reasoning upon it, Metaphys. lib. 14. c. 6. had led his scholastic commentators into the extravagant, and, as it may be reckoned, the impious notion, that whatever the Supreme Being willed or did, he always, and from eternity, actually performed. As the Stagirite's imagination was, that act in him preceded power, and that he was to be contemplated, never as in *potentiality*, but as in act and power, it was inferred, that one simple act could only be attributed to him; otherwise, said they, he is not immutable in his nature, if he passed from a state of *non agency* to *agency*. The scholastics of the 12th and 13th century, who left no thread of metaphysics untwisted, took up this fallacious one, and made it a topic in their theology. It was

The firſt part of the argument tends to prove, that there can be no juſt analogical proceſs of our ideas, when we reaſon from effects to their cauſe; ſince we can aſcribe no more perfection of powers, or qualities, to the latter, than what are plainly diſcovered in the former. Although a certain effect proves a cauſe adequate to it to be neceſſary, it does not therefore follow, that more efficiency belongs to it, and ſuch as extends to its having powers that are not to be collected from the effect, ſince the one, in unexceptionable reaſoning, ſhould be meaſured exactly by the other. Hence, when we eſtimate the power, wiſdom, and goodneſs, of the original cauſe of the world, and exalt them beyond what its production aſcertains them to be, it muſt be reckoned only an aſſumption, and not a juſt inference. With leſs propriety, ſtill, can we conclude, that its ſyſtem, or oeconomy, may be corrected and improved, by future ſcenes being opened to us, expreſſive of theſe excellencies. The Deity is a ſingle being in the world: He may, or he may not, have other attributes than thoſe exhibited to us; but we cannot make ſuch inferences with regard to his purpoſes, as we can do about the intentions and actions of men, whoſe general conſiſtency of conduct may be underſtood from experience and obſervation.

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was a *theſis* of the celebrated Abelard, without meaning to ſet bounds to the divine power, that, conſidering it as ever conjoined with his infinitely wiſe and good will, it was contradictory, and not to be conceived that the Deity would, or *willed* to do any thing, other than what he directly, and in fact, performed. This point was alſo ſtated by Peter Lombard, the famous maſter of the *ſentences*, in his *Collect* of theological diſputations. The ſimilarity of the argument to that above ſtated, is obvious. The one would prove, that the Deity could not do leſs than complete and perform, by the ſame act, all his will and purpoſe: The other implies, that we have no ground to infer that he could do more than what he has done. The one concludes, that, from his immutable nature, he was neceſſitated to do every thing, at once, which entered into the view or plan of his wiſdom: The other imports, that, in a rational judgment, we muſt conclude that he has done, to the utmoſt of his intelligible perfections. There appears to be leſs preſumption in ſaying, according to the latter argument, that, ſo far as our reaſon goes, or can be conceived by us, it muſt be ſo in the active power of the ſupreme cauſe, than to maintain, with the ſchool bred Theologians, that it was contradictory and impoſſible to ſuppoſe it otherwiſe.

The firſt remark to be made upon the general reaſoning againſt any juſt proceſs of our ideas, when we argue, by analogy, from effects to their cauſe, is, that it is not ſupported by experience, but rather contradictory to it. How does it appear, that, in any given effect, the cauſe is no more than equal to it? In the ſceptical philoſophy, it is alledged, that we underſtand ſo little about a cauſe or power in general, that the leaſt thing in nature may be the cauſe of the greateſt effect. By what rule of reaſon, then, do we proceed, if, beholding an effect produced, we conceive, and affirm, that no more could be done than was actually done by its cauſe? We ſurely cannot judge abſtractly of the cauſe, ſo as to make ſuch reſtriction. The effect ſhows to us what is produced, but not all that could be accompliſhed by it. In the qualifications of any material cauſe, as they cannot be inferior in kind, or fewer in number, to thoſe generated in the effect, ſo their bare equality to it in power is hardly conceived by us as a ſufficiency. But, allowing it be ſo in mathematical theories, it appears to be otherwiſe in the works of nature. By the more ſtable and permanent cauſes, the effects are not only repeated inceſſantly, but ſeem to be diverſified and enlarged; as in the earth's power of vegetation. It is increaſed by culture in various degrees; and is even conceived by us to ſurpaſs the quantity of plants or vegetables that have been, or are generated upon its ſurface. The ſcience of mechanics proves to us what accumulated force reſides in the inſtruments of corporeal motion, ſuch as the muſcles of animal bodies; which, although fitted to their uſe, could, in other poſitions, or with levers of more length, produce effects hundreds of times greater than they do. In ſignal productions of the human mind, whatever ſtrength of reaſon, or power of imagination, they diſplay, we ſtill conceive the intelligent or ingenious faculties of their authors to be more than competent to them. The maxim, therefore, that cauſes are ſtrictly commenſurable by their effects, is not only unverified by, but irreconcilable with, the phenomena of nature, as they appear to us; without conſidering whether they ariſe from material or immaterial principles. But, if affirmed with reſpect to intelligent cauſes of things, ſuch as men, who act freely, and with choice, to ſpecial ends, and may exert their powers in ſeveral degrees, without coming to the *ultimatum* of them, it

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can leſs be admitted as a rule in our reaſoning about the qualification of ſuch powers, or a juſt ground of concluding them to be in equality to their effects.

But more eſpecially in our contemplations of the attributes of the original and ſupreme cauſe, and comparing them with the world of beings produced by him, they can never be reckoned in exact proportion to one another. Great, ſtupenduous, and, to limited minds, a boundleſs object, as the creation is, yet it is neceſſarily finite. It comprehends not either the infinity of his eſſence, or the plenitude of his natural and moral perfections. He would not otherwiſe be that one ſelf-exiſtent and *ſingle* being in the univerſe, to whom, in excellence, no other could be compared; but might be reckoned to have the equality of his nature, and attributes, in the conſtituted world. As Deity, having an eternal exiſtence, ſeparate from the world he hath made, peculiar and incommunicable attributes muſt belong to him; as the original of being, he may be known to all rational creatures from their frame, and that of the world; but not completely inveſtigated in it. But to any order of them, ſuch as the human, the knowledge of his natural and moral perfections, as everlaſtingly the ſame, and immutable, is competent. Mutability is imperfection, which cannot be an original and ſelf-exiſtent principle; and, if ſuppoſed, would imply not a ſtate of exiſtence, but only what is equal to a negation of it, to all things that are; and leave a tendency to deſtruction as the ſole foundation of the ſubſiſting and eſtabliſhed univerſe. As immutable, the Deity is *true*, not only in himſelf, as having ever the ſame nature and perfections, but alſo *morally ſo*, in reſpect of his manifeſtations of them to the rational world. To exhibit, to intelligent beings, any copy of them that is not the juſt one, as far as it goes, would imply either error or guile; error in infallible wiſdom; deceit in a being who varies not the idea of his eternal mind, no more than the uniform conſtancy of his nature. He has not, therefore, *other attributes*, or ſuch as differ in the leaſt from the teſtimony he has given of theſe that are eſſential to him. The divine character expreſſed in them, although not altogether perfect, is a true one; and ſuch a diſcovery of it to reflecting minds, that, inſtead of imagining that an unparallelled *being*, as he is, in the world,

world, they can make no ſuch inferences, reſpecting his purpoſes, as thoſe of creatures like themſelves may admit of; it is on this very foundation, and becauſe he is the *one invariable*, that they can truſt with more aſſurance than may be done about creatures liable to change, that he will do nothing inconſiſtent with what he has already done. The conſiſtency or ſimilarity may not be obvious, or altogether intelligible, to our narrow minds. There may be to them an appearance of contrariety; yet as we behold, in nature, apparent contraries made to correſpond, we have reaſon to judge that it is our imperfect conceptions of the objects, or of their tendency, that repreſent an oppoſition in the nature of things, where there is, in reality, none. We do not conceive that the Deity was neceſſitated to create, but that he was a creator of his own free will, and from the motive of his eſſential goodneſs; or that the world he made could not have been otherwiſe framed than it is, and in a manner equally admirable; if he had ſo purpoſed in his allwiſe mind, whatever is effected may be conceived to have been practicable in more ways than in one, by infinite underſtanding. But the conſtitution of the world being made, by its author, ſuch as it is, we cannot, without impugning the immutability of his nature, ſuppoſe that it can be reverſed by him, or its principles counteracted. The univerſal laws of the ſyſtem, natural and moral, muſt remain unaltered, unleſs that ſyſtem be extinguiſhed. The intelligent beings, of every order, comprehended in it, as they are phyſically and morally ſubjected to theſe laws, can know no other as divine. To obſerve what operation they have in their particular ſpheres, is the moſt natural and proper exerciſe of their reaſon, and their beſt knowledge. If, with reſpect to ſuch a compound nature as the human, there ariſes a doubt about the duration of its exiſtence, information, when not derived from revelation, muſt come, as has been mentioned, from conſidering duly what ſignal difference there appears to be between the faculties of the body and thoſe of the mind, marked clearly even in their ſtate of union. The one, in early years, attains to all its capacity of action and enjoyment: The other advances ſlowly, and unfolds its powers in a gradual manner. Science beams upon the ſoul, when the eye of the body becomes dim. The lights of reaſon are often moſt ſteady, and the ſource of knowledge more enlarged,

ged, when the corporeal ſenſes fall into decay. In the ſcale of nature, thoſe ſubſtances are known to be moſt durable which arrive by ſlow degrees to their maturity. Both inanimate and animated beings, may be obſerved to be under the influence of this law. It is not, therefore, a bare aſſumption, but an inference warranted by the analogy of nature, to conclude that it obtains with regard to the human ſpecies, whoſe rational powers, no more than their affections, are extended now to their utmoſt reach. Creatures, far inferior to them, when they attain not their perfection, either in the place, or in the firſt form of their production, are ſeen to be advanced to it in another. It requires not a new *will*, or an energy different from the original one, in the ſupreme and omnipotent cauſe, to carry on the various ſyſtems of beings he has formed, according to the ſpecial laws of their natures, and to qualify them progreſſively, and in ſuitable ways, to correſpond to the allwiſe and good ends, both of his natural and moral government.

Having thus far, for the ſake of more rational contemplation than what could be found in Epicurus's particular *Phyſiology*, inſiſted chiefly upon his general principles, oppoſite as they are to the moſt fundamental truths in Theology, we now diſmiſs the ſubject; leaving his groſs ſpeculations upon the atomical conſtitution of the heavens and the earth to thoſe, who, with Lucretius's gloſſes, can patiently peruſe them; or to ſuch, who, from conceit in their profound knowledge of phyſics, may imagine they can ſuggeſt a more plauſible theory of materialiſm. In the next ſection, will be comprehended his doctrine of *Ethics*.

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SECTION IV.

Introduction to the Ethics of Epicurus.—The affection which conſtitutes the ſupreme felicity of human nature.—This principle qualified; and the ſenſe in which it is to be taken explained.—Rectified opinions the reſult of Philoſophy.—The doctrine of Man's Free Will aſſerted.—The pleaſure and utility of the Moral Virtues the only ſource of their eligibility, and the ground of the obligation of juſtice, and other civil ties.—Remarks upon the reaſoning in ſupport of the general principle of Moral conduct held forth by Epicurus, and the eſpouſers of his doctrine.

THE philoſophy of morals, or manners, in human life, is the ſtudy and knowledge of the *extreme*, or *ultimatum*, of the good or felicity at which human beings can arrive. All men agree, that happineſs is the end of their life, and their aim. For, why is life given but to enjoy it, or the deſire of continuing it implanted, but that all the felicity it can admit ſhould be embraced? Rarely, indeed, is the object in view juſtly comprehended; and, often, unſuitable and incompetent means are uſed, by the generality of men, for obtaining it. Hence are, daily, beheld the abuſes of the greateſt external advantages that can attend their condition. In vain are comforts thrown around them, which they underſtand not how to enjoy. Inſtead of being contented, they are filled with anxiety; and, beſide being haunted with cares about what they poſſeſs, their quiet is often diſturbed by deſires of other things *. They

* Cicero de Finib. lib. 1. pag. 44. Diog. Laert lib. 10 in Epicuri Epiſt. ad Menecaeum paſſim. Stobaei Sententiae, Sermo 16. fol. edit. pag. 155.

languiſh and complain, that all the good fallen to their ſhare is ſcanty, and inſufficient for their well-being. Do they know what they would have; or conſider what comfort there is in being ſatisfied with little? Their error muſt lie, either in a falſe judgment of what is good, or in a tainted heart; which, ſetting no bounds to its deſires, becomes inſatiable, or turns ſenſations, that moſt men would delight in, to ſpleen and diſpleaſure.

To philoſophiſe, as we ought, upon this intereſting ſubject, is a ſerious thing. A ſhew of ſentiment upon it is not ſufficient: We muſt feel ourſelves free of prejudices, and ſound, in order to reliſh the ſalutary maxims of life; unſecured, as it is, beyond the preſent day, and encouraging no truſt in the uncertain proſpect of *to-morrow* *. Precarious life requires, that we ſhould know how to ſpend every day of its continuance in all the happineſs it can afford; and not, like children, be only learning, from time to time, what is to be done in its whole courſe. How many of the aged are thus ſeen in the infancy of life, and hardly beginning to live, as they ought, when life itſelf is near its period. Thus fooliſh men always wander in ſearch of what is placed before them, and might be clearly perceived, if they only kept their eyes open. Life eſcapes them, without their underſtanding what it is; while, to the wiſe, nothing can be plainer than the maxim with reſpect to it. Let its courſe be ſo regulated, that the part which is paſt give no cauſe of repentance; and that which is preſent have no reference for enjoyment to what is to come. The good which is unexpected creates a ſweet ſurpriſe to the mind; and the leſs we think we need an addition to the pleaſure of the preſent hour, the more may we congratulate ourſelves upon the acceſſion of what was not looked for. Such is the firſt general principle which the philoſophy of life, or true wiſdom, teaches. But it is requiſite

* How the maxim here expreſſed accords with the ſober doctrine of Epicurus's *Canonics*, that have been ſtated as the foundation of his Ethical rules, is not to be underſtood. The philoſopher, who propoſes to rid the human mind of all thoughts of *to-morrow*, by a full draught of the pleaſures of the preſent day, muſt be ſuppoſed to drop all reaſoning about the real felicity of human life; and, inſtead of it, to adopt the ſtrains of Anacreon, every day allured by love, and encircled with myrtles, and *roſes dipt in wine*.

ſite to explain more particularly what is the extent of the felicity after which men aſpire, and in what it conſiſts; and then point out the means neceſſary to conſtitute and maintain it in all the circumſtances incident to human condition.

There is, in the univerſe, a felicity ſupreme, and another inferior; one proper to the gods, and the other to men. The firſt is a ſtate of being in which beatitude is felt, of the moſt exalted kind imaginable. Without decreaſing, or becoming more intenſe, it is always the ſame; pleaſure poſſeſſed in the full ſecurity, that it can be no more diminiſhed in degree, than loſt by time. The ſecond is a ſtate of well being, conſiſting of much good, and inconſiderable ill; in which life may be paſſed with all the quiet and conſtancy of agreeable repoſe that man's mortal condition will permit; while his enjoyments are variable with his circumſtances, and may either be augmented or impaired. How vainly do thoſe men boaſt, who hold forth a more arrogant doctrine, and repreſent the efficacy of their philoſophy to be ſuch as to equal them with the gods? To be inferior only to *Jove*, is a condeſcendence on the part of their wiſe man. But, without thus inſulting the imbecillity of human nature, and pretending to have the faculty of exempting ourſelves from the ſenſe of the evils of life, is it not enough to prove them to be capable of alleviation, and ſo far to admit of it; that, being born, as all men are, to have a ſhare in the common calamities of a precarious exiſtence, true wiſdom may enable us to bear them with an equality of mind that will render us, of all others, the leaſt miſerable; and, if our particular circumſtances do expoſe us to a more than ordinary acceſſion of evils, to be leſs impreſſed with them than any of the uninſtructed of mankind could have been in a like ſituation. To be delivered from ills, which, without a remedy found for them, would have afflicted us, is ſurely a ſpecial happineſs; and to enjoy, together with it, all the good our condition places within our reach, is the utmoſt degree of felicity at which, by any means, we can arrive.

What, then, is the principle or affection found in our nature, upon which may be conſtituted its chief felicity? It is no other than the ſenſe of pleaſure in body and ſoul, which, inſtinctively, guides all animals to ſeek with eagerneſs what is agreeable to their feelings, and fly from

what is painful to them. Nature, having interwoven it with their frame, calls it forth at their birth: They immediately diſcover how they are actuated by it; and that, in the budding of all other affections, this primary one is matured. As they grow up, it is cheriſhed; and life is preſerved by compliance with it. Can we doubt, therefore, that it ought to predominate, and be followed as the general guide of our deſires and averſions? Theſe oppoſite affections are conſtantly excited by the ſenſations of pleaſure and pain; which would alone be to us the *criteria* of good and evil, and of what is to be choſen, and what avoided, if the *goods* to be met with in life much exceeded the evils, or if we could as readily ſhun, as we are inclined to reject the latter. In the different ſtate in which things are found in the world, it is neceſſary to preſcribe ſome qualifications of the general rule, and not conſider it as implying our always chooſing pleaſure, and rejecting pain; when, in various caſes, the inferiority of the latter may be ſuch as to make it deſpicable; or when, by ſubmiſſion to ſome greater degrees of it, there may enſue more than a compenſation, by the augmented meaſure of the former. With reſpect to the admiſſion of the general rule, or of deviations from it, the directory, already given in the *Canonics*, may be ſufficient. Here it is only neceſſary to be obſerved, that although, in it, the fundamental principle be limited, there is no contradiction of it incurred. Pleaſure is ever deſireable, as a good in itſelf, and pain hateful as a like evil. When the tranſpoſition is made, their difference is ſtill perceived; and the latter only eligible from the conſideration, that the greater quantity, and better quality, of what is pleaſant and agreeable to us, will be the reſult. In this way, pleaſure reſigned, and pain ſuffered, is no more than a confeſſion that there is often preſented to us a conjunction of the two, which requires the attention of our reaſon and prudence, that we may not be led into a miſtake about their conſequences, as if no immediate pleaſure could be followed with pain, or any pain give cauſe to pleaſure. Experience here lies open to us; and we may be ſoon convinced from it, that, as there ought to be a reaſonable purſuit of pleaſure, ſo a tolerance of pain is ſuitable to the human condition; while our natural love of the one, and averſion to the other, continues unchangeable.

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How abſurdly, therefore, do ſome philoſophers exclaim againſt the ſenſations of pleaſure, as if there were no other but thoſe of the irrational and ſhameful kind? What is there blameable in cheriſhing them, not only as congenial to nature, but of utility and profit to life; the frequent calamities of which are relieved by them? When we ſay, that even any laborious exerciſe of the body is not to be undergone, but on account of ſomething commodious or profitable ariſing from it, and that no man is reprehenſible, who chooſes to have that pleaſure in familiarity which has neither any attendant, or conſequent uneaſineſs, or who avoids pain, to which neither preſent or future pleaſure is annexed; do we therefore aſſent to the doctrine and practice of the blind votaries of pleaſure? By no means. On the contrary, we hold it to be abject and odious, as we do thoſe perſons who are allured by the blandiſhments of preſent pleaſure, and ſuffer themſelves to be ſo corrupted into ſoftneſs of mind, that the labour productive of agreeable ſenſations is their averſion, and pleaſure taken by them at its firſt ſtart; and thus, from fear of pain, they relinquiſh the duties incumbent upon them. For, it is to be remembered, that there are times and occurrences not more to be avoided than wiſhed for, in which the enduring bodily diſtreſs is eligible, rather than repelling it, when, by ſuch undeſirable ſuffering, a more grievous load of it may be prevented. But, upon the ſuppoſition of circumſtances being in our option, the general principle is to be maintained; all pleaſure is to be aſſumed, and all pain rejected.

That the import of this principle may not be miſunderſtood, or wilfully perverted, either by the eſpouſers of vicious luxury, or the declaimers againſt rational pleaſure, let us more particularly conſider what is the extent of the pleaſure inſiſted upon, as the moſt eligible good. In its juſt explication, it will be found, inſtead of ſupporting the doctrine of the diſſolute, and foſtering the effeminate ſenſations of the voluptuous, to have a ſobriety in it; which may be accounted ſevere, and an undue reſtriction of the enjoyments of ſenſe. The pleaſure we aſſume, as the ſtandard of felicity, conſiſts not alone in what recreates and ſoothes the ſenſes, and in the progreſſion of ſuch perceptions, but chiefly, and ultimately, in the freedom from all pain. For ſince, upon ſuch a deliverance, joy is produced, and what cauſes joy is pleaſure, and

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what excites grief is pain, the total abſence, or privation of pain, is juſtly denominated pleaſure. That this eſtimate is proper, and ſupported upon the feelings of nature, appears by conſidering the gratifications of appetite. When hunger is allayed, or thirſt quenched, pleaſure takes place; and ſo, in every inſtance, the removal of pain engenders pleaſure. There is, in reality, no *medium* betwixt the preſence of pleaſure and the abſence of pain; nor is it to be alledged that this doctrine holds forth a ſtate in which the two are confounded together. To entertain ſuch a conceit is a fallacy; ſince no perſon can be ſo affected as to have neither the perception of pleaſure or pain, or to feel both in the ſame inſtant. When the latter is expelled, we always rejoice: Witneſs the exultation of thoſe delivered from any ſevere or lingering diſtemper. But pleaſure detracted from, or with-held, does not operate upon us ſo immediately, or with the ſame efficacy. To introduce diſcontent, ſome ſpecial pain muſt intervene, ſufficient to baniſh the felicity felt in the abſence of pleaſure.

There are, indeed, men who deride this theory, and account the boundary ſet by nature and reaſon to their deſires of pleaſure, a ſtate of complete indolence, or that in which all activity of body and mind muſt be ſuſpended. They imagine, it ſeems, that, unleſs the actions of life be hurried on like a torrent, there muſt enſue an ebb of them, that reſembles a ſtagnating pool. Is there not a calm exerciſe of the human faculties, effectual for all the proper purpoſes of life, and which, for the ſake of the ſweet compoſure and tranquillity attending it, is preferable to the vehemency, and ſtill ſwelling tide of deſires? The various and diſcordant paſſions excited by the latter, are too viſible amongſt mankind, and preſent repeated ſcenes of diſcontent, emulation, and outragious ſtrife; ſcenes that could never take place, if men ſtudied the juſt limitations of their deſires, and underſtood that the fulfilment of them was in vain purſued, unleſs it was found in the body, free from pain, and the mind from diſquiet. To what other ſatisfaction of their appetites would intemperate men carry on their wiſhes; or where can it be ſaid that they will ſtop, after exceeding this bound? Pleaſure, it is granted, is of two kinds; one of motion, and another of reſt. The firſt is not the *ultimatum* of good propoſed by nature. She gives the ſtimulations

tions of appetite, in themſelves troubleſome, not merely for the ſake of the immediate pleaſure of gratifying them, but that we may taſte the more equal, calm, and durable one, which reſults from being rid of their importunity, and attain that eaſy, placid, and ſettled enjoyment, that no bodily pain, or mental uneaſineſs, may diſturb. To have this ſtable pleaſure is the fruition of happineſs, to ſuch a height, that, although there may be ſome accidental interventions of joy and mirth, which may, a little, vary the ſcene, it cannot receive extenſion or enlargement, and is as fully enjoyed in finite as in infinite time. The important queſtion then is, by what means is this felicity attainable?

To make this inveſtigation, the lights of reaſon and philoſophy are the only proper and juſt guides. As what is pleaſant to us, and what is painful, is determined by our immediate ſenſations, ſo there is a judgment of reaſon which ſerves to regulate our opinions of what is good and profitable, and what is evil and diſadvantageous. Since our opinions of objects thus produce fixed ſentiments of their nature and efficacy, and with theſe ſentiments are always joined the affections of deſire or averſion, it is manifeſt of what importance in life the rectification of our opinions muſt prove: And this is the ſalutary inſtruction which the philoſophy of Ethics propoſes to give, and that may be the better afforded by it, while it rejects, as an unjuſt, immoral, and inſufferable doctrine, the ſcheme of a fatal neceſſity, which involves in one chain of rigid deſtiny, the acts and volitions of rational beings, and the phyſical courſes of things, void as they are of all animation and ſenſe. But let us not bend our free minds to the fetters of ſuch philoſophy. We feel ourſelves under no ſuch conſtraint; and, therefore, ought to know ourſelves to have the liberty of moral agents. How horrible is the contrary ſyſtem, which confounds the diſtinction of virtue and vice, and renders the practice of the one or the other no proper object of rewards or puniſhments! Rather than entertain the belief of ſuch a domination of fate over the wills and diſpoſitions of gods and men, we had better eſpouſe what the poets have imagined concerning them, which, however fabulous, does more honour to both, than to repreſent them in the character of the ſlaves to deſtiny. In contradiction to this groſs doctrine, it has been ſuggeſted, as a proper tenet in Phyſics, that the *atoms*

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declined a little from the perpendicular, whence might be inferred the free bending of the human mind, which, actuated by reaſon, has a voluntary motion, and no neceſſity impoſed upon it. Neither do we account Fortune to be a *goddeſs*, as ſhe is reckoned by ſome philoſophers, who, notwithſtanding her blind procedure and mutability, inveſt her with a divine character. But no ſuch being, whoſe acts are capricious and inconſiſtent, can exiſt among the immortals; and, ſo far as any one becomes an adept in the wiſdom of life, he will find himſelf croſſed by fewer contingencies of fortune. To the truly wiſe man, a very ſmall ſhare of them will fall. Yet, againſt their intervention, and ſuch outward conſtraints upon his actions as are inevitable, he will be prepared and armed. He will find a refuge in the maxims of his philoſophy, and in this one above all the reſt, that it is better to be unfortunate, with a rational approbation of what he has done, than to be fortunate with no ſuch ſenſe of his conduct.

When this juſt value is ſet upon the exerciſe of right reaſon, and the free examination, and unbiaſſed correction of our opinions take place; when we boaſt of nothing more noble in our conſtitution, than the power we have of chooſing, freely, betwixt good and evil; when that only is accounted morally good or ill, which, knowingly, and without compulſion, we ſeek after; what a ſignal overthrow may be given, by the light of philoſophy, to vain and falſe conceptions, and to the prejudices and terrors ariſing from them? How may we think of the gods without trepidation, and hear the aerial thunder roll, without regarding it as bolts ſhot by Jove from their placid abodes? How may divinations of every kind be contemned, when we conſider, that the predicted events, if they be from neceſſity, muſt and will take place; and, therefore, that any premonition, with reſpect to them, can be of no advantage to us? If, again, they proceed from chance, how can they be foreſeen; when all that can be affirmed of them is, that they may, or they may not happen? The ſtudy of phyſics, otherwiſe of inferior value, may, in reſpect of proper knowledge of many natural objects, prove helpful to the conceptions of our minds, and render them ſo far juſt and advantageous, that no more will be apprehended in the courſes, or variations of things around us, than what may be expected from their original

original principles. We may indeed underſtand, that, although the general conſtitution of things be fortuitous and variable, yet the caſual order that has obtained in them muſt have, at leaſt, a temporary conſtancy. The degrees of pleaſure and pain, of which our bodies and minds are ſuſceptible, may therefore be conſidered as fixed by nature. How far the former can be extended, has been declared: With regard to the latter, there is a rule, which muſt be acknowledged to hold true, that, if moderate in their degree, they may be borne; if exceſſive, they cannot be laſting *; and, if lengthened out, they cannot be ſevere. To be ſubjected to them, in any ſhape, through life, there is no neceſſity; and the relief from them is always at hand. Yet thoſe who, in a tolerable condition of life, wiſh for death, are no leſs culpable than ſuch as live always under the dread of dying. Life has in it ſomething too deſirable to ſay of it, as ſome have done, *it had been better not to have been born;* or elſe, in the moment of birth, to have paſſed into the gate of death. If this was a fixed ſentiment with them, how came it about that they lived ſo long? If ſaid only in wantonneſs, or in a hurry of paſſion, they ſhowed themſelves to be fools, or men who had never employed a ſerious or rational thought upon the important queſtion.

Amongſt the erroneous opinions that are corrigible by reaſon, the conceit, that the wiſdom of life is ſtudied, and its moral rules complied with, upon any other motive than that of the pleaſure and good derived from them, is a fallacy which ought to be rejected amongſt philoſophers. For, why ſhould the dictate of nature, that prevails in all other ſtudies and arts, be here diſregarded? We do not betake ourſelves to the ſcience of medicine for the ſake of the art itſelf, but for the acquiſition of health; or to the ſteerage of a ſhip, but on account of its utility and benefit in navigation. The wiſdom of life is no more than an art of a different kind. The moral virtues are found to be its beſt rules; nay, ſo cloſely connected are they with its greateſt good, that there is no ſuch thing as leading a pleaſant life, unleſs we live *wiſely*, *honeſtly*, and *juſtly*, or holding a *wiſe*, *honeſt*, and *juſt* courſe, without experiencing

* Dolor, in longinquitate levis, in gravitate brevis, ſoleat eſſe; ut ejus magnitudinem celeritas, diuturnitatem allevatio conſoletur. Cic. ibid. pag. 45.; et Diog. Laert. ibid.

cing the pleaſure and delight afforded by it. All other things conducive to pleaſure and joy are feeble and tranſitory, and may be disjoined from the happineſs of life; but the virtues are to be held its inſeparable and immortal ingredients. Yet, with all theſe recommendations, why ſhould they be embelliſhed with ſplendid, but inſignificant names, and affirmed to have the characters of beauty, excellence, and laudibility, in themſelves, and to be eligible on account of their native charms? For, ſurely, none would think them praiſe worthy or deſirable, if they were not efficients of pleaſure, and ſubſervient to the felicity of life; which, therefore, muſt have an eligibility ſuperior to them.

To hold forth any other attractive to the virtues, than the powerful one of pleaſure and utility, as it has no real foundation in nature, ſo it is ſuperfluous and unneceſſary. To every conſiderate mind, the ſentiment, that virtue is the true pleaſure, the chief delight, and joy of human life, and vice its pain and its diſtreſs, will be a ſufficient motive of action. The diſciple of wiſdom need only look around him to be convinced, by the cleareſt evidence, how this propoſition is proved an infallible truth. As no city can be happy in the midſt of ſedition, or family in the diſcord of its Lords, much leſs can the human mind, when at variance with itſelf, have any ſettled enjoyment. The predominance of the vicious paſſions, their tumult, and their contrariety to each other, baniſh all pleaſure, and envelope the ſenſes and the mind in a ferment of perturbation. To reſcue both from perpetual moleſtation, there is but one courſe, which common prudence points out. To diſtruſt the exceſs of deſire, and be reſerved in every emotion of the appetites and paſſions, is the ſafe counſel ſuggeſted by it. Philoſophy requires no more than the admiſſion of this principle, in order to diſplay the neceſſity and expediency of all her moral precepts. Upon it ſhe inſtitutes this rule, ſo uſeful and advantageous to the welfare of mankind, that the human deſires may well be diſtinguiſhed into ſuch as are both natural and neceſſary, and thoſe which are natural, yet not neceſſary; and a kind to which neither of theſe predicaments belong *. Of the neceſſary

* Ne naturales quidem multa deſiderant; propterea quod ipſa natura, divitias quibus contenta eſt, et parabiles, et terminatas habet. Inanium autem cupiditarum, nec modus ullus, nec finis inveniri poteſt. Cic. ibid.

ſary deſires, upon which life, in its ſimpleſt enjoyment, depends, the juſt eſtimate is, that they can be ſatisfied with no great labour or expence. Theſe that are natural may be reckoned to require but a moderate proviſion; ſince, as nature itſelf has contentment, ſo the meaſure of wealth adequate to it will be neither unlimited, or ſurpaſs commonability in the acquiſition. But of the laſt ſpecies, whether as to their meaſure or their end, no account can be taken. Theſe are the fictitious and unquenchable deſires, which have their ſource in ignorance and folly; and, if we behold the true pleaſures of life devoured by them, and that their impetuoſity, as well as extravagance, is inſufferable, how can we heſitate a moment to pronounce, that their turbulent rule is to be reprobated; and the gentle ſway of reaſon and virtue, theſe ſure guardians of peace and tranquillity, be ſubſtituted in their room. In this deciſion, we only teſtify that prudence is deſirable for the pleaſure it brings, and folly to be rejected for its many moleſtations. In a ſimilar manner, philoſophy inſtructs us to form a proper eſtimate of the pleaſures and pains of the body, and thoſe of the mind. Notwithſtanding both have their origin in the ſenſes, and whatever ſpecies of them the mind perceives, are referable to impreſſions made on the bodily organs; yet reaſon calls us to obſerve what difference there is in their energy, as it may affect the happineſs or miſery of human life *. Evident it appears, that the mental pleaſures and pains are greater than the corporeal ones. For, although, whenever the body is pained, the mind ſympathiſes, the former only is affected with what is preſent, but the latter with the remembrance of the paſt, and anxiety about the future. Suppoſing, even in the force of imagination, that we apprehend ſome mighty miſchief hanging over us, and that the pains of the mind are, in this way, vaſtly augmented beyond thoſe of the body; yet, as we may well learn to be under no ſuch dread, the abolition of the imaginary pain muſt be a pleaſure to us. Beſides, we naturally throw off the memory of any painful ſuffering, and willingly recal the impreſſions of pleaſure: So much, indeed, does the recollection of what has ſoothed the mind operate upon

* Nam corpore, nihil niſi praeſens, et quod adeſt, ſentire poſſumus; animo, autem et praeterita, et futura. Ibid.

us, that it may be reckoned, in the midſt of the ſevereſt bodily pains, to be that balm to the ſoul which damps the ſenſation of them. This conſtancy, at leaſt, the mind, with its capacity of recollection, and the habit of tranquillity, may diſcover in the worſt ſufferings of the body, and not only repel its painful feelings, but beget an intrepidity and firmneſs invincible by them.

When rectified opinions are, by reaſon and philoſophy, thus made to hold their place in the mind, and the natural and juſt principle embraced, that the greateſt good in body and in mind, with the neceſſary diſtinctions of true and falſe pleaſure inſiſted upon, is to be invariably ſought after, and the greateſt evil of both as conſtantly avoided; we may underſtand how the virtues of temperance, fortitude, juſtice, and others that are allied to them, become eligible. The attraction to them all, upon due inquiry, will appear to turn upon the deſire of pleaſure, and the ſenſe we have of it, either as individuals, or as joined with others in ſociety. Prudence muſt be owned to be their true parent; being that eye which nature has given men to diſcern their beſt good, and the way to attain it. It views every virtue in the light of a benefit; and therefore concludes it to be a deſirable diſpoſition. No pleaſure is, in itſelf, an evil; neither is intemperance avoided, or temperance obſerved, becauſe pleaſure is to be declined, but upon the rational and cogent motives that have been explained *. Temperance, therefore, is that virtuous affection which ſprings from the prudent admonition of the mind, with reſpect to the unhappy tendency of men's deſires and averſions, when their objects are blindly, and without controul, purſued. Indulging only the ſober demands of nature, it proves the quiet and peaceable ſatisfaction attending compliance with them. The intemperate cannot avoid altogether making the ſame judgment of what ought to be done, in order to obtain a real and laſting pleaſure. They are often known to reſolve, but have not the ſteadineſs to abide by their reſolutions. The dupes either of their deceitful imaginations of what is truly good, or betrayed by their inconſtancy, they run the diſaſtrous courſe

* *Temperantia* eſt, enim, quae in rebus aut expetendis, aut fugiendis, rationem ut ſequamur, monet. Ibid.

courſe of fools; or elſe, hover between the fits of remorſe and the ſtrength of their paſſions, diſſatisfied with their paſt conduct; and yet, ſtill addicted to follow the ſame courſe in future.

As temperance reſtrains the exceſſes of deſire and averſion, which are too commonly prevalent with men, *fortitude* does the ſame with regard to the impreſſions of fear; and from like ſentiments, ſuggeſted by reaſon, that the daſtardly ſoul is miſerable, and the brave one free from what is a continual perturbation *. It is not ſurely any laborious performance, or the ſufferance of pain, or trials of our patience, aſſiduity and vigilance, or what is ſo much commended under the name of induſtry, or fortitude itſelf, that engages us to be brave; but we are impelled to theſe exertions, that we may not live in conſtant dread and anxiety, but, as far as we can, bring our bodies and minds to a ſtate of tranquillity. Several particular motives conſpire to make us contemn that imbecillity of ſoul, by which many, to their ignominy, have abandoned their parents, friends, and country, and, moſt commonly, have alſo undone themſelves. Such a part can never be acted, but by the moſt abject of mankind. But the knowledge of what death is, according to a true conception of it, is alone ſufficient to elevate all noble ſouls above its terror, and to cauſe timidity of any tranſient pain, which precedes or attends it, to ceaſe. To *juſtice*, the ſame reaſoning will apply. If, as has been ſhewn, the exerciſe of prudence, temperance, and fortitude, is ſo conjoined with the ſentiment of pleaſure, that the ſeparation of them appears hardly conceivable, it may be preſumed, that the virtue of juſtice can be underſtood to have eſtimation in no other ſenſe but in that of a diſpoſition pleaſant and uſeful. Its prominent feature is to be injurious to none; but, on the contrary, to cheriſh always ſome affection or principle, which, in its nature or tendency, may compoſe the mind, or inſpire the hope that extreme want can never be incurred by thoſe in whom depraved nature does not prevail; and that, hence, any inducement or bias to injuſtice may be avoided. The circumſtances.

* Ex quo intelligitur, nec intemperantiam propter ſe fugiendam eſſe, temperantiamque expetendam, non quia voluptates fugiat, ſed quia majores conſequatur. Eodem *fortitudinis* ratio reperietur. Ibid.

cumſtances attending its practice, calmly obſerved, become ſtrikingly odious to the mind; and demonſtrate, that, with it, inward tranquillity and peace can never dwell. However ſecretly managed, its public diſcovery is always to be dreaded; and, even where the power, or exorbitant wealth of ſome, may make them bid defiance to the indignation or aſſaults of others, yet, generally, their apprehenſions are not altogether baniſhed, but often haunt them in another form. They are apt to impute the agitation of their minds, or any remorſe of their conſciences, to the diſpleaſure and wrath of the gods againſt them. To hazard incurring the leaſt of theſe vexations, no perſon of a ſound mind will be diſpoſed; but he will be ſenſible of many inducements men have to the obſervance of juſtice; and that, whether in narrow or in affluent circumſtances, much pleaſure and ſatisfaction will redound from it to them.

Here may be introduced a more particular explication of juſtice, which we find ſtated by Diogenes Laertius, as conformable to Epicurus's conception of it, when conſidered by itſelf *; and, if the queſtion was put, what idea could be entertained of it in the human mind, ſeparately from its acknowledged benefit and utility in civil ſociety? As it was a maxim in Epicurus's *Ethics*, that all good was naturally deſirable, ſo, he ſaid, that the deſire of juſtice, when apprehended under the idea of good, was to be accounted natural to mankind. If combined together in civil ſociety, for their general advantage, he allowed that a conception of it might be formed; but he denied that there was any thing implied in its idea, but what was relative to a political conſtitution. Without reference, therefore, to an agreement entered into by men in their aſſociated ſtate, juſtice was reckoned by him a mere name, and to be of no obligation. Hence, it took not place betwixt the human kind and irrational creatures, incapable of forming any ſuch contract. Tribes, or nations of men, who did not become parties in a covenant, could not be reckoned to do injuſtice to one another, or to commit mutual wrongs. Amongſt the members of the ſame community, juſtice is the equal diſtribution

* Ibid. in Epiſt. ad Menecaeum, in fine. Gaſſendus de vita, et moribus Epicuri; lib. 8. Sextus Empiricus Adverſ Mathem; lib 8. pag. 331.

ſtribution both of a common and a particular good, ſuppoſed to be found in it; but the extent of the diſtribution, and the equality and exactneſs with which it is made, can only be in proportion to the wiſdom of its conſtitution, and the due adminiſtration of its laws. No human policy is ſufficient to provide againſt all miſtakes; and the preſcriptions of juſtice can never be, at once, adapted to the variable circumſtances of civil ſociety. Although, therefore, a member of the community may hold that only to be right and juſt which is uſeful and profitable to the whole body, and conclude, that any treſpaſs upon this maxim is a breach of natural juſtice; yet, if wiſe and prudent, he will make allowances both for inevitable and undeſigned errors in the eſtabliſhed laws, eſpecially as theſe laſt may be corrected; and, unleſs the known obſtructions to public utility be inſiſted upon, inſtead of revolting from the ſociety, he will be contented with that meaſure of juſtice which the policy of the ſtate is calculated to produce; notwithſtanding it may be, in ſeveral caſes, rather the *ſymbol* and repreſentation of a public good to the conſtituents, than what is equal to the conception of a complete utility. Such was Epicurus's deſcant upon juſtice, in which we may trace the grounds of all the arguments uſed by ſome modern authors, who contend, as that philoſopher did, for its being no ſuch moral principle as benevolence, temperance, or fortitude, the propenſities to which may be found in man as an individual; while the ſentiment of juſtice cannot occur to him, unleſs he be joined to a public community; and, therefore, all its obligations muſt be derived from his being placed in that condition.

To conclude the ethical part of this philoſophy, it only remains to treat of friendſhip; upon which Epicurus pronounced the higheſt encomium, and with the more propriety, as the life he led with his friends might be quoted as a ſignal confirmation of its truth. Yet, his opponents alledged that friendſhip, in its true and genuine form, could not ſubſiſt amongſt thoſe who held pleaſure to be the chief good, and its perception to be the object of all the deſires of the ſoul *. According to this principle, ſaid they, our own pleaſures, and not thoſe of our friends, muſt be firſt and chiefly deſirable; and, therefore, the tie of friendſhip can

* Cicero, ibid. in fine.

can only be of the ungenerous and ſelfiſh kind, and ſought after upon the ſole view of its utility or convenience. To this objection ſeveral replies were made. Firſt, it was ſaid, that the ſenſe of pleaſure being attached to the exerciſe of all the virtues, it could not be otherwiſe in the caſe of friendſhip, which was calculated to receive, and to give the moſt abundant ſenſations of joy and delight; and that the pleaſures of our friends, and our own, being inſeparable, they became equal objects of our deſires: And hence Epicurus made it an apothegm, that wiſe men would be affected in the ſame manner towards their friends as to themſelves. But, if it was inſiſted upon, that, even in this view, the motive to friendſhip was not diſintereſted, but ſtill aroſe from the ſelfiſh deſire of pleaſure, the objection might be removed, by conſidering, that although the firſt inducement to it was utility, yet, in its uſage and habits, it might grow into the pureſt and moſt generous affection; ſo, towards certain objects that have, for a while, ſerved for our amuſement, we come to feel the attraction of love. Such ſympathetic affection is conceived by us for animals with which we have been converſant, and for places that have been long our reſort. How much more, then, may not the intimate correſpondence, and the exchange of kind offices we hold with men, beget in us the feeling of benevolence, and the pure and cordial love of our ſelect friends, without thought or conſideration of the benefit reſulting from our intercourſe with them? Laſtly, friendſhip may be more particularly regarded as a league amongſt the wiſe, into which they alone are qualified to enter, on account of the harmonious agreement of their ſentiments and manners. Where there is ſuch a ſimilarity of minds and diſpoſitions, the confederacy may well be ſupported upon the recogniſed ſentiment, that friends are induced to love one another no leſs than they do themſelves. That this may enſue is not barely conceivable, but what is known to have taken place in the cordial aſſociation of the wiſe and the virtuous in ſeveral ages. But enough has been ſaid to prove the general point, that, admitting pleaſure to be the chief good, no impediment ariſes to the intervention of pure and unmercenary friendſhip, which conſtitutes a neceſſary part of that ſupreme good, and cannot be inſtituted or enjoyed without pleaſure. Here, then, we finiſh the ſketch of Epicurus's *Ethics*, without extending

tending it to many particular precepts founded upon the ſcheme of them. It may only be obſerved, that it was part of the general doctrine, that the virtues were connected with one another, prudence being a common bond to them all; and, likewiſe, becauſe that principle itſelf had a conjoined influence with them upon a happy life. But their connection did by no means infer, as ſome philoſophers aſſert, an equality either amongſt them or the vices. As one man may be wiſer, ſo he may be more virtuous than another; and he may alſo leſs excel in ſome particular virtue than in another *. The ſuppoſed equality of the vices is, yet, a more palpable and hideous contradiction to the common ſenſe of mankind.

To the general ſcheme of the Epicurean morals, various remarks may belong; but the preceptive part of them muſt be allowed, in general, to be conſonant to the ſobereſt dictates of wiſdom and virtue. It was not againſt the latter of theſe that either the Stoics, or any of the ſtricter ſects, directed their objections; but the great diſputation was about admitting Epicurus's general principle, that pleaſure was the chief good; notwithſtanding he placed the efficiency of that good in the moral virtues. It was an ancient poſition in the ethical philoſophy, that pleaſure, taken in its common acceptation for the indulgence of the deſires, was adverſe to virtue. But it was not ſuppoſed, either in Socrates's diſſertations, or in the Platonic theory, or in that of Ariſtotle, that all pleaſure was inconſiſtent with virtue. On the contrary, in the fable of the Judgment of Hercules, it has been mentioned, as part of the argument, that the pleaſures of the ſenſes, although not to be cheriſhed, were beſt enjoyed when ſubjected to the rules of virtue †. Plato's diſtinctions of pleaſure into the real and deceitful, the temperate and intemperate, the ſteady and inconſtant, together with his other remarks, are philoſophically accurate and juſt, and nearly equivalent to Epicurus's *Canonics*, except in eſtimating, in a much higher degree, the good ariſing from the pleaſures of the mind, reaſon, and ſcience. The Peripatetics ac-

* ——— Queis paria eſſe placuit peccata,
Cum ventum ad verum eſt; ſenſus moreſque repugnant,
Atque ipſa utilitas, juſti, *prope* mater, et aequi.—Hor.

† Vid. Part V. Sect. 4. pag. 201.

counted thoſe ariſing from the corporeal ſenſes a deſirable good; but, in compariſon with the former, of a ſecondary and more imperfect kind. There appeared, indeed, to be little or no debate amongſt the philoſophers, about admitting the corporeal pleaſures to be, in a certain meaſure, ingredients in the requiſite enjoyments of life, until Ariſtippus vented his falſe and pernicious theory, that the higheſt felicity was no more than the ſum of all agreeable impreſſions made on the ſenſes. He was oppoſed in this doctrine by the Cynics and Stoics; the latter of whom pronounced bodily pleaſure to be only an accidental good, and pain to be no real evil.

Epicurus, a corporealiſt in *Phyſics*, and led, by his principles, to build much of any moral theory he might form upon the operation of the ſenſes, could not eaſily avoid an approach to the theory of the Cyrenaic philoſopher. As he placed the chief good of life in pleaſure, and the greateſt evil in pain, and held the ſources of both, whether corporeal or mental, to be ultimately referable to the ſenſes, Epicurus found, as has been obſerved, his explication of pleaſure, reſtricted as it was to exemption from pain *, attacked, with very pointed arguments, by the Cyrenaics; who denied that pleaſure could be felt in a ſtate void of agreeable emotions; which, at moſt, could be conceived to be no more than a dull inſenſibility to pain or pleaſure. The beſt reaſon that could be given why Epicurus advanced this controvertible tenet, was, that he could not throw off the corrupt and the licentious doctrine of the Cyrenaics in a more juſt and proper way, than by aſſigning a boundary to pleaſure, and affirming, that, beyond the ceſſation of pain, and tranquillity conſequent to it, there enſued no augmentation of delight. That he employed his principle to this moral purpoſe, is obſervable in ſeveral paſſages of the ſurvey taken of his reaſoning. It was uſed by him to condemn the excurſions of the inſatiable appetites and deſires, not only as inconſiſtent with true pleaſure, but as they were unauthoriſed by nature; which, upon due attention, would be found not to affect that which was boundleſs, but, by confining human felicity within a certain extent, to render it uniform, ſtable, and permanent.

This theory, however, was by no means reckoned juſt by Epicurus's opponents, who contended, that the abuſes of the natural and moderate deſires

* Vid. Part IV. Sect. 3. pag. 216.

deſires of pleaſures, could be no ſufficient reaſon for reſtraining the energy of theſe of the virtuous kind; and that nature itſelf contradicted the aſſertion, that the height of pleaſure conſiſted in the privation of pain, accompanied with tranquillity. It was confuted, they ſaid, even from what was obſervable among the inferior creatures, who ſhewed themſelves animated with more lively ſenſations of joy than what could ariſe from mere abſence of pain *. Men, beſide their rational faculties, being endowed with imagination and memory in a degree far ſuperior to the animal tribes, were not diſpoſed to reſt in a dull immunity from pain, but were eagerly bent on the exertion of all their faculties, and found ſuch pleaſure in it, that the attending toil and labour proved generally a great augmentation of their joy. It muſt be owned, indeed, that much, or the moſt conſiderable part of men's ſatisfactions, ariſe from the trials and uſes of their active powers. In the earlier ſtages of ſociety, they are inceſſantly prompted, by their wants, to the exerciſe of them. In any period of life, their ſuſpenſion cauſes languor; and when, with age, the ability fails, it is well if any recollection of paſt enjoyments can avail, to mitigate the inevitable dejection of the human mind.

It is evident that Epicurus could not explain in what manner that ſettled tranquillity, in which he placed ſupreme good, could be conſtituted upon his principles. It was not denied by him, but held as a fundamental doctrine, that the moderate pleaſure of the ſenſes conſiſted in their being moved in an exhilarating manner. But the bodily ſenſations, howſoever regulated, are of an importuning and reſtleſs kind, unleſs they be thrown into ſatiety; which is not the moſt agreeable condition. The commixture of them with the peaceful pleaſures of the mind, was a ſtrained union of two things, which cannot well be brought into concord; and yet, upon their ſuppoſed agreement, the maintainance of the Epicurean theory wholly depended. It was a proof that he held forth a moſt motely and defective ſcheme, when, after laying the foundation of all pleaſure in the body, and declaring the judgment of what was pleaſant or painful to be referable to the ſenſes, he could make the latter no further acceſſory to felicity, than by their being unannoyed with pain, and then having recourſe to the mind's tranquillity to eſtabliſh and perfect its imaginary form. How could he ſuppoſe, that the

* Plutarch, Adverſus Colotem.

beſt bodily conſtitution, with all poſſible attention paid to it, could be preſerved altogether from ſome uneaſy feeling for the ſpace of a few days, much leſs of weeks or months? And, as for an equal and conſtant tranquillity of mind, it ſurely required to be produced upon principles and ſentiments of a far more forcible influence than thoſe ſuggeſted by Epicurus. No other *anodyne* of pain, or preſervative of tranquillity, in the proſpect of death, could he bring forth from the fund of his philoſophy, than the remembrance of former pleaſures, afforded from converſations with his diſciples, and his own inventions, ſo much applauded by them *: Yet, it was his aſſertion, that, with ſuch ſupports, his wiſe man might, in the midſt of torments, exclaim, *how ſweet is the recollection of paſt joys?*

It may appear ſtrange, that the diſparity of their principles did not hinder two ſuch oppoſite theoriſts in philoſophy, as Epicurus and Zeno, to coincide nearly with each other, in a doctrine the hardeſt of any imaginable in practice. But, it is to be conſidered, that, in the philoſophy of every ſect, a meaſure of knowledge, or of virtue, of the utmoſt conſequence in human life, was held to be attainable. According to the Stoics, it was an intrepid and invincible conſtancy of ſoul, which defied all aſſaults of pain or perturbation. Amongſt the Epicureans, it was a calm and undiſturbed tranquillity of mind, that, although averſe to ſuffering pain, could yet endure it, when inevitable, with courage: And, with the Sceptics, it was an indifference with reſpect to all opinions, and unconcern about all accidents in life. By what means the human conſtitution might be thrown into theſe attitudes, was to be learned from the detail of their moral theories. In them, it muſt be allowed, there was a great difference as to their conceivable efficacy. But, when Epicurus ſo highly exalted the influence of his principles, we muſt either ſuppoſe that enthuſiaſm may ariſe from the bareſt grounds; or, that ſuch a temperament of the ſoul, as he alledged to be communicable to his wiſe man, muſt have proceeded more from nature, than from philoſophic inſtruction.

Beſide

* Cicero puts this aſſertion of Epicurus in a yet more extravagant and ridiculous light. Epicurus, vero, ea dicit, ut mihi quidem riſus captare videatur; affirmat enim quodam loco, ſi uratur ſapiens, ſi crucietur,—dicet, Quam ſuave eſt hoc, quam hoc non curo?—Tuſcul. Quaeſt. lib. 2. pag. 132.

Beſide throwing off any notion of man's dignity, as he participates of a rational nature, and is an agent in that ſphere, Epicurus did not admit any ſentiment of virtue, as, in itſelf, an object lovely and deſirable to the human mind. The epithets applied to it by other philoſophers, of beautiful and graceful, of noble and becoming, he rejected as words of empty ſound. He contended, as has been ſhown, that any virtuous action had no other charm beyond the pleaſure and benefit found in its performance. Yet, in every community of mankind, it appears, that ſome mental object has always been regarded as a noble and dignified one in itſelf, without the benefit or advantage attending it being conſidered. In the rude ſtate of human ſociety, the attraction to it may be hardly diſtinguiſhable from the indiſcriminate diſplay of man's active powers; and, often, to exhibit as much the energy of his paſſions, as his direct ſenſe of a virtuous principle; yet, it has been generally found to be connected with the image of virtue, and to imply the approbation of what is really praiſe worthy. Although the object may be narrow, and chiefly reſpective of the defence or credit of the ſmall ſociety to which he belongs, it proves that man, aſſociated with his kind, is immediately carried beyond his ſelfiſh concerns. In his earlieſt age, he begins to act for the ſervice of thoſe with whom he is connected, and delights in nothing ſo much as employing his feeble ſtrength to that purpoſe. Gradually ſenſible of the value of his faculties, that are uſeful to others, and to the praiſe that follows the exerciſe of them, he cheriſhes an obliging diſpoſition, until, by its becoming habitual to him, he performs the moſt generous and laudable actions. The ſenſe of the public good appearing moſt venerable in his eyes, his private affections are controuled by it, and the moral virtues embraced with ardor. To be brave in public danger; to be induſtrious in ſtudying the arts of peace; and to be prudent, temperate, and humane, in the conduct and manners of common life; are diſpoſitions that ſuit the temperament of his ſoul, and he exults in exerting them, as the ſure and only guardians of the general good.

Theſe traits of the human character are not aſſumed from any fictitious picture: They are no more than what many of the founders of ſtates, and the legiſlators and patriots, in the primitive ages of the world, are

are known to have exhibited. It may be truly ſaid of them, that they knew not what it was to act from the motive of particular good, or benefit to themſelves; when they triumphed in war, and yet were not led, by pride or ambition, to lift their heads above their fellow citizens, or to extend their deſires of the private enjoyments of life beyond the ſober requiſitions of nature. Some of them choſe to retire from public action, leſt it ſhould be apprehended, that their influence in the ſtate might treſpaſs upon the equality of its members. Others refuſed ſuperior authority, when offered them. There were thoſe, alſo, who, after framing a body of laws for their country, and obtaining their inſtitution by the public ſuffrage, and with a ſolemn engagement for their being obſerved, betook themſelves to a voluntary exile, and reſigned all participation of the good they had communicated to others, and of the happy effects of that form of government, which it was their greateſt glory to have deviſed. But, it may be aſked, are theſe noble examples of diſintereſted and virtuous affection to be found only in the firſt ſtages of civil ſociety? To this, it may be anſwered, that they ſhine forth, then, in their true colours, and genuine luſtre; and from obvious reaſons.

When governments include many cities, and great multitudes of men, the public good becomes a diſtant and complicated object; intelligible only, and capable of being attended to, but by a certain number of the community. To the generality, the view of it is loſt, and the ſenſe of acting with a regard to it, is almoſt extinguiſhed. Guardians are hired, with the honours and emoluments of the ſtate, to watch over its intereſt; and every one thinks he has a title to be hired for any exertion he makes in its behalf. The diſpoſition found amongſt the virtuous few to act a noble and a generous part, being deprived of its object, languiſhes, or is contracted within the narrow bounds of a family good, or a party intereſt. With warm inclinations, and eminent abilities, to advance the public wellfare, the patriot diſappears; or is only viſible in the characters of a worthy father, an agreeable aſſociate, and a cordial and diſintereſted friend. The rectitude and honeſty of his views, the firmneſs of his mind, and the humanity and generoſity of his ſchemes, that are diſtinguiſhable in any public ſcene, prove the principles of the moſt

moſt exalted virtue to be alive in his breaſt; but under diſadvantages for their exertion, from their being generally diſregarded. The indulged operation of the mean and ignoble paſſions having now produced its effect, men's minds are averſe to any other impreſſions but ſuch as coincide with the love of pleaſure, or private good; and the maxim of Epicurus's ſchool is the predominant one with them, *that the wiſe man does all things for his own ſake;* as if he had neither from nature, nor from a ſentiment of what was becoming him, any diſpoſition to the practice of the virtues, or ought to trouble himſelf about them, unleſs from the inducement of the private advantage they procure. Yet, moſt men would be aſhamed to declare, that they found in themſelves little or no propenſity to the love of ſociety, to compaſſion, to friendſhip, to gratitude, to equity, to fidelity, and to conſtancy of mind, or character; but according as they apprehended theſe qualities to advance their particular intereſt.

Beſide the influence of the ſocial affections, which tranſcend all ſelfiſh concerns, and carry men directly to their objects, there are other principles in the human conſtitution that operate much in the ſame manner. The human mind itſelf, naturally, forms a ſentiment of what is decent and honourable in deportment and behaviour. Actions are done, for no other reaſon but becauſe they appear fit and worthy of us, as men; who, from obſerving what is beautiful or deformed in external objects, readily transfer theſe perceptions to the manners and conduct of human life. Order and regularity in them are approved; and a ſenſe of character, from a conformity to a moral rule, is produced; and, together with it, the deſire of honeſt fame. In the progreſs of civil ſociety, men's natural thirſt of knowledge is increaſed, and extended to the invention and improvement of all uſeful and beneficent arts. They launch forth into the more ſpeculative ſciences, for the ſake of contemplating truth, ſimply, and in its abſtract forms. Any theory, therefore, which, like that of Epicurus, would reſolve all the energies and principles of the human conſtitution into a deſire of pleaſure, muſt be accounted altogether erroneous and defective *. We are, ſurely, ſays Cicero, in the concluſion of his argument with Torquatus, deſtined for ſome higher and nobler purpoſe, than that of having pleaſure for our main object in life;

* De Finib. Bonor. et Malor. lib 2. pag. 70.

life; endowed as we are not only with memories, retentive of numberleſs things, but with a ſagacity that foreſees and anticipates the conſequences of actions, to a degree of certainty that differs little from divination. Modeſty, likewiſe, and a ſenſe of ſhame, reſtrain our inordinate affections; and, beſide the ſenſe of juſtice, which forms the band of human ſociety, an invincible patience and reſolution is teſtified, in enduring toils, and encountering dangers; ſo that pain and death appear contemptible to us. Even our bodily ability for action avails to corroborate the vigour of our minds; and any one who has the leaſt of a manly ſpirit, ſubmits not eaſily to have that diffuſion of pleaſure thro' all the ſenſes, which, enervating nature, depreſſes and ſtupifies the ſoul; and yet this muſt be underſtood to be the ſtate contended for by Epicurus, as the perfection of human felicity. Hence it appears, why, amongſt all the arts cultivated among men as praiſe worthy, the ſtudy of pleaſure has not obtained an honourable name; and, although favoured in the ſongs of the looſer poets, it is not what Homer, Archilochus, or Pindar, have extolled in their heroes; nor has it ever raiſed an honourable monument, or furniſhed a laudible inſcription, to the memory of any of its profeſſed votaries.

In concluding the remarks upon Epicurus's ethical theory, it may be obſerved, in general, that it coincides more with the ſelfiſh than the benevolent ſcheme of morals. It holds forth the deſire of pleaſure to be ſo much the predominant affection of human nature, that the indication given of any more generous motive, is to be conſidered as only a modified ſpecies of ſelf-love. The theory, taken up in this view, although not explicitly ſtated by Epicurus, gave occaſion to ſome diſputation among the ancient philoſophers, whether the human heart was diſpoſed to pure benevolence? but the queſtion has ſerved more to perplex the inveſtigation of the modern theoriſts in morals. How men, allowing them to be poſſeſſed of diſintereſted affections, can exerciſe them without pleaſing themſelves, became a ſtumbling point in the controverſy, and appeared to defy metaphyſical refinement to reſolve it. The argument proceeded, as if ſelf-love and benevolence were inconſiſtent principles; and that it was neceſſary to adopt the one or the other in any juſt theory of the human mind. After various diſquiſitions of this kind,

a conjunction of the two was held forth; and ſympathetic affection repreſented to be the beſt explication of the energies of both. The ſcheme, alſo, has undergone ſome modifications, which brought it nearer to the original one of Epicurus, by conſidering the virtues of the human mind under the predicaments of being agreeable perceptions to ourſelves and others, and likewiſe as utilities of the ſame import. Hardly could more invention and ingenious argument be thrown together, in ſupport of any hypotheſis, than what is diſplayed upon theſe aſſumed principles of morality. But perceptions of what is agreeable or pleaſant in objects, denote qualities in them too general and indefinite to reach the proper delineation of the virtues, and diſtinguiſh them ſufficiently from the vices; more eſpecially when the bodily endowments, and thoſe of the mind, are ranked together as of equal eſtimation. Knowledge, wit, courage, aſſiduity, or dexterity in buſineſs, are both agreeable and uſeful qualities; but, if improperly employed, they cannot have the denomination or value of moral virtues. The eſtimate, therefore, of moral principles by ſuch characteriſtics, muſt be, at leaſt, an imperfect one. But, although in the diſplay of the ancient ſyſtems of philoſophy, we ſtill ſtrike the ground of ſome modern theory, our remarks here cannot be extended to particular diſcuſſions. After ſo lengthened an expoſition of Epicurus's philoſophy, we come now to exhibit the poſtponed one of Zeno and the Stoics, whoſe eminent fame was hardly equalled by any of the Grecian ſects.

PART IX.

SECTION I.

The Porch, or Stoical School inſtituted by Zeno.—His Character and Manners; and the Fame of his School.—His Succeſſors in it, of eminent reputation.

CITIUM, a ſmall Greek town in the iſland of Cyprus, but chiefly inhabited by the Phoenicians, was the place of Zeno's nativity *. Hence the appellation of Citieus, Phoenicus, and that of *Paenulus*, by Cicero, were given him. His father's trade of merchandize had occaſioned his viſiting Athens: Whether after his firſt or ſecond voyage, an accident is ſaid to have happened to the ſhip, which being wrecked in the entrance to the harbour, his whole fortune was loſt with it. His dejection had carried him to the ſhop of a bookſeller; where, finding one of Xenophon's pieces, he was captivated with the reading of it; and aſked where thoſe men called Philoſophers were to be met with? "There goes one of them," ſaid his aſſociate; while he pointed to Crates, the *Cynic*, as he paſſed by. He immediately reſolved to be his follower †. "It is well done of fortune," ſaid he, "for now I ſhall have no con-

* Suidas, in voce *Zeno*. Cicero de Finibus, lib 4. Diog. Laert. lib. 7. p. 369. Strabo, lib. 14. † Seneca de Tranquillitate Animi, tom. 2. pag. 327. Plutarch. de Tranquillitate.

cerns but about my cloke and philoſophy." It appears probable, however, that this was not his firſt acquaintance with the writings of the philoſophers; as the ſtory is differently told, and his father is ſaid to have bought, and carried home to him, ſome books of the *Socratics*. Attached as he became to Crates, no courſe taken with him availed to vanquiſh his natural modeſty, and give him a daſh of the Cynic impudence. His firſt literary production, *de Republica*, was alledged to have ſome taints of Cyniciſm; and ſaid, ironically, to be wrote *under the tail of the Dog*. He ſoon turned to other inſtructors in philoſophy; and, after hearing Stilpo for ſeveral years, he became Polemo's diſciple, along with Arceſilas. Surpaſſing the latter in age and erudition, he diſtinguiſhed himſelf, above all his diſciples, by many ſubtile diſputations. The import of theſe maintained againſt Arceſilas have been mentioned. Polemo ſaw that he would not acquieſce in the doctrine of the Academy; and ſaid, *that he only meant to convert it to his own profit, after the manner of the Phœnicians*.

Inſtructed in the tenets of the more ancient philoſophers, and converſant in the debated opinions of his own time, he inſtituted a ſchool in Athens, firſt called the Zenonian, but ſoon celebrated under the name of the *Porch*, where it convened *; and which was diſtinguiſhed from other ſuch *fabrics*, by a variety of pictures hung up in it; ſeveral of them the works of Polygnotus, Mycon, and Pandaenus, Phidias's brother, and other famous artiſts. The concourſe of diſciples to the *Stoical* ſchool was great, on account of the reputation of its founder. Conſtant in ſtudy, indefatigable in the exerciſe of his abilities, his manner of life exemplified temperance, and moderation in all his deſires, approaching to ſeverity; but which offended not by any Cynic diſregard of modeſty and *decorum*. Although a ſtranger to the Grecian conviviality, he was not unſocial, unleſs when threatened with a number of companions. When the populace flocked around him in his walks, he diſperſed them by ſome diſtributions of money; with reſpect to which he teſtified the greateſt indifference; and a diſdain, if it was offered to him by the rich, as an acceptable gratuity. "In caſe you need any thing," ſaid Democharis,

* Diogen. Laert. ibid. Pauſanias Atticis, lib. i. pag. 27.—30.

charis, ſaluting him, "I ſhall write to Antigonus, who will immediately ſupply your wants." Zeno made no reply; but was obſerved, ever after, to decline converſing with him. His correſpondence, however, with the King of Macedonia was honourable for both, on account of the regard ſhown by the monarch to a man of his character, and the proper acknowledgment of the honour done him by the philoſopher, although he complied not with the generous requeſt made to him *. He went frequently to ſup with Antigonus, when he came to Athens; and their friendſhip continued until Zeno's death; when the King expreſſed his regret in terms that ſignified how much he had been ſtruck with the leading features of his character, equanimity and conſtancy. "What a ſurpriſing ſpectacle of a man have I loſt!" ſaid he, "my admiration of him was more eſpecially excited, by obſerving that all the honours I could do him, or the benefits I offered; had no effect, either in changing his behaviour to pride, or to the affectation of more humility."

He was of a dark complexion, and rather moroſe in his aſpect; and, ſlender as he was in his make, he wore only, beſide his cloke, a thin *tunic* †; which ſome ſaid, was but a ſlight remove from the nakedneſs of the Cynic. Abſtemious, and frugal in his diet, and contenting himſelf, chiefly, with vegetable food, he lived to a great age, with a conſiſtency of manners that appeared to reſtrain man's natural, as well as his extravagant affections; yet Laertius adds, rather with a note of ſurpriſe, *his life was that of great felicity*. In the opinion of the Athenians, he ſuſtained the character of a philoſopher, with propriety, and ſingular advantage to the morals of the youth; which needed the correction his philoſophy preſcribed ‡. From the public eſtimation of his virtuous principles, and upright conduct, the keys of the city were often depoſited at his houſe, as the ſafeſt cuſtody. At his death, a decree paſſed for erecting,

* Diogen Laert. ibid.

† Hence the adverſaries of his ſect alledged, that the *tunic* made all the difference there was betwixt it and the *Cynics*;—according to the lines of the poet,

Et qui nec Cynicos, nec Stoica dogmata curat,
A Cynicis, *tunica* diſtantia.—Juven. Sat. 13.

‡ Ibid.

erecting, at the public charge, a ſepulchral monument to him in the *Ceramicus*. His lengthened years were reckoned to exceed ninety; and his attendance upon his ſchool comprehended more than fifty of them. Infirmity cauſing him to fall, as he came from his auditory, he broke a finger. Striking the ground with his hand, he expreſſed himſelf, as *Niobe* did in the tragedy, "*I come*, why do you puſh me?" It was againſt his philoſophy *to be driven to his exit*; or that it ſhould not be in him the act of his will, concurring with nature: He therefore reſolved to live no longer, leſt he might incur another ſurpriſe; and either by ſtarving, or ſtrangling himſelf, put an end to his life. The time of his flouriſhing was about the 120th Olympiad; ſo that, having anticipated the Epicurean philoſophy, then only beginning to be known, we muſt look back at leaſt thirty years in chronology, to keep in our view the progreſs of philoſophy in the ſchools.

Zeno appeared at a period when the diſputes in the Platonic Academy, encouraged by Arceſilas, ſet its diſciples at variance about their tenets, and ſpread amongſt them the ſeeds of unlimited ſcepticiſm. In theſe conteſts, Zeno played the dialectician with ſignal applauſe; and became the more enamoured of the art, in which he was acknowledged to excel his rivals. It has been often remarked, how blindly idoliſed the faculty of diſputation was amongſt the Greeks; and the value of philoſophy, and the merit of philoſophers, eſtimated by ſuperiority in it. Although the Dialectic was not properly reckoned a part of philoſophy, it was allowed to hold the reins in every diſcuſſion; and was, in a great degree, rendered itſelf ſyſtematic, before Ariſtotle's ſyllogiſtical rules came to light. Zeno ſtudied to perfect it, not ſo much by rules, as by frivolous diſtinctions, and the coinage of new words. In theſe, ſays Cicero *, he was an architect and innovator; while in things themſelves he hardly diſcovered his invention; but rather treated what others had advanced before in his own peculiar ſtile. He was followed cloſe in this

* Quamquam ex omnibus philoſophis, Stoici, plurima (verba) nominaverunt. Zeno quoque, eorum princeps, non tam rerum inventor fuit, quem novorum verborum; De Finib. lib. 3. Advena quidem, et ignobilis verborum opifex; Tuſcul. Quæſt. Stoicorum autem non ignoras quam ſit ſubtile, vel ſpinoſum potius, diſſerendi genus; De Finib. ibid.

this tract by the diſciples of his ſchool; ſo that, in the dialectic, a phraſeology obſcure, which had often no more meaning than propriety, and in the moral part of their philoſophy, various paradoxical ſentences, appeared more to darken and perplex its ſtudy, than to recommend it: Yet, from the admiration that always followed the deluſion of the logical art, and from the high ſtrain of moral virtue it held forth, there was no ſect that roſe to more general reputation. Further to characteriſe its principles, would only anticipate what will be better underſtood from their detail. We ſhall only obſerve, that Zeno's revolt from the *Cynoſarges* did not imply his abandoning the principles of that ſchool. Thoſe he maintained relative to the practice of virtue, were, materially, the ſame with the ſketch that has been given of *Antiſthenes's* tenets, which laid the foundation of the Cynic ſect. The indecencies of the latter were corrected by him; and its uncouth precepts delivered in a ſmoother form. The Stoics, however, were often put in mind, by their adverſaries, of their original, and their near affinity to the Cynics; which Zeno owned, and did not conſider as any reproach. His treatiſe of a *Republic*, although it contained ſome ſingular inſtitutions, and tended to diſcredit that of Plato, was held in much eſteem. One doctrine recited by Plutarch *, was much inſiſted upon in it. "Men," it was affirmed, "ought not to be ranged in diviſions, by ſeparate cities and towns, and under diſtinct laws, but live and unite, upon the more humane and liberal principle, that they were all of the ſame country, and citizenſhip; and that, as a flock of the ſame fold, no other than one order of life and manners ſhould be inſtituted amongſt them; and the right of common paſture the only one claimed." We ſhall afterwards ſee in what ſenſe a poſition, ſimilar to this very extraordinary one, was admitted into the moral ſyſtem. Laertius has enumerated Zeno's other works, with the commendation, that none of his ſect excelled him in philoſophic diſcourſes. He had, however, many able and diſtinguiſhed followers.

Of theſe, to be now particularly mentioned, the two principal were Cleanthes and Chryſippus, who ſucceeded Zeno in the *Porch*. The firſt was

* De Fortitudine Alex. Mag.

was a native of Aſſus in Lycia, but ſo poor as to be of no occupation, except what his bodily ſtrength enabled him to follow, for his ſuſtenance. A wreſtler in his own country, he took his courſe to Athens, in the condition of one who offered himſelf to any labour *. When he ſought employment from Crates, all his ſtock was four *drachmæ*; but he undertook work in the night, to be at liberty to attend the Cynic through the day. He next followed the ſtudents who went to hear Zeno, and gave ſuch attendance as he could in the Porch, without being diſturbed; until a ſummons was given him, from the magiſtracy, to declare how he, who looked ſo healthful and robuſt, ſubſiſted himſelf without employment. He repelled the penal indictment, by proving, teſtimonially, that, at one time, he drew water for a gardener; and, at another, he wrought for hire at the corn mill; and, by ſuch labour, in the hours of night, he gained what was ſufficient to maintain him, without working through the day. His painful induſtry, eſpecially when the motive to it was conſidered, excited admiration; and a gift of ten *minae* was ordered to be made him; but Zeno adviſed him not to accept it. He wiſhed to ſhow, from his example, how independency might be attained, in the loweſt condition of life, by honeſt labour; and that what Cleanthes had in that way performed was a reproach to thoſe, who, although no ſuch exertion was required of them, and all convenience of time was their own, employed it, not as they ought, either in profitable labour, or in ſuitable ſtudy. At his requeſt, Cleanthes brought him an *obolus*, as what he could eaſily ſpare, daily, from his maintenance. A purſe of the ſavings being made, Zeno, in a ſhort time, produced it at the *Porch*. "Behold," ſaid he to the ſtudents, "What you will hardly believe: Cleanthes is not only able to live, but this ſum he has gained is a teſtimony, that he could ſupport another ſuch as himſelf. He alſo finds time to ſtudy philoſophy: Yet how many are there, who not being in want of neceſſaries, would not decline a better ſubſiſtance at other people's expence; and ſome ſtudents of philoſophy there appear to be, who diſcover not half his deſire of knowledge, or ſpare half the time that he does to acquire it."

There

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 7.

There is no reaſonable aim which may not, in ſome meaſure, be attained by aſſiduity and patience. Cleanthes, unfurniſhed with tablets, wrote notes of Zeno's lectures upon ſhells and bones. Of a ſlow capacity, and as he appeared, in compariſon with the other ſtudents, naturally dull, he was called the *Aſs* amongſt them; as Xenocrates had been, when matched with Ariſtotle in the academy of Plato. "If I be ſo," ſaid he, "I only bear Zeno's burthen." He proceeded, however, in his courſe with ſo much attention and pains, that nothing in that philoſopher's theory appeared to have eſcaped him; and Zeno gave the moſt ample atteſtation to his perfect comprehenſion of the principles of his ſyſtem. The impreſſion the marked virtue of his character made upon all, contributed, as much as his ſurpriſing advancement in knowledge, to raiſe him high in the public eſteem. After nineteen years of attendance upon Zeno, none was accounted more worthy to ſucceed him in the Porch. He filled that place with great ability; and his publications, which were more numerous than thoſe of Zeno, hardly fell ſhort of equal approbation *. Hence the encomiaſtic title of *Father of the Stoics*, and other ſimilar epithets, are, by Cicero, affixed to his name. Simplicius, in his Commentaries upon Epictetus †, has mentioned his ſeeing a fine ſtatue of him, erected long after his time, in *Aſſus*; at the requeſt, as it would appear, of the citizens, and by the magnificent generoſity of the Roman Senate. The monument of him, and the only one from the original, tranſmitted to us, is of a nobler kind than any of braſs or marble; and, as it has done, will ſurvive many a *metallic* effigy. It is his celebrated, and often quoted, hymn to the ſupreme God, or *Jupiter*, known to men under various names. Amongſt his other works, Laertius mentions one of *Fabulous Traditions*. The explication of theſe, called *Archaeologies*, or antiquities of proper names, was made, by the Stoics, an appendage to their Phyſical ſyſtem. Cleanthes died much in the ſame manner, and, as Lucian reports ‡, nearly at the ſame advanced age, as Zeno. Finding an ulcerous ſwelling under his tongue, he faſted two days, by the advice of his phyſicians, as a remedy for it. Upon appearance of ſuc-

* Academ. Quaeſt. † Comment. in Enchirid. cap. ult.
‡ Dialog. de Longaevis.

ceſs in the cure, he was deſired to take meat, but in vain. "I have got," ſaid he, "ſo far in the way to my exit, that I think it now unfit to turn back." By continuing to faſt two days longer, he expired. As he diſſented in nothing from Zeno, ſo he appeared to follow his example in death.

Chryſippus, who, more properly, may be ſaid to have been Cleanthes's hearer than his diſciple, was ſucceſſor to him in the Stoical ſchool. He ſtudied under ſeveral other philoſophers; but he was of a genius not to be curbed by authority, or unhinged by attachment. A natural and firſt born ſon of the logical art, he held no opinions but what he thought might be traced out by it; and believed himſelf capable of diſcovering all its ſhelves and depths. "Give me only the topics," ſaid he, "and I ſhall find the proofs *." The acuteneſs of his genius, the extent of his imagination, and his general erudition, were acknowledged; but his preſumption was ſtill ſuperior to theſe qualifications. His treatiſes of the Dialectic, which were vaſtly numerous, if thoſe of Ariſtotle had been loſt, would probably have long been the chief food of the ſchools; and, notwithſtanding Epicurus's *Canonics*, they had, for a conſiderable time, an extenſive credit and fame. It was ſaid, that, without him, the *Porch* could not have ſtood; and he may be allowed, in reſpect of his logical aid, to have been to it a ſort of *key-ſtone*. For, although he differed from Zeno and Cleanthes in various points, yet, as intricate diſputation of every kind was his delight, he took up the controverſy in behalf of their ſyſtem, where it appeared to be moſt exceptionable or extravagant †. He even made it part of his glory, in debate, to ſhow that he underſtood how to manage an argument better than thoſe had done, who either maintained or controverted it. His arrogance, in this way, often carried him into abſurd and contradictory aſſertions. In the oſtentation of his ingenuity, he furniſhed Carneades, as Cicero obſerves, with weapons againſt

* Diogen. Laert. lib. 7. pag. 478. Cicero de Natur. Deor. lib. 2.; et Tuſc. Quaeſt. lib. 1.—Permulta alia colligit Chryſippus, ut eſt in omni hiſtoria curioſus.

† Jam vero Chryſippus, qui Stoicorum ſomniorum vaferrimus habetur interpres. Cicero de Nat. Deor. ibid. pag. 201.—Chryſippus, dum ſtudioſe omnia conqueſivit contra ſenſus et perſpicuitatem, &c. ipſum ſibi reſpondentem, inferiorem ſe fuiſſe, et armatum ab eo eſſe Carneadem.

againſt himſelf. The ſide of the queſtion he ſupported, was frequently found to loſe more than it gained by his ambiguities. The Stoics of his time derived, indeed, ſome preſent advantage from the logical duſt he raiſed in their defence. They aſſumed his dialectic into their philoſophy; but they became ſenſible of its futility. He was alledged to have rather miſrepreſented ſeveral of their tenets, than illuſtrated them *. Seneca complains of his ſubtiliſing to ſuch a degree, as to invalidate his own arguments; and Arrian and Epictetus ſpeak of him with little reſpect. He wrote upwards of ſeven hundred volumes; of which almoſt the one half was upon Logics. In the *farrago* of his works, every thing might be found; but much quoted from other authors, and much of his own repeated, but little treated with ſufficient accuracy. To recite ſome of his dialectical arguments, although thought brilliant, hardly would afford entertainment. His moſt memorable one is that, in which he endeavoured to prove the Stoical doctrine of *fate*, or neceſſity, to be reconcilable with human liberty; but the account of it will be more properly introduced in the concluſion of the dialectics of this philoſophy.

He was a native of Soli, a town in Cilicia; but, his father having emigrated from Tarſis, he is, by ſome authors, denominated from that place. In private life, the incidents related of him are inconſiderable. His morals were without reproach. He lived in privacy, and in the ſobereſt manner. To ſurpaſs all his predeceſſors in voluminous writing, ſeemed to be his chief ambition and employment, and alſo his foible. When, in Cleanthes's regency, Ptolemy Philopater requeſted to have one of his diſciples ſent to his court, Sphaerus accepted the miſſion, when Chryſippus declined it. He dedicated none of his books to princes, although many of them, as we ſee from Laertius's catalogue, were inſcribed to literary men, or particular friends. The manner of his death is differently related. He is ſaid to have died either of a draught

* Eum (Chryſippum) in ordinem cogere audeo; magnum virum, ſed tamen Graecum, cujus acumen *nimis tenue* retunditur, et in ſe ſaepe replicatur, Etiam cum agere aliquid videtur, pungit, non perforat. De Beneficiis, cap. 4.—Cicero's account of his embarraſment, with the ſophiſm of the *Sorites*, is curious. Acad. Quaeſt. lib 4.

of wine, taken after ſome ſacrifice, or of an exceſſive fit of laughter upon ſeeing an aſs eat figs. At the age of eighty, or, at the loweſt computation, of ſeventy-three, a ſlight diſorder might have occaſioned it. Athens honoured him with a ſtatue in the *Ceramicus*. His death enſued, according to Apollodorus, in the 143d Olympiad.

Having, for brevity's ſake, omitted to mention Perſaeus, Herillus, Ariſto Chius, Dionyſius Heracleotes, and others, who were Zeno's immediate diſciples, together with Cleanthes, ſo we bring not into particular view the appearances made, as philoſophers of the Porch, by Zeno Sidonius, Diogenes Babylonius, already mentioned as one of the three philoſophers ſent from Athens on an embaſſy to Rome, and Antipater, alſo ſaid to have been of Sidon, who were bred in Chryſippus's ſchool, and had eminent reputation. In ſtill a later period, Panaetius and Poſidonius flouriſhed; of whom the one lived near, and the other in, Cicero's time; and to whoſe ingenuity and erudition he gives the higheſt commendation *. It is enough to aſcertain the worth and merit of the firſt, that we know he lived in domeſtic intimacy and friendſhip with Scipio and Laelius. "Our hiſtory tells us," ſays the Roman Academic, "that Scipio Africanus †, going as ambaſſador to the Kings of that continent whence he took his honourable name, carried alongſt with him but one companion, Panaetius the Stoic." Cicero, for ſome time, attended the philoſophical lectures of the ſecond at Rhodes; and, amongſt other teſtimonies to his ſcientific knowledge, he mentions his having made a ſphere ‡, conſtructed ſo artificially as to repreſent the converſions of the ſun and the moon, and the five planets, exactly as they took place every day and night in the heavens. Although a native of Apamea in Syria, he not only held a public ſchool of philoſophy in Rhodes, but had a ſhare in the civil government of the city ‖. The honour done him by Pompey, then returning from his Aſiatic victories §, that got him the ſurname

* Panaetius, princeps, meo quidem judicio, prope Stoicorum. Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 4. Homo in primis ingenuus et gravis; dignus illa familiaritate Scipionis et Laelii. De Fin. lib. 4.

† Accad. Quaeſt. lib. 4. pag. 11. ‡ De Natur. Deor. lib. 2. pag. 227.

‖ Strabo, lib. 16. § Cicero Tuſcul. Quaeſt. lib. 3. pag. 146. Plin. Hiſt. Natur. lib. 7. cap. 30.

ſurname of *the Great*, is generally known from the narratives of Cicero and Pliny. The Roman general had turned out of his way, to have the pleaſure of hearing him diſcourſe. When arrived at his gate, he forbid the door to be ſtruck, as uſual, by the Lictor, or the Conſular faſces to be carried before him. Finding Poſidonius fixed to his bed, from violent pains of the gout, he was on the point of departing, after expreſſing his concern for his indiſpoſition: But the philoſopher would not allow him to go, without being, in ſome meaſure, gratified in what he underſtood was deſirable to him. In diſtreſs as he was, Poſidonius made his utmoſt effort to diſcuſs the Stoical topic, *that nothing was good, but what was honeſt.* His diſcourſe was frequently interrupted by fits of ſevere pain; but, inſtead of deſiſting, and owning himſelf vanquiſhed by it, he only exclaimed, "O! Pain, thou art troubleſome, but it is to no purpoſe; for I will not confeſs thee to be an evil." Beſides theſe, there were ſome others that might be added to the liſt of the eminent diſciples of the Porch, prior to the Auguſtan age; but as, in treating the Stoical philoſophy, notice muſt be taken of ſome of thoſe already named, who diſſented in particular points from Zeno's doctrine, we ſhall here mark a new Section, that will be introduced with an account of the Dialectical or preliminary part of Zeno's philoſophy, and conclude with his *Phyſics* and *Theology*.

SECT.

SECTION II.

Zeno's diviſion of Philoſophy.—The Dialectical part.—Human perceptions, and aſſociations of Ideas.—Stoical doctrine of Fate and Neceſſity.—Opinions of ancient Philoſophers upon the ſubject.—Chryſippus's argumentation.—Reaſonings of ancient and modern authors on Liberty and Neceſſity.—General principles of Phyſics and Theology, according to the theories of the Stoics.

ZENO divided philoſophy into Logics, Phyſics, and Ethics; but ſome of his earlieſt followers inverted this order *; and others of them made the diviſion a moſt complex one. Its parts were called *places;* which might, metaphorically, be conſidered as *genera* and *ſpecies.* It was thought, that, with propriety enough, philoſophy might be compared to an *animal;* in which Phyſics formed the blood and fleſh, Logic the bones, and Ethics the ſoul †; or to an *egg*, conſiſting of the ſhell, and its contents; or to a *planted field;* Logics correſponding to the hedge, Phyſics to the trees, or ground, and Ethics to the fruit. They were, however, moſtly agreed in dividing Logics, or, as it was called, *the rational part of Philoſophy*, into two branches, the Rhetorical and the Dialectical.

* Diog. Laert. lib. 7. pag. 389—90. Their diviſion of Phyſics was general and ſpecial. The firſt comprehended the world, the elements, and cauſes; and the other, bodies, principles, diſtinguiſhed from elements, gods, prodigies, place, and ſpace and *vacuum.*

† Sextus Empir. Adverſ. Mathem. lib. 7. Cicero de Legib. lib. 1.

Dialectical. The firſt was defined to be the art of good elocution, upon ſuch ſubjects as require oratory of the more diffuſive kind; and the ſecond, that of right diſputation upon any point, by cloſe queſtion and anſwer. Hence it was called, *the ſcience of what is true, or falſe, or neutral* *. The ſubdiviſion of the former comprehended invention, phraſeology, arrangement, and action; and, in every example given of it, an exordium, narration, confutation, and epilogue, was to be included.

Common to both arts are voice, ſpeech, and words; but the Dialectic, entering into a definition of each of theſe, diſtinguiſhed them, although conjoined, into the thing *ſignifying*, and that which was ſignified, and the contingent; which differ, as voice does from what is announced by it, and apprehended in the mind; and the man who ſpeaks from theſe, and from another perſon †. The voice of man is *articulate*, and his diction has literal ſounds. Theſe, ſignifying the notions of the mind, form words, or ſpeech; which, as it conveys ſome rational perception, has, previous to its utterance, what may be called a *dicible* (λεκτὸν); and that, whether true or falſe, muſt have ſuch congruity, in itſelf, as may be announced in words. Thus, we underſtand the expreſſion, when it is ſaid, *it is day;* although the affirmation ſhould be diſproved. Yet the *dicible* may be imperfect from a deficiency in the anunciation; as when *writeth* is only uttered; for the ſupply of which, *categorems*, or predicaments, are uſed. It is requiſite, that whatever is ſaid ſhould be ſpoken of ſome perſon, or thing. The perfect *dicibles* become the ſubject of axioms, or firſt principles, and prepoſitions, and ſyllogiſms.

The *ſyllogiſm* was reckoned the moſt important part of the Dialectic, as it afforded demonſtrative proof; and contributed much to the rectification of *dogmas* ‡, or common opinions; and, aſſiſting memory by order and method, rendered comprehenſion not only eaſy, but fixed and abiding. Diſcourſe is a collection of notions and inferences. Syllogiſm is a form of rational argument with reſpect to theſe; and demonſtration, which is the ſyllogiſtic concluſion, ariſes, when, by the *medium* of a thing known, or allowed to be ſo, a juſt inference is made of another

* Sextus Empir. ibid. lib. 2. † Diog. Laert. ibid. pag. 405. ‡ Ibid. pag. 382.

other truth, not known, or leſs evident. The Dialectical art was, therefore, ſtrangely ſaid to be a virtue in *ſpecies* *, containing in it other virtues; and its ſtudy was held to be abſolutely neceſſary for avoiding raſh and erroneous aſſent, diſtinguiſhing the probable and improbable in argument, and reprobating frivolous and ſophiſtical ratiocination; and, in general, for acquiring that habit of judging betwixt truth and falſehood, by which ſound and indubitable comprehenſion is conſtituted. Without it, even the wiſe man, it was ſaid, might be deficient in acuteneſs of perception, and be unable to hold accurate diſcourſe about his axioms, or to juſtify them, when either miſtaken, or wilfully perverted.

By no other ſect of philoſophers was the rhetorical art treated with ſuch minute attention to words, ſpeech, grammar, and ſyntax, and other parts of oratorial compoſition, as by the Stoics. Although there is ſome reaſon for adopting Cicero's cenſure of them, for being inventors of new terms, and chiefly verbal critics; yet it ſeems probable, that what he himſelf has delivered upon the elements of language, and propriety of diction, and even much of the ſame kind, that adorns the critical page of Dionyſius Halicarnaſſus, was collected from the various books of the Stoics upon theſe ſubjects, which were conſidered as parts of philoſophy. Upon the obſervation of Brutus, that few of the Stoics were orators, Cicero remarks, that their attachment to the ſubtleties of the Dialectic had diſqualified moſt, or all, of their ſchool, from being either good pleaders at the bar, or very eloquent †; and that he knew none of them in his time, except Brutus himſelf, and his uncle, Cato of Utica, who had learned Rhetoric with other maſters, that made a diſtinguiſhed appearance in oratory. But, if their Dialectic thus ſpoiled them as orators, it muſt be owned, as has been obſerved, that it did not make them ſhine, in the degree they imagined, as diſquiſitive philoſophers. They had a logical ſyſtem of their own, which was far from the exactneſs of the Ariſtotelian theory. Their ſyllogiſms were not preciſe

* Cicero, Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 4.

† Cicero, in Bruto, ſeu de Clar. Orat. pag. 219.

At ego, inquam, Brute, non ſine cauſa; propterea quod iſtorum in dialecticis omnis cura conſumitur, &c.

ciſe in their forms *; and, when they ſcattered them about profuſely, eſpecially in their moral reaſonings, it was evident, upon the leaſt examination, that they had often only a verbal, or apparent coherence, inſtead of exhibiting real, and connected ideas of things. But theſe fallacious uſes of the dialectic were not ſo much imputed to Zeno as to Chryſippus, and others who followed him in the Stoical ſchool; and, as has been ſaid, they, in time, became deſpicable amongſt the intelligent of the ſect.

Amongſt the queſtions in philoſophy, the one which reſpects human perceptions of objects by the ſenſes, and next to it, the internal judgment of them as true or falſe, has always proved of difficult ſolution. The analyſis of the firſt of theſe, as attempted upon phyſical principles, may yet be reckoned one of the obſcure, or halting places of ſcience: Yet the Stoics, who were corporealiſts, had their theory about it; and thought perception ſufficiently explained, by conſidering it to be the ſimple effect of the action, or intruſion of external objects upon the ſenſes; whence, ſaid Zeno †, was produced a form or *phantaſm* of them in the mind, which was called the *hegemonic*, or leading principle of the ſoul. But Chryſippus conceived this notion to be rather abſurd, as it implied, either that the mind, in having the conjunct phantaſms of a ſquare and a triangle, received two different impreſſions at the ſame time; or elſe, which is no leſs repugnant, that when theſe, or other ſuch conceptions, are joined together, as is often the caſe, the ſoul itſelf aſſumed a diverſity of forms. He therefore inſiſted that Zeno meant to ſay, that, from the impulſe of the ſenſes, the ſoul underwent, not what is commonly underſtood by an impreſſion, but what is ſignified by the more general word *alteration*. Thus, ſaid he, the air is altered by various percuſſions upon it; while, yet, no ſtamp or ſignature of them is ſuppoſed to take place in its parts. This deviation by Chryſippus,

* They had ſeveral forms; but theſe were not always obſerved; and they conſiſted, generally, of a ſingle propoſition; but, inſtead of *one middle term*, one, two, or more aſſumptions were admitted into them, and the inference from them was the ſame. Diog. Laert. ibid. pag. 392.

† Diog. Laert. ibid. pag. 393. Sext. Empir. lib. 4.; et Cicero Acad. Quæſt. ibid.

from Zeno's doctrine of perception, ſhows how apparently defective and groſs the notions of many of the ancient philoſophers were with reſpect to it; and alſo what inſuperable difficulties muſt be found, notwithſtanding all the diſcoveries ſince made about the rays of light, the organical texture of the eyes, and the impreſſions upon the *retina*, to give any plauſible account of it, without the intervention of an immaterial and intelligent percipient; and, even with its aſſumption, that the myſtery is not to be unfolded.

From a phantaſm being excited, ſome way or other, in the mind, there enſued what was called a comprehenſion of it, as of a thing in congruity with the *phantaſia*, or human imagination. What was to be underſtood by this congruity, or what diſtinguiſhed the accords or diſcords of objects with the imagination, was the ground of the obſtinate diſpute that has been mentioned, betwixt Zeno, and Arceſilas, and the Sceptics, and their adverſaries, about a true and a falſe *viſum*. This laſt term, we have obſerved, was uſed by them to expreſs every thing that affected the imagination, whether derived from the ſight, or the other ſenſes. The conteſt being already ſtated at large, we ſhall here mark the Stoical notion of a comprehenſion that was real, and another not real. It was the firſt, when it proceeded from a thing in exiſtence; and the ſecond, when it came from what did not exiſt but in the imagination. By this criterion, although a diſputable one, they diſtinguiſhed true *viſa*, or comprehenſions, from all fantaſtic illuſions; ſuch as occur in dreams, deliriums, and other perturbations of the ſoul. They denied not that theſe were a ſpecies of phantaſms; but they called them the *apparitions* of the *phantaſia*, which were not comprehenſible, becauſe they were impreſſed by no external object, and had only a caſual and diſtant reference to what was introduced, and authenticated by the ſenſes.

Comprehenſion was alſo conſidered, as it might be the foundation of bare opinion, or of ſcience. If a thing was ſo comprehended by the ſenſes, that reaſon could not diſprove its reality *, it was held to be the latter;

* Zeno repreſented his doctrine about comprehenſion by the action of the hand. The palm and fingers extended, ſaid he, are expreſſive of the phantaſia; when bent

a

latter; which was thought to be proper only to wiſe men. If it could not bear the ſcrutiny of reaſon, it was to be reckoned no more than a ſpecies of ignorance, which belonged to fools. When the ſenſes are ſound, and free from impediments to their action *, their repreſentation of objects was to be relied upon as true, and taken as the rule of nature for the truth of ſenſible things. The impreſſions of theſe being retained in the memory, excited *anticipations* of reaſon, or ſuch common notions of things as are comprehenſible by the phantaſia. The mind, remarking ſimilitudes amongſt them, either joins them together, or makes different compounds of them; or elſe diminiſhes their apparent magnitude, or tranſpoſes their proportions. Hence, ſaid they, whatever is underſtood by men, muſt either be from the incurrent evidence of ſenſe, or by tranſition from it to the collections of reaſon; which laſt chiefly takes place three ſeveral ways; by *aſſimilation*, *compoſition*, and *analogy* †. All this was exactly Epicurus's doctrine in his Canonics; which yet is delivered by him as his own invention. But Zeno, and his followers, had more right to claim originality in it. They added *contrariety*, as a fourth collection of ideas. The mind not only joins together ſimilar and diſſimilar, and analogous conceptions, but alſo thoſe which are directly oppoſite; ſuch as death and life, animate and inanimate; place of body and vacuity; ideas which have a neceſſary reference to each other, and cannot well be conceived without being, as it were, preſented together in the mind. And, thus, the *aſſociation* of ideas, which has been accounted a modern diſcovery, evidently made part of the Stoical arrangement of the human conceptions.

Previous to the impreſſions made, by the ſenſes, upon the mind, or *ſupreme* part of the ſoul, it was accounted a *tabula raſa*. But, beſide the inſcriptions received from them, and a conſequent awaking of the judgment

a little, they denote aſſent to what is comprehended in it; and when clenched together, invincible comprehenſion. Cicero Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 4. pag. 38.

* De Placitis Philoſoph. cap. 8. Ibid. pag. 15.; et lib. 1. pag. 9.

† The example of the firſt is, Socrates is known by his picture;—of the ſecond, a Centaur, having the parts of a man and a horſe conjoined;—of the third, when the ordinary ſize of man is magnified to that of a *Cyclops*, or diminiſhed to that of a *Pigmy*. Cicero de Finib. lib. 3. pag. 76.

of the mind, about their ſimilarity or diſſimilarity, another faculty, or power, the ſoul had, was to be noted, and conſidered as innate and characteriſtical in ſuch a being as man, endowed with ſenſe and reaſon; which was that of aſſenting, freely, to the reality and truth of the images or ideas of things mentally ſurveyed, or of diſſenting from it. For it was ſaid, that, although the mind was paſſive * in the admiſſion of phantaſms, and could not but contemplate them in their impreſſed form; yet the approbation of them as true, or good, or juſt, was to be deemed a free and voluntary act of the rational ſoul. This argument was uſed by the Stoics, and particularly inſiſted upon by Chryſippus, to remove a palpable objection to which their ſyſtem was liable, from its phyſical principles, that held forth ſuch a chain of cauſes and effects, as implied a rigid and inevitable fatality in all actions and events in the world, and was, conſequently, ſubverſive of any free agency in man, conſidered as the object of a moral theory. Before purſuing the courſe of the Stoical argument, it may be proper here to recite the notions of preceding philoſophers, with reſpect to fate or neceſſity, as oppoſed to chance, fortune, and accident; or to a ſuppoſed mixture of theſe two conceptions †. *Neceſſity*, ſaid Thales, is the ſtrongeſt of all things; for under it are all things; Pythagoras, that the world was enveloped in neceſſity; and Parmenides, that all things were done by it; and, for an explication of what was meant by *neceſſity*, he added, that it was the ſame with *fate*, juſtice, providence, and the efficient cauſe of the world. The obſcurity of this explanation was not much diminiſhed by the definitions of other philoſophers ‡. Heraclitus defined *fate* to be reaſon extended through the nature of the univerſe; and, by nature, he underſtood an *aetherial* body, the ſeed of all productions in the world, and the fixed meaſure of their periods; or, as we may underſtand it, of all generations and corruptions. Empedocles made nature the cauſe of neceſſity, by means of principles and elements. Plato called fate the eternal reaſon, and the perpetual law of the nature of the univerſe. He referred ſome things to providence, and ſome to neceſſity; conſidering them either

* Cicero de Fato, pag. 306—9. † De Placitis Philoſoph. lib. 1. cap. 24.
‡ Stobaei Eclogae Phyſicae, fol. edit. lib. 1. pag. 12.

ther in reſpect to *matter*, or to the efficient cauſe of the world *. The Stoical doctrine was much the ſame: But Zeno, and his followers, diſagreed in their deſcriptions of fate. Zeno called it the power of matter moving uniformly, and which differed little from providence and nature. Chryſippus explained it to be a ſpiritual power, maintaining all things in order; and, as he was apt to vary either his terms or conceptions, he called it the reaſon of the world governed by providence; or that reaſon by which the things paſt have been, the preſent are, and the future ſhall be. Panaetius aſſerted fate to be God. Poſidonus accounted it the third from *Jove;* nature being interpoſed between them. In general, their doctrine appeared to be, that neceſſity was a cauſe immoveable †, and violent, and to be diſtinguiſhed from fate, which they defined to be a *concatenation*, or ſeries of orderly cauſes; in which were included thoſe belonging to men; and of them ſome were to be reckoned fatal, and others not. Hence the poetic deſcription of the *Fates*, or *three Fatal Siſters*, might be underſtood; the names given them being correſpondent to their ſeveral offices. One was called *Lacheſis*, on account of diſtributing to every one a juſt portion, as if it were aſſigned by lot; another *Atropos*, becauſe the diſtribution made was, from all time immutable, and not to be varied; and a third *Clotho*, as the action of fate, in giving the various lots, was conceived to reſemble the twiſting of threeds, by connecting together, in one, both things themſelves, and their names. In this manner, *providence*, by foreſeeing, and providing, was underſtood to govern the world; *neceſſity*, to contain and uphold it; and *fate*, to carry all things round by irreſiſtible ſway; whether to generation, or to corruption.

Although Plato, Ariſtotle, and ſeveral other philoſophers, admitted what they called *fortune*, or *chance*, to be a cauſe of things by accident, and which intervened, unexpectedly, in things of human counſel and enterpriſe ‡; yet the Stoics, as Anaxagoras choſe to do, rather avoided entering into the diſpute; and ſaid it was ſuch a cauſe as could not be known by human reaſon. But chance and fortune, in the ſenſe of theſe philoſophers,

* De Placet. Philoſoph. ibid. cap. 25. † Ibid. Stobaeus, pag. 15.
‡ De Placitis Philoſoph. de Fortuna, ibid. cap. 29.

philoſophers, and as commonly underſtood, are, and muſt be acknowledged, mere names, and therefore no cauſes; and, no more can *neceſſity* be reckoned any thing, without the ſuppoſition of a firſt cauſe of all ſecondary and efficient cauſes. Yet, if we admit, upon that ſuppoſition, that there are, in human affairs, ſome ſingular events, for which not only no cauſe can be aſſigned, but what, in the judgment of the wiſeſt of men, are directly contrary to the ſtate of all cauſes viſible, and that preceded them; we may then be allowed to ſay, and do ſay, in common language, with reſpect to ſuch events, that they are fatal or caſual; *fatal* we call them, becauſe they cannot be accounted for, without recurring to the *will* and act of a *cauſe*, ſuperior to, and overruling all known or ſecondary cauſes; *fortuitous* or *caſual*, becauſe they rarely, and unexpectedly, intervene, and ſometimes appear to us rather to interrupt, as it were, *accidentally*, and for a time, than to controul the general courſe of cauſes and effects, eſpecially as theſe take place in matters of human concern.

It was generally ſaid by the poets, and correſponded to the doctrine of moſt of the philoſophers, that *Jove* himſelf, or the ſupreme God, could not reſiſt the decrees of fate. How, indeed, could he be imagined to do ſo, when not only his whole will was ſuppoſed to be expreſſed in theſe decrees, but all his power and energy to be actually and conſtantly exerted in their execution? The ancient *fataliſts*, as well as ſome modern *neceſſitarians*, preſume, that the Supreme Being could deſign or contrive his works only in one way, and according to one plan, and no other; and, as has been obſerved about the doctrine of ſome *Scholaſtics*, that he has always, from all time, done, or has been doing, whatever he can or will do. That the Divine acts are ever conſiſtent with, and guided by his moral perfections, is an abſolute truth; but it is incompetent to finite minds, to ſay what the counſels of infinite wiſdom are, or ſhould be, with regard to the extent of theſe acts, or to what length they ought to go forth, immediately, either in the exertion of creative power, or providential dominion. As the firſt of theſe cannot be reckoned to have been exhauſted by what was done, ſo neither can the ſecond, although perfectly ſufficient, in the ſcheme of it, for maintaining and governing all things, according to certain general laws of wiſdom

wiſdom and preſcience, be conceived to have ſo immediately and completely received the *fiat* of execution, as to leave no room for particular interpoſitions on the part of the Deity, and render unneceſſary his conducting the operation of ſecondary cauſes, and directing and overruling them ſo as to make them coincide with his general plan. Upon a contrary conception about the one, the *ultimatum* of infinite power muſt be found in the Creator's works; and it might be inferred, that he could not make the leaſt addition to the magnitude of them, or have created one ſtar more than he has done in the firmament of the heavens; and, upon the ſame, about the other, the concluſion might be, that he could have formed no other arrangement of the celeſtial bodies but that which obtains, or diſpoſed, in another manner, the lines of their motion, without diminiſhing the wiſdom of their contrivance. But, ſurely, there are ſeveral ways known to him of accompliſhing the ſame ends; ſo that whatever he does in *the heavens*, *or in the earth*, although always wiſely and juſtly done, is performed according to *his pleaſure*. He is not, therefore, bound up or conſtrained in his acts or procedure; nor can any thing be ſaid to be neceſſarily done by him, unleſs the contrary to it be an abſolute inconſiſtency in itſelf, or, which is the ſame thing, contradictory to the immutable perfections of his nature. But it was for the followers of Heraclitus, in *Phyſics*, as the Stoics were, and other ſuch corporealiſts, to ſay, moſt groſsly, that the Deity was immerſed in the material world; and, as if extended in his ſubſtance, pervaded all its parts. He, therefore, was to be conſidered not only as holding faſt, like Homer's *Jupiter*, the chain of fate, but as having, himſelf, no will or activity but as he was inſeparably connected, and of a piece, with it. How much more rationally and worthily may it not be conceived of the Creator of the world, that, as no ſoul or ſpirit made by him, in the higheſt rank of being, could poſſibly receive the perfection of its maker, either in natural or moral qualities, ſo the meaſure of theſe aſſignable to his creatures could not be according to one ſtandard alone of excellence, but ſuch as admitted of degrees, and ſubordinations in it, according to his will; and that, as the material creation could not have perpetual conſiſtency in its parts, or everlaſting and unerring powers of motion communicated to it, but only ſuch as required, in time, a renovation;

vation; ſo, over both the intelligent and corporeal worlds, the eye of his providence is ever ſtretched, and the hand of his power ready to interpoſe, not to obſerve events unforeſeen by him, or overtake what might otherwiſe eſcape his controul, but to behold how, in his unerring view, his providential inſtruments and miniſters operated, efficaciouſly, to the purpoſes of their appointment; and in the event of any failure in them, incident to all created powers, to ſupport them by his ſtrength, or to ſupply by his immediate acts the aid and influence not found in them; and thus aſcertain the ſovereign dominion he has over all his works, and the neceſſary dependence which the numberleſs ſyſtems of beings have upon him for their ſubſiſtence, and juſt adminiſtration.

In maintaining the Stoical doctrine of fate or neceſſity, operating by a chain of cauſes upon all things, Chryſippus, its defender, found himſelf involved, firſt, in ſeveral dialectical queſtions ariſing from it, ſuch as in the example mentioned in the *Logics* of Epicurus, that every annunciation, or *dicible*, as it was called, about a future contingent, was either true or falſe *. "Suppoſing a man to be ill in health," ſaid he, "it may be infallibly pronounced, with reſpect to him, that, if it be in the appointment of fate that he is to recover, he will recover, whether a phyſician be employed by him or not; and, under the contrary predicament, the negation of his recovery may be as certainly affirmed." This was juſtly called his *ſluggiſh* reaſon, or argument, from its manifeſt tendency to diſcourage and ſuſpend all induſtry in the affairs of human life. Here he was encountered in argument by Carneades, who inſiſted, that, if all things were done by antecedent cauſes, they muſt be effectuated by a coherent and cloſe connection of theſe cauſes, and in each of theſe there muſt be all the power of natural neceſſity: But, where ſuch neceſſity is, the agency of man is excluded, or elſe can be of no effect. It may, notwithſtanding, be aſſerted, that, as he has agency of a peculiar kind, ſomething is left in human power. When we inquire whence any particular event has ariſen, it is not ſatisfactory to affirm, in general, that it has proceeded from natural and neceſſary cauſes; and, therefore, the futurity of its exiſtence was always true. This would be ſaying

* Cicero de Fato, pag. 306.

ſaying no more, than that one thing had followed another, and ſomething had been produced, without its being intelligible that there was any ſpecial neceſſity, or efficiency in the nature of things, that it ſhould be ſo. Cauſes, therefore, muſt be known as efficient ones, otherwiſe they cannot be underſtood to be applicable to particular events. If, without conſidering their efficiency, we ſhould only mark them as being antecedent to, or conjoined with what was effected, we might pronounce that *Hecuba*, from being the mother of Paris, was the cauſe of the deſtruction of Troy; or we might adopt the reaſoning uſed by the deplorer of Medea's fate, in the tragedy, when ſhe ſays, "I wiſh that never a tree had been cut by the axe on Mount Pelion, to furniſh a plank for a ſhip's conſtruction; for, if it had been ſo ordered, my royal miſtreſs would not have ruſhed forth a deſperate votary to cruel love." She might, as much to the purpoſe, have wiſhed that no tree had grown there, or any ſuch mountain as Pelion ever exiſted, and ſo gone backward, endleſsly, with her wiſhes, as ſuppoſed that the circumſtantial events mentioned by her had cauſed Medea's unhappy flame. There are, certainly, beſide external cauſes, others that come not from neceſſity, but from the free and voluntary motions of human minds. Upon theſe are founded all our conceptions of moral principles, and moral action, and by them alone men underſtand what is juſt or unjuſt, honourable or diſhonourable, blameable or praiſe worthy, in their intercourſe with one another; and why, to certain actions, not only the character of merit is aſcribed, and to others that of demerit, but alſo, upon what account the former are juſtly made the objects of rewards, and the latter of puniſhments.

Chryſippus, finding the controverſy brought to this point, and managed by able diſputants, for neceſſity or liberty in human actions, thought it the moſt eligible part *, and what would moſt diſtinguiſh his ingenuity, to appear like an *honorary arbiter* between the parties, although he rather inclined to the ſide of liberty. To this purpoſe, his argument for the human mind being paſſive in receiving impreſſions, but exerting itſelf, voluntarily, in approving or diſapproving their ima-

* Diogen. Laert.; et Cicero, ibid.

ges, has been mentioned. He ſupported it, further, by diſtinguiſhing betwixt cauſes *principal* and *perfect*, and thoſe that are aſſiſtant and immediate. He did not deny antecedent cauſes; but alledged, that they were of the latter, and not of the former kind; and meant to allow of *fate* as a general cauſe or reaſon of events being *forcibly* connected together, but not ſo as to infer that all things were alike *neceſſarily* conſtrained by it. It would be abſurd, in philoſophy, to affirm that the human mind is moved without any cauſe; but there is no abſurdity in aſſerting, that the cauſe is neither exterior to it, nor one immediately preceding its motion, but another, and ſuch as ariſes within itſelf, from its own native power of *willing;* and which is experienced to be unconſtrained and free, in all inſtances of aſſenting to the appearances of objects; and approving or rejecting them, according to different views of their truth or propriety. The operation of an antecedent cauſe, as diſtinguiſhable from a perfectly efficient one, may be exemplified, *phyſically*, in the caſe of a *cylinder* placed on a declivity, and receiving an impulſe. Once moved, it takes a freſh motion from its own volubility, and deſcends, in conſequence of it, over the whole inclined plain. So the human ſoul, when acted upon by impreſſions of objects, may be conceived to move, not neceſſarily, or always, with the force, or in the direction, they have immediately given it. For, although natural appetite *, or deſire, be not in our power, ſo as that we can lay it aſide at pleaſure, yet aſſent to it is; and, according as it may be judged by the mind to tend to good or ill, and to deſerve approbation or not, it is controulable; and can either be indulged or reſtrained, forwarded or checked, upon the conſideration of its nature and conſequences. It is the exertion of this power that diſtinguiſhes the wiſe from the fools, and alſo denotes the human character to be virtuous, in oppoſition to that which has the ſtamp of vice. The mind is not moved without motives; but theſe, even although they come connectedly, have not a fatal, or irreſiſtible influence, unleſs the ſoul be of a diſpoſition to yield, blindly, to their firſt impulſe. Thus, many men, rude by nature, and uncultivated by reflection, notwithſtanding they be not urged by any uncommon

* Aulus Gellius, lib. 6. cap. 2.

mon or conſiderable preſſure from motives, diſcover themſelves to be *voluble*, like the *cylinder*, and ruſh on, by their own impetuoſity, until all the vices and faults of their temper be diſplayed. Others, again, who have as much, or more reaſon, to complain of the unfavourable incurſion of external motives upon them, or what men call their *unlucky ſtars*, and their *fate*, are ſeen, with little effort, and without offence to thoſe around them, to ſurmount theſe alledged obſtacles to proper conduct in life; or, to expreſs it more properly, to tranſmit the chain of fate, which is, in itſelf, orderly, and according to general reaſons of things, with a compoſure that enables them to obſerve events, and their ordinary conſequences, and to expect no more, and to deſire no more, in the one or the other, but what may be underſtood, and provided for by this attention. Such, therefore, are not excuſable who arraign fate, and would throw upon it the blame of their irrational behaviour. The ills experienced by them are cauſed by their own temerity; and men, as the Pythagoreans affirmed, generally conſent to the misfortunes they ſuffer.

Such was Chryſippus's reaſoning, and that too of the more moderate Stoics, who wiſhed to ſupport their ſcheme of *fatality* in conſiſtency with the free and voluntary determinations of the human mind. How connected this argument was with the foundations of moral principles, and the obligations to virtue, need not be pointed out to the leaſt intelligent; nor what difficulties attend the ſolution of it to the moſt ſtudious and beſt informed. Metaphyſics, notwithſtanding their boundleſs latitude, muſt here be circumſcribed, when the queſtion turns upon aſcertaining a fact, what power motives have in determining, ultimately, all the reſolutions of the human mind? The liberty of man's will, ſaid various of the diſciples of Zeno's ſchool, is a *chimera*, with which, from the idea it gives him of ſelf-importance, he is vainly inclined to flatter himſelf *: But, upon what juſt grounds or reaſons? The *will* is not a vague faculty, that acts independently, and without regard to motives. It is always, in ſome ſhape or other, under the influence of them, and acts in conſequence of a judgment or opinion formed in the mind; that

* Seneca, Marcus Antoninus, paſſim.

this or that object is either moſt advantageouſly, or moſt conveniently, its choice. Free, therefore, in its determination, when thus impelled, it cannot be reckoned; and it is only from the variety and perplexity of circumſtances, or incidents, which, in certain caſes, intervene, and produce, confuſedly, their effect, that men, upon ſubſequent conſideration, find themſelves at a loſs to recogniſe the particular motives that determine them; or elſe, they look upon them as feeble, and what might have been eaſily reſiſted by their will; and hence they raſhly conclude, that exertions of it are made often with little, or no inducement whatever, from motives.

The modern *Neceſſitarians* have expatiated much upon this reaſoning, and repreſented what a fantaſtic, abſurd, and ridiculous creature man would be, if he was not, in all his actions, governed by motives. His character would be ambiguous, and a *riddle*, never to be explained. Human life could be no more than a *legend* of unconnected events, about which, as proceeding from the abſolute *will* of capricious agents, no judgment could be formed, or any rule of knowledge take place. But this is contrary to fact. Particular men, in all ages, have had ſome ſimilarity of character; and different nations have diſcovered their reſemblances. Both the one and the other, when placed in like circumſtances, have acted much in the ſame manner, and proved, not only that they were ruled by motives, but that ſpecial ones had force ſufficient to produce, nearly, a uniformity of manners and conduct.

To theſe arguments the maintainers of human liberty reply, that they never conceived, or contended, that men's wills, or reſolutions to act, were unaffected by motives. Their reaſonable nature ſuppoſes them to be moved, and to act, with diſcernment and choice, from regard to them. But it is next to begging the queſtion to conclude, becauſe the human mind, in the natural exerciſe of its faculties, enters into rational conſiderations of the objects preſented to it, and decides in favour of one or other of them, that, therefore, it is not free, but enthralled by motives. What other idea can we form of free and unconſtrained agency in human beings, but that they follow, in their motions and actions, the deciſions of their reaſon and judgment? Motives, unleſs they be thoſe of a *phyſical* kind, are not neceſſary cauſes of action. All of them which

which are of a moral nature, and relate to the conduct of life, derive their influence from the judgment of the mind about their fitneſs, or unfitneſs, to be complied with, their apparent good or evil, or apprehenſions entertained of their probable conſequences. Men's determinations, with reſpect to theſe points, are known, even in ſimilar circumſtances, to be variable. The ſame motives, although there be no external impediment to their operation, have not the ſame power, either amongſt individuals, or ſocieties of men. Characters of nations, that approach the neareſt to each other, are ſtill diverſified. An entire correſpondence of ſentiments, in particular perſons, is a phenomenon as rarely to be obſerved as a perfect likeneſs in their features. Of what great importance, then, is it to be told, as if it were deciſive in the argument, that all our determinations follow the laſt judgment of the mind *, or, as it has been called, the *moſt prepollent* motive? But the queſtion ſtill is, what greater neceſſity ariſes from the mind's laſt judgment of motives, more than from any preceding one, to oblige it, irreſiſtibly, and without having the power of controul, to reſolve and to act, in this or that particular manner, and not in another? It may as well be ſaid, that men cannot avoid willing and acting always according to the preſent views they have of objects before them; and then, every motive, in every inſtant, muſt have the ſame power over them; and the *firſt* and *laſt* judgment of the mind will be of equal influence. But, hardly have the moſt enthuſiaſtic *fataliſts* ventured directly upon an aſſertion, ſo repugnant to the general ſenſe and experience mankind have of the great difference of the weight of motives, and which ſubverts as much all rational judgment, with reſpect to them, as it does any notion of a free choice, or liberty of the human mind conſequent to it.

That a ſelf-determining power belongs to human minds, may be alſo inferred from the diverſity of precepts and inſtitutions, religious and philoſophical, moral and political, to which not only various nations, but the ſame people, at different periods, have been taught, *practically*, to conform. Motives of the ſtrongeſt kind appear to be rejected, and weaker ones to be ſubſtituted in their room. It ſeems to be often more from

* Vide Leibnitz's Theodice.

from the particular caſt or tone of the mind itſelf, than from the force of motives, that ſuch changes are produced. It muſt be owned, that, in many caſes, men cannot ſtrictly ſay what motives have determined them, and ſtill leſs can they account for their preferring certain motives to others. They arraign themſelves as blameable, for compliances made by them. They feel compunction and remorſe, and conſider themſelves as juſt objects of puniſhment. How inconſiſtent are theſe appearances with the notion of the irreſiſtibility of motives; or that, on account of their influence, whatever men may will or do, is ultimately reſolvable into a fatal neceſſity? But, to what purpoſe do we inveſtigate a queſtion, that, from difficulties inſuperable in theological and moral reaſoning, never can be properly reſolved. Having only given a partial expoſition of theſe difficulties, we conclude it, with obſerving a fact reſpecting the difference of the moral doctrine of the oppoſite ſpeculatiſts upon the queſtion. It might be preſumed, that the *fataliſts*, or *neceſſitarians*, in their ſcheme of morals, ſhould have required leſs of man, ſubjected to deſtiny, and to whom the power of overruling motives was denied; and that, on the contrary, the maintainers of human liberty ſhould have exacted a greater meaſure of virtuous reſolution and performance. Yet we ſhall find, that the Epicurean, and even the Peripatetic ſyſtem of Ethics, was a relaxed one, compared with that of the Stoics; ſo that thoſe who held they *could do no more than concur with fate*, conſidered this doctrine as no valid objection either to the foundation of moral principles, or to the extenſion of the practice of them, in the utmoſt poſſible degree; while their antagoniſts, who reckoned on the natural freedom, and ability, of the human mind, to act a virtuous part, choſe rather to limit and diminiſh, than to enlarge and exalt the efficacy of the faculties and powers they aſcribed to man. Without pretending to account for theſe inconſiſtencies, it may be ſaid, that both theories, although the one, more obviouſly than the other, appeared to have been founded on moral and theological conſiderations.

The former proceeds upon the principle, that there is a perfect rectitude in the ſyſtem of the univerſe, maintained independently of human action; which, in virtuous minds, willingly correſponds to its order; and, in the vicious, is conſtrained to obey it. The remedy of the defects,

fects, or evils, of the creatures, is not ſuppoſed to reſt at all upon their precarious wills, or weak energies, but to be found in the original deſtiny of things, and the regular progreſſion of cauſes and effects. Man is taught by it, not to conſider himſelf as having a detached, or individual portion of power, but only a dependent, and co-operating, one in the moral ſyſtem. Yet, he may count it incitement enough to virtue, to know that he bears a part in the general ſcheme; the perfection of which is the glory of the ſupreme cauſe of order, truth, and beneficence, in the world.

The latter aſcribes a free agency to man in moral conduct, as the privilege of the intelligent order of beings, and places the excellence and merit of human virtue in the choice made of it. What is wanting, or weak, in the agent, to its due attainment, it ſuppoſes may be ſupplied by proper education and diſcipline; and, although he cannot propoſe to reach its utmoſt heighths, or even preſume upon the neareſt approach to them, he entertains the hope of making a laudable progreſs; the more laudable, whatever it be, that it is the act of his free will * and

* A late eminent author, in his argument for *neceſſity*, contends, that all praiſe, or blame, in human agency, reſts, *ultimately*, upon the diſpoſition or frame of the mind; ſo that a virtuous diſpoſition is the *only* object of the one, and a vicious temper of the other. "As every action," ſays he, "doth, in effect, proceed from an internal cauſe, ſuch as that of the one or other of theſe oppoſite diſpoſitions, the praiſe or blame muſt ultimately reſt upon this cauſe, and not upon the *external action*, or the *power of acting*."—*Eſſay upon Liberty and Neceſſity by Lord Kaimes, pag.* 145.

Praiſe, or blame, is the effect of moral ſentiment in a ſpectator, which reſpects not merely rational agency in general, whether internal or external, but alſo that of a qualified agent, ſuch as man, having the capacity and power of acting, or not acting, and of chooſing between one ſpecies of action and another. The bare inſtincts of nature, as Ariſtotle obſerved, are not properly termed virtues; which are endowments of the human ſoul, tranſcending natural temper, and not inſtinctive diſpoſitions, to be found in children, and even in changelings When we ſpeak of *laudable qualities*, we always conſider them as veſted in, and exhibited by, a proper agent. If they be exerted by any being without a conſciouſneſs of their excellence, and a preference of them to their contraries, our praiſe is either feeble, or with-held altogether. The commendation is given, not ſo much to the performance of virtuous deeds, which may be of more or leſs conſequence, according to circumſtances, as to

and reſolution, which enables him to overrule improper motives, by which others are ſwayed, and renders him not barely acceſſory to, and, whether he chooſes or not, inſtrumental in diminiſhing, and partly controuling, the evils of human life ariſing from vice, but a willing and determined agent in that noble purpoſe; to which, for dignity and worth, no other can be compared. But we turn now to the *phyſics* of Zeno and the Stoics; much connected as the principles of them were with their theology: A ſufficient view of both may be taken within the bounds of the preſent Section.

It ſhould have been before obſerved, that the definition of philoſophy, in the Stoical ſchool, was much the ſame with that of Plato. It was termed the ſtudy of *wiſdom*; and *that* defined to be, the *ſcience* or knowledge of things *divine* and *human*, and *of their cauſes* *. Seneca excepted againſt the laſt article, as a ſuperfluous addition; ſince *cauſes* were included in the preceding terms of the definition. The prolixity of the diviſion of phyſics, into its parts, which has been mentioned, was, in the diſcurſive manner of the Stoics, upon all the ſubjects of ſcience. Their aſſumption of two *principles of all things*, according to the moſt ancient and general doctrine of the philoſophers, is chiefly to be attended to and conſidered. The terms uſed to expreſs theſe principles were the ſame with thoſe adopted in other ſyſtems of philoſophy; which, agreeably to Anaxagoras's doctrine, diſtinguiſhed between *matter* and *mind*, the *element* and the *principle*, or that *ſubject* which was paſſive, and acted upon, and the *principle* that was active and efficient of its purpoſes. Without the concurrence of both principles, they conceived that nothing could be effectuated; ſince, if power were not exerted upon it †, matter could

to the good will and intention of the performer. In all human virtue, there is ſuch a degree of imperfection and weakneſs, that its praiſe or merit appears to reſt chiefly, and *ultimately*, in the free choice with which its acts are done; and in the actor overcoming propenſities he may find in himſelf, to a contrary deportment.

* Cicero de Officiis; et in Tuſcul. Quaeſt. lib. 4. Epiſt. 88.

† Neque, enim, materiam ipſam cohaerere poſſe, ſi nulla vi contineretur; neque vim, ſine aliqua materia: Nihil eſt, enim, quod non *alicubi* eſſe cogatur. Cicero, Acad. Quaeſt. lib. 1. Seneca, Epiſt. 65.

could have no coheſion; and, if there was no ſubject to act upon, power could have no operation. Thus was the active power of mind ſuppoſed to be conjoined with the paſſive ſubſtance of matter; as principles equally original, and neceſſary to each other, and to the conſtitution of the world, and the things it contains. This theory coincided with the poetic *Coſmopeia*, which, as has been obſerved, was a traditional account of the world's origin from a *chaos*, or a rude and unqualified ſtate of matter, that, from times of great antiquity, had been propagated in various countries. It may, indeed, be conſidered as the baſis of moſt of the *phyſical* ſyſtems that have been explained; although the ſpeculations built upon it, by philoſophers, were diverſified, and ſome of them groſſly abſurd. It held not forth a fortuitous production of the world, or a neceſſary one, from the inherent motions of matter; but that it originated from the act and influence of a *divine* and *intelligent mind;* which, if not the creator of matter, was the ſole modifier of it, and imparted to it all its forms and qualities. Zeno, by parentage a Phenician, appears, inſtead of inventing a theory of his own upon the ſubject, to have followed that which obtained among the learned in Sidon, and to have copied it exactly; ſo far, at leaſt, as it related to the formation of the four natural elements. The paſſage in Diogenes Laertius which ſupports this allegation, is remarkable, and has afforded room for various comments *. The Latin verſion of it may be given, in a note upon the page.

There is no principle, however intelligible, and capable of the moſt rational illuſtration, but may be perverted; eſpecially if aſſumed into connection with any theoretical tenets inconſiſtent with it. Much of the patch work, obſervable in the phyſical ſyſtems of the Greeks, may be aſcribed to this error. Without ſtrictly examining the import and tendency of the principles they borrowed, either from foreigners, or from one another, they often, improperly, blended them with their

* Deum in principio, cum apud ſe eſſet, eſſentiam, *vel materiam*, per aërem, in aquam convertiſſe Et, ut in planta ſemen continetur, ita Deum, qui ſeminalis ratio mundi eſt, tale ſemen in humido reliquiſſe, quod facilem aptamque operi materiam præberet; ad rerum deinceps generationem. Deinde progenuiſſe primum, elementa quatuor; ignem, aquam, aërem, terram.—Diog. Laert. lib. 7. pag. 459.

own ſpeculations. This was done, partly, from the difficulty of inventing new ones, and alſo to take advantage of the authority and credit allowed to the old. We need not, therefore, point out particularly, as the laborious *Bruckerus* † has done, the various ſources from which Zeno may be reckoned to have collected the principal tenets of his ſyſtem. If he ranged in the phyſiologies of Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Plato, and culled from each of them what he thought fit, the practice was not a novelty among the founders of the Grecian ſects. Reprehenſible, more than others of them, he could not be; unleſs his general theory was more heterogeneous, and incoherent in its principles. That his phyſical doctrine, or that of his ſchool, was marked with a palpable contradiction, by firſt aſſuming, in rational ſpeculation ‡, a principle diſtinct from matter, that acted upon it powerfully, and with intelligence; and then, in *phyſics*, retracting, or reducing it to material ſubſtance, or *body*, is too evident to be denied. A ſlip made, from their definition of matter, altogether paſſive, and void of form, into another miſerable one of body, ſufficed, it ſeems, to remove or palliate the contradiction. A *corporeal*, or *body*, was defined to be, *that* which either *doeth or ſuffereth;* and, as every thing might come under that predicament, all being was concluded to be body; a piece of logic which hardly has its parallel in abſurdity. An *incorporeal* was underſtood to be that which was comprehended only by the mind, or reaſon; and of that ſpecies of being they reckoned but four things; their *dicible*, which has been explained, and *time*, *place*, and *vacuity* of body. If any idea was affixed by them to the active, intelligent principle, it could be no other than that of a *being* immaterial, comprehenſible by the mind, and whoſe operations on matter made it, in that manner, only known to men. They allowed, that, without its acceſſion, matter could not cohere, or have the form of body. The *will* of acceſſion, and the thought of what was to be done, could only proceed from it. As that *will* and thought could not be conceived to have extenſion, in any ſimilarity to that of matter, neither could

† Tom. 1. Part 2. lib. 2. cap. 9. pag. 904. et ſequent.

‡ Stobaei, Eclog. Phyſ. lib. 1. Diog. Laert. ibid. pag. 460. Plutarch de Repugnantiis Stoicorum.

could the *being* that willed and deſigned be rationally ſuppoſed to have *materiality*, or a corporeal nature; otherwiſe, its action could not avoid being in, or upon itſelf, and not upon a diſtinct ſubſtance. The *being* called by the Stoics *Deity*, and the *perfection of reaſon* in the univerſe, would, in this conception, be, not a ſimple ſubſtance, or principle, but a compound one; nor a cauſe of any thing, without itſelf, which is the proper notion of a cauſe, but only a modification of the mutable part of its ſubſtance. But Zeno, and his diſciples, it appears, could make no more of a phyſical theory of the world, than involve the one principle in the other; and, although each was ſtill conſidered as a diſtinct *genus*, both compoſed one ſyſtem, called the *world*, in which a providential and fixed arrangement of all cauſes and events was ever to be found.

In the interpretation of this *phyſico-theology* of the Stoics, the learned and critical of antiquity, and in modern times, have found much difficulty. Whether the ungenerated, and eternal *mind*, was to be underſtood as ſo combined with, and congenial to the material ſubſtance and elements of the world, that the diſtinction betwixt the one and the other could only be that of a purer and more exalted ſpecies of corporeal ſubſtance, which formed the eſſence of the *Divinity*, while every element of nature, compared to it, was of a groſs and defective compoſition, appeared to be a problem about their doctrine, not eaſy to be reſolved. Their contemplations of the action of the Diving Being, whether reſpecting power, or extent, were expreſſed in metaphorical language, always ambiguous, and liable to miſconſtruction † Thus *Jupiter*, in agency, was pronounced to be an *aetherial* and *artificial fire*, which contained in itſelf the ſeeds, or ſeminal forms, out of which all particular things in nature had their production. A prolific and conſervative fire or *ſpirit* ‡, it pervaded, more or leſs, every portion of mat-

† De Placitis Philoſoph. lib. 5. cap. 19. Cicero de Natura Deor. lib. 2. Diog. Laert. ibid.

‡ ——— Vivere mundum,
Et rationis agi motu, cum *ſpiritus* unus,
Per cunctas habitet partes, atque irriget orbem,
Omnia pervolitans, corpuſque animale figurat.—Manilius, lib. 1.

ter, and part of the world; and, according to the changes it effectuated in them, it might be called by a variety of names. It was *Jove*, or *Apollo*, as it ſhone in the ſun and fixed ſtars; *Ceres*, or *Proſerpine*, in the vegetative power of the earth; and *Neptune*, in the controuled tides of the ſea. As there is but one *Dis*, or ſupreme and ever living Deity, ſo there is but one world, *which is full of him*, and one providence, by which it is ruled. Therefore, the world itſelf, has the appellation of *God*, animated, as it is, with an intelligent ſoul, and formed and qualified as an animal. Here the critical queſtion is, What was the meaning of the Stoics, when they ſaid, in the language of Manilius *, and of Seneca, not only that the world, in all its extent, and throughout all it contained, was moved by the Divinity, but that *itſelf* was God? Whether we underſtand this laſt expreſſion to imply that the ſoul of the world, or that active and ſubtile principle, called *aetherial* fire, and diſtinguiſhed from the elementary and common kind, was the eſſence of *Deity*, or that the *mundane* ſyſtem, taken together as a whole, was his ſubſtance, or his divine nature transfuſed into, and neceſſarily blended with, its conſtitution; manifeſt it is, that, in either of theſe conceptions, or poſitions, the Atheiſtical idea of *Spinoſiſm* is included; or ſuch an approach made to it, as is ever to be reprobated. It was denied, indeed, by *Boethus* †, the Stoic, that the world was to be accounted an animal, or had the *apparatus* of an intellectual ſoul; and the author *de Placitis* ‡, after ſaying that the world in general, and alſo the ſtars and the earth, were called God by the Stoics, adds, but the ſupreme of all the Gods was the *mind*, which was in the aetherial fire. This *mind*, or deity, was repreſented by them, not only as different from the corporeal ſubſtance of the world, but as the *Hegemonic* of, and therefore a ſuperior principle to, the *mundane* ſoul. Under this idea §, Seneca expreſſes his conception of him, as the artiſt of the works in the world, and the *incorporeal reaſon*

—— Deum, namque ire per omnes,
Terraſque tractuſque maris, coelumque profundum.—Virgil.
Jupiter eſt quodcunque vides, quocunque moveris.—Lucan.

* Qua pateat mundum, divino numine verti, atque *ipſum* eſſe Deum. Manilius, lib. 1. Totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum eſt, et Deus eſt; et ſocii ejus, et membra ſumus. Senecae, epiſt. 97.

† Diogen. Lart. ibid.

‡ De Placit. Philoſ. lib. 1. cap. 10.

§ De Conſolat. ad Helvetium, cap. 8.

reaſon of them. We might add, that the terms uſed by Marcus Antoninus, and Epictetus, in ſpeaking of the Supreme Being, are ſtill leſs exceptionable than thoſe of Seneca, and others that have been mentioned; who may be ſuſpected of adhering to the notion ſuggeſted by the *ſyſtematic*, but abſurd, argument of the Stoics, that every thing *which acted, or ſuffered, was body;* and, in conſequence of their holding cauſes to be *corporeal*, becauſe they were *ſpirits*, or aerial intentions affecting the parts of all things generated with form *, called the human paſſions, and other qualities of the ſoul, bodies exiſting in it; and itſelf a body, as it was the cauſe of life.

Unleſs, therefore, we make allowance for the extravagance of the Stoics, in their dialectical reaſoning, intermixing its abſurd concluſions with their phyſical doctrine, they cannot be altogether acquitted of holding forth a deity, whoſe eſſence, although reckoned aetherial and *ſpiritual*, was not ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed from body; and that they entertained the groſs imagination, that thought and extenſion might be attributes of the ſame ſubſtance. Their higheſt conception appeared to be, that as reaſon was the *hegemonic*, or ruling principle of the human ſoul, and frame, ſo was the *divinity* in the conſtitution of the world, thorough which, by the vehicle of fire, were diſſeminated, not only the principles of animation and ſenſe, but, in many of its parts, portions of reaſon in various degrees; ſome of them knowing, and others, not knowing, the tendency or end of this endowment. Men, ſaid they, in reſpect of their rational ſouls †, are the offſpring of the Divine Being, emanent particles of his aetherial ſpirit or *breath*; and ſuch are the inviſible daemons that abound, either in the celeſtial, or ſublunary regions. Generated, and therefore, not excepted from corruption, the whole of them are; together with the elementary fire, that is diſperſed through the natural world. It cannot, for ever, retain its conſervative quality. When the air, naturally humid, is rendered by it dry and combuſtible; when the earth, like a burning oven, reflects all around it only light and heat; a revolution of nature muſt enſue. In all bodies, there is obſervable a diſpoſition to it. They contain

* Plutarch, de Repugnant. Stoic.

† Ratio nihil aliud eſt, quam in corpus humanum, pars divini ſpiritus merſa; et divinae aurae particula. Seneca paſſim; et Cicero de Natura Deorum, lib. 2.

tain particles of fire, which are ever ſtruggling to get free from their confinement. At preſent, all the agitations, and the changes they undergo, are no more than the various, and inceſſant movements of this active, and powerful element. At laſt, it will predominate univerſally, and every other ſubſtance but *one* will be diſſolved by it; and nature be no more, than it was in the ſtate of chaos. At this period *, *he* whom Cleanthes in his hymn calls the principle, or cauſe of nature, will retract all ſubſtance into himſelf; in order, after ſome interval, to produce it again, in a renewed form. The opinion of the diſſolution of the world by fire, and of its renovation, was entertained by philoſophers of greater antiquity than the Stoics; and ſeveral of the poets have retailed it. Even where the former differed in their notions about its origin, and conſtitution, ſome of them were inclined to think it not only liable to viciſſitudes, but to periodical changes, either by inundation, or conflagration. We find the ſentiment hinted by Lucretius †, as well as ſolemnly delivered by Seneca and Manilius ‡. Nature, howſoever repreſented by them, as the original and parent of all things, appeared too weak in her productions, to afford them conſtancy and perpetuity. Generation, and corruption are, always and chiefly, viſible in them. What admits of change to the worſe, ſaid the Stoics §, is periſhable; but the world admits exſiccation of its parts, ſo that the whole is conſumable; nothing is everlaſting, and nothing will, in the revolution of ages, remain, but the Supreme Being; ſtiled by them, according to Laertius, the maker of all eſſence, himſelf being ungenerated, and incorruptible, and the architect of the world; and who, at certain fatal periods,

* Poſt inflammationem, relinqui nihil, praeter ignem, a quo rurſum, ac de eo renovatio mundi fieret; idemque ornatus oriretur. Cicero ibid. Et Plutarch, De communibus notitiis Stoicorum.

† Sic igitur, magni quoque circum maenia mundi, expugnata dabunt labem, *putreſque* ruinas. Lucret. lib. 11. ‡ Cum tempus advenerit, quo ſe renovaturus mundus extinguatur, viribus iſta ſuis, ſe caedent; et ſidera ſideribus incurrent, et, omni flagrante materia, uno igne, quicquid nunc ex diſpoſito, lucet, ardebit. Ovid's paraphraſe of the tradition is often quoted. Eſſe quoque in fatis, &c. It has been obſerved that Heraclitus, who made fire the primary element in nature, alſo taught the reſolution of all things into it, or a general conflagration.

§ Diogen. Laert. ibid p 454.

periods, will reſume and abſorb in himſelf, all diviſible ſubſtance, and exhibit it a new in a regeneration of nature.

When we conſider this repreſentation of the Deity, as a being diſtinguiſhed from the world of nature, and having the dominion over it; and to whom Cleanthes gives the title of the good, as well as the intelligent, we may be almoſt induced to think our animadverſion on the Stoical conception of the Supreme God erroneous, or not altogether juſt; notwithſtanding it muſt ſtill be accounted defective and exceptionable. Their great and fundamental error was in their pretending to inveſtigate, phyſically, the eſſences of all beings, and that of the divine and eternal mind, no leſs than of others. By the ancient philoſophers, in general, eſſence was underſtood to be a thing having *continuity*, or *parts without parts*. Plato, and others, who conceived the Deity to be incorporeal, therefore ſaid he was above *eſſence;* but thoſe who conſidered eſſences to be the only proper object of phyſical ſcience, and to belong to all ſubſtance, carried, in their apprehenſion of the moſt celeſtial and exalted being, the idea of extended parts, but with the refinement of them in the higheſt degree. According to the Stoics, it was not the common element of fire *, but an aetherial ſpecies, a *ſubtile ſpirit*, that pervaded and actuated the maſs of matter †. The Deity was not that fiery ſpirit; but, by the medium of it, he was *eſſentially* preſent every where, and came, as it were, into contact with his works. Adminiſtrating the alimentary fire, and conducting its artificial proceſs, he is exhibited in nature, and, from his efficiency of whatever is wiſe and beneficent in the world, he may be called by that *parental* name, and alſo by that of fate ‡. The natural world is not a congeries of matter, or corpuſcles, fortuitouſly moved, and accidentally compacted together. It is the production of an all intelligent cauſe; which has not, barely, a conjunction of parts, but a fitting of them, upon a ſcale of due proportions to, and connections with, one another. The combination of the

* Cicero de Natur. Deor. lib. 2.

† Elementum rerum omnium ignem dicunt; ejus *principia*, deum, et materiam. Ariſtocles apud Euſebium. Vid. Leipſii Phyſiol. Stoic. lib. 2. diſſert. 8.

‡ Materiae univerſae, fictricem ac moderatricem, eſſe divinam providentiam. Cicero ibid. lib. 3.

the parts, and their ſubſerviency to the harmony of the whole, is not diſſoluble by chance, or abruptly, but in conſequence of a long and ſtated progreſſion of cauſes and effects, that has its ordination and tenor from the original cauſe and former of the world. Upon any other plan than that which obtains, the viſible or intellectual world cannot be conſtituted in the nature of things *. Not that the will, or determinations of the Divinity, are to be underſtood as conſtrained by fate, or any neceſſary courſe of things exterior to himſelf. He knows no neceſſity but that of willing and acting †, according to the reaſon and moral rectitude of his nature. Being, in himſelf, the law of reaſon and truth in the univerſe, he cannot be otherwiſe than invariably obſervant of it in what he deſigns or performs. It is one, as he is, and can have only one exhibition; and, although apparently diverſified in its parts, it holds forth, in the world of beings, animated and inanimate, rational and irrational, a chain of cauſes and events, ſtrictly connected together, and conſtituting one ſyſtem, in which every thing bears a neceſſary, and relative part; and of which he muſt be confeſſed to be, alike, the original and the end,

That there ſhould be a various interpretation of the beſt authorities we have for the Stoical doctrine about the nature, or eſſence, of the Deity, and his agency in the world, need not be ſurpriſing. Plato confeſſed, that human language was inadequate to the ſubject; and that it was hardly allowable to men to pronounce what the *one eternal being* is, when we have no proper terms to expreſs the natures or eſſences of inferior things ‡. "No one," ſays Seneca, "*has known God:* Many think unworthily of him, with impunity. Whether is it," adds he, "that our knowledge of him is obſtructed, becauſe to him belongs a *radiance*, too ſubtile

* Nec Deus, ob hoc, minus liber aut potens eſt; ipſe, enim, neceſſitas ſua eſt. Seneca, in cap. 1. Quæſt. Natur.

Finxit in æternum cauſas; quæ cuncta coercet,
Se quoque lege tenens —Lucan.

† Neceſſe eſt ei eadem placere; cui, niſi optima, placere non poſſunt. Sen. ibid.

Sed nihil, in tota magis eſt mirabile mole,
Quam *ratio*, et certus, quod, legibus omnia parent.—Manil. lib. 1.

‡ Epiſt. 31.

ſubtile and bright for the human eye to behold, or that ſuch exalted majeſty as he is poſſeſſed of, affecting no oſtentation, is retired within a veil of the pureſt ſanctity?" Theſe, and other ſuch acknowledgements, that the moſt eminent of the ancient philoſophers make, both with regard to the ſhort extent of the human faculties, when exerciſed in reſearches ſo profound, and the difficulty of finding words free of ambiguity, might have diſpoſed the critics, in modern times, not to a harſh, but to the moſt favourable interpretation of their principles and reaſoning. Yet, this juſt and candid rule has not always been obſerved. Hardly one of them has eſcaped without a ſcrutiny into his conceptions and expreſſions; eſpecially thoſe reſpecting the idea and contemplation of the *divine being*, who can be but imperfectly comprehended by finite minds. The ſtigma has, indeed, been juſtly fixed upon the materialiſts of every ſpecies, ſo far as, from the plain import of their tenets, and not from metaphyſical or logical inferences, they have been proved to be ſuch in their theories; and thus, alſo, other errors and defects of the beſt heathen theology may, and ought to be reprehended, or pointed out. But the reprehenſion, in ſome inſtances, has been extended where it might have been ſpared; and, as Plato † has not been altogether acquitted of mixing ſome taint of materialiſm in his idea of deity, and even his repreſentation of his eſſence alledged to be no better than that of Heraclitus, alſo adopted by the Stoics, we need not wonder that the charge has been brought with leſs ſcruple againſt the latter, who, from their phyſical doctrine, were more obnoxious to it ‡. We ſee the accuſation, and the controverſy about it, ſtated, at ſome length, by Bruckerus, who, in rigid judgment, pronounces them to ſtand in near affinity to the Spinoſiſts. But, as Cudworth, Morhoof, and Moſheim, diſſent from him, his opinion may be the leſs regarded; and we may account that which has been given about the God of the Stoics the more tenible one; not that he was the fiery matter pervading the world, or, as it has been ſcholaſtically, and not very intelligibly, expreſſed, *a form informing the whole maſs of matter*, and an *inſeparable part of it*, but a principle of a diſtinct nature, called by Seneca the *incorporeal*

† Vide Bruckeri, Hiſt. Critic. Philoſoph. tom. 1. lib. 2. cap. 6. pag. 689.

‡ Ibid. pars 2. lib. 2. cap 9. pag. 937.

reaſon of things, that ruled and ſuperintended all the material motions, ſo as to make them correſpond harmoniouſly to his original plan. To the probability of this opinion, not that author's expreſſion only, but other more particular and deſcriptive ones, in the Cleanthean Hymn, bear the ſtrongeſt teſtimony.

The variety and ingenuity of the arguments the Stoics uſed, to prove the world's divine original, and its providential government, are remarkable; and ſuch as, being the beſt found among the ancient philoſophers, have been copied by the ableſt of the modern, who inſiſt upon the moral proofs *. How is it poſſible, ſaid they, to imagine that the admirable ſyſtem of the world could be arranged by any power or agency deſtitute of reaſon and intelligence? That which is manifeſt in the conſtitution of all things, is of the moſt perfect kind. Nothing appears wanting in the ſtructure of the natural world to complete its wiſe deſign; and the order of the moral one is analogous to it. Both are formed upon one plan, and conſtitute together one ſyſtem; an undeniable argument that they are held together, and contained, by one *divine* and *undivided ſpirit*. We behold, in the ſyſtem of nature, a variety of what may be called perfections in their kind, attained to in its parts, ſuch as the growth of plants and animals. Can this ſcale of varied beings have an origin, or be carried on, without there exiſts, at the head of them all, an excelling nature, or being, than which nothing can be conceived better? When reaſon is held to be the chief glory of man, it ſhould be conſidered, whence the faculty of it is derived to him. That which is void of mind and reaſon can never be ſuppoſed to generate *rationality*. It is becauſe he is a member of the world, and eſpecially of that part which was made for thoſe animated eſſences that have reaſon, and are above him, that he participates of it. Man, although endowed with reaſon, cannot produce theſe celeſtial things which he daily beholds †. They have in them evidences of power, counſel, and wiſdom, vaſtly ſuperior to what he finds in himſelf. They are things greater, and ſtronger, and wiſer, than he; and, therefore, never could be

* Cicero, et Seneca, paſſim. Diogen. Laert. ibid. pag. 459.

† Cicero de Nat. Deor. lib. 2. pag. 216.

be deſigned, or made, by him. That which produced them, tranſcends him, infinitely, in art and might. What, then, can *that* be, but *God?* To the congruity of its viſible parts, the world joins that of an aſſociation betwixt all intelligent natures, and holds forth a *community* of Gods and men; in which the irrational animals are not included. There is one *fount* of rational ſouls, although the derivatives from it may differ in their degrees of underſtanding. It is that *ſoul of the world*, which repreſents, and may be called *Deity*, that gives birth to them all. In the ſtars, and celeſtial regions, they are of purer eſſence, and more enlightened, than thoſe diſperſed in the lower ſpheres, and which partake more of the contagion of body. Human ſouls are ſparks ſtruck off from them, and therefore congenial to their divine original. They are not conjoined to the bodily *foetus*, but attend its birth. As men grow up, the rational principle diſcovers itſelf, and extends its thoughts, not to human things only, but to thoſe that are divine. The celeſtial powers attract their attention, and beget impreſſions of their own deſcent from, and relation to them. The human mind, which is, itſelf, ſagacious and provident, ſees, in the appointment of theſe powers, the higheſt wiſdom and providence. Man, in this contemplation, is diſpoſed to adore that heavenly benignity, by which all beings, and he in a ſpecial manner, are preſerved. He feels, in himſelf, a deſire of immortality, while he is here ordained to a mortal life. Is his ſoul's exiſtence to be prolonged beyond this ſhort period of its abode, or to periſh with it? Various difficulties attend the queſtion, whether it be, indeed, a ſubſtance exempted from corruption *, and, differing from the incorruptible ſoul of the world, is ſubjected to the law of other animals here below, and attains not that high perfection? And, upon the ſuppoſition of its ſurviving the body, what is to be its ſtate, and how long it will endure? Will it have a remembrance of its actions in the body; or, forgetting the paſt ſcene, be elevated to another, where, in its ſublime retreat, it will begin more properly to *know itſelf*, and its deſtination for immortality? Theſe, and other dubious queries, reſpecting the purifications neceſſary to be undergone, before it can be aſſociated with its kindred

* Senecae, Epiſt. 88.

ſpirits, in the purer regions of æther, have made the wiſeſt heſitate upon the point of the human ſoul's immortality. The moſt diſtinguiſhed diſciples of Zeno diſagreed in their doctrine with regard to it. Cleanthes maintained, that the ſouls of all men remained until the general conflagration. Chryſippus reſtricted this privilege to the wiſe; and Marcus Antoninus *, conſidering the argument, could decide it no otherwiſe, than by ſaying, that, if the prolongation of the ſoul's exiſtence, after death, was a juſt appointment, and according to nature, the diſciple of wiſdom might reſt aſſured that the Gods had ordained it, at leaſt for thoſe, who, by their virtuous actions and character, have grown into a conformity with them. But, even ſuch ought not to deſire any other appointment for them, than what the Gods, in a conſiſtency with the nature of things, have fixed upon as the beſt. "It becomes every wiſe man," ſays Epictetus †, "to ſubmit his mind to the law of the governour of the *whole*; as good citizens do theirs to the law of their particular community." "It is enough," adds the philoſophic Emperor, "if the Gods have deſtined us for no more, to have lived in their auguſt city, the world; more venerable to men than that of Athens to her citizens, who yet revere Codrus and Theſeus, and others that embelliſhed her, while we have more reaſon to exclaim, in adoration, *we have beheld the city of the ever living King.*"

Man was held, from his conſtitution, to be a *microcoſm*, or image of the world ‡. The dignity of nature, which approaches to that of God, being ſignally repreſented in his perſon, he was ſuppoſed to be the more ſenſible of the venerable form of the world. They diſtinguiſhed between the *whole*, and the *univerſe*; underſtanding by the firſt, the world, which was finite, and a *plenum*, and by the other, ſpace, or vacuity of body, which was infinite, and contained the world ‖. They called *place* that which was occupied, or half filled, with body. They held matter to be infinitely diviſible; but that itſelf, being continuous, and not conſiſting

* Marc. Anton. de Rebus Suis, lib. 12. ſect. 5. † Lib. 1. cap. 12.

‡ ——— Quid mirum, noſcere mundum,
Si poſſunt homines, quibus eſt, et mundus in ipſis,
Exemplumque Dei, quiſque eſt in imagine parva.—Manil. lib. 4.

‖ Diog. Laert. pag. 461. Stobæi Phyſ. cap. 17.

ſiſting of infinite bodies, could not have infinity. In their idea of time, except that it was an incorporeal, they did not altogether agree. Zeno defined it the interval of motion, and the meaſure of the celerity and tardineſs of the exiſtence of things. Poſidonius reckoned it, in general, infinite, but diviſible into paſt and future, as the preſent time was a *point* between the two extremes. The Stoics were more copious and diſtinct, in their explications of the phenomena of nature, than any of the ancient ſects. The ſketches of their phyſical theory given by Diogenes Laertius, and much more the extracts of it we find in Cicero, and which he turns ſo juſtly, and elegantly, into an argument for the exiſtence of deity, and divine wiſdom, in the world, are clear proofs of the improvements made by them in the ſcience of phyſics. Seneca's *Natural Queſtions* diſcover more general knowledge of the ſubject, than any other book tranſmitted from antiquity. But we come now to conclude our whole ſurvey of the Philoſophy of Greece, with the account of the *Ethics* of Zeno's ſchool.

SECT.

SECTION III.

Nature's firſt recommendations to Man.—How beſt ſupported.—Virtue the proper inſtrument of action in human life, and the efficient of its end.—Eligible for its own ſake.—Equally productive of what is agreeable and profitable.—The read good of Man placed in his own power.—The cure of the paſſions not an apathy.—The Stoical wiſe man's perfection.—Objections to their ſcheme of Morals.—Qualifications of theſe objections.—The general concluſion.

ZENO, and the diſciples of his ſchool, made a prolix diviſion of the heads, or common places of moral philoſophy; which were reckoned thoſe of appetite, things good and evil, virtue, ends, acts, and offices *. Their firſt poſition in *ethics* was, that nature had implanted in every animal a deſire to preſerve itſelf, and to be in ſuch concord with its ſtate of being, that whatever things tended to cheriſh it, were affected and loved; while thoſe contrary to it were avoided or rejected. This is ſo much in the primary direction of nature to all living creatures, that their young are obſerved to ſeek what is ſalutary to them, and refuſe what is hurtful, even before they have experience of the pleaſure or pain attending the gratification of their appetites. It is, therefore, an error, and what is turned by ſome philoſophers to abuſe in moral ſpeculation, to aſſert, that this innate propenſity to ſelf-preſervation is reſolvable into the *appetite* of pleaſure. For, with what propriety

* Diog. Laert. pag. 415.

ty in reaſon can that be ſo called, which is no more than the energy of a creature, ſenſible of its exiſtence, and, having the natural love of itſelf, is deſirous of continuing its life and well-being? The pleaſure ariſing from the indulgence of this primary deſire can only be reckoned an acceſſory one; which is recogniſed upon ſubſequent reflection and experience. With reſpect to this, and other original appetites, nature appears to make little or no diſtinction between animals and the vegetable ſpecies. In the one, and in the other, they are found alike accommodated to their ends, without the intervention of thought or will; and, as trees ſeem to ſmile, and to be made gay, by their buds and flowers, ſo animals derive a phyſical vivacity, and exhilaration, from the opening of their propenſities. For ſome time, the appetite in human creatures has no other aim but that of ſelf-preſervation. What may be conducive to this end is unknown to them; until reaſon, that eminent faculty beſtowed on man, awakes to make the diſcovery, and to act as the ruler and guide of the irrational deſires.

It is not without juſt foundation, that nature's firſt recommendation to man, is the conſervation of his ſtate of being; ſince he is endowed with a capacity of knowing *what it is*, and conſidering how it may be promoted, not, ſimply, upon the deſire of good, general and undefined, but of that ſpecies which is moſt eſtimable, and has, in the eye of reaſon, the character of worth and excellence. Every diſcovery of truth, every obſervation of the conformity or relation of one thing to another, or of their contrariety, is agreeable to the human mind; and one of its firſt, and chief ſatisfactions, ariſes from ſuch inveſtigations and diſcoveries. To find out what is conſonant to nature, and what repugnant, and to live according to the knowledge of this, and in the ſelection of the natural congruities, is the office which reaſon and philoſophy preſcribe, and alſo the ultimate end of human actions. By natural appetite, they muſt be owned to have for their object good or felicity; and reaſon dictates, that it ſhould be the higheſt to which men can aſpire, or the moſt worthy and exalted. Of this nature every action is to be reckoned, which is conſonant to what is fair, honeſt, and pertaining to virtue; while any one, which falls ſhort of this rule of excellence, is to be diſregarded. Hence the inſtinctive appetites, whoſe objects are infe-

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rior to it, are not to be deemed deſirable in themſelves *. To render life conſiſtent, and of a piece, it is neceſſary that its action and its end ſhould be of one kind. As the members of the human body are fitted to one manner of living, ſo the impulſe of the mind is not to every form of life, but to a ſpecial one; and to this, reaſon and its powers are more particularly adapted. Enlightened by philoſophy, the mind makes the diſcovery, that the end of action is to be found in the efficacy of the action itſelf, and not in any thing extraneous to it; in like manner as the end of ſome arts is included in their practice. What, then, is that inſtrument of action in human life, the employment of which is equivalent to the end? It is virtue †. And, what is the principle of virtuous action? It is, to hold no other moral diſtinction of things but one; which is that of things honeſt and fair, and thoſe which are baſe and ignominious ‡. Hence the founder of the Stoical ſect framed this ſyllogiſtical argument, as the leading one of his ſyſtem of ethics,—*whatever is good is laudable; whatever is laudable is honeſt; therefore, whatever is good is honeſt.*

Unleſs this propoſition, either formally, or in effect, be admitted as true, no ſcheme of morals can be inſtituted ‖, nor the action of virtue ſupported in the human character. If there be not allowed a decency, and

* Cicero de Finib. lib. 3. † Ibid. pag. 75.

‡ It is here we are to conſider the Stoics as departing from all attention to natural inſtincts and propenſities, and proceeding to eſtabliſh their moral ſcheme, chiefly, upon the dialectical ground. "The deſire of knowledge," ſaid they, "at firſt excited from natural curioſity, becomes ſo much the delight of the mind, that it is choſen for its own ſake, without regard to the inſtincts of nature, or their objects. So we often eſteem thoſe perſons more to whom we are recommended, than them who gave the recommendation. Duties and offices appear, from the light of reaſon and contemplation, more engaging, than from any natural propenſity to their performance. The ſenſe of the harmony of virtuous action, is felt by us to have an attraction of a ſuperior kind, to which all men ought to yield." "But," ſays Cicero, "how is this conſiſtent with their fundamental maxim, of living in concord with, and agreeably to, the dictates of nature. Their ſtride over this principle," he obſerves, "was ſimilar to that made by the Epicureans, who firſt held pleaſure to be the only good, and then pretended to hug pain, when virtue required of them adherence to its principles."

‖ Cicero de Finib. lib. 4. pag. 90.

and dignity, in honeſt and virtuous conduct, which makes it amiable, and worthy of admiration, and therefore laudable; and, if ſuch deportment be not accounted a real good in itſelf, and eligible, even without regard to its utility, the only proper and certain foundation of moral offices muſt be weakened, or entirely ſubverted. But the truth of the premiſſes, in the propoſition from which the concluſion is inferred, can hardly be diſputed; or, if it be, the common ſenſe and reaſon of mankind is ſufficient to eſtabliſh it. No rational perſon ever applied the epithet of laudable, or commendable, to any thing which includes not in it the notion of good, or of what is agreeable and beneficial. The courſe of life that is happy is approved and praiſed; but no one makes the encomium of that which is miſerable. The native excellence of virtue, which has appropriated to its ſpecies of action the name of fair, decorous, ornamental, and honeſt, in like manner challenges, and procures, univerſal commendation. Who is ſo perverſe, and unnatural in his affections, or ſo unhinged in his reaſon, as to look with approbation upon characters deſtitute of this admired trait, and repreſent them as having an equal claim to applauſe? The ſordid and covetous, the flagitious and profligate, themſelves, expect it not; but, under the conſciouſneſs of demerit, and the ſecret dread of reproach, they would have wiſhed to have gratified their avarice, their ambition, or their luſt of pleaſure, by other means than thoſe which have diſgraced them in the opinion of mankind, even although they had been free from the apprehenſion of condign puniſhment.

It is no leſs evident, that, from the impulſe of nature, we not only prefer, in our eſteem, honeſt ſtudies and purſuits to ſuch as are baſe, but that our affection to the one, and our hatred of the other, proceed, without taking into view their different conſequences. Thus, it may be aſked, what intereſt have men in the actions of others done in a remote age, or at a great diſtance of place from them, any more than they have in the motion of the planets and ſtars, which are placed beyond their reach, and above their controul? Yet, as they make the latter their ſtudy, ſo they are ſolicitous to hear a narrative of the former, and to expreſs their approbation, or their blame, of what has been tranſacted; agreeable to that internal perception which all men have of a beauty

and comelineſs in virtuous deeds, and of a deformity and turpitude in their oppoſites. Even the feigned repreſentations of human characters, under the one or the other of theſe views, excite attention and concern: But, remarkable are the impreſſions made on the minds of the noble youth, a proper part of whoſe education it is to read, or hear recited, the lives and actions of thoſe illuſtrious men, who preferred a virtuous behaviour to utility or gain. They diſcover how differently they are moved with the hiſtory of the *Scipios*, and that of the *Tarquins*; and how readily nature, in all ſuch caſes, prompts to the diſcrimination of characters, and to an eſteem or deteſtation of them, according as they partake of virtue or vice.

There is, then, in virtue, a convenience to the end, which is happineſs; there is an eligibility of the principle, for its own ſake, and reflection recommends it under the idea of good. It is, therefore, to be ſelected as perfective of felicity; and the province of its diſciple is, to chooſe the honeſt action, and to reject the baſe. But, poſſeſſed as he may be of diſcernment and prudence in this function, he cannot perform his becoming, but arduous taſk, without magnanimity. If pain be accounted an evil, if death be reckoned the laſt and greateſt diſaſter, he will, as is natural to all creatures who have this conception of them, avoid encountering the one, and fly, as far as poſſible, from the other. In either caſe, the ſenſe of manly behaviour will forſake him; and the dictate of duty, however urged, from the conſideration of what he owes to parents, country, or friends, will not be regarded. He will not dare to try if pain may be rendered tolerable, by enduring it; or allow himſelf to think what power imagination and opinion have to elevate or depreſs the human mind *; and that the ſufferers in a noble cauſe, ſuch as the warrior, who bleeds in defence of his country, or the patriot, who dies in vindication of its laws, feels not half the pains of his honourable wounds, or grieves for his fate, but exults in it, as a conſummation of his title to glory and fame.

He who darts his javeline, or ſhoots his arrow at a mark, not only does every thing to take his aim aright, but his laſt and greateſt exertion

* Cicero de Finib. lib. 3. pag. 78.

tion muſt be, to reach and to hit it. In the acquiſition of virtue, which is the convenient affection, and the choſen one in life, every power of the ſoul muſt be called forth, and the utmoſt effort made, without fear of any obſtacle in the way, or under any deſpondency of ſucceſs. Conſcious of his high and glorious aim, the man of virtue beholds all other objects thrown down into a level below it; or, if they interfere, he conſiders them as not inſuperable, by the ſtrength of his reſolution, and the vigour of his abilities. In theſe he has a confidence; and preſumes the more, that they will avail to overcome all oppoſition, as many of the objects that ſtand in competition with virtue, are more apt to excite his contempt, than to engage his regard; and, in all events, he is perſuaded, that no real evil can befal him. To prudence and magnanimity, he joins temperance and juſtice; and finds the ſummary of all the moral offices, or the main ſtem that ſupports the reſt, to be conſtituted of theſe four; which, reſolved into their ſeveral operations, imply right judgment or knowledge of offices to be done; undergoing duty, and ſuſtaining what attends it; moderation and compoſure of appetite; and diſtribution, not only of what is due, but of what is fit to be diſpenſed to all. They are (κατορθωματα) perfect reaſons in contemplation, and complete rectitudes in practice. Of meaſures or degrees, they do not properly admit; but muſt be found, each of them, in its full proportion and vigour, or not at all. To ſay, that there be more juſtice, and leſs juſtice, more conſtancy, and leſs conſtancy, is equally abſurd as to affirm, that truth may be more or leſs true *. They are connected together, and may indeed, be deemed qualities common to the ſame agent, although they be different energies. He who does one thing wiſely, does another with firm reſolution, another with compoſure, another with juſtice; ſo that each of theſe virtues, being ſimilarly practiſed by the ſoul, leads on to the exerciſe of the others. As, in general, there is a near reſemblance between the affections of the body and thoſe of the mind †, ſo it is more eſpecially manifeſted in this, that the right ſtate of both depends on the harmony of their conſtituent parts; or, when the

* Diog. Laert. lib. 7. pag. 444.

† Cicero Tuſculan. Quaeſt. lib. 4. pag. 167.

qualities proper to each of them agree among themſelves. In this manner, the virtues evidently prove the health of the ſoul. A collective power, or what may be called a body of them, is formed, by means of their concord and union; and hence, a beatitude ſupreme, ſtable, and enduring, is the reſult.

Seductions from virtue moſt commonly ariſe from the purſuit of objects foreign to it, from falſe conceptions of good, and from the irrational opinions in credit with thoſe with whom we are converſant. Yet nature need not be arraigned of miſleading us; ſince there is no perverſion in the inclinations ſhe gives. She, alſo, has marked virtue and vice with ſuch a diſcriminating line, that it may be apparent to all, not only in the extremes of both, but in thoſe inſtances of affection and action, in which, according to the erroneous opinion of ſome philoſophers, it is ſuppoſed to diſappear, or become imperceptible. But, as in the virtues, which are *perfect offices*, there is no mean performance, in like manner, in the vices, called (αμαρτηματα), there is an equality which excludes degrees. Equal they are, as they proceed from the ſame ſource of falſe judgment, or wrong affection, common to them all. In each of them, there is a tranſition from the line of perfect rectitude; which, whether it be leſs or more, ſufficiently diſcovers the frenzy or the vice.

Good, they defined to be that which had utility, or what differed not from it. "The part," ſaid they, "is neither the ſame, nor different from the whole. The uſeful object is to be regarded as good; and the uſeful action partakes of virtue; yet theſe are not all the qualities of objects or actions. The pleaſing and the agreeable are alſo diſtinguiſhable in both *, and are often found united together. To conſtitute the whole of good, then, we muſt admit that combination which nature has made, not of things really different, but what, although congenial, are marked with diſtinct ideas in our conception. In this manner, the *bonum* and *pulchrum*, the profitable and the honourable, are one and the ſame,

* Honeſtate igitur, dirigenda utilitas eſt, et quidem ſic, ut haec duo verba inter ſe diſcrepare, ſed tamen unum ſonare videantur.—Etenim, quod ſummum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, naturae convenienter vivere, id habet, hanc, ut opinor, ſententiam, cum virtute congruere ſemper.—Cicero de Officiis, lib. 3. Sextus Empiric. lib. 10. pag. 442.

ſame, and equal ingredients of the higheſt and chief good." Their diviſion of it into its matter or ſubject, and the *operator*, or what was comprehended, *materially*, in the virtuous action, and *formally* in the agent, is one inſtance, of many, in their philoſophy, how much the verbal diſtinctions of the dialectic were affected among them. It is unneceſſary, therefore, to follow them in tracing out the acceſſories of good, ſuch as complacence, joy, and the like. The general inference from theſe diſtinctions was, that all good, not attainable by the will, and active powers of the mind, could not properly come under this denomination; and that the deſire of ſuch good, and much more a dependence upon it, was not only erroneous, but unphiloſophical, and degrading to the man of wiſdom and virtue. "He is," ſaid they, "by his conſtitution, made to owe all real good and enjoyment to himſelf. It originates within his mind, and terminates in its character; to the perfection of which no external advantages are requiſite. By placing theſe at a diſtance from him, and rendering them precarious and tranſient, nature has plainly ſhown, that they are not his proper felicity, and that he ought not to be deluded by them. Do theſe things, indeed, deſerve the name of true good, which are convertible into its oppoſite? We ſay, juſtly, it is the property of heat to warm, and of cold to chill; becauſe theſe different effects are, invariably, experienced from them. But no ſuch affirmation holds, with reſpect to the efficiency of external things in producing happineſs. Not only riches, glory, and nobility, but health of body, beauty, and ſtrength, are not always found conducive to this end. In many caſes they have a contrary tendency; and, therefore, they can never be reckoned amongſt things intrinſically, or, by natural conſequence, good. They may, at moſt, be ranked among thoſe of a variable and indifferent nature; which often preſent the form and ſhew, but want the eſſentials of felicity *."

The Academicians and Peripatetics advance a doctrine not very conſiſtent, when they admit virtue to be the principal ingredient in felicity, and

* It is to be obſerved, that Poſidonius, Panaetius, and others of the Stoical ſchool, conſidered many externals as a ſpecies of *good*, or ſecondary *eligibles*.—Diog. Laert. ibid. pag. 428.

and the only object worthy of eſtimation, and hold, at the ſame time, the goods of nature and fortune to be expetible in themſelves; ſo that the virtuous man, although he might be, in a great meaſure, happy without them, was rendered more bleſſed by their attainment. It follows, therefore, that they are neceſſary to complete his happineſs; and that it muſt increaſe or decreaſe, according as theſe things, exterior to the mind, happen to abound with, or to be wanting to him. Their aſſertion carries in it this abſurdity, that, beſide virtue, allowed by them to be the ſole eſtimable good, there are other deſirable things; and yet, when theſe are taken together with virtue, both of them are of no more eſtimation than that divine principle alone. It is ſurely more conſonant to reaſon, to pronounce external goods, in general, to be things indifferent, ſince they are not, in themſelves, efficients of felicity, but, according to their uſe, may be converted either to ill or to good; and, if even they ſhould be granted to have the latter quality, they are not at the command of our wills, or placed within the reach of human power. If a diſtinction is to be made between their kinds, the juſt one would be, to ſay of ſome of them, that they are to be *preferred*, and of others, that they are to be *rejected*, and of ſome others, that they are *neutral*. Thus, ſoundneſs of body, and ingenuity of mind, are preferable to diſeaſe, and to a ſlow capacity; and, in like manner, life to death, pleaſure to pain, joy to grief, wealth to poverty, and glory to diſgrace. The firſt have ſome eſtimation, but not an intrinſic one; and a preference is given them only in reſpect of the latter, which are rejected. They are to be aſſumed, and accepted as commodious in life, but not choſen as objects worthy of eſtimation *; while the others are to be rejected as incommodious, but not feared, or avoided, as evils. By adopting this diſtinction, the crown of dignity and worth is preſerved eminently to virtue; and as, in a court, we ſpeak not of the king being *preferred*, but confine this phraſe to thoſe neareſt him in honour, ſo it is to be taken, when uſed in a moral eſtimate of good and evil. Things exterior to the mind, and not of the nature of virtue, are, in a proper ſenſe,

* Cicero de Finib. lib. 3. et 4. pag. 115. Seneca de Vita Beata, cap. 22. Ibid. Epiſt. 80. et 96.

ſenſe, neither the one nor the other; but ſuch of them, as not being adverſe to virtue, and are ſuitable to nature, may be ſaid to be *preferred*, or *promoted*, as having ſome eſtimation, in compariſon with others, which are of little or no account.

The paſſions are vehement emotions of the mind, againſt the conſtancy of nature, without reaſon, or contrary to it *. They are oppoſed to what may be termed the *eupathies*, or good affections of the ſoul, and may well be reckoned its diſeaſes. The ſprings of them are opinions of good and evil, conceived without reaſon or prudence; and, in this reſpect, they are to be regarded as ſo many falſe judgments pronounced by the mind, in matters of the greateſt conſequence in life †. What, indeed, is avarice, but a conception of accumulated wealth, as an acquiſition highly prized in the world? What intemperance in the proviſions of the table, or what ungoverned appetite, but a vain imagination that theſe, and other ſuch exceſſes, are not ſo much inſtances of depravity, as they are proofs of the livelineſs of deſire, and of conſtitutional vigour, joined with an oſtentatious diſplay of the means afforded for every ſenſual gratification? But the vice of the mind, in theſe caſes, although latent, or palliated, is diſcoverable; and, in fact, is generally acknowledged by thoſe who are under the influence of ſuch deluſions. In the extravagance of deſire, and in the tranſport of pleaſure, the judgment of the mind is more overpowered than loſt. It often perceives the evil of the violent paſſion, and yet yields to it. Self-blame is mixed with the conſent; and hence many are juſtly repreſented by the poets, in the condition of *Medea*,

Againſt their better judgment borne away.

When men are deceived, or miſtaken, in any point of reaſon or judgment, it ſuffices for their correction, and the change of their opinion, to

* Diogen. Laert. ibid. pag. 433.

† Sed omnes perturbationes, *judicio* cenſent, fieri, et opinione; itaque, eas definiunt *preſſius*, ut intelligatur, non modo, quam vitioſa, ſed etiam, quam in noſtra ſint poteſtate. Cicero Tuſcul. Quaeſt lib. 4.—Nulla naturae vi commoventur; omniaque ea ſunt opiniones, et judicia levitatis. De Fin. lib. 3.

to be ſhewn their error. But ſuch conviction is not enough to liberate them from the ſway of unruly deſire, or ſhameful fear. The unhappy prejudice is owned by them, while its indulgence is continued; and nothing, but the experience of the aggravated evil, can avail to correct thoſe ſelf-condemned fools.

Philoſophy, which has been often called *the medicine of the ſoul*, has for its particular object the cure of the paſſions *; but this cure conſiſts not in an *apathy*, which implies an extirpation of the good and placid affections, as well as of the vicious and turbulent ones. The former, being conſiſtent with the tranquillity and conſtancy of the mind, are to be entertained in all their proper extent; and the latter, as the cauſes of perturbation, are to be ſuppreſſed. As the vehement and vicious paſſions may be reduced to four principal ones, fear, grief, envy, and jealouſy, ſo the *eupathies* may be comprehended in three ſources, thoſe of ſatisfaction, chearfulneſs, and equanimity †. It may be ſaid of *caution*, that it is the wiſe man's declination of evil, without any mixture of vain or abject fear; and that circumſpection and diſcernment attend it. *Will* was taken, by Zeno and the Stoics, in a peculiar ſenſe, for the natural movement of the mind towards good, under the direction, and with the conſtancy of reaſon; and was, therefore, to be diſtinguiſhed from blind and ungoverned deſire. In concord with its rational approbation of good, ariſe benevolence, humanity, and the kind affections connected with them. Diſpaſſionate, therefore, in a moral ſenſe, as the wiſe man is, his ſenſibility to all the becoming and laudable movements of the ſoul is manifeſt. His proper ſphere he knows to be the rational life, and that which is connected with, and perfected by, ſuitable offices.

Nature

* Cicero, Tuſcul. Quaeſt. lib. 3. pag. 148. † Ibid. lib. 4. pag. 169. Diogen. Laertius, ibid. Plutarch. de Genitura Animalium.

It was the doctrine of the Stoics, that the turbulent paſſions, having their ſources in nature, could not be eradicated; but that the impulſe to their gratification, as it aroſe chiefly from falſe judgment of good, might be, and was, totally ſuppreſſed in the breaſt of their wiſe man; who had his *eupathies*, but none of the *perturbations* of paſſion. To ſay, therefore, that they held an *apathy*, in the abſolute ſenſe of the word, was a falſification of their tenet, and what they could not maintain, without a contradiction in terms. Vide Seneçam de Ira, lib. 1. cap. 8.

Nature has laid a foundation for the perception and knowledge of a *perfect moral office*, agreeable to, and incumbent on man, in his condition and rank in the univerſe. His underſtanding is a detached *particle* of that ſovereign reaſon, which pervades the whole. The particular nature, and the univerſal, may be circumſtantially varied, but can never be eſſentially different, or entirely disjoined from each other. What is order, proportion, and congruity, in the general conſtitution of things, is, in man, a rectitude of ſentiment and affection, analogous to it. His obligation to correſpond with the univerſal ſyſtem, ariſes from the nature and quality of his internal perceptions; which mark to him the eſſential differences of things, and repreſent ſome objects in one determined light, and others in another. Even the common notions that prevail among mankind, with reſpect to juſtice and injuſtice, ſobriety and intemperance, timidity and fortitude, and their approbation of the one, and their blame of the other, are interpreted, by the diſciple of wiſdom, as hints afforded by nature of a fitneſs and unfitneſs in the reaſon of things, which it becomes every rational mind to regard as a rule both of ſentiment and of action. It may, indeed, be aſſerted, that there is a *pre-conception* of juſtice and temperance, prudence and fortitude, as each a virtue or excellence, before it be exemplified in the act, or exhibited by any agent. No ſtate or community of men could, by any declaration, impart to theſe virtues the character of right and true notions, unleſs the human mind was prediſpoſed to recogniſe them as ſuch. The idea of juſtice, therefore, is founded in nature, and not in the authority of the laws or cuſtoms of nations. Hence it is, that, when particular communities have enjoined a ſpecies of action contrary to, or inconſiſtent with, the natural ſentiment of right and wrong, the man of virtue has been ſeen to adhere to his principle, and to act upon it, without regard to the loſs of his fortune or of his life. Such a high ſenſe of moral conduct, independent of the more remote and inferior conſiderations of public or private utility, has been teſtified by illuſtrious men in ſeveral ages and countries of the world; who, therefore, may be quoted as exemplifying the perfect moral office, revered among the gods, and held ſacred by all the wiſe among men.

Such is the explication of the (κατορθωμα), or perfect moral office; the characteriſtic of which is, that, beſide being only competent to the wiſe man, it requires no other argument to prove its truth and obligation, but what is derived from the natural conception of virtue, as agreeable to the eternal reaſon and fitneſs of things. The middle, or common office, for which Zeno invented the word (καθηκον) *, was held to be inferior to it; for the performance of which, not a perfect, but a *probable* reaſon only, might be given. If it interfered with the perfect moral office, its obligation ceaſed, or was to be rejected. The proof of it proceeded upon the conſideration of the ſpecial circumſtances, conditions, relations, and connections, in which mankind are, or may be placed. The determination of the wiſe man to conform to it, aroſe from his theory of nature, and the views preſented to him of a common, as well as a particular good, ſought after, and generally attained, amongſt every ſpecies of animals. In the whole of them, ſcarce any appeared to be produced for themſelves alone, and without preſerving a correſpondence with thoſe of their tribe. Many of them, beſide being naturally attracted to their tribe, aſſociated together for their common defence; and others, having a more perfected inſtinct, laboured painfully for the benefit of their ſpecies; in compariſon with which, the toil and hardſhip ſubmitted to by the individual, was lightly regarded †. Inſtincts ſimilar to theſe were not only found in man, but an enlargement of them aroſe from his many ſocial faculties. Speech, conference, diſcourſe, a curioſity that prompts inquiry, an imagination that teems with new objects of it, and an aptitude to teach others, as well as to be taught, are, all together, ſuch incitements to man's aſſociation with his fellows, and ſuch engaging bands of this intercourſe, that no poſſeſſion of wealth, remote from ſociety, no ſolitary gratifications, however repeated, can compenſate for the want of that exquiſite entertainment he finds in living and acting in connection with thoſe of his ſpecies. Hence, the man of wiſdom embraces ſociety, from that powerful recommendation which nature has given it; and that inſtructs him, that *man* ought not to

* Diog. Laert. ibid. pag. 430. Cicero de Officiis, lib. 1. pag. 381.
† Cicero de Finib. ibid. pag. 81.

to be alienated from *man;* were it only upon the account, that he is *man.* He, therefore, joins himſelf to a civil ſtate, that he may participate in the mutual exchange of offices, and have the opportunity of doing to others all the good in his power. He approves, as a dictate of reaſon, that, where a community is formed, and a public intereſt eſtabliſhed, there the private good is to be held the inferior one, and, in every interference, to yield to that of the generality. Praiſe worthy, therefore, is the man to be accounted, who meets danger and death for the ſake of his country. His action, in ſuch a caſe, is, indeed, no more than that which nature has made the mark of the nobler animals; who, in proportion to their ſuperior ſtrength, take upon themſelves the defence of the weaker of their tribe. Thus, the bull confronts the enemy of the herd; and declines not encountering the rage of the lion. How much more is ſuch generous action the characteriſtic of heroic men; ſuch as *Hercules*, *Bacchus*, and others, whoſe vigour, whether of body or mind, was made ſubſervient to the benefit of the human race? What, indeed, do we mean, when we call *Jupiter* the beſt, and the greateſt, the *help bringing god*, and the guardian of hoſpitality, but that he takes charge, in a ſovereign manner, of the ſafety and welfare of mankind? If thus made the care of the immortal gods, can the intereſts of mankind, or their preſervation, be accounted an object of ſmall moment by men themſelves? The world in which we live is, as it were, one *city*, common to the gods and to men; between whom, there ſubſiſts an affinity and connection, which extends not to the irrational and brute creatures. Diſſimilar in their qualifications, the latter are not under the ſame law with the former, who know juſtice and goodneſs, not only in the act, but in the principle. Thus, the wiſe man has a ſenſe of the virtues, as they may be diſplayed, either in reſpect of the community at large, or of what individuals have a title to require of him. His ideas of the common rights of humanity, and of theſe belonging to every citizen of a republic, do not exclude his conception of private property, as a ſpecies of right diſtinct from both theſe. For although, in a theatre, every place be a common one, yet, that ſeat which any perſon occupies, is held, unqueſtionably, to be his poſſeſſion. In general, the wiſe man conſiders the offices he owes to ſociety, as relative to his particular ſta-

tion, and to be regulated by it; but in ſuch a manner, that no action of his may contradict the leading maxims eſpouſed by him, as a man capable of perfecting, by the ſtudy and practice of virtue, the fair character of his mind, ever productive of his higheſt felicity.

Under this predicament, he is diſpoſed and qualified to act a ſuitable part in every ſituation of life. His habitual virtue, failing him in none, will ever prove equal to itſelf. Whether, then, he rules as a magiſtrate, or obeys as a citizen; whether he occupies the place of ſafety, or of danger; whether he be in affluence, or in want; converſant with pleaſure, or with pain; extolled by the voice of the multitude, or depreciated; he will exhibit the ſame principles, exemplify the ſame character, which nature and reaſon have taught him to aſſume, not in degrees, or mediocrity, but in the full extent of its excellence. Defection from it, in the ſmalleſt inſtance, he conſiders as equivalent to a total revolt, and holds that man incapable of virtue, who reaches not its utmoſt perfection *; eſpecially as all its ingredients are connected together. In the eſtimate, therefore, of his many qualities, every name of honour and praiſe may be aſcribed to him; and, even thoſe epithets are applicable to his character, which are not literal, but allegorical deſcriptions of its incomparable merit. He, alone, is found in all his faculties †; he is free, in the propereſt ſenſe of the word; he is rich, as well as fair; a king, truly, he is, and more than a king: He is *divine*, and hath a god within him; which, under *Jove*, exalts him to an equality with the immortals ‡. Has he, then, no human weakneſs, no defect at all? He has; but it is only an inevitable frailty of nature. The ſpleen may invade him, and involve his mind in a dark or diſtracting cloud.

That

* Diog. Laert. ibid. pag. 444. † Cicero de Finib. lib. 3.; et in Paradoxis Stoicorum.

‡ Horace's fine ridicule upon the chimerical perfections of the Stoical wiſe man, is heightened, by conſidering it, not as the fiction of the Epicurean poet, who threw out a witty ſtroke againſt a ſect he did not eſteem, but as expoſing a conceſſion, which, whether they would or not, they were obliged to make, about the imbecillity of nature. The ſpleen, or vapouriſh fit, incident to the wiſe man, notwithſtanding his alledged perfection, which the poet expreſſes in half a line, contraſts the whole character:

Ad

That this ſtandard of perfection, held forth by the Stoics in the character of their wiſe man, was an imaginary one, and what neither Zeno, Cleanthes, Chryſippus, nor any of the moſt venerable perſonages of their ſect, ever pretended to reach, was, in effect, acknowledged: Yet, it was ſaid by them, that what had not been known, might *poſſibly* be diſcovered *. From their adopting a moſt fantaſtic tenet, that all *ſages* ſupported one another, and had ſuch an (φιλια), or reciprocal help in communication among them, that every ſatisfaction or pleaſure ſhared in by an individual, was taſted of by the reſt; it may be ſuppoſed, that they thought a compenſation for the want of perfect excellence and felicity, in any particular character, might be afforded from all their virtues, when combined together. But ſuch abſurd aſſertions, which were in affinity with their *paradoxes*, theſe egregious flowers of their dialectic, brought their moral theory into much controverſy and ridicule. By their graver adverſaries, their paradoxical ſentences were impugned with phlegm and with acrimony. The Academicians, and other ſceptics, treated them with deriſion; and they were generally ſported with by the poets. The detail of their ethical principles and precepts was ſo moulded upon their *logical* ratiocinations, which conſiſted chiefly in *enthymems*, and other abrupt, or lame figures of the ſyllogiſm; that, as Cato is ſaid to have affirmed, in his commendation of their connected arguments, if but one *iota* was put out of its place, the whole ſeries of them would be deranged. It is, alſo, to be obſerved, that the more rigid, or, as they would reckon themſelves, the moſt *orthodox* of their ſect, would admit of no qualification of any of their general principles. Diſputable as theſe might be, and at variance with the common ſenſe and experience of mankind, a conceited adherence to them was maintained; as in their affirmation, that virtue alone, without any exterior concurrence of health, ſtrength, or corporeal well being, was a ſufficient foundation.

> Ad ſummam, ſapiens uno minor eſt Jove, dives,
> Liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum,
> Praecipue ſanus—niſi cum *pituita* moleſta eſt.
> Epiſt. 1. lib. 1.

* Cicero de Officiis, lib. 1. cap. 43. Plutarch. de Repugnantiis Stoicorum.

dation for complete happineſs *. As this point became the main ground of controverſy between them and the Peripatetics, it gave occaſion to Panaetius and Poſidonious, two of their eminent authors, to diſſent from this tenet. Their antagoniſts boaſted, that, from their diſagreement in various inſtances, they had often no more to do, in order to confute them, than to ſtate the contradictions among themſelves. Diogenes Laertius, in his life of Zeno, has taken care to collect and animadvert upon them; and Plutarch, in a particular treatiſe †, has made the moſt of this argument, to vilify their principles. The one author had a manifeſt partiality to a contrary ſyſtem; the other, addicted to no particular one, choſe to make his attack upon the theory of the Stoics, eminent as it was in fame, and boaſted of by its diſciples for the perfection of its dialectical ſtructure.

But, liable as the Stoical ſyſtem was to ſuch animadverſions, it muſt be owned, that, in the ſource and explication of moral offices, it excelled the theories of the other ſects. Several of the diſciples of the ſchool diſplayed in their writings an accuracy of method, and a copiouſneſs of invention, peculiar to them ‡. The Roman orator, inſtructed in all the Grecian philoſophy, and who firſt exhibited it in the language of his country, preferred the diſſertation of Panaetius upon *Offices*, as the beſt, and adopted it as a text for his own treatiſe on that ſubject. The Stoical doctrine was ſingularly adapted to attach the mind to virtue, and to enforce its purſuit. The ſelection it made of this principle of action, as the only noble, and eligible one in human life, and the contempt with which it treated every extraneous and inferior motive, had a direct tendency to exalt the idea of its worth, and to increaſe its influence over the minds of men. Studious of its excellence, and bent on its attainment, as the higheſt perfection and happineſs, the diſciples of the Porch were prompted to diſtinguiſh themſelves by virtuous exertions. Even that arrogant idea of a ſelf-derived, and independent felicity, aſſumed by them, availed,

* Diog. Laert. ibid. pag. 445. Cicero, ibid. lib. 4.

† De Repugnantiis Stoicorum.

‡ Diogenes Laertius, in his life of Zeno, pag. 418. mentions various of the Stoics, beſide Panaetius and Poſidonius, who wrote, with approbation, either on the theoretical or practical part of Ethics.

availed, in a ſurpriſing manner, to their progreſs in virtue. Hence the characters exhibited by this philoſophy, were marked with ſtriking features in every rank and ſtation of life. In the robe of the ſenator, and that of the military commander, no leſs than with the plain cloak of the ſchools, they were conſpicuous, and diſcovered a command of the paſſions, and a government of the mind, generally admired. Virtue, with them, was no more than the exertions of reaſon and reſolution; and, where the proper ſources of both were afforded by nature, they preſumed the object to be attainable. Here we ſtate not the queſtion, Whether this ſcheme did not far overrate the powers of the human mind, and, therefore, might be concluded a vain and fantaſtic one, which could never be verified in practice? The more pertinent query is, Whether a ſyſtem of morals, which held perfection in virtue to be obligatory and practicable, was, in reſpect of proficiency in it, and the proper diſcipline of the mind, preferable to any other, that admitted virtue as a general rule of conduct, but joined with it other objects, as equally neceſſary to happineſs; whence aroſe the indulgence of deſires and aims, which relaxed the force of the virtuous principle? It appears, that, comparing the Stoical with the Epicurean, or the Peripatetic theory, in this view, the ſolution of the queſtion, in favour of the former, is not difficult.

After the reputation of the Stoical ſect declined, and that of Epicurus got the aſcendent at Rome, its patterns were ſtill admired in the Tubero's and Varro's, the Cato's and Brutus's, and other diſtinguiſhed characters in the Roman republic. It revived again in the time of the Emperors, and was held in the more eſteem, as it appeared to bid defiance to their barbarous edicts. Thraſeas Paetus, and his conſort Arria, were then ſeen to act their applauded part; and Helvidius Priſcus proved, by his manly behaviour, that a virtuous mind was invincible by misfortune, or the hardeſt trials. It aſcended the throne in the perſon of Marcus Antoninus; who, in the ſoliloquies he compoſed, adopted moſt of the Stoical principles and maxims, although without adhering ſtrictly to all their tenets. In his manner of repreſenting them, the aſperity of their precepts are ſoftened, and the abſurdities of ſome of them ſo far corrected, that we eaſily forget that they were ever included in the general

theory.

theory. Of Epictetus *Manual* much the ſame thing may be ſaid; eſpecially when read together with his ſcholar Arrian's diſſertations; in which the *anecdotes* given of the manners and ſayings of that philoſopher, diſcover him to have entertained ſentiments different from thoſe of a dogmatical or unfeeling perſon. If we look further for illuſtrations of the Stoical doctrines, with reſpect to the providential and all-wiſe government of the univerſe, by the ſupreme and eternal mind, and theſe ſupported by the ſtrongeſt arguments, we find them beſt diſplayed in Simplicius's commentary upon Epictetus's well known treatiſe.

It is an obſervation made by Plutarch upon this philoſophy, which, in ſeveral reſpects, he endeavours to expoſe, that, where it was grafted upon a ſedate and mild natural temper, it was productive of the beſt effects; but, when mingled with a ſanguine and haughty diſpoſition, it run to exceſs, and overſet the mind. But, allowing the remark to be juſt, it may be ſaid, not inconſiſtently with it, that the propenſities of nature will always ſo far prevail againſt ſpeculative opinions, however ſtrongly inculcated by philoſophy, that the latter will be forced, in ſome meaſure, to yield; but if, on the contrary, the doctrines correſpond with the natural diſpoſitions, that the mind will be yet more apt to loſe the proper balance of its affections, and to be carried into extremes. In the caſe of over-rigid maxims of virtue, ſuch as the Stoical diſcipline was alledged to preſcribe, the corrective from nature is both a ſure and a ſafe one. From the hiſtory of mankind, it is apparent, that, wherever the powers or affections of nature have been ſtrained, or her feelings violated, ſhe has generally, although ſometimes in an imperceptible manner, reſumed her authority *. Notwithſtanding a few fanatics in philoſophy may have been, for a while, deaf to her voice, they were unable to perſevere in their oppoſition to it, or to perſuade others to diſregard it. If ſome Stoics of inferior note were chargeable with an unnatural affectation of auſterities, we do not find that any of the eminent men of their ſect were accuſed of having this blemiſh in their character †.

Even

* Naturam expellas furca, tamen uſque recurret.—Hor. Epiſt. 10. lib. 1.

† Cicero, in his oration *Pro Muraena*, ſays of Cato: In M. Catone, judices, haec bona, quae videmus divina, et egregia, ipſius ſcitote eſſe propria. Quae nonnunquam requirimus, ea ſunt omnia non a natura, ſed a magiſtro.

Even ſuch of them, as, like Cato, were ſtrict in their principles, and rather ſevere to themſelves, were known to be placid and mild in their manners, and indulgent to others with whom they were converſant *. They proved, by their deportment, that rigid maxims of virtue, although adopted in ſpeculation, ought, in practice, to be qualified. The extreme of any virtue, if not before apprehended, becomes, upon reflection, and a regard to circumſtances, perceptible to a virtuous mind, and receives the proper correction. But this is not the caſe, where the moral rule of life is conſidered as leſs ſtrict in itſelf, or where, from the propenſities of nature, men are inclined to ſwerve from it. The limit between the virtue and the vice is, then, leſs attended to; and the mind, gradually loſing ſight of it, thinks not of curbing its favourite affections, until itſelf be ſubverted, and undone by their prevailing power.

Here we are arrived at the concluſion of our ſubject. The ſucceſſions of the celebrated Grecian ſchools have been, in their order, brought into view; and the theories and reaſoning of the philoſophers, reſpecting the moſt important objects of the human underſtanding, have been traced. Their various ſpeculations about the conſtitution and ſtate of the world of beings, viſible and inviſible, and the diſagreement of the ableſt of them with one another, may well be conſidered as a proof, that the faculties

* The characters of other eminent Romans, who had their education from preceptors of the Stoical ſect, are repreſented in the following paſſage: Hujuſcemodi Scipio ille fuit, quem non poenitebit facere idem, quod tu: Habere eruditiſſimum hominem (*Panaetium*) et paene divinum domi; cujus oratione, et praeceptis, quamquam erant eadem iſta, quae te delectant, tamen aſperior non eſt factus, ſed (ut accepi a ſenibus) leniſſimus. Quis vero C. Laelio comior? quis jucundior, eodem ex ſtudio iſto? quis illo gravior, ſapientior! Poſſum de L. Philippo de C. Gallo dicere haec eadem: Sed te domum jām deducam tuam, &c.—Cic. Ibid.

faculties of man are adapted to inveſtigate the arduous ſubject, only in an imperfect and partial manner; and that it is not given to a creature of his condition to underſtand, thoroughly, *what the works of God are, from the beginning of them unto the end.* Hence metaphyſical reaſoning, with reſpect to them, has ſo often proved vain and chimerical; and the ſcience itſelf, although called *the firſt philoſophy*, cannot be proſecuted, but a certain length, without the diſcovery of its perplexities. Perfection of wiſdom only belongs to God; and, therefore, ſaid Ariſtotle, none but he can be a *perfect metaphyſician.*

While the phyſical theoriſt teſtifies his abſurd preſumption, that, in a world planned by infinite wiſdom, every line of its contrivance ſhould fall within the level of his underſtanding; the Sceptic, on metaphyſical ground, is a contraſt to him, by ſcorning all human knowledge. He is diſcontented, and angry, with the human faculties, which he reckons of no ſufficient extent for knowing any thing, or reaſoning about it with certainty. How ſurpriſing, and intollerable, is it, ſays he, that, having reaſon, we ſhould not underſtand what ſubſtances are in their eſſence, and how they differ from a collection of qualities? It is not even conceivable to us, in what manner our bodies are moved, at the will of our minds. Our apprehenſion of cauſes and effects, is, metaphyſically, dark and ambiguous; and, when we pretend to diſtinguiſh them, we only ſubſtitute names for things. To conceive, that, as in all the creatures below us, the reach of our faculties may be, and are, wiſely and properly, accommodated to our ſtate of being, is a thought too plain, and obvious, to be entertained in the plodding mind of the Sceptic. Yet, ſurely, upon the ſuppoſition that any tribe of the inferior animals ſhould attain a degree of reaſon beyond their natural inſtincts or ſagacity, it may be underſtood what turbulence would be excited in the ſublunary ſcale of beings.

It appears, that Providence has meaſured out the precious endowment, *knowledge*, ſparingly, and with reſerve, becauſe of the abuſe to which, by creatures of a certain conſtitution, it might be turned; and that the Pythagoreans held a juſt doctrine, when they ſaid, that human advancements in it were to be preceded, or attended, with a ſuitable degree of purification from corporeal affections and paſſions. We are

not

not permitted to ruſh into knowledge. Intuitive truths are few; and ſerve only as the baſis of ſcience, or the demonſtrative proof. Progreſs in it requires the exerciſe of our rational faculties, by the compariſon of our ideas; and, where that cannot be inſtituted between two of them, we muſt conſider, whether, by calling in a third one, their ſimilarity, or diſſimilarity, their equality, or inequality, may not be rendered manifeſt. It is enough, that, by this rational act, we perceive that diſcoveries of truth may be made, and even in a lengthened ſeries of them, which, in ſome ſciences, appears to us ſurpriſing. It is evident, that the extent of our conceptions exceeds that of our knowledge; and that we have various ideas, which we cannot clearly contemplate. But, as ideas are the ſource of knowledge, it may well be preſumed, that, imperfect as ſome of them are, they ſerve to open the mind to meaſures of it, unattainable in the body; and that many things, not now diſcoverable, will, in the channel of them, be hereafter underſtood. Human philoſophy, although it teaches us not what ſubſtances are, enables us, from obſerving the very different qualities and operations of body and mind, to diſtinguiſh them as two natures of being, ſeparately exiſtent in the univerſe, and found, in our mixed conſtitution, to have, each of them, its peculiar office. The appointment of the ſoul to have dominion over the body, is manifeſt; and there can be no ſubverſion of this order, without the deſtruction of the man. Equally apparent it is to the contemplative mind, that, over all the claſſes of being, there is an inviſible ruler, and preſerver, without whoſe agency, and allwiſe government, the material world could not ſubſiſt, nor the incorporeal one have the arrangement of the active powers competent to it. But, how ſhall theories of human invention explain what diſtributions of theſe powers are made to the various ranks of creatures, in the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms; or how they are to be diſtinguiſhed, by their efficiency, from one another; whether, in ſome of them, there may be modes of corporeal mechaniſm, and in others an immaterial principle, called *vitality*, yet not the ſame with ſoul or mind? Theſe are queſtions, about the ſolution of which, if the curious and inquiſitive have employed their ſtudies, the reſult has only been a temporary amuſement to themſelves, and others of their taſte, for deluſive theory.

We have obſerved, with what admiration the circular motions of the heavenly bodies were contemplated by the moſt ſcientific geniuſes in the Grecian philoſophy: For ſuch Pythagoras, Plato, and Ariſtotle, may juſtly be accounted. The firſt, recogniſed in them the harmony of numbers; and the ſecond, an eternity of one unvaried motion. The third conſidered their circumvolutions as an image of intellect in act, and returning uniformly into itſelf. That the celeſtial ſpheres were animated, and conducted in their motions, by intelligences of an order only inferior to the ſupreme, and eternal mover, was a doctrine common to them all. The queſtion reſpecting the manner in which motion was communicated to bodies, whether of the celeſtial or ſublunary kind *, has alſo been mentioned, as ſtated by Plato. That philoſopher, however, did not pretend, like ſome of his followers, to dogmatiſe upon this doubtful point. Conceivable, he ſaid, it might be, in three ſeveral ways. For, beſide ſuppoſing that the action of the intelligences might enſue by incorporeiety with the ſtars, after the manner of the human conſtitution, or by the interpoſition of ſome unknown medium, it is remarkable, that he thought that their volitions alone might be ſufficient to accompliſh the myſterious energy. Notwithſtanding it was a general maxim in his theory, that intellect, or mind, did not, immediately, connect itſelf with body, but required the intervention of ſoul, and, therefore, he held forth a general one of the world, yet he did not ſpecify the modifications of that ſoul, or deliver a doctrine about its particular diſtributions. In this, it muſt be owned, there was a reſerve becoming a philoſopher, attentive to the difficulties of the ſubject he treated; and not diſpoſed to ſolve them, any how, for the ſake of eſtabliſhing a ſyſtem †. He expreſſed, as has been obſerved, a diſtruſt of the beſt human conceptions about the diverſified operation of the *mundane* ſoul, in the heavens, and in the earth. The doctrine of various ſouls appeared a ſtumbling one to him, and inadmiſſible in phyſics. It was left, therefore, to his diſciple Ariſtotle, to reſolve the perplexing queſtion, in the moſt ſpecious manner he could. He rejected the Platonic ſoul of the world; while he underſtood, as little as his maſter, how a partition was to be made of

* Part 5. ſect. 3. pag. 278. † Vid. ibid. pag. 276.

of ſoul, mind, or intellect. Much, however, he thought was to be done, whether in phyſics, metaphyſics, or logics, by making nice diſtinctions; and ſince, according to his doctrine, forms incorporeal conſtituted the natural elements, and all the tranſmutations of which they were ſuſceptible, he conſidered it to be no exceptionable, but rather a juſt and neceſſary poſition, that there were ſeveral ſpecies of ſoul; which might be, chiefly, comprehended in thoſe of the *vegetable*, the *animal*, and *intellectual* kind.

This diſtinction of the natures of beings in the world, was, indeed, no novelty, but had been, long before, made, not only by the philoſophers, but by the vulgar of mankind. Yet it went not the length of determining, preciſely, what was the characteriſtical difference of theſe natures, unleſs where it was palpably marked, as between the vegetable and the animal, and the rational and irrational creature, or the man and the brute. To go farther, was not eaſy for the Stagirite himſelf; who, as has been obſerved, did not hold, that every corporeal ſubſtance was animated; and, therefore, he heſitated whether to call the animal life a ſoul, or part of a ſoul. He aſſerted, that nature was not only a principle of motion, but of reſt; ſo that matter, or body, might be found in a paſſive, and quieſcent ſtate, as well as in an active one. Some of his followers, however. did not adhere to this poſition; but maintained, that an immaterial principle, in various forms, moved and actuated all corporeal nature, and that no part of it could be reckoned to be at abſolute reſt, or without having, at leaſt, a tendency to motion. This doctrine was that of Plato, afterwards methodiſed by thoſe denominated his latter diſciples; of whom Proclus, and Platinus, were the moſt celebrated. It is this theory, which ſome modern eſpouſers of the Peripatetic philoſophy, already taken notice of would oppoſe to the Newtonian doctrine, about the motions of the planets around the ſun; reſolved, as it was, into the ſpeculative principle of their *projection* and *gravitation*. As Newton himſelf aſſigned no phyſical cauſe of this complex motion, but conſidered it as a *law*, impreſſed upon theſe bodies by *divine* and omnipotent power; his phyſical philoſophy has been, hitherto, generally underſtood to ſupport, ſignally, the principles of theiſm; more eſpecially as it diſplays the Creator's celeſtial works in a light

more

more declarative to men of his almighty power, and unerring wiſdom, than any other theory of them ever before unfolded; and its having this excellent tendency, the moſt ſceptical have not preſumed to diſpute. That difficulties may be found in it, with reſpect to the cauſe of the coheſion of the particles of matter, and in conceiving by what means the planetary bodies ſhould, at the ſame time, both gravitate to, and recede from, their centres, has been underſtood, and made the ſubject of phyſical controverſy, at home and abroad. Upon account of the very excentric *elypſiſes*, in which the comets move, and the peculiarities obſerved in theſe bodies, objections, thought to be inſuperable, have been ſtarted to Newton's theory, and recourſe had to another ſuggeſted from obſervations on *electrical* bodies, and their attractive and repellent powers. This principle of phyſics is regarded by thoſe converſant in the ſcience of it, as what may be the foundation of a theory about the motions of the heavenly bodies, and other natural *phaenomena*, more *phyſically* juſt, and ſatisfactory, than any account of them that can be collected from Newton's *Principia*. If this theory ſhould gain reputation, and, as its admirers preſume, become the prevalent one, there will be more ground than is afforded from the Newtonian phyſics, for true and philoſophic theiſts to take the alarm. But it will admit of heſitation, and doubt, whether they ſhould reſt their arguments upon explications of the ancient Peripatetic doctrine, that are, at leaſt, controvertible, and exhibit a theory of ſoul, and mind, which, although allowed to be juſt and true in its general principle, that matter is the paſſive, and mind the only active ſubſtance in the world, and the original cauſe of all corporeal motion, yet preſume to give a detail of the immaterial principle, and form diviſions and arrangements of it into ſeveral diſtinct ſubſtances, of which human reaſon appears unqualified to take any proper or ſatisfactory cogniſance.

To finiſh our concluſive remarks, it may be proper to look forward, and obſerve in what the competition amongſt the ſeveral ſchools of Greece, for preferable fame, at length terminated. The reſult was, a declining the fetters of any particular ſyſtem, and taking the liberty to borrow, out of the various theories, thoſe tenets only, which were judged to be moſt agreeable to reaſon. Upon this ground aroſe the

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ſect called *Eclectic*, from the ſelection its adherents made of their philoſophic principles and opinions. To Potamon, a native of Alexandria, philoſophy owed this reformation; which, although it confined the reſearches of truth to the diſcoveries made in the ſchools, was conſiderable, and advantageous. We know but little of Potamon's diſcipline, and have only ſome rules, ſaid to be preſcribed by him, about admiſſible tenets. It is not agreed, whether he appeared at Rome in the reign of Auguſtus, or in that of Tiberius Caeſar; but his ſchool ſoon roſe to great reputation. Notwithſtanding attachments to particular ſects ſtill obtained, the prevalence of his general doctrine appeared, from the free ſentiments both of the poets and philoſophers of that aera. The writings of Plutarch, and of the elder Pliny, teſtify how much, in their time, adherence to any ſect was diſregarded. The Roman Emperors, after Auguſtus, choſe their inſtructors in philoſophy, indifferently, out of all the celebrated ſchools. But a ſecond birth of philoſophy, although a weak and motely one, enſued in the famous ſchool of Alexandria; which, by the favour and liberality of the Ptolemies, became an aſylum to the learned, much more externally illuſtrious, by the munificent proviſions made for them, than ever Athens had proved.

The bounties of the Ptolemies to the profeſſors of philoſophy, in their academy of *Iſis* and *Serapis*, did not operate to the advancement of the ſciences. Whether, after great efforts, ſuch as the Grecian ſchools had made, the human genius is, naturally, thrown into a temporary languor, or elſe, that inſtitutions for ſcientific proficiency are not, always, calculated to produce it, the profeſſors in the Alexandrine ſchool ſhowed their genius to be of the retrograde kind, and defective of all invention. They ſtudied only explications, and paraphraſes, of the works of Plato, Ariſtotle, and other maſters of the Grecian ſchools; and ſeveral of theſe labours were confined to grammatical and verbal criticiſms. When more was attempted, the object was to bring about a *ſyncretiſm*, as it was called, of philoſophy; or to reconcile the tenets of the moſt famous ſects to one another. In this harmoniſing ſcheme, prejudices and partialities could not fail to operate; and it appears, from what is tranſmitted to us of the writings of *Numenius* of *Apamea*, of

of Ammonius Saccas, and Plotinus his diſciple, together with thoſe of Proclus of Lycia, and Porphyrie, and Jamblicus, into what a *farrago* of Egyptian, Pythagoric, Platonian, Ariſtotelian, and other incongruous doctrines, the Grecian philoſophy was converted. In it, two oppoſite things were conjoined; the moſt ſubtile refinements of metaphyſics, and the deluſions of vulgar credulity and ſuperſtition. Plato's ideas were perſonified, and his triple world was repreſented as repleniſhed with a multiplicity of Demons and Genii, good and bad. How to repel the influence of the latter, and hold a communication with the former, was the great object of their philoſophic ſtudy and diſcipline. To attain this end, while the metaphyſical geniuſes, ſuch as Proclus and Plotinus, dived deep into contemplations about the methods of purifying the human ſoul from the errors of the underſtanding, and the depravities of the heart; the leſs *ſpiritual*, and common profeſſors of philoſophy, reſolved the work into the virtues of incantations, ſpells, and ſorceries. In this manner did philoſophy aſſume, for its ſupports and efficacy, all the apparatus of *magic*. Belief in *theurgy*, as it was called, became a deluſion no leſs general, than that which had, for many ages, prevailed among mankind, in conſequence of the implicit faith given to the reſponſes of the oracles, and all the other impoſitions of the *prieſtly* auguries and divinations.

When the ſchools of ancient Greece, ſo famed for the exertions of natural reaſon, and philoſophic ſtudy, thus ſhowed *their latter end to be worſe than their beginning*, it was high time that men ſhould be called to recogniſe that ſupernatural revelation vouchſafed to them by the *father of their ſpirits*, and marvellouſly preſerved in one nation of the earth. There, only, was to be found a religious inſtitution, and *ſanctuary*, in which the Supreme Being, the creator of the heavens and the earth, was repreſented by no ſenſible image, but his worſhippers required to adore him, who was inviſible, in a ſpiritual manner. When all other nations appeared to renounce this rational principle in their public worſhip, and, notwithſtanding its approbation, by ſome of their wiſe men, to eſpouſe many unbecoming, and deteſtible rites and practices, the Jewiſh ſanctuary was kept unprofaned by ſuch impieties. The ſacred doctrine of a One Eternal, and Incorporeal Deity, was not only underſtood

ſtood among the *Rabbis*, or learned few of the nation, but inculcated upon all the worſhippers of the God of Iſrael. Notwithſtanding the revolt of the ten tribes from Judah, adherence to it diſtinguiſhed that people, in all the countries where, in their public calamities, they were diſperſed. It appeared to be the *teſtimony* which the Supreme Being was pleaſed to give of himſelf, in a manner more adapted to the inſtruction of the bulk of mankind, than any ſeries of ſpeculative reaſoning could prove. It was ſuch a divine revelation, as Socrates, and Plato, and the beſt of the ancient philoſophers, acknowledged to be neceſſary for the reformation of the religious principles, and moral ſentiments, of the human race. How much more was it atteſted to be a heavenly light, held out in the midſt of general darkneſs, when conſidered as preparatory to the brighter day of the evangelical revelation? The ſupernaturally avouched miſſion, the character, deportment, and offices, of the *Meſſiah*, the *perſon* ſent to reclaim the world by his doctrines, bore every requiſite proof, that the Author of *Chriſtianity* was, indeed, the *Logos*, or revealed wiſdom of God; having a perfection and tendency in it, to that end, which never could be reached by human theories; and ſuch as, from the import of its ſublime and ſalutary truths, was calculated to overawe and reform the vicious, and inſtruct and comfort the pious and the good, in every ſtate and condition of human life.

* * * * *

The ſucceſſions of the Grecian Philoſophers, and their ſchools, have been traced, through this Work, in the order of time, except in the tranſpoſition of the Stoical Philoſophy. There was, however, a fancied arrangement of them, which appears more arbitrary, than proper, that, in imitation of Diogenes Laertius's diſpoſition of their lives, was generally embraced by the Schoolmen. It proceeds upon a ſuppoſed, or imagined connection of the general principles of ſome of the ſects with others. The Table in the Appendix exhibits this arrangement.

APPENDIX.

TABLE of the Succeſſions of the Schools; and of the Sects of the Philoſophers.

The IONIC School, founded by
Thales Mileſius, continued by
Anaximander,
Anaximenes,
Anaxagoras Clazomen,
Archelaus Athen.

The ITALIC School, founded by
Pythagoras Samius, continued by
Hippodamus Thurius,
Eutyphamus,
Hipparchus,
Archytas,
Theano, uxor Pythagorae, &c.

Precedently to the appearance of *Socrates*, aroſe the ELEATIC School, ſo called from Zeno Eleates, but founded by

Xenophanes Colophonius, continued by
Parmenides,
Meliſſus,
Zeno Eleates.
Claſſed with them, the *Atomiſts*,
Leucippus,
Democritus Abderites,
Protagoras.
Ranged under them,
The Acataleptic, the Pyrrhonian, or Sceptical ſects; and, conjoined with them, the ſchool and ſect of *Epicurus*.
Intervention of the ſmaller ſchools that aroſe upon Socrates's death; the *Eliac*, *Eretriac*, and *Megaric*.
The two more durable ſects of the ſame origin,
The Cyrenaics and Cynics.

Of the Firſt,
Ariſtippus, the founder, ſucceeded by
Arete, his daughter,
Ariſtippus, called Metrodidactus, his ſon, and followed by
Theodorus *Atheus*,
Hegeſias,
Anniceris.
Theſe are placed under the head of the *Italic* School.

Of the Second,
Antiſthenes, the founder, ſucceeded by
Diogenes Sinopenſis,
Monimus Syracuſanus,
Demetrius Cynicus,
Hipparchia,
Crates Thebanus, &c.
Theſe placed under the head of the *Ionic*, or *Athenian* School.

The

The School of ATHENS, inſtituted by Anaxagoras, or Archelaus, held by

Socrates; continued by
Plato, under the name of the *Academy*; afterwards divided into the *Old*, the *Middle*, and the *New*.

Old Academy, ſupported by
Speuſippus,
Xenocrates Chalcedonius,
Ptolemo Athenienſis,
Crates Athen.
Crantor Solenſis.

Middle Academy, founded by
Arceſilaus, continued by
Lacydes Cyrenaeus,
Telecles Phocenſis,
Evander,
Hegeſinnus Pergamenus.

New Academy, founded, if not by Lacydes, by
Carneades Cyrenaeus, continued by
Clitomachus Carthaginienſis.

Beſide the triple diviſion of the *Academy*, above ſtated, there ſprung from it, and from other Schools of Philoſophy in Athens, the three moſt numerous and celebrated of all the Sects; that of the *Peripatetic*, *Stoic*, and *Epicurean*; each of them diſtinguiſhed by a particular name, the *Lyceum*, the *Porch*, and the *Gardens*.

Succeſſions in theſe Schools.

The *Lyceum*, or Peripatetic.
Ariſtotle the founder. His ſucceſſors,
Theophraſtus Eteſius,
Strato Lampſacenus,
Demetrius Phaleraeus,
Critolaus Phaſelites, &c.

The *Porch*, or Stoic,
Zeno Citticus the founder. His ſucceſſors,
Cleanthes Aſſius,
Chryſippus,
Diogenes Babylonius,
Antipater,
Poſidonius,
Panaetius, &c.

The *Gardens*, or Epicurean School.
Epicurus the founder. His ſucceſſors,
Mus, ſervus ejus,
Zeno Epicureus,
Hermachus,
Lucretius, &c.

THE END.